GIBBS C.J. For about ten years from 1968 the parties to this appeal lived in what is nowadays called a "de facto relationship" - i.e. although not married to each other, they lived together as though they were husband and wife. They first lived at Mount Pritchard, in a house owned by the appellant, Arthur George Calverley. He paid the respondent, Dianne Lea Green, $10.00 per week as a contribution to the cost of the provisions that she purchased for the household; although at first that sum represented about half that cost, as time went on it came to represent a much smaller proportion. The respondent had continued in her employment and she provided from her earnings the rest of the money necessary to pay for the household provisions. In 1972, in consequence of a disagreement, the respondent left the appellant, but after a few weeks there was a reconciliation and she returned to live with him again. Both parties then thought it wise to move to more congenial surroundings, and they jointly decided that they should move to Baulkham Hills if a house could be found there at a price that the appellant could afford. A house was found in about August 1973, but the appellant at first experienced difficulty in obtaining finance. Later he told the respondent that a loan had been approved, but that the finance company required the purchase to be in the joint names of the parties, and at his suggestion she joined with him in signing an application for finance in which she was represented to be his wife. Finance was approved and the house at Baulkham Hills was purchased for $27,250. The appellant paid the deposit, which is stated in the evidence to have been $9,000, from part of the proceeds of the sale of the house at Mount Pritchard. An amount of $18,000 was borrowed on a mortgage given by both parties and under which they were jointly and severally liable to pay the sum borrowed with interest. It does not appear from the evidence how the remaining amount of the purchase price, $250, was paid, but it appears to have been paid by the appellant. The land was transferred to the parties as joint tenants. They lived together in the house, under the same arrangements as before, until April 1978, when the respondent left.
2. It was held by Rath J. at first instance that the land at Baulkham Hills was put into the joint names of the parties for the purpose of enabling finance to be raised, and not to confer any beneficial interest on the respondent, and that she had no beneficial interest in the property. On appeal, the decision of Rath J. was reversed, and it was held by the Court of Appeal that, subject to the mortgage, the parties were joint owners in equity,…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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AGLC
Calverley v Green [1984] HCA 81
Case
[1984] HCA 81
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court of Australia considered the dispute between the appellant, Calverley, and the respondent, Green, concerning the beneficial ownership of a property. The property was registered in the name of the appellant, but the respondent claimed a beneficial interest in it.
The central legal issue before the Court was whether a resulting trust arose in favour of the respondent, despite the property being registered solely in the appellant's name. This required the Court to examine the principles governing resulting trusts, particularly in circumstances where contributions to the purchase price were made by one party and the legal title was held by another. The Court also had to consider the effect of a loan from a third party on the determination of beneficial ownership.
The Court held that a resulting trust arises where a party contributes to the purchase price of property, and that contribution is not intended to be a gift or loan to the legal owner. In this instance, the respondent had made substantial contributions towards the purchase price of the property, and these contributions were not intended as a gift to the appellant. The fact that a portion of the purchase price was advanced by way of a loan from a third party did not alter the beneficial interest that arose from the respondent's direct contribution. The Court applied the established principles of resulting trusts, focusing on the intention of the parties at the time of the purchase.
The High Court found in favour of the respondent, declaring that she held a beneficial interest in the property proportionate to her contribution to the purchase price.