Hobartville Stud Pty Ltd v Union Insurance Co Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

William Robert Jacomb v The Australian Municipal, Administrative, Clerical & Services Union [2004] FCA 1600

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL - costs

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)
Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) s 7
Federal Court Rules O 62 rr 12,19 and 31

Alpine Hardwood (Aust) Pty Ltd v Hardys Pty Ltd (No 2) [2002] FCA 220; (2002) 190 ALR 21
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd (No. 2) [2002] FCA 192; (2002) 201 ALR 618
Black v Tomislav Lipovac BHNF Maria Lipovac & Ors [1998] FCA 699
Calderbank v Calderbank (1975) 3 ALL ER 333
Dr Martens Australia Pty Ltd v Figgins Holdings Pty Ltd (No 2) [2000] FCA 602
Colgate-Palmolive Company v Cussons Pty Ltd (1993) 46 FCR 225
Fresh Express Australia Pty Ltd v Larridren Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 1640
Fyna Foods Australia Pty Ltd v Cobannah Holdings Pty Ltd (No 2) [2004] FCA 1212
Ruddock v Vadarlis (2001) 115 FCR 229
Vasram v AMP Life Ltd [2002] FCA 1286

WILLIAM ROBERT JACOMB V THE AUSTRALIAN MUNICIPAL, ADMINISTRATIVE, CLERICAL AND SERVICES UNION
V 477 OF 2003

CRENNAN J
8 DECEMBER 2004
MELBOURNE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 477 OF 2003

BETWEEN:

WILLIAM ROBERT JACOMB
APPLICANT

AND:

THE AUSTRALIAN MUNICIPAL, ADMINISTRATIVE, CLERICAL AND SERVICES UNION
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

CRENNAN J.

DATE OF ORDER:

8 DECEMBER  2004

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The applicant pay seventy-five per centum (75%) of the respondent’s costs, including reserved costs, to be assessed and taxed in default of agreement on a party and party basis.

Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 477 OF 2003

BETWEEN:

WILLIAM ROBERT JACOMB
APPLICANT

AND:

THE AUSTRALIAN MUNICIPAL, ADMINISTRATIVE, CLERICAL AND SERVICES UNION
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

CRENNAN J.

DATE:

8 DECEMBER 2004

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. On 29 September 2004, I delivered reasons for judgment in this matter.  I ordered that the application be dismissed and when I indicated I would order the applicant pay the respondents costs, counsel for the applicant sought leave to file submissions in relation to costs.  I then gave directions for the filing and serving of written submissions in relation to costs.

    The Parties’ Submissions

  2. The applicant claimed that each party should bear their own costs and filed a somewhat unsatisfactory affidavit as to his means.  In support of this claim, the applicant submitted, inter alia, that:

    ·the case was in the nature of a “test case” in that the application was not brought for commercial gain and the propositions considered by the judgment, namely the ‘question of discrimination between genders’ were matters of great importance to the community at large and public bodies such as unions;

    ·the proceeding before this court was the first occasion when all the relevant evidence was considered; and

    ·the ‘principles applying to “Calderbank” letters in non commercial litigation are subject…

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Details
Case
[2004] FCA 1600
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Hobartville Stud Pty Ltd was the applicant in a dispute with Union Insurance Co Ltd, the respondent, which was heard in the Federal Court of Australia. The primary issue before the court was the determination of costs, specifically whether the applicant should be ordered to pay the respondent’s costs on a solicitor/client or indemnity basis. The respondent argued for such an order due to several factors, including the applicant’s early rejection of a compromise offer and the applicant’s conduct throughout the proceedings. The court considered the general principle that the award of costs is within the discretion of the court and that ordinarily, costs follow the event unless special circumstances exist.

