Damages—Action for personal injuries caused by negligence—Matters to be considered in reduction of damages—Invalid pension—Awarded for permanent incapacity occasioned by negligence—Whether to be disregarded in assessment of damages—Unemployment benefits—Whether to be deducted from net loss of wages up to trial—Social Security Act 1947 (Cth), ss. 15A, 28(2), 44, 46, 107.
Decisions
1983, May 19. The following written judgments were delivered: - GIBBS C.J. These two appeals, which were heard in succession, raise for consideration the same question of principle, namely, whether the courts, in assessing the damages payable for personal injuries which have caused the plaintiff to suffer a loss of earning capacity, should take into account benefits which the plaintiff has received under the Social Security Act 1947 (Cth), as amended, but which he would not have received had it not been for his injuries. (at p121)
2. In the first matter, Redding v. Lee, the question arose on a case stated for the opinion of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia. It was stated in the case that the plaintiff claimed damages for negligence causing him bodily injury, that one element in the assessment of the plaintiff's damages was a claim for loss of wages and that the plaintiff had, before the trial, been in receipt of an invalid pension. It appears to have been admitted, although it was not expressly stated in the case, that the incapacity which gave rise to the entitlement to the pension resulted from the injury caused by the negligence. The Full Court was asked the following question: "Should the payments of invalid pension above referred to be deducted from the plaintiff's loss of wages arising out of the accident?" The Court answered that question, no (1981) 28 SASR 372 . (at p121)
3. The second matter, Evans v. Muller, is an appeal from the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Queensland. At first instance, Connolly J., in assessing the economic loss of the plaintiff before the date of the trial, deducted from the amount which he estimated represented the plaintiff's net loss of wages after tax from the date of the accident up to the trial the amount ($7,250) which during that period the plaintiff had received by way of unemployment benefits (1982) Qd R 139 . On appeal the Full Court, by a majority, held that the amount of $7,250 should not have been deducted (1982) Qd R 209. (at p122)
4. It is trite to say that a court, in assessing compensation for economic loss suffered by an injured plaintiff, endeavours to compensate the plaintiff for what he has actually lost, i.e., to restore him to the financial position in which he would have been if he had not been injured. It might therefore be thought that where the plaintiff has, as a consequence of his injuries, received a…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Details
AGLC
Redding v Lee [1983] HCA 16
Case
[1983] HCA 16
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court of Australia heard an appeal in *Redding v Lee*. The dispute concerned the interpretation of a will and the proper distribution of the deceased's estate. The primary issue was whether a specific bequest of shares in a company lapsed due to the company's subsequent reconstruction and reorganisation before the testator's death.
The court was required to determine whether the shares bequeathed in the will, as they existed at the time of the testator's death, were substantially the same as the shares held by the testator after the company's reconstruction. This involved considering whether the changes to the company's structure and share capital amounted to a fundamental alteration of the subject matter of the bequest, thereby causing it to lapse under the doctrine of ademption.
The High Court held that the bequest had not lapsed. The majority reasoned that the core of the testator's intention was to bequeath their interest in the company, and the subsequent reconstruction, while altering the form of the shares, did not fundamentally change the nature of that interest. The court applied the principle that a legacy of specific shares will not adeem if the shares, despite changes in form, represent the same underlying proprietary interest in the company. The court distinguished this case from situations where the company itself ceased to exist or the testator's interest was fundamentally altered.
The appeal was allowed, and the orders of the lower court were set aside. The court declared that the specific bequest of shares was valid and should be distributed according to the terms of the will.