Madden v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Madden v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2014] FCA 446

Citation: Madden v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2014] FCA 446
Parties: ALEXANDER WILLIAM MADDEN v OFFICIAL TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY and MAXWELL WILLIAM PRENTICE
File number: NSD 866 of 2013
Judge: FARRELL J
Date of judgment: 8 May 2014
Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY – after-acquired property – construction of s 127 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (NSW) – interest in property held on resulting trust for bankrupt – trustee became aware of interest after expiration of 20 year period – whether trustee making a “claim” – distinction between legal and equitable interests – whether trustee needed to take steps to perfect title – whether property had re-vested pursuant to s 127 – effect of failure to disclose interest to trustee – whether bankrupt owed fiduciary duties to trustee – whether an estoppel arose in favour of trustee
Legislation:

Bankruptcy Act 1924 (Cth)
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth)
Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW)
Real Property Act 1900 (NSW)

Cases cited:

Breen v Williams (1996) 186 CLR 71
Burke v Stapleton (1970) 120 CLR 664
Coshott v Coshott [2013] FCA 907
Falloon v Madden [2012] NSWSC 652
Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation (1984) 156 CLR 41
Pilmer v Duke Group Limited (in liq) (2001) 207 CLR 165
R v McNeil (1922) 31 CLR 76
Re Auzhair Supplies Pty Limited (in Liq) [2013] NSWSC 1
Re Bulluss; Ex-parte Official Assignee (1957) 18 ABC 83
Re Dakin (1948) 14 ABC 186
Re Lehrain; Official Receiver (Trustee) v Frankston Timber Pty Ltd (1975) 6 ALR 301
Re Orange; Ex-parte Jaques (1958) 18 ABC 157
Re Quirk (1968) ALR 53
Re Sabine (1958) 18 ABC 188

Date of hearing: 30 September 2013
Date of last submissions: 30 September 2013
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 65
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr S White SC with Mr J King
Solicitor for the Applicant: Abraham Legal
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr S Golledge
Solicitor for the First Respondent: TressCox Lawyers
Counsel for the Second Respondent: Mr J T Johnson
Solicitor for the Respondents: Sally Nash & Co Lawyers

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 866 of 2013

BETWEEN:

ALEXANDER WILLIAM MADDEN
Applicant

AND:

OFFICIAL TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY
First Respondent

MAXWELL WILLIAM PRENTICE
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

FARRELL J

DATE OF ORDER:

8 MAY 2014

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT DECLARES THAT:

The applicant’s interest in certain land at Burraneer (Woolooware Property) referred to in Falloon v Madden [2012] NSWSC 652 is revested in him pursuant to s 127 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (Bankruptcy Act) subject to the rights of any person other than the first respondent or the second respondent.

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.   The first ground of the application is dismissed.

2.   The second respondent is restrained from taking any step to be registered under the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) as a proprietor of the Woolooware…

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Details
Case
[2014] FCA 446
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Madden v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy, the primary issue before the court was the determination of the ownership of the Woolooware Property, which was subject to a resulting trust arrangement. Mr Madden had been discharged from bankruptcy in 1998, but his interest in the property had vested in the Official Trustee due to his status as a bankrupt at the time of acquisition. The court had to decide whether the trustee's interest in the property would revert to Mr Madden after the expiration of the 20-year period stipulated in section 127(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).

The legal issues that the court had to resolve included whether the trustee needed to make a "claim" to perfect the title to the property, the distinction between legal and equitable interests, and whether the property had re-vested in Mr Madden pursuant to section 127. Furthermore, the court had to consider the effect of Mr Madden's failure to disclose his interest in the property to the trustee, whether the bankrupt owed fiduciary duties to the trustee, and if an estoppel arose in favour of the trustee.

