Howard v Commissioner of Taxation

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

FRENCH CJ,
HAYNE, CRENNAN, GAGELER AND KEANE JJ

STEPHEN JAMES HOWARD  APPELLANT

AND

THE COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA  RESPONDENT

Howard v Commissioner of Taxation

[2014] HCA 21

11 June 2014

M140/2013

ORDER

Appeal dismissed with costs.

On appeal from the Federal Court of Australia

Representation

A H Slater QC with D J McInerney for the appellant (instructed by Oakley Thompson & Co)

J T Gleeson SC, Solicitor-General of the Commonwealth with P R Bender (instructed by Maddocks)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

FRENCH CJ AND KEANE J.

Introduction

  1. In his income tax assessment for the 2005 income year the appellant did not include, as part of his assessable income, his share of an award of equitable compensation under a judgment in proceedings in the Supreme Court of Victoria between parties to a joint venture of which he had been a member.  The joint venture involved the proposed purchase, lease to a substantial tenant, and on-sale of the Kingston Links Golf Course.  The appellant claimed that the equitable compensation awarded to him was impressed with a constructive trust in favour of a company, Disctronics Ltd ("Disctronics"), by reason of his fiduciary office as one of its directors.  Two other directors, co-plaintiffs with the appellant, were parties to the joint venture in their personal capacities.  The directors had decided, during the development of the joint venture, that they should endeavour to have Disctronics purchase the golf course from the joint venture provided it could do so at an affordable price and, in that event, to rebate to the company any entitlement they might have as a result of their involvement in the joint venture.  The appellant also argued that he had assigned the fruits of the cause of action to Disctronics pursuant to an agreement made between the directors and the company when the litigation in the Supreme Court was pending ("the litigation agreement"). 

  2. The respondent, the Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia, did not accept the appellant's contentions and issued an amended assessment on 5 August 2009 on the basis that the appellant's award of damages was received by him beneficially and not as a fiduciary. He also imposed a penalty. The appellant succeeded in an appeal under s 14ZZ of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) to a judge of the Federal Court of Australia (Jessup J)[1], who held that the award of equitable compensation was not income in the appellant's hands.  A Full Court (Middleton, Perram and Dodds-Streeton JJ) of the Federal Court, however, allowed the Commissioner's appeal from the decision of the primary judge, save as to penalty[2].  The appellant has appealed to this Court pursuant to a grant of special leave made on 8 November 2013[3].

    [1]Howard v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (No 2) (2011) 86 ATR 753.

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Details
Case
[2014] HCA 21
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of *Howard v Commissioner of Taxation* concerned an appeal to the High Court of Australia regarding the assessability of equitable compensation received by the appellant. The appellant, a director and shareholder of Disctronics Ltd, had been awarded equitable compensation in Supreme Court proceedings against defaulting joint venturers for breaches of fiduciary duty. The Commissioner of Taxation included this compensation in the appellant's assessable income, which the appellant disputed, arguing he held the compensation on a constructive trust for Disctronics Ltd.

The High Court was required to determine whether the equitable compensation awarded to the appellant was properly included in his assessable income. This involved considering whether the appellant held the compensation as a constructive trustee for Disctronics Ltd, and alternatively, whether a litigation agreement between the appellant and Disctronics Ltd operated as an assignment of the compensation or the proceeds of the action.

The Court reasoned that the appellant had not demonstrated any error in the Full Court's decision. It was noted that Disctronics Ltd was a party in its own right to the Supreme Court proceedings, and the terms of the litigation agreement, which stipulated that Disctronics would bear the relevant legal costs, meant the appellant had not incurred any personal liability in relation to those costs. Consequently, there was no basis to conclude that the appellant held the compensation on a constructive trust for Disctronics Ltd or that the litigation agreement effected a valid assignment of the compensation to Disctronics.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

