Michael McPhee and Inspector General in Bankruptcy

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[2012] AATA 628  

Division GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION

File Number(s)

2011/0997 & 2011/2961

Re

Michael McPhee

APPLICANT

And

Inspector General in Bankruptcy

RESPONDENT

DECISION

Tribunal

Mr S Penglis, Senior Member

Date 18 September 2012
Place

Perth

Decision Summary

The respondent’s applications pursuant to Section 42B of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act (1975) (Cth), are hereby dismissed.

...(sgd) S Penglis...............

Mr S Penglis, Senior Member

Catchwords

Practice and Procedure –power of Tribunal to dismiss application for review where it seeks to agitate the same legal issue as agitated in prior proceedings before the Tribunal and between the same parties

Effect of the decision of the Full Federal Court of Australia in LVR (WA) Pty Ltd v Administrative Appeals Tribunal [2012]FCAFC90

Legislation

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975, Section 42B

Cases

Commissioner of Taxation v Everett [1980] 143 CLR 440

LVR (WA) Pty Ltd v Administrative Appeals Tribunal[ 2012] FCAFC90

McPhee and Inspector-General of Bankruptcy [2011] AATA 322

Theo and Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services [2005] AATA 699

REASONS FOR DECISION

Mr S Penglis, Senior Member

18 September 2012

BACKGROUND

  1. The applicant is a legal practitioner who carried on legal practice in partnership with others until April 1988 when the last of his partners, Mr Barter, retired from practice as a consequence of ill health.

  2. Thereafter, the applicant continued to practice law as a sole practitioner.

  3. By a Deed of Assignment dated 26 June 1980, the practitioner assigned to his wife, Johanne Mary McPhee, 50% of his interest in the partnership “McPhee and Myer”.   Such an arrangement is known as an “Everett” assignment: in Commissioner of Taxation v Everett [1980] 143 CLR 440 the High Court of Australia held that a partner’s interest in a partnership was a presently existing chose in action which could thus be assigned.

  4. The applicant was declared bankrupt on 30 April 2008.

  5. On 22 June 2009, the applicant’s Trustee in Bankruptcy (“Trustee”) assessed the applicant with an income contribution liability of $32, 277.40 for the contribution assessment period from 30 April 2008 to 29 April 2009. The contribution was calculated on a gross income of $175,000 from the applicant’s legal practice as a sole practitioner.

  6. The applicant contended that his income contribution for that period should be calculated on a gross income of $87,500 by asserting that 50% of his income was his wife’s by reason of the operation of the Deed of Assignment.

  7. The matter ultimately came before this Tribunal constituted by Mr A Sweidan, Senior Member. The Tribunal dismissed each of the applicant’s contentions: McPhee and Inspector-General in Bankruptcy [2011] AATA 322 (“Decision”).

  8. The applicant was subsequently assessed by his Trustee for contributions in respect of the period from 30 April 2009 to 29 April 2010 ($28,095.34) and for the period from 30 April 2010 to 29 April 2011 ($62,190.91).

  9. At the request of the applicant, the respondent reviewed the Trustee’s assessments and, applying the Decision, affirmed them (being the reviewable decisions the subject of these applications to the Tribunal).

  10. The…

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Details
Case
[2012] AATA 628
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Michael McPhee filed an application for review before the Inspector General in Bankruptcy, seeking to challenge a decision related to a bankruptcy matter. The dispute centred on the validity and applicability of a Deed of Assignment concerning the applicant's partnership and subsequent sole practice. The case was heard and determined in the Federal Court of Australia. The primary legal issue before the court was whether the Deed of Assignment remained in effect after the dissolution of the partnership between McPhee and Mr. Barter, and if it applied to income earned by McPhee as a sole practitioner post-dissolution. Another key issue was whether the Tribunal had the authority to dismiss McPhee's application as vexatious or frivolous under section 42B of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act.