The court held that the Official Trustee's interest in the Woolooware Property was perfected as a result of Mr Madden's equitable interest in the property, which vested in the trustee upon the acquisition of the property. The court found that the statutory provisions, including section 127(1) of the Bankruptcy Act, applied to both legal and equitable interests. The court also determined that the trustee was not required to take steps to perfect the title to the property, as the vesting of Mr Madden's interest in the property in the trustee was sufficient to constitute a perfected title. The court found that the property had re-vested in Mr Madden pursuant to section 127, and that the failure to disclose his interest in the property to the trustee did not result in any fiduciary duties owed by Mr Madden to the trustee. Finally, the court held that no estoppel arose in favour of the trustee.

ORDERS:

1. The first ground of the application is dismissed.
2. The second respondent is restrained from taking any step to be registered under the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) as a proprietor of the Woolooware Property.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The first ground of the application is dismissed.

2. The second respondent is restrained from taking any step to be registered under the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) as a proprietor of the Woolooware Property.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Unless otherwise indicated, all references to sections of an Act in these reasons are references to sections of the Bankruptcy Act.BACKGROUND Ms Margaret Falloon (Ms Falloon) was the registered proprietor of the Woolooware Property. She lived in a de facto relationship with Mr Madden at the time she completed its purchase on 3 January 1995. Mr Madden was discharged from bankruptcy under s 149(1) on 6 December 1998. Ms Falloon and Mr Madden married in December 1999 and Ms Falloon died on 31 July 2000, leaving two adult children from her prior marriage. Mr Madden’s son Michael was the executor of Ms Falloon’s estate.Falloon v Madden The question of who owned the Woolooware Property was the subject of a judgment of Stevenson J in the Supreme Court of New South Wales rendered on 14 June 2012: Falloon v Madden [2012] NSWSC 652 (Falloon) and the background to that litigation is taken from Stevenson J’s reasons for judgment. In proceedings commenced in 2010, Ms Falloon’s two adult children sought (among other things) a declaration against the executor of her estate that he held the Woolooware Property in trust for them as tenants in common in equal shares. The second proceedings were commenced by Mr Madden who sought a declaration that the executor held the Woolooware Property on resulting trust for Mr Madden alone. Relevantly to the matters in contention, Stevenson J said at [135]-[162]: 135My conclusion is that Bill [Mr Madden] and Margaret [Ms Falloon] contributed very nearly, but not quite equally to the purchase price [of the Woolooware Property]. I find that Margaret contributed $401,046.72 and that Bill contributed the balance, $408,953.28.136 That is, Bill contributed 50.5 per cent, and Margaret 49.5 per cent.137It follows from these conclusions that a presumption arises that Margaret held, and her estate now holds, a 50.5 per cent interest in the Woolooware Property on a resulting trust for Bill.138There is no evidence to rebut that presumption, and I am not able to infer, in all the circumstances, that Bill intended to make a gift to Margaret of that part of the Woolooware Property to which he contributed.139A more likely explanation may be that Bill wanted to "park" his interest in the Woolooware Property in Margaret's name because of his bankruptcy and to avoid "after acquired" property becoming divisible amongst his creditors.Bill's Bankruptcy140The resulting trust arose on settlement of the purchase of the Woolooware Property: that is 3 January 1995.141 On that date, Bill was a bankrupt. 142In my opinion, the equitable interest in the Woolooware Property arising by reason of the resulting trust to which I have referred was "after-acquired property" for the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).143Section 58(1)(b) of the Bankruptcy Act provides that "after-acquired property" vests in the Official Trustee as soon as it is acquired. Subsection 58(6) provides that "after-acquired property" means property "that is divisible amongst the creditors of the bankrupt". In s 5 "property" is defined to mean real or personal property and "includes any estate [or] interest...to any such real or personal property". Section 116(1) of that Act provides that property "divisible amongst creditors" includes property acquired by the bankrupt "after the commencement of the bankruptcy and before his or her discharge".144It follows that the equitable interest in the Woolooware Property arising from Bill's contribution to the purchase price vested in the Official Trustee.145Mr Evans accepts that Bill's interest in the Woolooware Property remains vested in the Official Trustee, notwithstanding his subsequent discharge from bankruptcy: Official Receiver v Schultz (1990) 170 CLR 306; Daemar v Industrial Commission of NSW (No 2) (1990) 22 NSWLR 178; Gosden v Dixon (1992) 107 ALR 329; Metherell v Public Trustee [2010] WASC 205 at [4]. 