BCI Finances Pty Ltd (in liq) v Binetter

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BCI Finances Pty Limited (in liq) v Binetter [2018] FCAFC 189

Appeal from:

BCI Finances Pty Limited (in liq) v Binetter (No 4) [2016] FCA 1351

BCI Finances Pty Limited (in liq) v Binetter (No 5) [2017] FCA 1524

File numbers: NSD 2109 of 2016
NSD 188 of 2018
Judges: ALLSOP CJ, MOSHINSKY AND COLVIN JJ
Date of judgment: 9 November 2018
Catchwords:

CORPORATIONS – directors’ duties – where certain directors involved companies in a scheme for the dishonest evasion of taxation – where, as a result of the scheme, the companies were assessed to taxation, penalties and interest – where the companies went into liquidation and were unable to pay their taxation liabilities – where the primary judge found that certain directors had breached their fiduciary duties to the companies – where the companies had entered into transactions with Israeli banks whereby the banks advanced money secured by offshore deposits – where the existence of the offshore deposits was concealed from the Australian Taxation Office – whether the primary judge erred in finding that the transactions between the companies and the Israeli banks were not loans – whether the primary judge erred in failing to hold that there was no breach of duty because the advances from the Israeli banks were interest-bearing loans – whether the primary judge erred in finding that one of the directors was not liable for breach of the duties he owed to the companies

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – costs – deceased person – where a person was appointed to represent the deceased person’s estate for the purpose of a proceeding pursuant to r 9.24 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 – where claims were brought against both the estate and the representative in his own right – where claims against the estate succeeded and claims against the representative in his own right failed – whether costs orders against the estate should be payable by the representative personally or limited to the assets of the estate – whether set-off of costs orders appropriate

Legislation:

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), ss 181, 436A, 439C

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 128

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 43

Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth), ss 51, 264, 264A

Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth), s 8-1

Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth), Pt IVC

Federal Court Rules 2011, rr 9.05, 9.24

Cases cited:

Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Moszko Mejer Dzienciol by his guardian ad litem Phillip Dzienciol [2001] WASC 305(S)

Australian Growth Resources Corporation Pty Ltd v Van Reesema (1988) 13 ACLR 261

Breen v Williams (1996) 186 CLR 71

Commissioner of Taxation v Radilo Enterprises Pty Ltd (1997) 72 FCR 300

Cuthbertson & Richards Sawmills Pty Ltd v Thomas (No 2) [1999] FCA 1789

Equiticorp Finance Ltd (in liq) v Bank of New Zealand (1993) 32 NSWLR 50

Foots v Southern Cross Mine Management Pty Ltd (2007) 234 CLR 52

Hallstroms Pty Ltd v Commissioner of…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCAFC 189
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of BCI Finances Pty Ltd (in liq) v Binetter involved a dispute concerning directors' duties and tax evasion. The liquidators of BCI Finances Pty Ltd and EGL Finances Pty Ltd (collectively, the "finance companies") initiated proceedings against various defendants, including Gary Binetter, who was a director of both companies, and others, alleging breaches of directors' duties and seeking damages and other relief. The primary judge found that certain directors, including Gary, had breached their fiduciary duties to the companies by involving them in a scheme for the dishonest evasion of taxation. The companies had entered into transactions with Israeli banks, whereby the banks advanced money secured by offshore deposits, the existence of which was concealed from the Australian Taxation Office. The companies subsequently went into liquidation and were unable to pay their taxation liabilities. Gary appealed the primary judge's findings, arguing that the transactions with the Israeli banks were interest-bearing loans and that he had not breached his duties as a director.

The court was required to decide whether the primary judge erred in finding that the transactions between the companies and the Israeli banks were not loans and whether the primary judge erred in failing to hold that there was no breach of duty because the advances from the Israeli banks were interest-bearing loans. The court also had to determine whether the primary judge erred in finding that one of the directors was not liable for breach of the duties he owed to the companies.

The court found that the primary judge did not err in finding that the transactions between the companies and the Israeli banks were not loans. The court held that the transactions did not have the characteristics of a loan, as there was no intention to repay the amounts advanced by the Israeli banks, and the arrangements were part of a scheme to evade taxation. The court further found that Gary had breached his duties as a director by continuing to involve BCI in the scheme for the period in which he was a director. The court held that Gary's knowledge of the true nature of the transactions and his involvement in the process by which BCI "repaid" Emil's family's half of the BCI-Bank Hapoalim transaction was evidence of his participation in the scheme. The court also found that the primary judge did not err in failing to hold that there was no breach of duty because the advances from the Israeli banks were interest-bearing loans.

