BCI Finances Pty Limited (in liq) v Binetter (No 4) [2016] FCA 1351
File number:
SAD 5 of 2015
Judge:
GLEESON J
Date of judgment:
18 November 2016
Catchwords:
CORPORATIONS – directors’ duties – scheme for purpose of evading or avoiding liability to pay income tax – companies did not benefit from participation in scheme – whether directors breached duties – whether breach of duties resulted in tax liabilities – whether other respondents knowingly participated in breaches of duty
Allco Funds Management Ltd (Receivers and Managers Appointed) (In Liquidation) v Trust Company (RE Services) Ltd (in its capacity as responsible entity and trustee of the Australian Wholesale Property Fund)[2014] NSWSC 1251
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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The case of BCI Finances Pty Ltd (in liq) v Binetter (No 4) involved a legal dispute concerning directors' duties in relation to a scheme allegedly designed to evade or avoid income tax liabilities. The liquidators of BCI Finances Pty Ltd brought proceedings against various respondents, including directors and other entities, seeking to hold them accountable for their participation in the scheme and any resulting tax liabilities. The primary issue before the court was whether the directors breached their duties by participating in the scheme and, if so, whether such breaches resulted in tax liabilities for the companies involved.
The court examined the evidence and arguments presented by both sides, focusing on the nature and purpose of the alleged scheme. The liquidators argued that the scheme involved documenting transactions in a manner that concealed the true nature of the offshore deposits and the income derived from them, thereby enabling the applicants to avoid tax liabilities. The court considered whether the directors' knowledge of the scheme could be inferred from their roles and whether other respondents knowingly participated in the breaches of duty.
In its reasoning, the court found that certain respondents had indeed participated in the scheme as alleged, with the primary purpose of allowing them to benefit from the offshore deposits without transferring the funds to Australia. The court held that the directors breached their duties by participating in the scheme and that their actions resulted in tax liabilities for the companies involved. The court also found that some respondents knowingly participated in the breaches of duty.
The court ordered the dismissal of the proceedings against two respondents and scheduled a hearing for submissions on orders to give effect to the reasons and the question of costs. This decision highlights the importance of directors' duties in relation to tax compliance and the potential consequences of breaching those duties, including personal liability for tax liabilities incurred by the companies they oversee.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The proceedings against the third and fifth respondents be dismissed.
2. The matter be listed for hearing of submissions on orders to give effect to these reasons, and on the question of costs, on a date to be fixed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
In Department of Health v Arumugam [1988] VR 319; (1988) 30 AILR 117 at 330, Fullagar J said:If all that is proved, by inference or otherwise, in the absence of explanation, is less than all the elements of proof required for the complaint to succeed, neither a total absence of explanation nor a non-acceptance of an explanation can by itself provide an element of proof required. It can enable already available inferences to be drawn against dishonest explainers with greater certainty, but that is all.Destruction or suppression of evidence If a litigant (or their agent) does anything which tends to suggest a lack of confidence in that litigant’s position in litigation, this is a matter that can be taken into account and lead to an inference that the facts essential for the litigant to maintain his position are lacking: Li v The Herald and Weekly Times Pty Ltd [2007] VSC 109; (2007) ATR 81-887 (“Li v Herald and Weekly Times”) at [305]–[306]. Examples of such conduct include “the destruction of, or failure to produce, important relevant documents, particularly incriminating ones, and the subornation of a witness or the fabrication of evidence” as well as recourse to lies: Li v Herald and Weekly Times at [306], [309]; Tobin v Ezekiel [2012] NSWCA 285; (2012) 83 NSWLR 757 at [60]–[62]. Statements by a litigant that he is unable to recollect an event or the details thereof may, in combination with other evidence, evidence a consciousness of liability: R v Cuenco [2007] VSCA 41; (2007) 16 VR 118 at [20]. The inference to be drawn depends on the consciousness that is demonstrated by the litigant’s conduct. Conduct, including bribery or destruction of evidence, may be such as to suggest a consciousness that the litigant’s case is generally weak. Conduct such as the failure to produce a specific document or witness may indicate a weakness of a specific part of the case: Li v Herald and Weekly Times at [307].Inferring knowledge from holding office as a director? On behalf of the liquidators, Mr