Jagroop v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Jagroop v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 48

Review of: Amitesh Bali Chand Jagroop v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] AATA 751
File number: VID 683 of 2015
Judges: DOWSETT, KENNY AND MORTIMER JJ
Date of judgment: 15 April 2016
Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – migration – judicial review of Administrative Appeals Tribunal decision affirming cancellation of applicant’s skilled visa under s 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether Ministerial Direction revoked after application made to Tribunal for review applicable – whether Ministerial Direction given under s 499 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) administrative or legislative instrument – unnecessary to determine – whether accrued right in relation to review by Tribunal which engaged s 7(2)(c) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) – application dismissed – Legislative Instruments Act 2003 (Cth) ss 5, 13 – Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) ss 7, 46
Legislation:

Acts Interpretation Act1901 (Cth)

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth)

Legislative Instruments Act 2003 (Cth)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

Legislation Act 2003 (Cth)

Acts and Instruments (Framework Reform) Act 1915 (Cth)

Legislation (Exemptions and Other Matters) Regulation 2015 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Anderson v Minister for Environment, Heritage and the Arts [2010] FCA 57; 182 FCR 462

Applied Medical Australia Pty Ltd v Minister for Health [2016] FCA 35

Commonwealth v Grunseit (1943) 67 CLR 58

Currareva Partnership v Welford [2000] QSC 98; 5 QAR 211

Demillo v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCAFC 134; 139 ALD 29

Esber v Commonwealth [1992] HCA 20; 174 CLR 430

Jebb v Repatriation Commission (1988) 8 AAR 285; 80 ALR 329

Kraljevich v Lake View and Star Ltd (1945) 70 CLR 647

Lee v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1996) 68 FCR 491

Maxwell v Murphy (1957) 96 CLR 261

Minister for Industry and Commerce v Tooheys Ltd (1982) 60 FLR 325

Paerau v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCAFC 28; 219 FCR 504

Queensland Medical Laboratory v Blewett (1988) 84 ALR 615

Repatriation Commission v Keeley [2000] FCA 532; 98 FCR 108

RG Capital Radio Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Authority [2001] FCA 855; 113 FCR 185

Roche Products Pty Ltd v National Drugs and Poisons Schedule Committee [2007] FCA 1352; (2007) 163 FCR 451

Rodway v The Queen (1990) 169 CLR 515

Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority (2008) 235 CLR 286

Uelese v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 86; 60 AAR 534

Vietnam Veterans’ Association of Australia New South Wales Branch Inc v Cohen (1996) 70 FCR 419

Visa International Service Association v Reserve Bank of Australia [2003] FCA 977; 131 FCR 300

Williams v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 674; 226 FCR 112

Date of hearing: 11 February 2016
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 83
Counsel…
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Details
Case
[2016] FCAFC 48
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Jagroop, a Fijian citizen, against the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the Federal Court of Australia was called upon to determine the validity of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal's (AAT) decision affirming the cancellation of the applicant's skilled visa under section 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The applicant contested the applicability of a subsequent Ministerial Direction, Direction No. 65, which revoked the earlier Direction No. 55, arguing that Direction No. 55 should apply to his case. The central legal issues involved whether Direction No. 55 constituted a legislative or administrative instrument and, more crucially, whether the applicant had accrued a right under Direction No. 55 that would be protected by section 7(2)(c) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth).

The court examined the nature of Direction No. 55, determining that it was neither purely legislative nor purely administrative but rather a directive that provided general guidance without dictating specific outcomes in individual cases. This characterisation was significant because it determined the applicability of section 7(2)(c) of the Acts Interpretation Act, which protects accrued rights from the effects of subsequent legislative changes. The court found that Direction No. 55 did not confer any specific rights on the applicant that would be affected by its revocation, as it did not specify outcomes for individual cases but rather provided general guidance. Consequently, the court concluded that the applicant did not have any accrued rights under Direction No. 55 that would be protected by section 7(2)(c).

