SRFB v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SRFB v Minister for Immigration &
Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 252

MIGRATION – jurisdictional error - requirements in s 424A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – natural justice

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 424A, 424B, 424C, 425,

Migration Legislation Amendment (Procedural Fairness) Act 2002 (Cth)

Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559 referred to

Re Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham (1998) 168 ALR 407 referred to

VEAJ of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 678 referred to

Nader v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 101 FCR 352 referred to

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Al Shamry (2001) 110 FCR 27 referred to

SRFB & SRGB v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

S 66 of 2004

RYAN, JACOBSON & LANDER JJ
8 SEPTEMBER 2004
ADELAIDE

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

S 66 of 2004

On appeal from a single judge of the Federal Court of Australia

BETWEEN:

SRFB & SRGB
APPELLANTS

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION &
MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

RYAN, JACOBSON & LANDER JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

8 SEPTEMBER 2004

WHERE MADE:

ADELAIDE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellants pay the respondent’s costs in the proceedings.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

S66 of 2004

On appeal from a single judge of the Federal Court of Australia

BETWEEN:

SRFB & SRGB
APPELLANTS

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION &
MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

RYAN, JACOBSON & LANDER JJ

DATE:

8 SEPTEMBER 2004

PLACE:

ADELAIDE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction:

  1. This is an appeal from a judgment of a judge of the Court (Mansfield J) dismissing an application under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) for review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (‘the RRT’) made on 5 December 2001. The RRT affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister refusing to grant the appellants protection visas.

  2. The appellants are citizens of Iran.  They claimed to have a well-founded fear of persecution on religious or political grounds arising from charges of apostasy which they said were brought against them when they returned to Iran from India in October 2000.  They claimed that they did not know the precise basis of the charges but they offered three possible explanations to the RRT including the claim that they lived together in India for much of the period from 1992 to October 2000 without being married.

  3. The RRT rejected the appellants’ claims, largely on the ground that they were implausible.  The appellants contended before the learned primary judge that the decision of the RRT was affected by a number of separate grounds of jurisdictional error.  Four of those grounds are pursued on the appeal.

  4. The…

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Details
Case
[2004] FCAFC 252
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of SRFB v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs, the appellants, a married couple, sought to appeal against the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) which had rejected their application for refugee status. The RRT found that the appellants were not reliable witnesses, particularly in respect of evidence about their association with each other and the wife’s marriage to a third party. These inconsistencies and implausibilities led the RRT to reject the appellants' claim that they were declared 'mortad' because they were living together without being married.

The legal issues in the case centred around the obligations of the RRT under sections 424A and 441A of the relevant legislation. Specifically, the appellants argued that the RRT had breached natural justice by not providing adequate notice of the information that would be relied upon to affirm the decision of the delegate before the hearing. The appellants contended that this failure constituted procedural unfairness.

The court considered that section 424A does not require the RRT to give particulars of information before the oral hearing, as the section is triggered only when the RRT has determined that the information would be a reason, or part of the reason, for affirming the decision. The court found that in this case, the RRT's decision to provide particulars of the information after the hearing did not breach the principles of natural justice. The court further held that there was no implied limitation in section 424A that would prevent the RRT from providing an opportunity for the appellants to respond orally during the hearing once the need for the statutory notice arose.

The appeal was ultimately dismissed, and the appellants were ordered to pay the respondent's costs in the proceedings.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellants pay the respondent’s costs in the proceedings.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The appellants claimed that they returned to Iran from India in October 2000 but they fled after being declared ‘mortad’. The RRT rejected this claim as a logical consequence of its findings about the various explanations given by the appellants for the underlying reason why the Iranian authorities brought the charges against them.The oral evidence of the ‘inconsistency’ The transcript indicates that the husband and the wife were both present at the same time during the hearing. Some of the questions about the wife’s first marriage seem to have been addressed to the husband and the wife. The question of the first marriage was raised by the interviewing officer during the morning of the hearing. The following exchange took place:-IO:‘OK. Now, as you know, there was a bit of confusion in your application and with the delegate about whether or not you were previously married. Can you explain to me if you were married before?LAK: [the wife] Yes.INT:I married on 24th of August 98, and I got divorced on April 2000. And I didn’t, I didn’t tell that to my adviser.IO:So you were married the 24th of August 98, and you said you divorced when?INT:April 2000.…IO:Did – how did your organise the divorce?LAK:I sent a letter to my father and I give permission to him to get with a divorce.’ Later in the morning there was an adjournment. After the adjournment the following exchange took place between the appellants and the interviewing officer:-INT: (For SK) [the husband]‘If you are not convinced with anything if you ask us we will provide you with more details please just let us know which parts you need further details or elaborations and we will explain the matter.IO:What I would like to do is put to you some information that the Tribunal has but hasn’t been before you. Because this information is not information that you’ve presented to the Tribunal and it’s adverse information there is a time period by which you can respond to it. What I would like to do though, is to give you the opportunity for me to give it to you in the hearing and to give you the opportunity to discuss it with me if you so wish. But what I will also be doing is presenting a letter to you probably by your adviser and then you will have a time period within which you can respond to this material. So I will put it officially in the sense of it being a written form but I would also like to raise it now in the hearing to give you an opportunity to respond.Now, I have with me a copy of your tourist visa application that you put into the Australian Consulate General in Mumbai. And I have a copy of both – both of you applied for tourist visas. So I have a copy of both of those and the supporting documentation which you provided with your application for tourist visa. I also have a photocopy of your passport that you presented at that stage to the Australian Consulate General. The information that you supplied to the Australian Consulate General in both cases, in both your applications, is different in a number of ways to the information that you have given me today in the hearing. This information calls into question your credibility and it is significant in this particular case because it was also an issue, credibility was also an issue for different reasons, with the delegate.Now, what I’d like to do is run through some of the discrepancies or inconsistencies. If you wish, you can respond or your adviser can respond but if you wish you can also stay that and respond in writing after I write to you officially to put these points to you. So the first point relates to [the first husband].’