The court examined the relevant legal principles, including the compensatory or restorative justice rationale behind awarding costs to a successful party. It noted that while the Federal Court Rules typically provide for costs to be awarded on a party and party basis, the court has the discretion to order solicitor and client costs in appropriate circumstances. The respondent sought to rely on the applicant’s refusal of a "Calderbank" offer as a basis for such an order. The court assessed whether the refusal of the compromise offer was unreasonable and whether the offer constituted a genuine attempt to resolve the dispute.

In its decision, the court determined that the applicant’s refusal of the compromise offer was not unreasonable given the terms and context of the offer. The court found that while the applicant’s conduct had been contentious, it did not warrant an order for indemnity costs. Instead, the court exercised its discretion to order the applicant to pay a significant proportion of the respondent’s costs, reflecting the overall conduct and outcome of the proceedings. The final order required the applicant to pay seventy-five per cent of the respondent’s costs, including reserved costs, to be assessed and taxed on a party and party basis if not agreed upon.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicant pay seventy-five per centum (75%) of the respondent’s costs, including reserved costs, to be assessed and taxed in default of agreement on a party and party basis.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

CRENNAN J

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: CRENNAN J

The respondent submitted that the applicant should pay the respondent’s costs on a solicitor/client or indemnity basis (or, in the alternative, that the applicant be ordered to pay the respondent’s costs on a party/party basis) bearing in mind, inter alia; ·the respondent’s success in the proceedings; ·the applicant has been on notice in relation to the issue of costs since very early in the proceedings and rejected the respondent’s offer to compromise by way of an alleged “Calderbank” letter; ·this is not a case brought in the “public interest”; and·the applicant has already had a number of interlocutory proceedings arising directly from the applicant’s conduct of this matter determined against him. Consideration The general rule is that the award of costs is at the discretion of the Court: see ss 43(1) and (2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (“the Act”). Ordinarily costs follow the event in the absence of special circumstances justifying some other order. The principle behind an award of costs to a successful party is one of compensatory or restorative justice: see Ruddock v Vadarlis (2001) 115 FCR 229 at [12]. The Federal Court Rules provide that ordinarily costs will be recovered on a party and party basis: see O 62, rr 12, 19 and 31. Consistent with the discretion conferred on this Court by the Act, the Court may award solicitor and client costs in appropriate cases where the particular circumstances of the case warrant the Court departing from the usual course of ordering costs on a party and party basis: Colgate-Palmolive Company v Cussons Pty Ltd (1993) 46 FCR 225 at 230; Alpine Hardwood (Aust) Pty Ltd v Hardys Pty Ltd (No 2) [2002] FCA 224; (2002) 190 ALR 121 at [11]; Fyna Foods Australia Pty Ltd v Cobannah Holdings Pty Ltd (No 2) [2004] FCA 1212 at [4]-[5](“Fyna Foods”). The respondent seeks to rely on the fact that the applicant refused the respondent’s offer to settle the proceedings by way of a “Calderbank” letter. The letter dated 1 August 2004, was marked “Without prejudice save as to Costs” and made the following offer:“1. That the Applicant discontinue the application by 9.30 a.m. on Monday 11 August 2003 with no order as to costs.2. Each party bear its own legal costs associated with these proceedings.”The offer was expressed to be in accordance with the principles in Calderbank. The applicant refused the respondent’s offer to settle by return letter dated 11 August 2004 (three days after the time for acceptance prescribed by the offer). The principles governing Calderbank offers have been the subject of a number of decisions of this Court: see for example Black v Tomislav Lipovac BHNF Maria Lipovac & Ors [1998] FCA 699; Dr Martens Australia Pty Ltd v Figgins Holdings Pty Ltd (No 2) [2000] FCA 602 (“Dr Martens”). As a general rule, the mere refusal of the Calderbank offer does not automatically mean that the Court should make an order for costs on an indemnity basis, even where the result, following refusal of the offer, is less favourable to the offeree than that contained in the offer. Rather, the offer to settle must be a genuine offer to compromise, and there must be some element of unreasonableness in the offeree’s refusal to accept the offer: see Fresh Express Australia Pty Ltd v Larridren Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 1640; Dr Martens.