DZAAC v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

DZAAC v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 127

Citation: DZAAC v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 127
Appeal from: Application for leave to appeal: DZAAC v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FMCA 760
Parties: DZAAC v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP AND RON WITTON IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE INDEPENDENT MERITS REVIEWER
File number: NTD 32 of 2012
Judge: MANSFIELD J
Date of judgment: 1 March 2013
Date of hearing: 10 January 2013
Place: Darwin
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: No catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 45
Counsel for the Applicant: The applicant did not appear
Counsel for the Respondent: A Nanson
Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NORTHERN TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NTD 32 of 2012

BETWEEN:

DZAAC
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent

RON WITTON IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE INDEPENDENT MERITS REVIEWER
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MANSFIELD J

DATE OF ORDER:

1 MARCH 2013

WHERE MADE:

DARWIN

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application is refused.

2.The applicant pay to the first respondent costs of the application.

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with under s 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NORTHERN TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NTD 32 of 2012

BETWEEN:

DZAAC
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent

RON WITTON IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE INDEPENDENT MERITS REVIEWER
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MANSFIELD J

DATE:

1 MARCH 2013

PLACE:

DARWIN

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. The applicant on behalf of herself and two children seeks an extension of time to appeal from a decision of a Federal Magistrate given on 13 August 2012.

  2. The Federal Magistrate dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision of an Independent Merits Reviewer (IMR) under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act). The IMR, in affirming an earlier decision of a delegate of the second respondent, recommended that the applicant on behalf of herself and her children not be recognised as persons to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention (the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees as amended by the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees).

    BACKGROUND

  3. The applicant is a Sri Lankan of Tamil ethnicity. 

  4. Both her parents were killed during the LTTE insurgency in Sri Lanka, her mother many years ago and her father more recently. 

  5. She and her now estranged husband left Sri Lanka in March 2010, and arrived at Christmas Island on 30 March 2010.  Each of them then applied for a protection visa.  Each of those applications was refused on 12 July 2010.  Each of those applications was then subject to an independent merits review.  In the applicant’s case, on 26 March 2011, the IMR affirmed the decision of the departmental delegate.

  6. By that time the applicant and her husband had ceased living together, and it appears the marriage had broken down.  Nevertheless, the hearing of their two independent merit reviews took place contemporaneously.

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Details
Case
[2013] FCA 127
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Magistrates Court, DZAAC, a Sri Lankan Tamil national, sought judicial review of a decision made by an Independent Merits Reviewer (IMR) under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The IMR had affirmed an earlier decision of a delegate, recommending that DZAAC and her children not be recognised as refugees under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. DZAAC sought judicial review on the grounds that she had been denied procedural fairness during her hearing before the IMR. The primary issue before the Federal Magistrate was whether DZAAC was deprived of procedural fairness in the course of her hearing. The court held that DZAAC had not been deprived of procedural fairness. The IMR had excluded DZAAC and her estranged husband from parts of their respective hearings to allow for separate interviews. However, DZAAC was continuously represented by her migration agent, who did not object to the course of the hearing at the time. Additionally, DZAAC was given a detailed opportunity to respond to apparent contradictions in her evidence, which she did not satisfactorily address. Consequently, the Federal Magistrate dismissed DZAAC’s application for judicial review. The court ordered that the application be refused and that DZAAC pay the first respondent's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application is refused.

