SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SAAP v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs
[2002] FCA 577

MIGRATION - application for protection visa - review of decision of Refugee Review Tribunal – whether Tribunal failed to accord the applicant procedural fairness - whether Tribunal failed to comply with provisions requiring it to notify the applicant in writing of information upon which it based its decision.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – review of decision of Tribunal – whether failure of Tribunal to comply with legislative requirements amounted to reviewable error – effect of privative clause.

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s 39B
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 414, 418, 420, 423, 424, 424A, 426, 427, 474
Migration Regulations regs 4.41, 5.01, 5.02, 5.02A

Boakye-Danquah v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 438 - referred to
Craig v State of South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 - considered
Darling Casino Ltd v New South Wales Casino Control Authority (1997) 191 CLR 602 - referred to
Forster v Jododex Australia Pty Ltd (1972) 127 CLR 421 - referred to
Minister for Immigration &Multicultural Affairs vAl Shamry [2001] FCA 919 - referred to
NAAX v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 263 - referred to
NABE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 281 - referred to
Paul v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1196 - referred to
Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355 - referred to
R v Coldham; Ex parte The Australian Workers' Union (1982) 153 CLR 415 - referred to
R v Hickman; Ex parte Fox and Clinton (1945) 70 CLR 598 - considered
R v Murray; Ex parte Proctor (1949) 77 CLR 387 - referred to
Re Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Miah (2001) 179 ALR 238 - considered
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 180 ALR 1 - referred to
Re Refugee Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82 - referred to
Sook Rye Son v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (1991) 161 ALR 612 - referred to
Wang v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 167 - referred to
Zhang v Minister for Immigration Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1993) 45 FCR 384 - referred to

SAAP & ANOTHER v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

S.204 of 2001

MANSFIELD J
10 MAY 2002
ADELAIDE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

S.204 OF 2001

BETWEEN:

SAAP & ANOTHER
APPLICANTS

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

MANSFIELD J

DATE OF ORDER:

10 MAY 2002

WHERE MADE:

ADELAIDE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application is dismissed.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

S.204 OF 2001

BETWEEN:

SAAP & ANOTHER
APPLICANTS

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

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Details
Case
[2002] FCA 577
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, the applicant brought proceedings against the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, challenging decisions made by the Migration Review Tribunal. The applicant contended that the Tribunal acted outside its jurisdiction and committed jurisdictional error in two respects: first, by relying on evidence from the applicant's daughter that was allegedly obtained unlawfully, and second, by failing to provide the applicant with particulars of information obtained from her elder daughter and by not inviting the applicant to comment on that information as required by section 424A of the Act. The Federal Court was required to determine whether the Tribunal's actions constituted jurisdictional error that was reviewable.

The Court examined the statutory provisions and concluded that the Tribunal's functions and powers are not confined to the specific process outlined in section 424(2) and 424(3). The Court found that the Tribunal is empowered to gather relevant information in a manner that ensures fairness, justice, and informality, and is not bound by technicalities. The Court further noted that the obligation to provide certain information to the applicant and to give the applicant an opportunity to comment on it, as outlined in section 424A, may apply depending on the nature of the information procured. The Court did not need to determine whether the particular breach of section 424A amounted to jurisdictional error, as it found that relief would not be granted in any event.

The Court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant had not established a basis for the Court to exercise its power under section 39B of the Judiciary Act. The Court ordered that the application be dismissed.

