Fraud of servants of Crown preventing knowledge of breach of contract-When time begins to run-Crown Suits Act 1898 (W.A.) (62 Vict. No. 9), secs. 5 (2), 32, 33, PERTH.

36, 37-Mining Development Act 1902 (W.4.) (2 Edw. VII. No. 20). secs. 19, July 27.

Part III. (secs. 22-37) of the Crown Suits Act 1898 (W.A.) provides for the enforcing of claims against the Crown by a petition and proceedings thereon

31 CLR 77

similar to those in an ordinary action between subjects. Sec. 33 provides H. C. OF that No claim or demand shall be made against the Crown under this Part of this Act unless it is founded upon and arises out of some one of the causes of action mentioned in this section. Provided that nothing herein contained shall be deemed to give a cause of action for breach of contract which would not have arisen in like circumstances before the passing of this Act. (1) Breach of any contract entered into by or under the lawful authority of the Governor on behalf of the Crown or of the Executive Government of the Colony, whether such authority is express or implied." Sec. 37 provides that "No person shall be entitled to prosecute or enforce any claim or demand under this Part of this Act unless the petition setting forth the relief sought is filed within twelve months after the claim or demand has arisen."

Held, that fraudulent conduct on the part of the servants of the Crown, which has prevented a person who has contracted with the Crown from knowing that the Crown has committed a breach of the contract, does not extend the time for filing a petition in respect of the breach of contract beyond twelve months after the breach complained of took place.

Gibbs v. Guild, (1882) 9 Q.B.D., 59, distinguished. Decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia (Burnside J.) in part

APPEAL from the Supreme Court of Western Australia.

A petition under the Crown Suits Act 1898 (W.A.) by Neil McNeil and Claude de Bernales, who carried on business under the firm name of the West Australian Gold and Copper Mines, was filed on 26th August 1919, and, as amended on 8th June 1921, was substantially as follows :-

1. Between January 1914 and June 1915 your petitioners delivered to the State Smelting Works on the Phillips River Goldfields 108 lots of copper ore under the provisions of the regulations for the pur- chase of auriferous copper ores made on 25th February 1914 by the Governor in Executive Council under the powers conferred by the Mining Development Act 1902 (W.A.).

2. By the said regulations it was provided (inter alia) as follows :- 11. A charge will be made to cover the costs of receiving, sampling, and smelting the…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading The Crown v McNeil

Details

AGLC: The Crown v McNeil [1922] HCA 33
Case: [1922] HCA 33
Decision Date: 27 July 1922

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Neil McNeil and Claude de Bernales, trading as the West Australian Gold and Copper Mines, petitioned the Supreme Court of Western Australia against the Crown. The dispute concerned alleged overcharges and underpayments by the State Smelting Works in relation to the delivery and treatment of copper ore between January 1914 and March 1919. The petitioners claimed that the Smelting Works, acting under the authority of the Crown, had breached contractual obligations by rendering untrue accounts and failing to pay the correct proceeds from the sale of the ore's products.

The central legal issues before the High Court on appeal were whether the claims brought by the petitioners were barred by the twelve-month time limit stipulated in section 37 of the Crown Suits Act 1898 (W.A.), and whether fraudulent conduct by the Crown's servants, which concealed the breach of contract from the petitioners, could extend this time limit. The Crown argued that section 37 imposed a strict condition precedent to enforcing any claim, and that equitable principles regarding concealed fraud did not apply to actions against the Crown under this Act. The petitioners contended that their cause of action for an account of continuous dealings did not arise until their demand for an account was refused, and alternatively, that concealed fraud prevented the time limit from running.

The High Court, in its judgment, held that fraudulent conduct by the Crown's servants, which prevented a party from knowing of a breach of contract, did not extend the time for filing a petition under the Crown Suits Act beyond the twelve months prescribed by section 37. The Court distinguished the present case from equitable principles applied in private litigation, emphasising that section 37 was a statutory bar to prosecuting claims against the Crown. The Court found that the claims in question arose at the time of the alleged overcharges or underpayments, not at the later date of the demand for an account or discovery of the fraud. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal in part, finding that claims arising more than twelve months before the petition was filed were time-barred.

Orders