146Bill asserts that all the creditors of his bankrupt estate (including the Commissioner of Taxation) have been paid. If that is so, it may be that, taking into account his equitable interest in the Woolooware Property, there is now a surplus in his bankruptcy, which should revert to him.147In these circumstances the parties agree that it may be necessary to join the Official Trustee to these proceedings to deal with this aspect of the matter.148The parties have invited me to publish a judgment giving reasons in respect of all other aspects of the matter, with a view to join the Official Trustee once those matters are decided.149I have agreed to this proposal. Accordingly, this aspect of the matter will be revisited once the views of the Official Trustee are known.150However, as I explain below, the fact that what would otherwise be Bill's equitable interest in the Woolooware Property has vested in the Official Trustee has an impact on his claim for reimbursement for various amounts he claims to have expended in relation to the property. Resulting trust - joint tenants or tenants in common?151The question arises as to whether, in equity, Bill and Margaret held their interests in the Woolooware Property as joint tenants or as tenants in common.152As Margaret has died, the question is important because if she and Bill held their equitable interests in the Woolooware Property as joint tenants, Margaret's interest has now passed to Bill by operation of survivorship.153A case very similar to the present was considered the High Court in Delehunt v Carmody (1986) 161 CLR 464. 154In that case a man, living in a de facto relationship with a woman, purchased a property in his own name in circumstances where he and the woman contributed equally to the cost of acquisition of the property.155 Gibbs CJ (with whom the other members of the Court agreed) said: - "Of course in the present case the property was not conveyed to the two persons who had contributed to the purchase price, but to only one of them. When a purchase is made in the name of one of two or more persons who contributed to the purchase price, and the relationship between the parties does not give rise to a presumption of advancement, the property will be held on a resulting trust for the persons who paid the price. Quite clearly, where the contributions to the purchase price have been in unequal shares the property will be held on a resulting trust for the contributors as tenants in common in proportion to the amounts which each contributed; Calverley v Green (1984) 155 CLR 242 at 246-7, 258; 56 ALR 483. There seems to be no authority which decides the precise question whether, when a resulting trust was raised in favour of purchasers who had contributed to the price in equal shares, the beneficial interest of the purchasers would have been that of joint tenants or tenants in common. However, it would seem to follow, by analogy with the case where conveyance is made to all contributors, that (apart from the effect of section 26 of the Conveyancing Act) they would be equitable joint tenants, and this conclusion is accepted as correct in Hanbury and Maudsley, Modern Equity, 12th ed (1985) at 254 and Ford and Lee, Principles of the Law of Trusts (1986), at 966".156Section 26 of the Conveyancing Act 1919, to which Gibbs CJ referred provides: - "(1) In the construction of any instrument coming into operation after the commencement of this Act a disposition of the beneficial interest in any property whether with or without the legal estate to or for two or more persons together beneficially shall be deemed to be made to or for them as tenants in common, and not as joint tenants. "157The enactment of s 26 of the Conveyancing Act removed the presumption, formerly made in equity, that if two people advanced purchase money in equal shares they intended to be joint tenants of the land purchased.158Section 26 did not, in terms, apply to the facts in Delehunt v Carmody (and is not, in terms, engaged by the facts in this case) for the reason that there is no "instrument" disposing of the beneficial interest in the relevant property.159However, in Delehunt v Carmody Gibbs CJ concluded that the enactment of s 26 affected the relevant equitable presumption in circumstances of equal contribution. 160 Thus Gibbs CJ said: - "If equity follows the law, it will follow the rules of law in their current state. Where, as a result of following the law, a beneficial joint tenancy would formerly have been created, now a beneficial tenancy in common will (in New South Wales) come into existence. In other words, although s 26 of the Conveyancing Act has no direct application to the present case, its indirect effect is to require it to be held that there was a resulting trust for the purchasers in an interest of the same kind as that which would have resulted if the land had been conveyed to them at law, ie as tenants in common."161It follows, in my opinion, that whether the contributions made by Margaret and Bill are to be regarded as equal or not equal, the result is that, in equity, they held the Woolooware Property as tenants in common.162It follows that, although Margaret has now died, Bill has not acquired her interest in the Woolooware Property by survivorship. Reactivation of Mr Madden’s bankruptcy

