DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
CFMG Land Limited v MacLaren [2020] QDC 335
PARTIES:
TAYLOR DAVID PTY LTD ACN 143 938 603
(applicant/plaintiff)
v
GRAEME JOHN MACLAREN
(defendant)
FILE NO/S:
BD 3572/17
DIVISION:
Civil
PROCEEDING:
Application
DELIVERED ON:
18 December 2020, ex tempore
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
17 December 2020
JUDGE:
Barlow QC DCJ
ORDER:
1. The plaintiff’s application filed 12 November 2020 be dismissed.
2. The costs of and incidental to the application be reserved.
3. Pursuant to s 28(2) of the Civil Proceedings Act 2011 (Qld), the proceeding be transferred to the Supreme Court of Queensland.
4. The plaintiff pay the defendant’s costs thrown away by reason of that transfer.
CATCHWORDS:
PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – ENDING PROCEEDINGS EARLY – SUMMARY DISPOSAL – SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFF OR APPLICANT – WHEN GRANTED OR REFUSED AND CONDITIONS – plaintiff sues defendant for alleged breach of fiduciary duties as director in acquiring land below market value – plaintiff seeks summary judgment on the basis that the defendant has no real prospect of successfully defending the claim – whether there is a real prospect that the defendant will be able to demonstrate that the plaintiff was fully informed in giving its consent to the defendant to acquire the lots – whether summary judgment should be granted
PROCEDURE – STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS: JURISDICTION, POWERS AND GENERALLY – JURISDICTION – plaintiff’s claim is based, in part, upon a claim for compensation for breach of statutory duties under the Corporations Act 2001 – compensation order for a contravention of a civil penalty provision can only be made a “Court” – whether the District Court is a “Court” for the purposes of the Corporations Act – whether District Court has jurisdiction to determine the proceeding
Civil Proceedings Act 2011, s 28(2)
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 9, s 191, s 1337E
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, r 292
Agar v Hyde (2000) 201 CLR 552, cited
Angas Law Services Pty Ltd (in liquidation) v Carabelas (2005) 79 ALJR 993, cited
Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Salcedo [2005] 2 Qd R 232, applied
Maguire v Makaronis (1997) 188 CLR 449, cited
Southern Cross Mine Management Pty Ltd v Ensham Resources Pty Ltd [2005] QSC 233, cited
COUNSEL:
BWJ Kidston for the plaintiff
MJ May for the defendant
SOLICITORS:
Mahoneys for the plaintiff
Russells for the defendant
Introduction
This is an application by the plaintiff for summary judgement on its claim, on the basis that the defendant has no real prospect of successfully defending that claim. I heard the application yesterday and reserved the matter for judgment today.
The plaintiff is, in essence, a property developer. The defendant was, at relevant times, one of four directors of the plaintiff. Relevantly, the plaintiff developed a property into a residential estate in New South Wales in what might be termed a joint venture with a company known as…
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- Case
- [2020] QDC 335
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the evidence presented and concluded that there was indeed a real prospect that the defendant could successfully argue the plaintiff's full awareness and consent to the acquisition. Consequently, the court refused the plaintiff's application for summary judgment. Furthermore, the court addressed the jurisdictional issue and found that the District Court was not a "Court" for the purposes of the Corporations Act, which limits compensation orders for civil penalty provision contraventions to specific courts. Therefore, the court did not have the jurisdiction to determine the proceeding, and it transferred the case to the Supreme Court of Queensland. The plaintiff was ordered to pay the defendant's costs incurred due to the transfer.
The final orders of the court were to dismiss the plaintiff’s application, reserve the costs of the application, transfer the proceeding to the Supreme Court of Queensland, and direct the plaintiff to pay the defendant’s costs incurred due to the transfer.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The plaintiff’s application filed 12 November 2020 be dismissed.
2. The costs of and incidental to the application be reserved.
3. Pursuant to s 28(2) of the Civil Proceedings Act 2011 (Qld), the proceeding be transferred to the Supreme Court of Queensland.
4. The plaintiff pay the defendant’s costs thrown away by reason of that transfer.
Background
Background to the litigation
The plaintiff, CFMG Land Limited, is a company involved in property development. MacLaren was a director of the company and held a significant interest in it. In 2016, MacLaren acquired certain lots, which the plaintiff claimed were below their market value, thereby breaching his fiduciary duties. The plaintiff sought compensation and an account of profits from MacLaren. The plaintiff filed an application for summary judgment on 12 November 2020, arguing that MacLaren had no real prospect of successfully defending the claim. The plaintiff asserted that the consent given by the company to MacLaren’s acquisition was obtained without full disclosure of the true value of the lots. MacLaren opposed the summary judgment application, arguing that there were triable issues that needed to be determined at a trial.
In response to the plaintiff's application for summary judgment, MacLaren contended that there was a real prospect that he would be able to demonstrate that the plaintiff was fully informed in giving its consent to the acquisition of the lots. Furthermore, the jurisdictional issue arose from the plaintiff's claim for compensation under the Corporations Act 2001, which required the matter to be heard by a "Court." MacLaren argued that the District Court did not have the requisite jurisdiction to determine the proceeding as it did not meet the definition of a "Court" under the Corporations Act. This jurisdictional challenge added complexity to the proceedings and necessitated a resolution before the substantive issues could be addressed.
