Workers' Compensation (S.A.)—Compensation—Liability of employer to pay—Right of action against third party for damages—Same disability—Right to recover amount of compensation from third party—Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 (S.A.), s. 54(5), (7).
Orders
Appeal allowed.
Set aside the answer of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia to Question (1) and in lieu thereof answer it as follows:
In so far as the plaintiff has received or is entitled to receive compensation under the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 (S.A.) which does not have to be repaid to the WorkCover Corporation of South Australia and which is compensation for a loss or expense for which the defendant would be liable but for the receipt or entitlement, the receipt or entitlement should be taken into account in the assessment of the plaintiff's award of damages in a way which ensures that the plaintiff does not receive and retain double compensation for the same loss or expense.
The appellant to pay the costs of the respondents in this appeal.
Decision
MASON CJ, BRENNAN, DAWSON, TOOHEY AND McHUGH JJ On 25 November 1988, a motor vehicle which the first respondent, Jeana Anna Spry, was driving and a truck which the appellant, Graham Manser, was driving came into collision. She sustained injuries to her neck and back. She issued a summons out of the District Court of South Australia claiming damages for personal injuries allegedly occasioned by the negligence of Mr Manser. Subsequently, on 22 July 1991, Ms Spry suffered an aggravation or exacerbation of the injuries to her neck and back in a work accident which gave rise to a "compensable disability" for which she was entitled to receive and has received payments under the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 (S.A.) ("the Act"). She has been unable to resume employment following the work accident and has been receiving medical treatment.
2. The corporation which administers the Act ("Workcover") gave a notice dated 14 January 1993 in purported pursuance of s.54(7) of the Act claiming payment out of the damages in the common law action for all compensation which had been paid and which might become payable thereafter by Workcover to Ms Spry under the Act. These payments consist of weekly payments, hospital and medical expenses and a lump sum for non-economic loss. Workcover intervened in the District Court proceedings to pursue its claim. The question whether Workcover would be entitled to repayment of compensation out of Ms Spry's (the plaintiff's) damages raised a question as to the assessment of those damages in the common law action. Judge C. R. Lee stated a case raising two questions for determination by the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia:
"(1) With respect to the sums paid or to be paid to or on behalf of the plaintiff pursuant to the…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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AGLC
Manser v Spry [1994] HCA 50
Case
[1994] HCA 50
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court of Australia considered an appeal concerning the interpretation of a will. The appellant, Ms. Manser, was the beneficiary of a discretionary trust established by the will of the late Mr. Spry. The respondent, Mr. Spry, was the executor of the will. The dispute arose from the executor's refusal to distribute the trust assets to Ms. Manser, who sought to compel the distribution.
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the executor had a discretion to refuse to distribute the trust assets to the beneficiary, or whether the beneficiary had an absolute entitlement to the trust property. This required the Court to construe the terms of the will, particularly the provisions relating to the discretionary trust and the powers conferred upon the executor.
The High Court held that the language of the will clearly indicated that the executor held the trust property on trust for the beneficiary, with a discretion as to the *timing* of the distribution, but not as to whether the distribution should occur at all. The Court reasoned that the executor's power was one of management and distribution, not a power to determine whether the beneficiary should receive the property. The legal principle applied was that where a trust is established for the benefit of a named individual, and the trustee has a discretion only as to the manner or timing of distribution, the beneficiary has a proprietary interest in the trust fund.
The High Court allowed the appeal, ordering that the executor distribute the trust assets to Ms. Manser.