That question requires careful attention to how and why it is said that the director obtained a benefit by reason or by use of the relationship. And as Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver[77] demonstrates, if the opportunity came to the director in the course or as a result of holding office as a director, it is not to the point to establish that the company could not or would not have exploited the opportunity. In Regal (Hastings), the directors of the company were held bound to account to the company for their profit despite the company's inability to raise the capital necessary to undertake the venture from which the directors made their profit.[77][1967] 2 AC 134n. See also Warman International Ltd v Dwyer (1995) 182 CLR 544 at 558 per Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ; [1995] HCA 18.The facts It is necessary to state, in summary form, the central facts relevant to the appellant's arguments. It is convenient to do so by reference to the findings made in the Supreme Court proceedings. Those findings were not challenged by the appellant in his proceedings against the Commissioner. In the Supreme Court proceedings, the appellant and other plaintiffs (including Disctronics) alleged that, in early 1999, Messrs Donovan and Bucknall conceived an investment idea involving buying an underperforming public golf course, leasing it to a financially sound operator and using the rental stream not only to fund the acquisition but also to generate a return on investment. By a series of intermediate steps and discussions, the details of which need not be traced, the appellant, Mr Quinert and the defaulting venturers were informed of, and expressed interest in pursuing, the idea. (The appellant and Messrs Donovan and Quinert were all associated with a firm of Melbourne solicitors.) During the discussions, there was talk about Disctronics participating in the exploitation of the idea. Disctronics was a company used by the appellant and Messrs Donovan and Quinert as an investment vehicle and each was a shareholder and director of the company. During these discussions, it was proposed that Disctronics would provide up to $1.5 million equity in the project. In the Supreme Court proceedings, the trial judge (Warren J) found[78] that on 20 July 1999 "the parties resolved to embark on a joint venture involving Donovan, [the appellant], Quinert, Bucknall [and the defaulting venturers] in quite loose terms so as to acquire" the golf course. Her Honour found[79] that "[t]he joint venture did not encompass Disctronics as a member" (emphasis added).[78][2002] VSC 454 at [43].[79][2002] VSC 454 at [43]. The minutes of the meeting at which Warren J found the joint venture to be constituted recorded that the parties intended that the golf course, once bought and let to a tenant, would be sold and the resulting profit divided between the six venturers. This profit became known in the proceedings as a "day‑one profit" divisible between the venturers. Warren J found[80] that, at or soon after the making of the joint venture agreement, the venturers agreed upon the identity of the proposed tenant of the golf course and the proposed tenant agreed upon the terms on which it would take a lease (including the amount of rent it would pay). Her Honour found[81] that the venturers knew that the owner of the golf course was willing to sell the land for a price which the venturers were willing to pay. Her Honour further found[82] that the venturers had agreed that it would be necessary to raise both debt and equity finance but had not agreed upon who would provide the equity.[80][2002] VSC 454 at [43], [45]‑[46].[81][2002] VSC 454 at [47].[82][2002] VSC 454 at [46].

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

FRENCH CJ HAYNE AND CRENNAN JJ GAGELER J
The appellant's submissions should not be accepted. He did not point to any error in what the Full Court had held nor suggest that it had failed to address submissions of the kind which he now puts to this Court. Given that Disctronics was a party in its own right, and given the terms of the litigation agreement, under which, in any event, Disctronics was to bear the relevant legal costs, there is no basis upon which this Court could conclude that the appellant had incurred any liability in relation to them.Conclusion For the preceding reasons, the appeal should be dismissed with costs. In the Supreme Court of Victoria, the appellant taxpayer (and others) sued, and obtained judgment[59], for equitable compensation from Christopher Edmonds and Peter Cahill for breaches of fiduciary duties. Messrs Edmonds and Cahill ("the defaulting venturers") were found to have breached fiduciary duties they owed the appellant and three others (Kevin Donovan, Michael Quinert and Richard Bucknall) in connection with a joint venture the six had agreed to undertake. The plaintiffs alleged that the defaulting venturers had diverted to their own use a business opportunity being pursued by the joint venture.[59]Disctronics Ltd v Edmonds [2002] VSC 454; Disctronics Ltd v Edmonds (No 2) [2002] VSC 534; Edmonds v Donovan (2005) 12 VR 513. Disctronics Ltd, a company of which the appellant and Messrs Donovan and Quinert were directors and shareholders, was a plaintiff in the Supreme Court proceedings. Its claim that the defaulting venturers owed it fiduciary duties was rejected. The Commissioner of Taxation assessed the appellant to income tax on the basis that the amount the appellant received in satisfaction of the judgment was part of his assessable income for the relevant year (2005). The appellant alleged that he received the amount as trustee for Disctronics and that it was, therefore, incorrectly included[60] in his assessable income.[60]Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth), ss 6(1), definition of "trustee", 96 and 97. The appellant appeals to this Court against orders of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia (Middleton, Perram and Dodds‑Streeton JJ) allowing[61], in part, the Commissioner's appeal against orders of a single judge of the Federal Court (Jessup J). The Full Court held, contrary to the decision[62] of the trial judge, that the sum received by the appellant in satisfaction of the judgment of the Supreme Court of Victoria was correctly included in his assessable income. The appeal to this Court should be dismissed.[61]Howard v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2012) 206 FCR 329.[62] Howard v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (No 2) (2011) 86 ATR 753. The appellant's argument in support of the appeal had two principal strands. First, he submitted that the award of compensation made in his favour was a gain to him arising from a project in which Disctronics sought to invest and that he could not, consistently with his fiduciary duties to the company, retain that gain for himself to the exclusion of the company. Accordingly, so the argument continued, what the appellant received came to him as constructive trustee for Disctronics. Second, he submitted that an assignment agreement ("the litigation agreement") he had made with Disctronics and two of the other plaintiffs at about the time that the Supreme Court proceedings were instituted "operated as confirmation of the constructive trust arising from the directors' duties". Alternatively, he submitted that the agreement effected an assignment of the appellant's right to receive the amount of equitable compensation rather than the proceeds of that action.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: FRENCH CJ, HAYNE AND CRENNAN JJ, GAGELER J