The Federal Court dismissed the application, holding that the applicant had not accrued any right under Direction No. 55 that would be protected from the effects of its revocation. The court further ordered that the applicant pay the costs of the first respondent, the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection. This decision underscores the importance of the distinction between legislative and administrative instruments in the context of judicial review and the protection of accrued rights under the Acts Interpretation Act.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of and incidental to the application.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons set out below, we do not consider the applicant accrued or acquired any right under Direction No. 55, and therefore we would dismiss the application.BACKGROUND The applicant is a Fijian citizen who had previously been to Australia on a tourist visa, but who relevantly entered Australia on 2 November 2003 as the holder of a Skilled – Australian-sponsored (Migrant) (Class BQ) visa, subclass 139 (Skilled – Designated Area-sponsored). The applicant returned to Fiji for short visits on several occasions, but continued to reside in Australia until he left voluntarily in early 2014 and returned to Fiji. During some of these 11 years in Australia, the applicant was incarcerated. As the Tribunal’s decision on review records, the applicant was convicted of the manslaughter of his then wife, Nileshni Singh, who had come to Australia from Fiji in February 2006, having married the applicant secretly in Fiji in June 2005. In December 2007, the applicant pleaded guilty in the Supreme Court of Victoria to one count of criminally negligent manslaughter. He was sentenced on 13 February 2008 to imprisonment for ten years with a non-parole period of seven years, a sentence subsequently reduced by the Court of Appeal in March 2009 to eight years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of five years and six months. The applicant was released on parole on 21 December 2011. The applicant lived in the community for almost a year before receiving, in November 2012, a notice from the Department of Immigration and Citizenship that consideration was being given to whether to cancel his skilled visa under s 501(2) of the Migration Act on the basis that he did not pass the character test in the Migration Act. A deliberative process then ensued, during which the applicant made submissions to the Department as to why his skilled visa should not be cancelled. On 30 January 2013, a delegate of the Minister decided, pursuant to s 501(2) of the Migration Act, to cancel the applicant’s skilled visa. The applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate’s decision on 6 February 2013, and on 19 April 2013, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision. In doing so, the Tribunal applied Direction No. 55 concerning visa refusal and cancellation under s 501 of the Migration Act. The Tribunal’s decision was eventually set aside by a Full Court of this Court on 23 September 2014, and the matter was remitted to the Tribunal for determination. After the Full Court’s decision, in December 2014, Direction No. 65 was made, and in its terms it revoked Direction No. 55. On remitter, there was no dispute that the applicant did not pass the character test set out in s 501(6) and so the residual discretionary power in s 501(2) fell to be exercised. The applicant contended before the Tribunal that although Direction No. 55 had been revoked in the intervening period, it should apply to his review in preference to Direction No. 65. Contrary to that contention, the Tribunal decided Direction No. 65 was applicable.RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

This provision had a parallel, in relation to legislative instruments, in s 13 of the Legislative Instruments Act. The effect of both provisions was that for the purposes of the application of s 7(2) of the Acts Interpretation Act, unless there was a contrary intention, the operation and application of instruments of either a legislative or administrative character could be affected by the terms of s 7(2)(c). In this circumstance, assuming there was no contrary intention for the purposes of applying s 7(2), the outcome of this appeal turned on whether the applicant had acquired a right under Direction No. 55, which engaged s 7(2)(c) of the Acts Interpretation Act.THE TRIBUNAL’S DECISION On the issue of which Direction was applicable, the focus of the argument before the Tribunal, and therefore its reasoning, was on the question whether Direction No. 55 was a legislative instrument. This led to the application of s 7(2)(c) of the Acts Interpretation Act through the route of ss 5 and 13 of the Legislative Instruments Act. Although that focus was unnecessary for the reasons we have just explained, given the way the matter was argued before it, the Tribunal’s approach on the review cannot reasonably be criticised. We turn to set out its reasoning. The Tribunal recognised that given neither Direction No. 55 nor Direction No. 65 was registered in accordance with the Legislative Instruments Act, the deeming provision in s 5(3) did not operate in respect of them. In considering the other aspects of the definition of “legislative instrument” in s 5 of the Legislative Instruments Act, the Tribunal did not accept that directions given under s 499, while they were instruments in writing, bore a “legislative character” as s 5(1)(a) of the Legislative Instruments Act then required. Contrasting directions given under s 499 of the Migration Act with a determination made under s 85 of the Migration Act, the Tribunal said at [45]-[46]:A determination of the sort made under s 85 of the Migration Act does determine the law in that it limits the application of the law so that a visa may only be granted to those who meet the quota restrictions. Qualification under the Migration Act and Regulations is insufficient. That is a qualification to the law as it would otherwise apply. That same is true of those determinations that the Migration Act specifies must be made by legislative instrument.The Directions made under s 499 are, however, in a different category. The power that Parliament has given to the Minister under s 499 is not to modify what would otherwise be the operation of the law. Section 499(2) specifically provides that the Minister does not have power to give directions that would be inconsistent with the Migration Act or regulations made under it. If directions made under s 499 were characterised as a modification or variation of what was provided for by Parliament in the legislation, be it the Act or Regulations, that would be contrary to s 499(2).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