ORDERS:
1. The application is dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application is dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The applicant alleges that the Tribunal acted outside its jurisdiction, and so committed jurisdictional error in a way which is reviewable, notwithstanding s 474(1) of the Act, in two respects. The first was by relying upon the evidence from the applicant’s daughter “which it had obtained unlawfully”. The second is by failing to give to the applicant particulars of information obtained from her elder daughter which it considered would be part of the reason for affirming the decision under review, and by failing to invite the applicant to comment on that information, as required by s 424A of the Act. It is appropriate to address those two matters in turn.(a) The alleged unlawful obtaining of evidence At the commencement of the hearing on 5 September 2001, although the applicant’s elder daughter was present, it was not intended by the applicant that she give evidence. She had not been required by the Tribunal to be present. However, the Tribunal member indicated that he may want to take some evidence from her. She was therefore sworn to give evidence. At the time no objection was taken to that course either by the applicant or by her adviser. In the course of his introductory remarks, the Tribunal member also said:“During the hearing I will tell you about any information I have that is adverse to your claim, and you will have an opportunity to comment on that information, and so will your adviser.”After the two independent witnesses had given evidence, the Tribunal member indicated that he wished to hear evidence from the elder daughter and that he would do so in the absence of the applicant. Arrangements were made for the applicant to leave the hearing room for a short time. Again, no objection to that course was raised at the time either by the applicant or by her adviser. It is contended that the evidence of the daughter was obtained unlawfully, and was used then by the Tribunal to find adversely to the applicant on her credibility and to reject many of her claims about persecution. The argument runs that the Tribunal is empowered to compel the giving of oral evidence by way of “summons” to appear to give evidence under s 427, and is not otherwise empowered to compel the giving of oral evidence. The daughter did not attend the hearing for the purpose of giving evidence, but rather simply to support her mother. Thus, it was the Tribunal which unlawfully requested the daughter to give evidence without having formally summonsed her. I do not accept that the Tribunal acted unlawfully in procuring the evidence from the applicant’s daughter in the way in which it did so. It is charged by s 420 to carry out its functions fairly, justly and informally. It is not bound by technicalities, but must act according to substantial justice and the merits of the case. Its functions, and the way it may exercise its powers to fulfil its functions, are contained in Part 7 of the Act. Once a competent application for review is made to the Tribunal, it is obliged to review the decision: s 414(1). The Registrar of the Tribunal is obliged to notify the Secretary of the Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs of the application and the Secretary then is obliged to give to the Registrar a copy of a statement about the decision under review that sets out the findings of fact made by the person who made the decision, refers to the evidence on which those findings were based, and gives reasons for the decision: s 418(2). The Secretary is also obliged to give to the Registrar each other document, or part of a document, that is in the Secretary’s possession or control and is considered by the Secretary to be relevant to the review of the decision: s 418(3). The applicant is entitled to give information to the Tribunal by statutory declaration and by written arguments: s 423(1). The Tribunal is empowered by s 424 to seek additional information that it considers relevant, provided it then has regard to that information in making its decision. It is empowered to invite a person to give additional information. Section 424(3) describes how the Tribunal should invite a person to give information. However, s 424 does not otherwise prescribe the means by which the Tribunal may get information from other persons. Section 424(1) provides:“In conducting the review, the Tribunal may get any information that it considers relevant. However, if the Tribunal gets such information, the Tribunal must have regard to that information in making the decision on the review.”Section 424(2) commences with the words “Without limiting subsection (1)” and then permits the Tribunal to invite a person to give information. The information gathering process is clearly not confined to that involving an invitation under s 424(2) given in accordance with s 424(3) and as further explained in s 424B. Nor is the obligation to give certain information to the applicant under s 424B confined to information obtained under the “invitation” process, although s 424A(1)(a) and (c) limit the sort of information to which s 424A applies. Depending upon the nature of the information it procures, it may be obliged to notify the applicant of that information and to give the applicant an opportunity to comment on it: s 424A. Section 426 entitles an applicant to give the Tribunal written notice when responding to an invitation to appear before the Tribunal, that the applicant wants the Tribunal to obtain oral evidence from a person or persons named in the notice, and the Tribunal is obliged to have regard to those wishes. It appears in this case that the two persons concerned were so nominated and, by arrangement, attended to give evidence. The Tribunal is also is empowered by s 427 to take evidence on oath or information, and to “summon a person to appear before the Tribunal to give evidence”: s 427(3)(a), provided that person is in Australia.

Decision

Reasons for decision

MANSFIELD J
I do not, therefore, need to finally decide whether the particular breach of s 424A amounted to jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal. But for s 474(1) of the Act, it is an apparently attractive proposition that each of the procedural prescriptions in Div 4 of Pt 7 of the Act is an essential precondition to the exercise of the decision-making power (see Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355 at [93-100]) or that each imposes “imperative duties” (an expression used in Darling Casino Ltd v New South Wales Casino Control Authority (1997) 191 CLR 602 per Gaudron and Gummow JJ at 632), so that contravention results in reviewable jurisdictional error. That was the approach adopted by Wilcox J in Boakye-Danquah. The particular contravention of s 424A in this matter might however suggest that it is necessary to look beyond the section itself to the nature of the particular procedural irregularity before categorising the contravention as a jurisdictional error. It is also appropriate to note the respondent’s contention that the effect of s 474(1) of the Act is to broaden the lawful authority of the Tribunal so that its jurisdiction is limited only by the provisions in the Hickman principles: The Queen v Coldham; Ex parte The Australian Workers’ Union (1982) 153 CLR 415 per Mason ACJ and Brennan J at 418-419. The decision of Tamberlin J in NABE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 281 would seem to support that contention. As I have said, it is not necessary to finally resolve those issues as I would decline relief in any event.CONCLUSION For the reasons I have given, I have reached the view that the applicant has not established a basis upon which the Court should exercise its power under s 39B of the Judiciary Act. I consider that this application should be dismissed. I so order.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: MANSFIELD J