Angas Law Services Pty Ltd (in liq) v Carabelas

Link copied
Case Copied 50 min read

HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GLEESON CJ,
GUMMOW, KIRBY, HAYNE AND HEYDON JJ

ANGAS LAW SERVICES PTY LTD (In liquidation)

& ANOR   APPELLANTS

AND

GEORGE CARABELAS & ANOR  RESPONDENTS

Angas Law Services Pty Ltd (In liquidation) v Carabelas

[2005] HCA 23

27 April 2005
A49/2004

ORDER

1.Remit the matter to the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia to consider the amendment to the statement of claim foreshadowed in this Court and to deal with any issue arising out of any amendment that may be permitted. 

2.Except as provided in order 1, appeal dismissed with costs. 

On appeal from the Supreme Court of South Australia

Representation:

G Griffith QC with L G de Ferrari for the appellants (instructed by Cowell Clarke Commercial Lawyers)

R J Whitington QC with M B Manetta for the respondents (instructed by von Doussas)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

  1. GLEESON CJ AND HEYDON J.   The first respondent, George Carabelas, and the second respondent, his wife, were at all material times the holders of the two issued shares in the capital of Angas Law Services Pty Ltd ("ALS").  They were also the only directors of ALS.  Mr Carabelas is a legal practitioner.  Apart from signing some financial statements, Mrs Carabelas does not appear to have taken an active part in the affairs of ALS, but the case was conducted on the assumption that she acquiesced in decisions made by her husband.  ALS was incorporated in 1986.  It was wound up, on the ground of insolvency, by order of the Supreme Court of South Australia dated 26 April 1994.  The petitioning creditor was the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation, who was owed $25,408 for capital gains tax incurred upon the sale, in October 1989, of a property in Angas Street, Adelaide, which was the company's principal asset.  The petition was presented on 16 March 1994, which was agreed to be the date relevant for considering preference issues.  The second appellant is the liquidator of ALS.

  2. ALS and the liquidator brought two claims against the respondents in the Supreme Court of South Australia.  The first was a claim by ALS for compensation under s 229(7) of the Companies (South Australia) Code ("the Code"), based upon alleged contraventions of s 229(2) and s 229(4). The second was an application by the liquidator for orders under s 588FF(1) of the Corporations Law, based upon a contention that, during the period specified in the statute and before the commencement of the winding up of ALS, and at a time when ALS was insolvent, ALS entered into transactions involving preferences under ss 588FA and 588FC. The preference issue occupied only a small part of the time taken in this Court, and it is convenient to put it aside until the conclusion of these reasons.

    The statute

  3. Section 229 of the Code, so far as presently relevant, provided:

    "(2)     An officer of a corporation shall at all…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Angas Law Services Pty Ltd (in liq) v Carabelas and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2005] HCA 23
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal by Angas Law Services Pty Ltd (in liquidation) against Mr and Mrs Carabelas. The dispute concerned allegations that the respondents, as directors and sole shareholders of Angas Law Services, had contravened section 229 of the Companies (South Australia) Code. Specifically, the liquidator alleged that the directors had improperly used their position to gain a personal advantage and had caused detriment to the company by causing it to grant a mortgage to secure a director's liability to a bank, and by subsequently dealing with the resulting debt owed by the director to the company.

The legal issues before the High Court included whether the directors had exercised due care and diligence, whether they had improperly used their position for personal advantage or to the detriment of the corporation, and the circumstances in which shareholders might ratify or excuse breaches of directors' duties. The court also considered the relationship between offences under the Code and common law duties owed by directors and officers. A key factual issue revolved around an alleged novation of a debt owed by a director to the company, which the respondents argued would reduce their liability.

The High Court noted that the primary judge had rejected the respondents' agency theory, which was intended to explain and potentially justify certain actions, including a specific journal entry. This rejection was upheld by the Full Court. The court also observed that the company was insolvent by June 1992, with its primary creditor being the Australian Taxation Office, and that the substantial costs of liquidation and litigation had dwarfed the original debt. The court found that the attempt to recover a significant sum from Mr Carabelas was based on alleged contraventions of section 229, rather than a direct claim for an outstanding debt.

The High Court ordered that the matter be remitted to the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia to consider an amendment to the statement of claim foreshadowed by the appellants and to deal with any issues arising from such an amendment. Otherwise, the appeal was dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Remit the matter to the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia to consider the amendment to the statement of claim foreshadowed in this Court and to deal with any issue arising out of any amendment that may be permitted.

2. Except as provided in order 1, appeal dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

GLEESON CJ HEYDON J GUMMOW AND HAYNE JJ KIRBY J
Before turning to the way in which the primary judge, and the Full Court, dealt with the s 229 claim, it is worth mentioning another feature of the litigation. The evidence showed that, in June 1993, years before proceedings were commenced, Mr Carabelas entered into a deed with the Commonwealth Bank under which his outstanding liabilities to the bank were discharged. The commercial circumstances of that arrangement were not the subject of any findings by the primary judge. It was accepted by the parties that one consequence of that deed was that ALS was under no further obligation to the bank. That probably explains why no attempt was made to treat the amount of the contingent liability incurred by ALS in June 1988 (or that amount less $435,040) as a loss. ALS was insolvent as at 30 June 1992, but, apart from the bank, its only significant creditor appears to have been the Federal Commissioner of Taxation, who was owed $25,408. If it were not for legal and accounting expenses incurred in relation to the liquidation, and this litigation, the only people who would stand to gain from the present action would be Mr and Mrs Carabelas, in their capacity as shareholders of ALS. The opening qualification to that sentence, of course, is important. The proceedings at first instance lasted 13 days. The only substantial debt originally owing to a third party has been dwarfed long since by costs of the liquidation and the litigation. Apart from the relatively modest amount owing to the revenue, and legal and accounting costs, the ultimate fruits of the litigation, if there are any, will go to the respondents. That in itself is curious. It is also curious that the attempt to recover $474,950 from Mr Carabelas was based upon an allegation of contraventions of s 229 rather than upon a straightforward claim (at least in the alternative) that he owed ALS that amount, and that his debt was never discharged.The decision of the primary judge The proceedings in the Supreme Court of South Australia were commenced in 1997. The case for the appellants was ultimately expressed in a Second Further Amended Statement of Claim dated 13 September 2000. The matter came on for hearing before Williams J in February 2003. Williams J found in favour of ALS and assessed the amount of compensation for which the respondents were liable at $474,950. He also ordered the respondents to pay interest of $731,423. He ordered the respondents to pay to ALS a total amount of $1,206,373, together with costs[1].[1]Scott v Carabelas [2003] SASC 156. The primary issue of fact which Williams J had to resolve arose out of the agency theory advanced by the respondents. If that theory had been accepted, it may have provided an answer to the allegations of contravention of s 229. In particular, it would have explained, and may have justified, the journal entry GJ10. Williams J rejected the theory, and his reasoning in that respect was upheld by the Full Court. As to the financial position of ALS, which was relevant both to the claims under s 229 and to the preference issues, Williams J noted that at the date of the winding up order (26 April 1994) ALS owed the revenue authorities $25,408.41. That amount became due and payable on 4 March 1991. In a letter to the Australian Taxation Office of 23 September 1993, ALS acknowledged its inability to pay that debt. Williams J accepted the evidence of an accountant that ALS was insolvent on 30 June 1992, and on 30 June 1993.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GLEESON CJ, HEYDON J, GUMMOW AND HAYNE JJ, KIRBY J