Re McBain; Ex Parte Australian Catholic Bishops Conference

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GLEESON CJ,
GAUDRON, McHUGH, GUMMOW, KIRBY, HAYNE AND CALLINAN JJ

RE JOHN McBAIN   SECOND RESPONDENT

EX PARTE AUSTRALIAN CATHOLIC  APPLICANTS
BISHOPS CONFERENCE & ANOR

Re McBain; Ex parte Australian Catholic Bishops Conference
[2002] HCA 16
18 April 2002
C22/2000

ORDER

Application dismissed with costs.

Representation:

D F Jackson QC with J A McCarthy QC and M Christie for the applicants (instructed by Dibbs Barker Gosling)

No appearance for the first respondent

F P Hampel QC with S J Moloney for the second respondent (instructed by John W Ball & Sons)

Interveners:

R G Orr QC with R Sofroniou intervening on behalf of the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)

R J Ellicott QC with A J Tudehope intervening on behalf of the Australian Family Association (instructed by O'Hara & Company)

B W Walker SC with K L Eastman intervening on behalf of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (instructed by the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission)

C M Maxwell QC with K L Emerton intervening on behalf of the Women's Electoral Lobby (Victoria) Inc (instructed by Blake Dawson Waldron)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GLEESON CJ,
GAUDRON, McHUGH, GUMMOW, KIRBY, HAYNE AND CALLINAN JJ

RE JOHN McBAIN   SECOND RESPONDENT

EX PARTE ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF                            APPLICANT
THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
EX REL THE AUSTRALIAN EPISCOPAL
CONFERENCE OF THE ROMAN
CATHOLIC CHURCH

Re McBain; Ex parte Attorney-General (Cth) ex rel Australian Episcopal Conference of the Roman Catholic Church
18 April 2002
C6/2001

ORDER

Application dismissed with costs.

Representation:

D F Jackson QC with J A McCarthy QC and M Christie for the applicant (instructed by Dibbs Barker Gosling)

No appearance for the first respondent

F P Hampel QC with S J Moloney for the second respondent (instructed by John W Ball & Sons)

Interveners:

R G Orr QC with R Sofroniou intervening on behalf of the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)

R J Ellicott QC with A J Tudehope intervening on behalf of the Australian Family Association (instructed by O'Hara & Company)

B W Walker SC with K L Eastman intervening on behalf of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (instructed by the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission)

C M Maxwell QC with K L Emerton intervening on behalf of the Women's Electoral Lobby (Victoria) Inc (instructed by Blake Dawson Waldron)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

  1. GLEESON CJ.These proceedings are brought, in the original jurisdiction of this Court, to quash a decision of a single judge of the Federal Court of Australia, Sundberg J[1].  The ground of challenge to the decision is not that the judge acted outside jurisdiction, or otherwise fell into jurisdictional error.  It is that the decision, made within jurisdiction, was wrong in law.  No party to…

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Details
Case
[2002] HCA 16
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court considered applications brought by the Australian Catholic Bishops Conference and the Commonwealth Attorney-General, ex rel. the Episcopal Conference, seeking writs of certiorari. These applications concerned a prior, concluded litigation in the Federal Court. The applicants were not parties to the original Federal Court proceedings and had not appealed or sought constitutional relief in relation to that judgment. The Attorney-General's application also sought to affirm the operation of a State law as not inconsistent with federal law under section 109 of the Constitution.

The central legal issues before the High Court were whether the claims presented by the applicants constituted a "matter" within the meaning of Chapter III of the Constitution, thereby engaging the Court's original jurisdiction. Specifically, the Court had to determine if a matter arose under section 75(v) or section 76(i) of the Constitution independently of any right of appeal, and if so, whether relief should be granted in the exercise of the Court's discretion. The Court also considered whether certiorari was available against a judge of a federal superior court for non-jurisdictional error of law on the face of the record, and the factors relevant to the exercise of discretion in refusing such relief, particularly when the applicants were not parties to the original litigation.

The Court ultimately dismissed the applications. While acknowledging the potential for a broad interpretation of "matter" as suggested by cases like *Mellifont v Attorney-General (Q)*, the Court found that the claims before it did not give rise to a justiciable "matter" under Chapter III of the Constitution. The applicants, not being parties to the original litigation and lacking a direct interest in the outcome, could not establish the necessary standing or a genuine controversy to invoke the Court's original jurisdiction for certiorari in this context. The Court also noted reservations regarding the assumption that the *Sex Discrimination Act 1984* (Cth) was a law with respect to external affairs, and raised observations about the capacity of a State executive to abstain from enforcing its own legislation. The applications were dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Application dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

GLEESON CJ GAUDRON AND GUMMOW JJ HUGH J (dissent) CALLINAN J (dissent)
I would therefore refuse the application by the Attorney‑General of the Commonwealth to intervene in the application brought in his name. He intervened in the other application as of right.Conclusion The application by the Episcopal Conference and the application by the Attorney‑General of the Commonwealth should each be dismissed, in each case with costs. Subject to two reservations and one addition I agree with the reasons for judgment and orders proposed by McHugh J. My first reservation is as to the correctness of the highly questionable assumption which was made by all who presented arguments in this case, that the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) was a law with respect to external affairs. My second reservation relates to another matter which was not argued, that the State of Victoria, which is to say the Executive of that State, may deliberately and selectively abstain from enforcing[310] an enactment, indeed a relatively recent enactment of the legislature of that State, whether it has or has not the capacity to persuade the legislature to change or repeal that enactment by a subsequent enactment: and whether in those circumstances some other person might be entitled to do so.[310]cf Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers [1978] AC 435; Truth About Motorways Pty Ltd v Macquarie Infrastructure Investment Management Ltd (2000) 200 CLR 591 at 668-670 [206]-[211], 671 [215]. In addition, I wish to make some observations about the meaning of the word "matter". As long ago as 1921, its presence in Ch III of the Constitution gave rise to conflicting views whether this Court could provide advisory opinions[311]. It has also given rise to differing opinions as to the Court's jurisdiction to hear appeals on questions of law in criminal cases[312]; and whether the Parliament may or may not confer jurisdiction on a Federal Court over part of a "matter"[313]. More recently, this Court has been required to consider the question whether the Parliament can confer standing on persons who are not directly affected by a legal wrong[314]. For present purposes it is sufficient to point out that in Mellifont v Attorney-General (Q)[315], an "appeal" in a criminal case in which the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal (and of this Court) would, in the circumstances play no part in the subsequent determination of the charge in the indictment, this Court (Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ, Brennan J dissenting) held that an Attorney-General's reference under s 669A of The Criminal Code (Q) related to the subject matter of the legal proceedings at first instance, and was not therefore divorced from the ordinary administration of the law[316]. Mellifont may therefore provide a basis for a broad view of what is a "matter" and that perhaps, the absence of an "immediate" right, duty, privilege or liability may not of itself always be decisive.[311]In re Judiciary and Navigation Acts (1921) 29 CLR 257.[312]cf Saffron v The Queen (1953) 88 CLR 523; Mellifont v Attorney-General (Q) (1991) 173 CLR 289.[313]Abebe v Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 510.[314]Truth About Motorways Pty Ltd v Macquarie Infrastructure Investment Management Ltd (2000) 200 CLR 591.[315](1991) 173 CLR 289.[316](1991) 173 CLR 289 at 305 per Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson, Gaudron and McHugh JJ.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GLEESON CJ, GAUDRON AND GUMMOW JJ,

Full text does not contain this section.