CYG18 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

CYG18 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 770

File number(s): SYG 1598 of 2018
Judgment of: JUDGE LAING
Date of judgment: 29 May 2025
Catchwords: MIGRATION – Application for judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (“IAA”) – whether the Secretary’s referral of material under s 473CB of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) was affected by relevant error due to omission of a letter making protection claims – materiality – application succeeds
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 473CB
Cases cited:

BVI18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCCA 9; (2020) 351 FLR 103

CQR17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 61; (2019) 269 FCR 367

LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12; (2024) 98 ALJR 610

Division: General
Number of paragraphs: 33
Date of hearing: 6 March 2025
Place: Sydney
Counsel for the Applicants: Mr D Godwin
Solicitor for the Applicants: Legal Aid Commission of NSW
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr T Reilly
Solicitor for the First Respondent: HWL Ebsworth
Second Respondent: Submitting appearance, save as to costs

ORDERS

SYG 1598 of 2018

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

CYG18

First Applicant

CYH18

Second Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE LAING

DATE OF ORDER:

29 MAY 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The name of the first respondent be amended to “Minister for Immigration and Citizenship”.

2.A writ of certiorari issue quashing the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority dated 3 May 2018.

3.A writ of mandamus issue directed to the Administrative Review Tribunal requiring it to reconsider and determine the matter according to law.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

JUDGE LAING:

  1. The applicants seek judicial review of a decision made by the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) (as it was). The IAA affirmed a decision of a delegate (Delegate) of the first respondent (Minister) refusing to grant the applicants Safe Haven Enterprise (Class XE) (Subclass 790) visas (protection visas).

  2. For the following reasons, the IAA’s decision will be quashed. A writ of mandamus will issue requiring the Administrative Review Tribunal to reconsider and determine the matter according to law.

    BACKGROUND

  3. The applicants are citizens of Iran. The first applicant (Applicant) applied for a protection visa on 16 September 2016. The second applicant, his…

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Details
Case
[2025] FedCFamC2G 770
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of CYG18 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, the applicants, citizens of Iran, sought judicial review of a decision by the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) to affirm a delegate's decision to refuse their applications for a protection visa. The applicants challenged the IAA's decision on the basis that the Secretary's referral of material to the IAA was affected by relevant error due to the omission of a letter making protection claims. The applicants argued that the omission of the letter was material and resulted in jurisdictional error.

The central legal issues the court needed to decide were whether the Secretary's referral of material to the IAA was affected by relevant error due to the omission of the letter, and if such error was material. This involved examining whether the omission of the letter was legally unreasonable and if the error had a material effect on the IAA's decision.

The court found that the omission of the letter was indeed legally unreasonable. The court held that the test was not whether the document might have been relevant to the review, nor whether the court could have concluded subjectively that the document was irrelevant to the review. Instead, the test was whether there was an evident and intelligible justification for the conclusion that the document was not relevant to the review. The court concluded that there was no such justification, and thus the omission of the letter constituted a relevant error. Furthermore, the court found that this error was material as it had a significant effect on the IAA's decision. The court quashed the IAA's decision and ordered that the matter be reconsidered by the Administrative Review Tribunal according to law.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

For the following reasons, the IAA’s decision will be quashed. A writ of mandamus will issue requiring the Administrative Review Tribunal to reconsider and determine the matter according to law.BACKGROUND The applicants are citizens of Iran. The first applicant (Applicant) applied for a protection visa on 16 September 2016. The second applicant, his daughter, applied as a member of the family unit. On 13 November 2017, the Delegate refused the application. The decision was referred to the IAA for review. On 3 May 2018, the IAA affirmed the Delegate’s decision.THE IAA’S DECISION The IAA accepted (at [9] and [20]) that: (a)the Applicant was raised in a Shia Muslim family but no longer believed in Islam or any other religion, although he retained a belief in God;(b)the Applicant’s daughter was born Muslim, but was no longer religious; and(c)the Applicant no longer possessed the passport upon which he departed Iran. The IAA found, however, that the Applicant had “fabricated the majority of his claims for protection” (at [10]). In particular, the IAA did not accept (at [18]-[20]) that:(a)the Applicant was related to a prominent person identified in the decision;(b)the Applicant was in conflict with another claimed relative because of his denunciation of Islam or religious opinion;(c)the Applicant was threatened, detained and tortured, lost his job and had his marriage end due to this conflict;(d)the Applicant used to express his denunciation of Islam or religious opinion publicly, including at his workplace;(e)the Applicant’s wife was pressured to divorce him;(f)the family of the Applicant’s wife rejected the Applicant’s daughter because of the Applicant’s denunciation of Islam or religious opinion;(g)the Applicant was detained in 2009;(h)the Applicant lived in hiding;(i)after leaving Iran, the Applicant’s mother’s house was raided and his brother was put under pressure;(j)the Applicant had two relatives who were involved in political activities, including one who was given a suspended sentence; or that(k)the applicants departed Iran on a fraudulent passport. The IAA did not accept that the Applicant had been imputed with an anti-government political opinion or that his daughter had been harmed because of her father’s denunciation of Islam or religious opinion, or because of her lack of religion. The IAA was not satisfied that the Applicant had publicly voiced his religious views or attempted to proselytise, or that he would have any interest in doing so in Iran. The IAA was also not satisfied that the second applicant would wish to voice publicly her religious views in Iran. The IAA concluded that it was not satisfied that the applicants faced a real chance of harm in Iran on the basis of their religious opinions or practices (at [25]). Having regard to country information, the IAA was not satisfied that there was a real chance of the applicants returning to Iran involuntarily. The IAA was not satisfied that there was a real chance of the applicants being prosecuted on return to Iran for seeking asylum in Australia. The IAA was not satisfied that the applicants had a profile capable of attracting adverse attention from the Iranian authorities upon return (at [26]).