2. The applicant pay to the first respondent costs of the application.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with under s 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The Federal Magistrate dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision of an Independent Merits Reviewer (IMR) under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act). The IMR, in affirming an earlier decision of a delegate of the second respondent, recommended that the applicant on behalf of herself and her children not be recognised as persons to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention (the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees as amended by the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees).BACKGROUND The applicant is a Sri Lankan of Tamil ethnicity. Both her parents were killed during the LTTE insurgency in Sri Lanka, her mother many years ago and her father more recently. She and her now estranged husband left Sri Lanka in March 2010, and arrived at Christmas Island on 30 March 2010. Each of them then applied for a protection visa. Each of those applications was refused on 12 July 2010. Each of those applications was then subject to an independent merits review. In the applicant’s case, on 26 March 2011, the IMR affirmed the decision of the departmental delegate. By that time the applicant and her husband had ceased living together, and it appears the marriage had broken down. Nevertheless, the hearing of their two independent merit reviews took place contemporaneously. The applicant (and her husband) primarily claimed to fear persecution if she was returned to Sri Lanka because of her Tamil ethnicity and a perceived association with the LTTE. Her husband had first been arrested by the Sri Lankan authorities in 1997, and had been beaten and had reporting conditions imposed on him for some two years. Thereafter, they had experienced few problems in Sri Lanka until more recent times. The applicant and her husband said that in about mid-2008, as a result of an accidental meeting, they had taken in a boarder in their house by the arrangement of her husband. Apparently the boarder came to be suspected of being associated with the LTTE, and he disappeared in late 2009. Around the same time, the applicant and her husband, she claimed, became associated with this man in the minds of the authorities. Her husband was arrested and beaten. When he was released they fled Sri Lanka. The applicant said that just after her husband had been released, Sri Lankan authorities came to their house again looking for him, and had assaulted her. They obtained Sri Lankan passports and apparently left Sri Lanka lawfully to travel to Malaysia, and from there found their way to Australia. Consequently, the applicant claimed the Sri Lankan authorities would attribute to her and her husband the political view that they were each LTTE sympathisers. The IMR accepted that, despite the cessation of hostilities in Sri Lanka, the Sri Lankan authorities in certain circumstances continued to commit human rights abuses against those Tamils they considered to have LTTE links or sympathies. However, the IMR concluded that there was no reason why the Sri Lankan authorities would believe that the applicant fitted that profile so as to attract the adverse attention of the Sri Lankan authorities if she returned to Sri Lanka.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Consequently, the IMR was not satisfied that the claimant and her children, upon their return to Sri Lanka, could in the reasonably foreseeable future face a real chance of persecution by reason of their ethnicity, their political opinion – either real or imputed – or their membership of a particular social group of women without male protectors, or as a returning failed asylum seeker.DECISION OF THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATE The applicant sought judicial review of that decision in the Federal Magistrates Court. On 13 August 2012, a Federal Magistrate refused that application. The applicant claimed that she had been denied procedural fairness in the course of the hearing by the IMR, in substance because during the course of that hearing the IMR excluded the applicant from the room for part of the hearing while he heard from her husband, and excluded her husband from the room for part of the hearing whilst he heard from her, and delivered two separate decisions which each refused to recommend that either the applicant or her husband were in need of protection. The issue principally ventilated before the Federal Magistrate was whether the applicant had been deprived of procedural fairness in the course of her hearing. The Federal Magistrate rejected the contention to that effect. It is necessary to know, in a little detail, the basis upon which that conclusion was reached. Firstly, it is clear that the claims of the applicant and her husband had, to a point in time, proceeded together. After they were estranged, they continued to be represented by the same migration agent. The migration agent requested the IMR to hear their applications separately, as was technically done, although he did not formally seek separate hearings and the hearings proceeded together without objection. The complaint is not about that, but that, during the course of the hearing, the IMR excluded the applicant from the room for part of the hearing whilst he heard from her husband, and then excluded her husband from the room for part of the hearing whilst he heard the applicant and delivered two separate decisions. It is important to note that the applicant continued to be represented through the whole of her hearing by her migration agent. He was the same migration agent that represented her husband. The migration agent did not object at the time about the course which the IMR adopted, either on behalf of the applicant or on behalf of her husband. The migration agent obviously decided that it was appropriate to continue to represent each of them. That was a matter for the migration agent. Secondly, as the IMR mentioned, following the interviews on 19 January 2011, the IMR wrote to each of the applicant and her husband at some length. He drew her attention, and that of her advisors, to a number of apparent contradictions in the evidence between the two of them. They were on matters of detail about the circumstances in which the applicant came to be assaulted, her husband’s movements after he was released from the police station, the number of police visits to their home, the nature of his injuries, the length of time they had remained in Sri Lanka after travelling to Colombo to arrange passports, the length of time after the assault of the applicant before they went to Colombo, and the assertion that they had been under observation by “white vans” whilst they were in Colombo. The applicant (and on his application the husband) was given the opportunity to respond at length to those concerns. Responses were provided. The applicant’s response did not persuade the IMR that the applicant’s version of events was reliable.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Indeed, it is appropriate to record that the applicant has not been represented. She has made no submissions on the hearing of this application. It has a slightly prolonged history.CONSIDERATION The application was instituted on 26 September 2012 in this Registry of the Court. The applicant gave an address for service. She filed an affidavit in support of her application also identifying that address as her current address. In her original affidavit, the applicant referred to a medical condition from which she was then recovering (as at 18 September 2012) which impeded her instituting her appeal within time and said that she was undergoing regular counselling for her mental health issues. The accompanying material included a report from a general practitioner asserting that she was unfit to attend to such matters as the institution of an appeal until 19 September 2012 due to emotional distress after rejection of her application and a resultant exacerbation in her chronic pain. There was other material relating to a medical condition which related to a period of time prior to September 2012. Finally, there was a notice to her of an appointment at an outpatient service on 27 September 2012. Her subsequent affidavit of 21 December 2012 did not add to that picture except her assertion that she underwent regular counselling for her mental health issues. At a directions hearing on 5 December 2012, the matter was listed for hearing on 8 January 2013 (subsequently changed to 10 January 2013) at 9:00 am and routine directions were given for the preparation of an appeal book, and other matters. The first respondent complied with those directions. The applicant did not do so. On 21 December 2012, she filed a further affidavit indicating that she was aware of the hearing (on 10 January 2013). She provided further reasons in support of her application for an extension of time. That is, she explained the reasons for the delay. That is not now an issue, as the first respondent acknowledges that there is an acceptable reason for the delay and that, if there is any arguable merit in any of her grounds of appeal, it would be appropriate to grant an extension of time. The first respondent’s position is simply that there is no prospect of the appeal succeeding, if an extension of time is granted, so that the extension of time should be refused. The applicant also indicated that she proposed to argue, through a solicitor, that the IMR had failed to take into account a relevant consideration, namely the “applicant’s claims to complementary protection” under s 36(2)(aa) of the Act. A further affidavit was filed by her on 7 January 2013. It again noted the hearing date. It said she wished to have her case transferred to Canberra and wanted legal representation organised through the Court. She said that she could not secure the services of a legal professional as she continued to undergo counselling for mental health issues, although she did not bring forward any contemporary support for those assertions, and that she did not have financial resources to pay for her legal costs.