Marshall SC made a submission that the directors’ knowledge of the offshore deposits could be inferred from the fact that they held the office of directors. It was not clear whether he sought to have a wider submission that knowledge of a director as to the company’s activities could be inferred from the fact of holding office as a director. I do not accept that there is a general proposition as to the inferences of knowledge that may be drawn from the fact that a person holds office as a director. In my view, this must depend upon the circumstances of the case and, in particular, any evidence about the director’s participation in the management of the company. I do not accept that the decision in Texxcon Pty Ltd v Austexx Corporation Pty Ltd [2011] VSC 203 supports a broader proposition. A director’s continuing obligation to keep informed about the activities of the corporation (Daniels v Anderson (1995) 37 NSWLR 438; (1995) 118 FLR 248 (“Daniels”) at 503) does not permit a general inference as to knowledge, not least because the relevant director may not have complied with that obligation. THE LIQUIDATORS’ CASEThe alleged scheme involving Israeli banks
Decision
Reasons for decision
I understood the liquidators’ case on the purposes of the scheme to be directed to the states of knowledge of the various participants in the scheme.Summary of conclusions about the alleged scheme On the evidence set out below, I find that Erwin and Emil Binetter agreed to participate in a scheme involving EGL and IDB and, subsequently, BCI and Bank Hapoalim, broadly to the effect of the alleged scheme, although it will be necessary to be precise about the elements of the scheme that are supported by the evidence. In particular, the scheme, as initially implemented, involved:(1)“back-to-back” arrangements by which funds, in the control of Erwin and Emil Binetter, deposited outside of Australia (“offshore deposits”) were used as security for advances of funds by the Israeli banks to the various applicants;(2)providing funds obtained pursuant to the “back-to-back” arrangements to various of the corporate respondents to assist in their business activities in Australia;(3)documenting the arrangements between the applicants and the Israeli banks so as to permit the applicants, if required, dishonestly to produce documents purportedly evidencing the arrangements but which did not disclose the offshore deposits;(4)lodging income tax returns on behalf of EGL and BCI which would declare no, or no significant, taxable income, because any income disclosed would be offset by substantially equivalent amounts claimed to be deductible expenses and generally (but not always) referable to payments to the Israeli banks, described in contemporaneous records as payments of interest to the Israeli banks. I also find that Milgerd, Erma, Ligon 159 and Ligon 158 were parties to the scheme from its inception. I do not find that Margaret Binetter agreed to participate in or facilitate a scheme of the kind alleged, or in any scheme to avoid or evade income tax. I find that each of Andrew and Michael Binetter agreed to participate in or took steps to facilitate the scheme at various times. Ligon 268 and Binqld subsequently entered into transactions with IDB that involved the key elements of the scheme set out above. Ligon 268’s income tax returns were affected by its role as trustee of the Bankstown Eye Trust, but it did not disclose any significant taxable income from its activities as a lender of funds obtained from IDB. Following from the conclusion that the scheme involved documenting the transaction in a manner which would not reveal the existence of the offshore deposits, I find that those who arranged the documentation intended to conceal the existence of the offshore deposits and any income earned from the deposits, principally by seeking to ensure that the applicants’ records would create the false impression that the terms of the transactions were not affected by the deposits. Based on the elements of the scheme, I find that its purposes, and the purposes of those respondents who participated in it, included the following:(1)to allow various of the respondents to have the benefit in Australia of the funds comprising the offshore deposits, without transferring those funds to Australia;(2)to interpose the applicants between various of the respondents and the Israeli banks;(3)to arrange a situation whereby each of the applicants treated transfers of funds from the Israeli banks as loan funds and the applicants and various of the respondents claimed, as deductible interest expenses, amounts said to be liabilities to the Israeli banks, on the basis of documentation which, if produced by an applicant to the ATO, would enable the applicant to conceal dishonestly important aspects of the transactions with the Israeli banks (particularly, the existence of the offshore deposits and the recipient or recipients of interest paid on the offshore funds, but also the true quantum of payments made to the banks in consideration of their respective participations in the arrangements); and(4)to thereby evade liability to pay income tax to the Commissioner or to assist others to evade their tax liabilities.