An example of a statement with a qualitative nature which decision makers must then apply in those terms is what appears in cl 9.2(1)(a)(i) and (ii), which provide:9.2 Strength, duration and nature of the person's ties to Australia(1) Reflecting the principles at 6.3, decision-makers must have regard to:a)How long the person has resided in Australia, including whether the person arrived as a young child, noting that;i)Less weight should be given where the person began offending soon after arriving in Australia; andii)More weight should be given to time the person has spent contributing positively to the Australian community. Notwithstanding these features, as the Minister submitted, the terms of Direction No. 55 do not purport to direct a decision maker as to the outcome of the s 501(2) residual discretion in relation to any given individual, or categories of individuals. Further, by the use of qualifying words such as “generally” (for example, in cl 8(4) that primary considerations “should generally be given greater weight than the other considerations”), the weighing process in each case is in substance left, as it must be, to the individual decision maker exercising the power under s 501.Characterisation as legislative or administrative The choice between characterisation of a power as legislative or administrative power has been described as “difficult in theory and impossible in practice”: see RG Capital RadioLtd v Australian Broadcasting Authority [2001] FCA 855; 113 FCR 185 at [40], citing the Report of the Committee on Ministers’ Powers (“the Donoughmore Committee”) (HMSO Cmd 4060) at 19. There is now a considerable body of authority providing guidance on how that choice should be made: see Commonwealth v Grunseit (1943) 67 CLR 58; Minister for Industry and Commerce v Tooheys Ltd (1982) 60 FLR 325; RG Capital RadioLtd v Australian Broadcasting Authority; Queensland Medical Laboratory v Blewett (1988) 84 ALR 615; Vietnam Veterans’ Affairs Association of Australia New South Wales Branch Inc v Cohen (1996) 70 FCR 419; Currareva Partnership v Welford [2000] QSC 98; 5 QAR 211; Visa International Service Association v Reserve Bank of Australia [2003] FCA 977; 131 FCR 300; Roche Products Pty Ltd v National Drugs and Poisons Schedule Committee [2007] FCA 1352; 163 FCR 451; Anderson v Minister for Environment, Heritage and the Arts [2010] FCA 57; 182 FCR 462; Applied Medical Australia Pty Ltd v Minister for Health [2016] FCA 35. Those authorities can be put to one side in the present proceeding. For the reasons we have outlined, whether administrative or legislative in character, Direction No. 55 was affected by the terms of s 7(2)(c) of the Acts Interpretation Act, either through s 13 of the Legislative Instruments Act (if it was legislative in character) or through s 46 of the Acts Interpretation Act (if it was administrative). As already indicated, the critical issue for the outcome of this judicial review application is whether the revocation of Direction No. 55 affects “any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under” the Direction, for the purposes of s 7(2)(c) of the Acts Interpretation Act. Did the applicant accrue a right under Direction No. 55?