The appeal was allowed, and the costs orders made by the primary judge were varied. The respondents were ordered to pay the finance companies' costs on the ordinary basis, with certain liabilities limited to the assets of the estates of the late Emil and Erwin Binetter. The finance companies were ordered to pay the costs of one of the respondents. The respondents were also ordered to pay the appellant's costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. Subject to paragraph 4 below, paragraphs 5, 6 and 10 of the costs orders made by the primary judge on 15 December 2017 be set aside and in lieu thereof it be ordered that:

5. Each of the first, second, fourth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth and tenth respondents pay the first applicant’s costs on the ordinary basis, as agreed or taxed, with such liability to be joint and several, and with the liability of the first respondent limited to the assets of the estate of the late Emil Binetter.

6. Each of the first, second, fourth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth and tenth respondents pay the second applicant’s costs on the ordinary basis, as agreed or taxed, with such liability to be joint and several, and with the liability of the first respondent limited to the assets of the estate of the late Emil Binetter.

10. The first and second applicants pay the costs of the fifth respondent on the ordinary basis, as agreed or taxed.

3. Subject to paragraph 4 below, the respondents pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal, as agreed or taxed.

4. There be liberty to apply within seven days if any party wishes to raise a matter regarding the form of these orders.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The balance of these reasons will be structured as follows. First, we will set out a statement of the facts. Secondly, we will provide a summary of the reasons of the primary judge. Thirdly, we will consider each of the issues raised by the appeals.STATEMENT OF THE FACTS The following statement of the facts is substantially based on the Liability Judgment. In addition, we have drawn on the chronology contained in the Appeal Book and some of the documents in the Appeal Book to which we were taken during the hearing of the appeals. It is necessary to set out the facts in some detail for the purposes of considering the issues raised by the appeals. Among other things, the detailed factual narration is relevant to the question whether the advances by the Israeli banks were loans. It also provides context in which to evaluate the contentions that Gary breached his duties as a director of BCI and EGL and that the primary judge erred in not so concluding. All references to dollars ($) are to Australian dollars unless otherwise indicated.Key individuals Emil and Gerda are the parents of Gary. Emil died on 17 December 2014. Erwin and Margaret are the parents of Andrew, Michael and Ronald. Erwin died on 25 August 2009. Erwin and Emil conducted a shoe manufacturing business at Marrickville, Sydney until around 1990. At some time, they commenced investing in property and property development. By the time of BCI’s incorporation in 1992, the brothers had amassed a portfolio of property investments which they valued in the several millions of dollars. Erwin and Emil engaged in numerous joint business ventures. In about 1997, Emil and Erwin decided to separate their business dealings. However, Emil and Gary continued to be directors of EGL until September 2001 and Erwin and Emil were directors of BCI until Erwin’s death and Emil’s retirement. By April 2004, Erwin had been diagnosed with dementia. However, the primary judge did not find that he lacked mental capacity to make decisions affecting the finance companies at any point in time prior to his death. Between 1986 and 2007, Gary was employed as a flight steward with Qantas Airways. Australian Securities and Investments Commission searches showed that he had an address in Double Bay, Sydney, while he was a director of BCI and EGL. In more recent times, Gary has lived in Israel. Michael is or was a solicitor, specialising in commercial tax law. Ronald is an ophthalmic surgeon.The corporate entitiesBCI BCI was incorporated on 1 May 1992. The primary judge inferred that Erwin and Emil caused the incorporation of BCI. The company’s registered office was in Rose Bay, New South Wales (at the home address of Erwin and Margaret) from 17 October 1996. BCI’s principal place of business was at that address from 30 June 1994. At all material times, BCI carried on business as a financier, on-lending funds it obtained to other entities which used the funds for business purposes. At all relevant times, the shareholders of BCI were Erwin and Emil.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