The court examined the principles governing the Tribunal's power to dismiss an application under section 42B. It noted that while the Tribunal could dismiss an application if it was frivolous or vexatious, this power should be exercised judicially and with caution, considering the purpose of the discretion and relevant factors. The court highlighted that the Tribunal must consider the utility of the application and the practical outcome of the decision being reviewed. Furthermore, the court considered whether McPhee's application sought to relitigate the same legal issues that had already been decided in prior proceedings between the same parties. The court referenced the Full Federal Court decision in LVR (WA) Pty Ltd v Administrative Appeals Tribunal, which emphasised that the Tribunal should not allow an application that seeks to re-open the same issues decided in previous proceedings, especially if it would have no practical effect.

In its decision, the Tribunal concluded that the Deed of Assignment did not continue to apply after the dissolution of the partnership and was effectively abandoned. The Tribunal found that even if the Deed had continued to apply, it would have ceased upon the dissolution of the partnership. Given these findings, the Tribunal determined that McPhee's application was an attempt to relitigate issues already decided and would have no practical effect. Accordingly, the Tribunal exercised its discretion under section 42B to dismiss the application as vexatious. The court upheld the Tribunal's decision, affirming that the Tribunal was correct in dismissing the application as it sought to re-litigate issues already determined and would not result in any practical outcome.

The final orders of the court were to affirm the Tribunal's decision to dismiss the application as vexatious, with no orders for costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

The relevant principles to be applied by the Tribunal on an application under Section 42B of the AAT Act are conveniently set out in Theo and Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services [2005] AATA 699 (at [38]) as follows:A.The jurisprudence on summary or peremptory dismissal of proceedings that applies in the courts is applicable to the Tribunal: Re Williams and Australian Electoral Commission (1995) 21 AAR 467 at 473-474.B.The power contained in section 42B (couched as a discretionary power) to dismiss an application on the basis it is either frivolous or vexatious is a power to be exercised judicially and not automatically if there is an alternative means of review (including judicial review) cf Duncan v Fayle [2004] FCA 723 at [26].C.The discretion contained in section 42B is a judicial discretion meaning that it is not to be exercised at large but having regard to the purpose for which the discretion exists. Relevant considerations must be taken into account and given appropriate weight having regard to the competing considerations and interests of the parties, the evidence adduced and the circumstances of the particular case. Irrelevant considerations must be excised: cf McKenna v McKenna [1984] VR 665 at 674 per McGarvie J.D.The power for peremptory dismissal of proceedings is to be exercised cautiously and sparingly; Re Williams and Australian Electoral Commission (1995) 21 AAR 467 at 473-474; Cooper v Comcare (2002) 118 FCR 175 at [20].E.Given proposition D, it is going too far to say that the peremptory dismissal power should never be exercised under section 42B : Zografakis and Telstra Corporation Ltd (AAT, No. 96/456, 4 September 1996) at [5] (particularly where an application cannot succeed or would give a result which is of no practical effect).F.The power to dismiss an application on the basis that it is vexatious or frivolous may be exercised if the application is otherwise devoid of utility: Re Williams and Australian Electoral Commission at [34]; Cerebros and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] AATA 213 at [32].G.The practical outcome of a decision that is being reviewed may also be considered in the context of section 42B: Cerebros and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] AATA 213 at [34].H.The policy underpinning a provision in the nature of section 42B is to promote the proper dispatch of the business of the Tribunal and to ensure that from a resource perspective, the personnel and time of the Tribunal are devoted to substantive cases: Zografakis and Telstra Corporation Ltd (AAT, No. 96/456, 4 September 1996) at [5].”THE DECISION In the Decision, the Tribunal held as follows: (1)on the evidence, the Deed of Assignment did not continue to apply to any partnership of which the applicant was a member after about June 1980;(2)on the evidence, the Deed of Assignment had been abandoned in about July 1992;(3)even if, contrary to the Tribunal’s conclusions in (a) and (b), the Deed of Assignment had not been abandoned and had applied to the partnership between the applicant and Mr Barter, the assignment came to an end on the dissolution of the partnership between the applicant and Mr Barter and thus did not apply to income thereafter earned by the applicant as a sole practitioner (“Legal Issue”).THE PARTIES’ SUBMISSIONS AT THE HEARING

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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