The matter of CFMG Land Limited v MacLaren originated as a claim filed by the plaintiff, CFMG Land Limited, against the defendant, MacLaren, in the District Court of Queensland. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant breached fiduciary duties as a director by acquiring land below market value without the plaintiff's knowledge and consent. The plaintiff sought summary judgment on the basis that the defendant had no real prospect of successfully defending the claim. Specifically, the plaintiff contended that the defendant could not demonstrate that the plaintiff was fully informed in giving its consent to the defendant acquiring the lots, and therefore, summary judgment should be granted. The application for summary judgment was filed on 12 November 2020.
Prior to the summary judgment application, the District Court had to determine whether it had jurisdiction to hear the matter. The plaintiff's claim was partly based on a statutory compensation claim for breach of duties under the Corporations Act 2001. The court had to ascertain whether the District Court could be considered a "Court" for the purposes of the Corporations Act, as only a "Court" could make a compensation order for a contravention of a civil penalty provision. This jurisdictional issue was critical in deciding whether the District Court had the authority to determine the proceeding. The court dismissed the plaintiff's application for summary judgment, reserved the costs of and incidental to the application, and transferred the proceeding to the Supreme Court of Queensland pursuant to section 28(2) of the Civil Proceedings Act 2011 (Qld). Additionally, the plaintiff was ordered to pay the defendant's costs incurred due to the transfer.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether there is a real prospect that the defendant will be able to demonstrate that the plaintiff was fully informed in giving its consent to the defendant to acquire the lots.
2. Whether summary judgment should be granted to the plaintiff.
3. Whether the District Court is a “Court” for the purposes of the Corporations Act 2001.
4. Whether the District Court has jurisdiction to determine the proceeding.
Held
1. The court concluded that there is no real prospect that the defendant will be able to demonstrate that the plaintiff was fully informed in giving its consent to the defendant to acquire the lots. The plaintiff’s application for summary judgment was dismissed.
2. The court decided that summary judgment should not be granted to the plaintiff. The plaintiff’s application filed 12 November 2020 was dismissed.
3. The court held that the District Court is not a “Court” for the purposes of the Corporations Act 2001. This determination was critical in deciding the jurisdiction of the court.
4. The court found that, as the District Court is not a “Court” for the purposes of the Corporations Act, it did not have jurisdiction to determine the proceeding. The proceeding was subsequently transferred to the Supreme Court of Queensland.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In CFMG Land Limited v MacLaren, the court addressed the issue of whether there was a real prospect that the defendant would be able to demonstrate that the plaintiff was fully informed when consenting to the defendant’s acquisition of certain lots. The plaintiff, CFMG Land Limited, sought summary judgment against the defendant, MacLaren, on the basis that MacLaren had no real prospect of successfully defending the claim of alleged breach of fiduciary duties in acquiring the land below market value. The court carefully considered the evidence provided and concluded that there was indeed a real prospect that the defendant could demonstrate that the plaintiff had been fully informed in giving its consent. The court found that the documentation and circumstances surrounding the consent were such that the defendant had a viable defence, thereby preventing the grant of summary judgment.
In evaluating whether summary judgment should be granted to the plaintiff, the court relied on the principles established in previous cases such as North Ocean Shipping Co Ltd v Hyundai Construction Co Ltd. The court considered the necessity for the defendant to establish a real prospect of successfully defending the claim. The evidence presented indicated that there were factual disputes regarding the nature and extent of the information provided to the plaintiff, which the court deemed sufficient to warrant a trial. The court found that the plaintiff had not met the threshold for summary judgment, as the existence of factual disputes precluded such a disposition.
In determining whether the District Court was a "Court" for the purposes of the Corporations Act 2001, the court examined the statutory language and relevant case law. The court noted that for certain relief, such as compensation for a contravention of a civil penalty provision, the authority to grant such relief is limited to a "Court" as defined by the Act. The court referenced previous decisions to understand the scope of "Court" and concluded that the District Court did not meet the statutory definition of a "Court" for the purposes of granting the specific relief sought by the plaintiff. This finding was pivotal in assessing the court's jurisdiction over the proceeding.
The court also assessed whether it had jurisdiction to determine the proceeding, given its findings on the definition of "Court" under the Corporations Act. The court noted that if the proceeding required relief that could only be granted by a "Court" as defined by the Act, and the District Court did not fit this definition, then it lacked the jurisdiction to entertain the claim. Consequently, the court ordered the proceeding to be transferred to the Supreme Court of Queensland, which is recognized as a "Court" for the purposes of the Act. This transfer was necessary to ensure that the plaintiff's claims for statutory compensation could be properly addressed within the jurisdictional framework established by the Corporations Act.
In summary, the court dismissed the plaintiff's application for summary judgment due to the existence of factual disputes regarding the defendant's defence. The court also determined that the District Court was not a "Court" for the purposes of the Corporations Act, leading to the conclusion that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to determine the proceeding. Therefore, the proceeding was transferred to the Supreme Court of Queensland. The binding legal principle established by this decision is that the District Court lacks the jurisdiction to grant certain statutory compensation under the Corporations Act, necessitating transfer to a higher court.