CITATION:FE Accommodation Pty Ltd & Anor v Gold Valley Iron Ore Pty Ltd [2025] NTCA 8
PARTIES:FE ACCOMMODATION PTY LTD (ACN 160 943 082)
and
G&C PASTORAL CO PTY LTD
(ACN 008 039 405)
v
GOLD VALLEY IRON ORE PTY LTD
(ACN 618 094 634)
TITLE OF COURT: COURT OF APPEAL OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
JURISDICTION: CIVIL APPEAL from the SUPREME COURT exercising Territory jurisdiction
FILE NO:AP 7 of 2024 (22427907)
DELIVERED: 14 August 2025
HEARING DATE: 19 February 2025
JUDGMENT OF: Kelly and Blokland JJ and Lasry AJ
CATCHWORDS:
APPEAL– contract – appeal against assessment of damages – whether trial Judge erred by awarding nominal damages only to first plaintiff – whether error in construction of s 84 Supreme Court Act – held no error– s 84 permits an award of interest only on “the sum for which judgment is given” - whether trial judge erred by not awarding interest on the principles in Hungerford v Walker – held no error – claim for interest as damages not pleaded and proved - whether trial judge erred in not dismissing the respondent’s counterclaim on the basis of Anshun estoppel – held no error – whether trial judge erred in awarding interest under s 84 Supreme Court Act on amount awarded on respondent’s counterclaim – held no error
CROSS APPEAL - whether trial Judge erred in finding s 52(3) of the Sale of Goods Act did not apply to assessment of second appellant’s damages – held no error - whether error in the assessment of damages concerning values and starting points for assessment – held no error
Federal Court Act 1976 (Cth), s 51A(1)
Sale of Goods Act 1972 (NT), s 38, s 52, s 52(1), 52(3)
Supreme Court Act1979 (NT), s 84
Supreme Court Act1986 (Vic), s 60(1)ABD (Metals and Waste) Ltd v Anglo-Chemical Ore Co Ltd [1985] 2 Lloyds Rep 456; Adrenaline Pty Ltd v Bathurst Regional Council (2015) 97 NSWLR 207; Ajaimi v Giswick Pty Ltd (No 3) (2022) 67 VR 529; Australian Financial Services and Leasing Pty Ltd v Hills Industries Ltd (2014) 253 CLR 560; Baltic Shipping Co v Dillon (1993) 176 CLR 344; Barrow v Arnaud [(1846) 8 QB 595 at 609-610 (115 ER 1000 at 1006)]; Clark v Macourt [2013] HCA 56 253 CLR1; Commonwealth of Australia v Amann Aviation (1991) 174 CLR 64; Commonwealth v Chessell (1991) 30 FCR 154; Commonwealth v SCI Operations (1998) 192 CLR 285; David Securities Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1992) 175 CLR 353; Ebinger Actien Gesellschaft v Armstrong (1874) 9 QB 473;Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Haxton (2012) 246 CLR 498; FE Accommodation Pty Ltd & Anor v Gold Valley Iron Ore Pty Ltd [2020] NTSC 61; FE Accommodation Pty Ltd & Anor v Gold Valley Iron Ore Pty Ltd [2024] NTSC 61; Ford v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd (2009) 75 NSWLR; Gold Valley Iron Ore Pty Ltd…
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- Case
- [2025] NTCA 8
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the court was whether the trial judge correctly applied the principles of unjust enrichment and failure of consideration in assessing the respondent's claim for restitution. The appellants argued that the trial judge erred in her analysis by not considering whether the respondent's receipt of the licence for use and possession of the Camp for one year constituted a benefit that could offset the payment made. They contended that if the benefit received was insufficient to justify the payment, then the enrichment of the respondent would be unjust, warranting restitution.
The court rejected the appellants' arguments, holding that the trial judge correctly determined that there was no failure of consideration. The court reasoned that the respondent had received a benefit in the form of the licence, which was valued at $750,000, exceeding the payment made by the appellants. Consequently, the respondent's enrichment was not unjust, and there was no basis for an order of restitution. The court further clarified that the statutory power to award interest under Section 84 of the Supreme Court Act 1979 (NT) could not be applied to amounts that were deducted in mitigating the loss, as such payments reduce the damages owed and are not part of the sum for which judgment is given.