Decision

Reasons for decision

The appellants were married in October 2000 and, where we refer to them individually we will call them the ‘husband’ and the ‘wife’.The Decision of the RRT The RRT found that the appellants were not reliable witnesses, particularly in respect of evidence about their association with each other and about the wife’s marriage to a third party. This evidence was central to the claimed fear of persecution because it was one of the explanations given by them for the charge of ‘mortad’ or apostasy. The explanations which they gave were that they lived together unmarried, that they were involved with new age teachings known as ‘Osho’ and that they had associated with a political activist whose views were opposed to the government of Iran. The wife’s evidence was that she and her husband began living together in India in 1992 but that in August 1998 she married another man (“the first husband”) whom she divorced in April 2000. Her evidence was that she then resumed living with her husband although she did not marry him until about six months later, ie, in October 2000. However, in the course of the hearing the appellants were confronted with a document, being an application for a tourist visa sought by the wife in September 2000. She stated in the applicant form that she was then married to her first husband. The RRT raised with the appellants the inconsistency between this document and the evidence that the wife had divorced her first husband in April 2000 and had resumed living with her husband. The transcript of the hearing shows that the RRT informed the appellants that it would be writing to them to give them an opportunity to respond to the inconsistency. But the RRT also informed the appellants that they could discuss the inconsistency with the presiding member at the hearing. They were told that the issue affected their credibility and the wife provided an oral response at the hearing. We will set out below the relevant portions of the transcript. After the hearing the RRT sent a letter to each of the appellants stating that the information about the tourist visa application was a reason, or part of the reasons, for affirming the decision of the delegate. The letter was apparently sent in accordance with s 424A. The RRT did not accept the explanation given by the appellants either orally or in their response to the letter namely that the wife did not know in September 2000 whether she was legally married to her first husband. The RRT found that no satisfactory explanation was provided by the appellants as to this aspect of their evidence. The RRT also found that there were other aspects of the claim that the appellants were living together unmarried during the period from 1992 to 2000 which did not make sense. The RRT said that these ‘implausibilities combined with unreliable and inconsistent evidence’ led to the rejection of the appellants’ claim that they were declared ‘mortad’ because they were living together without being married.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The primary judge considered that the RRT had addressed all of the appellants’ claims. He was of the view, at [65], that the RRT addressed the claim of imputed political opinion. He said that the RRT found that the appellants did not associate with political activists and this was consistent with the RRT’s general concern about the reliability of their evidence.Consideration It seems to us to be clear that s 424A does not require that particulars be given prior to the oral hearing. This is because the RRT’s obligation is to give particulars of any information it considers would be the reason, or part of the reason, for affirming the decision. Thus, as has been recognised in a number of authorities, s 424A is enlivened only at the point at which the RRT has information and has determined that the information would be the reason or part of the reason for affirming the decision; see VEAJ of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 678 at [31] (Gray J); Nader v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 101 FCR 352 at [59] (Hill J). Even if, as in the present case, the RRT has acquired information before the hearing, the point at which the information may become a relevant reason will often be reached only after an applicant has responded to questions at the hearing. As Merkel J (with whom Ryan and Conti JJ agreed) observed in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Al Shamry (2001) 110 FCR 27 at [30] (“Al Shamry”) s 424A makes no provision for an invitation to be given to an applicant in the course of the hearing. If the RRT is aware prior to the hearing of the significance of the item of information of which the applicant may be unaware, fairness may require that particulars of the information be supplied before the review; Al Shamry at [40]. That was not so in the present case. Counsel for the appellants put an alternative submission. The effect of it was that there is an implied limitation in s 424A that once the need to give the notice arises, the RRT cannot depart from the statutory requirements of s 424A and s 441A by extending an inconsistent invitation to an applicant to respond orally during the hearing. That is to say, the RRT cannot approbate and reprobate the statutory obligations to which it is subject under s 424A. It is of course plain that there is no such express limitation contained in s 424A. However, as Merkel J said in Al Shamry at [39] – [40], s 424A is a statutory enactment of the basic rules of natural justice. Thus, the only implied limitation can be one of fairness in the way in which the statutory obligations are observed. It is impossible to spell out the content of this limitation in more precise terms. Each case must turn on its own facts. An example of procedural unfairness would be if an interviewing officer were to inform an applicant at the hearing that, although the requisite statutory notice would be given after the hearing, the applicant would be treated more favourably if he or she responded orally without waiting for the notice.