FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Jagroop v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 48
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- Case
- [2016] FCAFC 48
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the nature of Direction No. 55, determining that it was neither purely legislative nor purely administrative but rather a directive that provided general guidance without dictating specific outcomes in individual cases. This characterisation was significant because it determined the applicability of section 7(2)(c) of the Acts Interpretation Act, which protects accrued rights from the effects of subsequent legislative changes. The court found that Direction No. 55 did not confer any specific rights on the applicant that would be affected by its revocation, as it did not specify outcomes for individual cases but rather provided general guidance. Consequently, the court concluded that the applicant did not have any accrued rights under Direction No. 55 that would be protected by section 7(2)(c).
The Federal Court dismissed the application, holding that the applicant had not accrued any right under Direction No. 55 that would be protected from the effects of its revocation. The court further ordered that the applicant pay the costs of the first respondent, the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection. This decision underscores the importance of the distinction between legislative and administrative instruments in the context of judicial review and the protection of accrued rights under the Acts Interpretation Act.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of and incidental to the application.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
An example of a statement with a qualitative nature which decision makers must then apply in those terms is what appears in cl 9.2(1)(a)(i) and (ii), which provide:9.2 Strength, duration and nature of the person's ties to Australia(1) Reflecting the principles at 6.3, decision-makers must have regard to:a)How long the person has resided in Australia, including whether the person arrived as a young child, noting that;i)Less weight should be given where the person began offending soon after arriving in Australia; andii)More weight should be given to time the person has spent contributing positively to the Australian community. Notwithstanding these features, as the Minister submitted, the terms of Direction No. 55 do not purport to direct a decision maker as to the outcome of the s 501(2) residual discretion in relation to any given individual, or categories of individuals. Further, by the use of qualifying words such as “generally” (for example, in cl 8(4) that primary considerations “should generally be given greater weight than the other considerations”), the weighing process in each case is in substance left, as it must be, to the individual decision maker exercising the power under s 501.Characterisation as legislative or administrative The choice between characterisation of a power as legislative or administrative power has been described as “difficult in theory and impossible in practice”: see RG Capital RadioLtd v Australian Broadcasting Authority [2001] FCA 855; 113 FCR 185 at [40], citing the Report of the Committee on Ministers’ Powers (“the Donoughmore Committee”) (HMSO Cmd 4060) at 19. There is now a considerable body of authority providing guidance on how that choice should be made: see Commonwealth v Grunseit (1943) 67 CLR 58; Minister for Industry and Commerce v Tooheys Ltd (1982) 60 FLR 325; RG Capital RadioLtd v Australian Broadcasting Authority; Queensland Medical Laboratory v Blewett (1988) 84 ALR 615; Vietnam Veterans’ Affairs Association of Australia New South Wales Branch Inc v Cohen (1996) 70 FCR 419; Currareva Partnership v Welford [2000] QSC 98; 5 QAR 211; Visa International Service Association v Reserve Bank of Australia [2003] FCA 977; 131 FCR 300; Roche Products Pty Ltd v National Drugs and Poisons Schedule Committee [2007] FCA 1352; 163 FCR 451; Anderson v Minister for Environment, Heritage and the Arts [2010] FCA 57; 182 FCR 462; Applied Medical Australia Pty Ltd v Minister for Health [2016] FCA 35. Those authorities can be put to one side in the present proceeding. For the reasons we have outlined, whether administrative or legislative in character, Direction No. 55 was affected by the terms of s 7(2)(c) of the Acts Interpretation Act, either through s 13 of the Legislative Instruments Act (if it was legislative in character) or through s 46 of the Acts Interpretation Act (if it was administrative). As already indicated, the critical issue for the outcome of this judicial review application is whether the revocation of Direction No. 55 affects “any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under” the Direction, for the purposes of s 7(2)(c) of the Acts Interpretation Act. Did the applicant accrue a right under Direction No. 55?