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The effectiveness of the regime for dealing with administration of bankrupt estates depends on the forthrightness of those who become bankrupt; non-disclosure of assets in a timely way is a serious matter. As Mr Madden’s silence has effectively deprived his bankrupt estate of the benefit of his interest in the Woolooware Property, I commend consideration of pursuing Mr Madden in relation to any offences for which he may be liable under the Bankruptcy Act.CONCLUSION For the reasons at [3], I will dismiss the first ground of the application. I will make a declaration that Mr Madden’s interest the Woolooware Property is revested in him pursuant to s 127 of the Bankruptcy Act 1 subject to the rights of any person other than the first respondent or the second respondent. I will stand the matter over to a time convenient to counsel to address the issue of costs and to advise the Court of the course now proposed in relation to ground four.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Mr Prentice says that as a result, the limitation period provided for in s 127(1) had no relevance. CONSIDERATION The interpretation of s 127(1) contended for by Mr Madden summarised at [16] reflects the summary of the effect of s 98(3) Bankruptcy Act 1924 by Menzies J in Burke v Stapleton at 671:It seems to me that the subsection, recognizing (1) that land, being the property of the bankrupt, has become vested in the trustee by virtue of the Act, and (2) that the trustee may not have perfected his title so he may still be in the position of having to make a claim thereto, provides that (1) no such claim shall be made after twenty years and (2) the land claimed, which was nevertheless vested in the trustee by or under the Bankruptcy Act, should, after twenty years, revest in the bankrupt or those claiming through the bankrupt. This reading of the subsection affords no support for the appellants’ case. The section, although it operates of itself to revest land, the title to which is still outstanding, makes no provision for the trustee transferring land to which he has a complete title. There is no dispute that when Mr Madden’s interest in the Woolooware Property arose on 3 January 1995, he was an undischarged bankrupt and accordingly it constituted “after-acquired property” as defined in s 58(6) of the Bankruptcy Act, and s 58(1)(b) operated to vest Mr Madden’s interest in the Woolooware Property in the Official Trustee, as no other person had been appointed as Mr Madden’s trustee at that time. The areas of dispute are the related issues of:1.whether it is necessary for Mr Prentice to make a “claim” in relation to Mr Madden’s interest in the Woolooware Property so as to perfect his title to it; or 2.whether, having regard to the nature of that interest as “co-ownership”, s 66F operates to recognise the vested interest of the Official Trustee as “perfected”; and 3.if Mr Prentice must make a “claim” to perfect his title to the Woolooware Property, whether the second “limb” of s 127(1) operates so that Mr Madden’s interest in the Woolooware Property “revests” in him.What is a “claim”? Re Quirk and Burke v Stapleton were decided under the statutory predecessor of s 127(1), s 98(3) of the Bankruptcy Act 1924, which related to claims by the trustee in bankruptcy to an estate or interest in land. Section 98(3) was set out in the judgement of Menzies J in Burke v Stapleton at 670:After the expiration of twenty years after the date of the sequestration of the estate of a bankrupt, no claim shall be made by the trustee of the estate, to any estate or interest in any land which is part of the property of the bankrupt, and that estate or interest shall, subject to the rights (if any) of any person in possession of the land, be deemed to be vested in the bankrupt or any person claiming through or under him, as the case may be. Section 127(1) of the Bankruptcy Act and s 98(3) of the Bankruptcy Act 1924 are relevantly the same, except that s 127 relates to all “property” of the bankrupt, not an estate or interest in land alone: see Re Lehrain; Official Receiver (Trustee) v Frankston Timber Pty Ltd (1975) 6 ALR 301 at 305 per Sweeney J.