After a further hearing, on 15 December 2017 the primary judge delivered further reasons for judgment: BCI Finances Pty Limited (in liq) v Binetter (No 5) [2017] FCA 1524 (the Quantum Judgment). In addition to issues concerning the quantum of damages, these reasons dealt with costs. One of the issues concerned the appropriate costs orders in relation to the unsuccessful defence of Emil’s estate and Erwin’s estate (the first and second respondents below). On behalf of Margaret, it was argued that the costs order against her (in her capacity as legal personal representative of the late Erwin Binetter) should be limited to the assets of the estate, and there should be no set-off of the liabilities for costs as between BCI and Margaret. The primary judge rejected these arguments. Her Honour also rejected comparable arguments that were advanced by Gary in relation to Emil’s estate. On 16 April 2018, the primary judge published further reasons for judgment, dealing with certain outstanding issues: BCI Finances Pty Limited (in liq) v Binetter (No 6) [2018] FCA 500. Four appeals were instituted against the judgments and orders of the primary judge:(a)An appeal brought by BCI and EGL against the dismissal of their claims against Gary and Margaret (proceeding No NSD2109/2016) (the Liquidators’ appeal).(b)An appeal brought by Gary against the costs orders made by the primary judge (proceeding No NSD188/2018) (Gary’s costs appeal).(c)An appeal brought by Michael against the findings of liability against him (proceeding No NSD189/2018) (Michael’s appeal).(d)An appeal brought by Margaret (in her capacity as the legal personal representative of the late Erwin Binetter), Margaret in her own right, Andrew, Erma and Ligon 158 (proceeding No NSD195/2018). This appeal was structured in two parts, referred to as Section A and Section B:(i)Section A involved an appeal by Margaret (in her capacity as the legal personal representative of the late Erwin Binetter), Andrew, Erma and Ligon 158 (the Andrew parties) against the findings of liability against them (the Andrew parties’ appeal).(ii)Section B involved an appeal by Margaret against the costs orders made by the primary judge (Margaret’s costs appeal). While judgment was reserved, settlement was reached in respect of the following appeals or parts of the following appeals:(a)The part of the Liquidators’ appeal concerning Margaret.(b)The whole of Michael’s appeal.(c)The whole of the Andrew parties’ appeal.(d)The whole of Margaret’s costs appeal. The appeals that remain on foot are therefore as follows:(a)The Liquidators’ appeal insofar as it relates to Gary.(b)Gary’s costs appeal. In the Liquidators’ appeal, the finance companies’ grounds of appeal are set out in a supplementary notice of appeal. Grounds 1-4 relate to Gary, while grounds 5 and 6 relate to Margaret. In light of the settlement, only grounds 1-4 remain relevant. Further, in the Liquidators’ appeal, Gary relies on an amended notice of contention. This contains a single ground, namely that the primary judge erred in finding that the transactions between BCI and EGL and the Israeli banks were not loans and in failing to hold that there was no breach of Gary’s duties to BCI and EGL because the advances from the Israeli banks were interest-bearing loans. In support of this contention, Gary relies on the submissions made by the Andrew parties, both in writing and at the hearing of the appeals. Accordingly, in order to deal with this contention it will be necessary to consider the submissions made on this issue by the Andrew parties. It is logical to consider this contention before considering the finance companies’ grounds of appeal.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

BCI further submits that the primary judge erred in the following respects:(a)The primary judge treated the Civic dealings with IDB in 2004 as “Emil Binetter’s dealings”, and held that, although Gary was aware that these involved back-to-back arrangements, Gary could only be found to have known about BCI’s back-to-back arrangements by June 2012 (Liability Judgment, [971]). This was an error. Gary’s lies under oath, including in 2011, suggest that he knew the truth before June 2012. The Civic-IDB 2004 dealings were not just “Emil Binetter’s”, as the primary judge found. Gary was a director of Civic, and signed key documentation that showed the true nature of the arrangements. The funds obtained by Civic (and Advance, of which Gary was also a director) were used for BCI to “repay” Bank Hapoalim. Gary was a director of BCI, and Emil was 77 years old at the time. The appropriate finding was that Gary had full knowledge not only of the Civic (and Advance) part of this transaction, but of the BCI part. Once that finding is made, there is no reason to think that Gary’s knowledge of the true nature of BCI’s dealings with Bank Hapoalim did not extend back to the time when he became a director of BCI.(b)The primary judge held that there was no evidence that Gary took any steps, as a director of BCI, to give effect to the scheme involving BCI or that he took any particular role in the management of BCI (Liability Judgment, [969]). The primary judge found that “even if Gary Binetter agreed to participate in the scheme, there is no evidence that he did participate in the scheme by doing any particular thing or receiving any particular benefit” (Liability Judgment, [971]). This approach should not be accepted for the following reasons.(c)First, the primary judge held elsewhere that Gary owned “part of the offshore funds from which the offshore deposits were sourced at various times” (Liability Judgment, [231]). That being so, Gary plainly stood to benefit from the scheme.(d)Secondly, the primary judge did not give sufficient weight to Gary’s failure to give evidence considering the material that was available against him: cf Liability Judgment, [973]. The evidence summarised above provided a firm basis to find that Gary knew all relevant facts regarding BCI’s affairs when he was a director. Only Gary knew the full truth (Emil having passed away). Any doubts about whether it should be inferred that Gary knew of the true state of BCI’s affairs while he was a director of BCI should have been resolved against Gary: see, eg, Transport Industries Insurance Co Ltd v Longmuir [1997] 1 VR 125 at 141-142; Hampton Court Ltd v Crooks (1957) 97 CLR 367 at 371-372; SS Pharmaceutical at 293.(e)Thirdly, once it is accepted that Gary knew the nature of BCI’s dealings with Bank Hapoalim, given his position as a director of BCI, the appropriate finding was that he agreed, as a director, that BCI should continue its participation in the scheme. That alone is sufficient to show that the primary judge’s dismissal of the case against Gary should be overturned. But if more were required, the fact that Gary was involved in the process by which BCI “repaid” Emil’s family’s half of the BCI-Bank Hapoalim transaction is, contrary to the Liability Judgment at [971], evidence of Gary participating in the scheme by doing a “particular thing”. The Court should hold that Gary breached his director’s duties to BCI by continuing to involve it in the scheme for the period in which he was a director of BCI.Consideration of BCI’s submissions