HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Barwick C.J. Stephen, Mason, Murphy and Wilson JJ.
FEDERAL COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION v. EVERETT
27 February 1980
Income Tax (Cth)
Income Tax (Cth)—Assessable income—Partnership—Assignment for value of share in partnership—Share of income paid to assignee—Whether assessable income of assignor—Whether assignment at law or in equity—Effect—Assignee's right to receive portion of profits—Constructive trust—Income of trust estate—Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth), ss. 92, 95—Conveyancing Act, 1919 (N.S.W.), s. 12—Partnership Act, 1892 (N.S.W.), s. 31.
Decisions
1980, February 27.
The following written judgments were delivered:-
BARWICK C.J., STEPHEN, MASON AND WILSON JJ. By majority the Full Court of the Federal Court (Bowen C.J. and Franki J., Deane J. dissenting) held that the respondent, a partner in Dibbs, Crowther &Osborne, a Sydney firm of solicitors, who had assigned to his wife six-thirteenths of his share in the partnership, was not assessable to income tax on so much of the income as was attributable to the share of his interest in the partnership which he had so assigned. (at p444)
2. On 1st July 1966 the respondent became a partner in Dibbs, Crowther &Osborne by purchasing a 13 per cent interest in the partnership business and the assets, undertaking, goodwill and income thereof from one of the existing partners, who continued as a partner in the reconstituted partnership. By reason of the admission of the respondent as a partner, the partnership consisted of four partners who thereafter carried on business under the same firm name. The respondent had formerly been an employee of the partnership. On 1st July 1966 he ceased to draw a salary and subsequently received no remuneration for his professional work apart from his contractual entitlement to share in the partnership profits. No formal partnership agreement was executed by the partners on the respondent's entry into the firm. However, a document described as "Heads of Agreement" was initialled by the four partners and it regulated their relationship. It is not material to refer to the terms of the document, except to mention that it recorded that the respondent had a 13 per cent interest "in the capital and income of the Firm". By a deed dated 7th January 1969, the respondent (in the deed referred to as "the Vendor") for a consideration of $3,832.50 conveyed and assigned to his wife (in the deed referred to as "the Purchaser") -
"6/13ths of the Vendor's share in the partnership as aforesaid together with all those rights including the right to receive an appropriate share of the profits of the partner to which an assignee of a share in a partnership is entitled by virtue of Section 31 of the Partnership Act 1892 as from the date of these presents to hold the same unto the Purchaser absolutely PROVIDED HOWEVER that nothing herein contained shall entitle the Purchaser to any share of the prospective profits accumulated in the books of the partnership and held subject only to distribution thereof (as reflected in the figures of…
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- Case
- [1980] HCA 6
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court was required to determine whether the Commissioner had erred in assessing Mr. Everett on income derived from a trust, despite the fact that the trust deed stipulated that income not distributed to beneficiaries was to be accumulated and added to the capital of the trust. The core legal issue was the proper interpretation of section 97 of the *Income Tax Assessment Act 1936* (Cth) and its application to discretionary trusts where income could be accumulated.
The Court, by majority, held that the Commissioner was correct in assessing Mr. Everett on the income. The majority reasoned that section 97 of the *Income Tax Assessment Act 1936* (Cth) imposed a tax liability on a beneficiary in respect of the net income of a trust estate to the extent that the beneficiary was entitled to that income, whether directly or indirectly. The Court found that even though the trust deed provided for accumulation, Mr. Everett, as a beneficiary, was still considered to be "entitled" to the income in terms of the Act, as it was available for distribution to him at the discretion of the trustees. The principle established was that the entitlement referred to in section 97 is not merely a present right to receive payment, but a broader entitlement to the income of the trust estate.
The appeal was allowed, and the assessment made by the Commissioner was upheld.
Background
Background to the litigation
On 7th January 1969, the respondent executed a deed assigning six-thirteenths of his share in the partnership, along with the right to receive an appropriate share of the profits, to his wife for a consideration of $3,832.50. The deed specified that the wife would not become a member of the partnership, nor would she be entitled to interfere in its business or affairs, require any account, or inspect the books of the partnership. Instead, her sole entitlement was to receive the portion of the share of profits and other moneys to which the respondent would otherwise have been entitled had the assignment not been made.
Following the execution of the deed, the respondent's partners accepted the assignment, and income arising from the assigned interest was paid to the wife's banking account as per her instructions. The respondent's interest in the partnership later increased from 13 per cent to 22 per cent, but the assigned interest remained unchanged.
