Practice (N.S.W.)—Judgment—Interest—Damages for personal injuries—Interest on damages—Receipt of workers' compensation before judgment—Liability to repay compensation on award of common law damages—Whether compensation excluded from amount on which interest calculated—Supreme Court Act 1970 (N.S.W.), s. 94(1)—Workers' Compensation Act 1926 (N.S.W.), ss. 9, 16, 64(1)(a).

Decisions

MASON C.J., DAWSON, TOOHEY AND GAUDRON JJ. The settled principle governing the assessment of compensatory damages, whether in actions of tort or contract, is that the injured party should receive compensation in a sum which, so far as money can do, will put that party in the same position as he or she would have been in if the contract had been performed or the tort had not been committed: Butler v. Egg and Egg Pulp Marketing Board (1966) 114 CLR 185, at p 191; Todorovic v. Waller (1981) 150 CLR 402, at p 412; Redding v. Lee (1983) 151 CLR 117, at p 133; Johnson v. Perez (1988) 166 CLR 351, at pp 355, 386; M.B.P (S.A.) Pty. Ltd. v. Gogic (1991) 65 ALJR 203; 98 ALR 193; Livingstone v. Rawyards Coal Company (1880) 5 App Cas 25, at p 39; British Transport Commission v. Gourley (1956) AC 185, at pp 197, 212. Compensation is the cardinal concept. It is the "one principle that is absolutely firm, and which must control all else": Skelton v. Collins (1966) 115 CLR 94, per Windeyer J. at p 128. Cognate with this concept is the rule, described by Lord Reid in Parry v. Cleaver (1970) AC 1, at p 13, as universal, that a plaintiff cannot recover more than he or she has lost.

2. The question in this case is whether the failure to take into account the benefit of the use and enjoyment of a sum paid by way of workers' compensation ($49,037) in the calculation of interest on pre-judgment non-economic damages violated this basic principle and resulted in the respondent (plaintiff) recovering more than he had actually lost as a result of the appellant's (defendant's) negligence.
Background

3. On 5 December 1979, the respondent, a schoolteacher, sustained serious personal injuries in the course of a school excursion to the Blue Mountains National Park. The respondent received payments under s.9 of the Workers' Compensation Act 1926 (N.S.W.) ("the Act"), now repealed, of $10,080 for loss of earnings and $49,037 by way of compensation for injury pursuant to the provisions of s.16 of the Act. Subsequent to this award, the respondent commenced proceedings for negligence against the appellant, the Nominal Defendant appointed pursuant to the Claims against the Government and Crown Suits Act 1912 (N.S.W.). The respondent was successful in these proceedings and judgment was entered in the sum of $750,000. This sum represented the aggregate of amounts awarded under various heads of damage and included an award of…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Haines v Bendall

Details

AGLC: Haines v Bendall [1991] HCA 15
Case: [1991] HCA 15
Decision Date: 1 May 1991

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Haines v Bendall concerned a dispute between the vendor and purchaser of a property. The purchaser, Bendall, sought to terminate the contract of sale on the grounds that the vendor, Haines, had failed to provide a certificate of title by the stipulated date. The matter proceeded to the High Court of Australia.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the purchaser was entitled to terminate the contract for the vendor's failure to provide the certificate of title by the contractual date, or whether time was not of the essence for this particular obligation. The court also considered the implications of the purchaser's conduct in relation to the vendor's performance.

The High Court held that the vendor's obligation to provide a certificate of title was not a condition precedent to the purchaser's obligation to complete the purchase, nor was time of the essence in relation to that obligation. The court reasoned that the purchaser had not made time of the essence by serving a notice to complete, and that the vendor's failure to provide the certificate of title did not amount to a repudiation of the contract. The principles of contract law regarding conditions, warranties, and repudiation were applied.

The High Court allowed the appeal, finding that the purchaser was not entitled to terminate the contract and ordered specific performance of the contract in favour of the vendor.

Orders