The Supreme Court of the Northern Territory affirmed the decision of the trial judge, holding that the respondent was not entitled to restitution. The court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellants pay the respondent's costs of the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The appellants contend that the trial judge applied the wrong test and that the correct legal analysis of Gold Valley’s claim for restitution is as follows.[51](a)The claim was based upon a failure of consideration. That is, Gold Valley paid $500,000, and claimed it got nothing in return because the Contract was terminated.(b)In Baltic Shipping Co v Dillon Mason CJ observed:[52]The action to recover money paid on a total failure of consideration is on a common money count for money had and received to the use of the plaintiff. (c)In Pavey & Matthews Pty Ltd v Paul, Deane J explained that unjust enrichment is not an independent cause of action but a “unifying legal concept” underpinning actions for money had and received:[53]... the concept of unjust enrichment in the law of this country... constitutes a unifying legal concept which explains why the law recognises, in a variety of distinct categories of case, an obligation on the part of a defendant to make fair and just restitution for a benefit derived at the expense of a plaintiff and which assists in the determination, by the ordinary processes of legal reasoning, of the question whether the law should, in justice, recognise such an obligation in a new or developing category of case...(d)In Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Haxton, French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ described the ‘distinct categories’ instead as ‘distinct classes of qualifying or vitiating factors’ as follows.[54]In David Securities Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia, this Court explained the part played by unjust enrichment in a claim for money had and received (in that case for recovery of a payment made under mistake of law). That explanation may be expressed, at a fairly high level of abstraction, as an approach to determining such claims. In summary:·recovery depends upon the enrichment of the respondent by reason of one or more recognised classes of “qualifying or vitiating” factors;·the category of case must involve a qualifying or vitiating factor such as mistake, duress, illegality or a failure of consideration, by reason of which the enrichment of the respondent is treated by the law as unjust;·when identified in this way, unjust enrichment gives rise to a prima facie obligation in a respondent to make restitution;·this prima facie obligation can be displaced by circumstances which the law recognises would make an order for restitution in favour of the claimant unjust.(e)Accordingly, the correct question for the trial judge to ask was whether there was in this case a ‘qualifying or vitiating factor’, namely failure of consideration.(f)It was Gold Valley’s onus to prove the existence of a ‘qualifying or vitiating factor’. The Court of Appeal of South Australia observed in Hegarty v Keogh (No 2):[55]The claimant bears the onus of proving the existence of a recognised qualifying or vitiating factor [Alexiadis v Zirpiadis (2013) 302 ALR 148, [30] (Kourakis CJ]. The respondent is not required to demonstrate the “justice” of the receipt or retention of a benefit. The claimant bringing the claim must first show that the facts of the claim fall within an established category of unjust enrichment [K Mason, J W Carter and G J Tolhurst, Restitution Law in Australia (LexisNexis Australia, 2nd ed, 2008), [2204]]:It is wrong to treat the defendant as having a general onus to establish the justice of the receipt or retention of the benefit. The error lies in inconsistency with the idea that there are recognised cases in which a prima facie obligation to make the restitution arises. The idea of a prima facie case asserts that the injustice element of unjust enrichment is a matter which must be proved, not assumed, by bringing the facts within one of the established categories such as mistake.(g)As those observations make clear, Gold Valley was not simply required to prove that it had paid money under a contract which had been discharged. Rather, it was required to bring the facts of this case within the established category of failure of consideration so as to establish that it would be unjust for Gold Valley not to have the funds returned.(h)This is also consistent with the observations of Mason and Carter, Restitution Law in Australia (2016, 3rd Edition) at [1 103]:Discharge is not in itself sufficient: the requirements of unjust enrichment must be satisfied. As always in the ineffective contract context, the problematic elements are benefit and injustice.(i)It is also consistent with the observations of Allsop P and Young JA (with whom Sackville AJA agreed) in Ford v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd:[56][120]No separate defence of change of position or any other particular restitutionary defence was pleaded.[121]The relevant enquiry as to the availability of the order for payment or repayment does not cease with the identification of the relevant qualifying consideration, such as mistake. The enquiry is as to the injustice of the retention of any money or benefit. This lies at the root of the claim and of any defence such as change of position: Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd [1991] 2 AC 548 at 560 (per Lord Templeman) and 578 (per Lord Goff) ....[123]The question of request, payment, receipt and benefit should be viewed as matters of substance and not form or legal technicality: Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (at 673-674)....[126]None of the above paradigms covers the facts here precisely, but all reveal the necessity to look to the substance of the matter. In Quek v Beggs (1990) 5 BPR 11,761, McLelland J (as he then was) was concerned with a case of undue influence. This was not a case of money had and received, but rather undue influence by a spiritual adviser. The judge found that Pastor Beggs had used undue influence and the question was whether he should make restitution. The judge said (at 11,779): "There is an analogy with proceedings to enforce restitution of money payed by one person to another under a fundamental mistake of fact." He then quoted the Australia and New Zealand Banking Group case noting that the courts paid regard to substance rather than to form as to what had occurred. McLelland J thought that it would not be appropriate to order restitution looking at the substance of what had occurred.(j)Those passages from Ford were cited with approval by Leeming J (with whom Macfarlan and Ward JJA agreed) in Adrenaline Pty Ltd v Bathurst Regional Council.[57](k)When the substance of what occurred in this case is identified it should be clear that there was no failure of consideration. Whilst Gold Valley paid $500,000, it received $750,000 in value, being the licence for use and possession of the Camp for one year. That is the ‘substance’ of what occurred.(l)Gold Valley did not prove that there had been a failure of consideration by reference to all the facts. The trial judge made no mention of the licence fee in her reasoning.