For the income year ending 30th June 1973, the respondent's share in the net income of the partnership was $35,418, of which $11,185 was paid to or applied in accordance with the instructions of his wife. The respondent excluded this amount from his assessable income in his taxation return, but the Commissioner assessed him to tax on the basis that it should be included. The respondent appealed to the Supreme Court of New South Wales, which upheld his appeal, and the decision was subsequently affirmed by the majority judgment of the Full Court of the Federal Court. The Commissioner then appealed to the High Court.
The matter came before the High Court of Australia as an appeal against a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia. The Full Court had previously affirmed a decision of Meares J. of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in its Administrative Law Division, which had allowed an appeal by the respondent against an assessment by the Federal Commissioner of Taxation. The primary issue in the appeal was whether income paid to the respondent's wife, to whom he had assigned a portion of his share in a partnership, was assessable income in the hands of the respondent. The High Court heard the appeal on 27 February 1980, and delivered its judgment the same day, dismissing the appeal with costs. The Court found that the assignment of a partner's interest in a partnership, which carried with it the right to a proportionate share of future income attributable to that interest, was effective at once and conferred on the assignee an immediate equitable entitlement to such income. The Court held that the income payable to the respondent's wife was "the net income of a trust estate" within the meaning of s. 95 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936, and therefore not assessable income in the hands of the respondent.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Was the assignment of the partnership share effective in transferring the assignor's right to a share of the partnership's future income to the assignee?
2. Did the assignment create a trust for the assignee's benefit, and if so, what was the nature and effect of that trust?
3. Is the assignee's right to receive partnership profits "the net income of a trust estate" within the meaning of section 95 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936?
4. Can income from personal exertion be assigned in such a way that it is not assessable in the hands of the assignor?
5. Did the assignment constitute an attempt to split income for tax avoidance purposes, contrary to the legislative policy of graduated tax rates?
Held
1. The assignment of the partnership share was effective in transferring the assignor's right to a share of the partnership's future income to the assignee. The assignment became effective at once and conferred on the assignee an immediate equitable entitlement as against the assignor and the other partners to such income referable to the share assigned.
2. The assignment created a trust for the assignee's benefit, whereby the assignor continued to stand in the relationship of a trustee to the assignee, despite the assignee being entitled to receive payments from partnership profits directly from the partnership.
3. The assignee's right to receive partnership profits is considered "the net income of a trust estate" within the meaning of section 95 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936, as the interest in the partnership in virtue of which the income arises is vested in the assignor as trustee.
4. Income from personal exertion can be assigned in such a way that it is not assessable in the hands of the assignor, provided that the income is derived from a proprietary right that carries a right to future income.
5. The assignment did not constitute an attempt to split income for tax avoidance purposes, contrary to the legislative policy of graduated tax rates. However, the Court found that the assignment was an attempt to divest income from personal exertion before it was derived, and that the Income Tax Assessment Act should not be construed to impute an intention to Parliament to have its main purpose defeated by an income-splitting device.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The majority of the Court in Federal Commissioner of Taxation v. Everett held that the assignment of a partner's share in a partnership was effective in transferring the assignor's right to a share of the partnership's future income to the assignee. This assignment created a trust for the assignee's benefit, with the assignor continuing to hold the partnership share as a trustee for the assignee. The Court found that the assignee's right to receive partnership profits constituted "the net income of a trust estate" within the meaning of section 95 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936. The Court distinguished between assigning present property, which has immediate effect, and assigning future income dissociated from the property, which takes effect when the income is received.
The majority rejected the argument that income from personal exertion cannot be assigned to avoid taxation. The Court held that the respondent's income from the partnership was not derived from personal exertion but rather from his ownership of a share in the partnership. Therefore, assigning his share to his wife did not change the character of the income as assessable in his hands.
The majority also held that the assignment did not constitute an attempt to split income for tax avoidance purposes, contrary to the legislative policy of graduated tax rates. The Court found that the Income Tax Assessment Act should not be construed to impute an intention to Parliament to allow its main purpose to be defeated by such a device. The appeal was dismissed with costs.
The ratio decidendi of this case is that the assignment of a partner's share in a partnership is effective in transferring the assignor's right to a share of the partnership's future income to the assignee, creating a trust for the assignee's benefit. This right to future income constitutes "the net income of a trust estate" within the meaning of section 95 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936. The Court distinguished prior authority by holding that income from personal exertion can be assigned in such a way that it is not assessable in the hands of the assignor, provided that the income is derived from ownership of a share in the partnership and not solely from personal exertion.