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 3 May 2018, the IAA affirmed the Delegate’s decision.THE IAA’S DECISION The IAA accepted (at [9] and [20]) that: (a)the Applicant was raised in a Shia Muslim family but no longer believed in Islam or any other religion, although he retained a belief in God;(b)the Applicant’s daughter was born Muslim, but was no longer religious; and(c)the Applicant no longer possessed the passport upon which he departed Iran. The IAA found, however, that the Applicant had “fabricated the majority of his claims for protection” (at [10]). In particular, the IAA did not accept (at [18]-[20]) that:(a)the Applicant was related to a prominent person identified in the decision;(b)the Applicant was in conflict with another claimed relative because of his denunciation of Islam or religious opinion;(c)the Applicant was threatened, detained and tortured, lost his job and had his marriage end due to this conflict;(d)the Applicant used to express his denunciation of Islam or religious opinion publicly, including at his workplace;(e)the Applicant’s wife was pressured to divorce him;(f)the family of the Applicant’s wife rejected the Applicant’s daughter because of the Applicant’s denunciation of Islam or religious opinion;(g)the Applicant was detained in 2009;(h)the Applicant lived in hiding;(i)after leaving Iran, the Applicant’s mother’s house was raided and his brother was put under pressure;(j)the Applicant had two relatives who were involved in political activities, including one who was given a suspended sentence; or that(k)the applicants departed Iran on a fraudulent passport. The IAA did not accept that the Applicant had been imputed with an anti-government political opinion or that his daughter had been harmed because of her father’s denunciation of Islam or religious opinion, or because of her lack of religion. The IAA was not satisfied that the Applicant had publicly voiced his religious views or attempted to proselytise, or that he would have any interest in doing so in Iran. The IAA was also not satisfied that the second applicant would wish to voice publicly her religious views in Iran. The IAA concluded that it was not satisfied that the applicants faced a real chance of harm in Iran on the basis of their religious opinions or practices (at [25]). Having regard to country information, the IAA was not satisfied that there was a real chance of the applicants returning to Iran involuntarily. The IAA was not satisfied that there was a real chance of the applicants being prosecuted on return to Iran for seeking asylum in Australia. The IAA was not satisfied that the applicants had a profile capable of attracting adverse attention from the Iranian authorities upon return (at [26]). In circumstances where the applicants departed Iran legally, and did not have an adverse profile, the IAA was not satisfied that there was a real chance that the Applicant would be questioned by the Iranian authorities upon return. Even if the Applicant were questioned, the IAA considered that this would not amount to serious or significant harm. If the authorities became aware of the applicants’ asylum application, the IAA was not satisfied that the applicants would be imputed as holding an anti-government or anti-Islamic opinion. The IAA concluded that it was not satisfied that the applicants faced a real chance of relevant harm from the authorities as failed asylum seekers from a western country (at [26]-[27] and [33]).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Section 473CB relevantly provided:MIGRATION ACT 1958 - SECT 473CBMaterial to be provided to Immigration Assessment Authority(1)The Secretary must give to the Immigration Assessment Authority the following material (review material) in respect of each fast track reviewable decision referred to the Authority under section 473CA:(a) a statement that:(i)sets out the findings of fact made by the person who made the decision; and(ii)refers to the evidence on which those findings were based; and(iii)gives the reasons for the decision;(b)material provided by the referred applicant to the person making the decision before the decision was made;(c)any other material that is in the Secretary's possession or control and is considered by the Secretary (at the time the decision is referred to the Authority) to be relevant to the review;… A number of cases have found relevant error to have been established on account of what has been held to have been unreasonable failure by the Secretary, through delegates, to provide or consider providing “other material” within the contemplation of s 473CB(1)(c). The applicants drew attention, by way of example, to the decision in BVI18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCCA 9; (2020) 351 FLR 103 (Judge Driver). In that case, jurisdictional error was found by reference to a failure of the Secretary to provide the IAA with the record of an interview conducted with the applicant in Nauru. There have also been cases in which an argument of this nature has not succeeded. The Minister drew attention to the example of CQR17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 61; (2019) 269 FCR 367 (CQR17). In that case, an inference was not drawn that the Secretary contravened s 473CB(1)(c). Even if the inference had been drawn, it was found that the contended non-compliance would not have been material (see [28]-[52] per Jagot J). Ultimately, each case must turn upon its own facts. In cases involving an alleged contravention of s 473CB(1)(c) of the Act, an issue may arise as to whether the documents in question were within “the Secretary's possession or control”. However, in the present case, I was advised at hearing that it was not disputed that the letter from Freedom House was within the Secretary’s “possession or control” and capable of being located through reasonable searches. Having regard to the evidence before me concerning the nature of the document and its addition to the Applicant’s “file”, I accept that this was a reasonable position for the parties to have taken. The parties confirmed at hearing that the only issues for determination by the Court concerned the significance of the document, namely:(a)whether the document was so significant that it should be found that s 473CB(1)(c) was contravened; and(b)if so, whether any such contravention was relevantly material. Relevant to the first question is what was said by Jagot J in CQR17: 34.For reasons which will become apparent, in the circumstances of the present case, this question tends to collapse into the other question the appellant posed – was it legally unreasonable for the Secretary to have concluded that the documents were not relevant?.. 39.… The test is not whether I consider the document might have been or was relevant to the review. Nor is the test whether I could have subjectively concluded that the document was irrelevant to the review. The test is whether there is an evident and intelligible justification for the conclusion that the document was not relevant to the review.