Gleeson (Trustee), in the matter of Coster v Eggleton

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

Gleeson (Trustee), in the matter of Coster v Eggleton [2024] FedCFamC2G 11

File number(s): SYG 887 of 2023
Judgment of: JUDGE MANOUSARIDIS
Date of judgment: 12 January 2024
Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY – application by trustee in bankruptcy of discharged bankrupt for orders pursuant to s 66G of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) for the sale of two properties of which at the time he was made bankrupt the bankrupt was the registered proprietor with his de facto spouse – whether in relation to one of the properties (first property) the de facto spouse had contributed $63,000 of her own money towards the purchase price of $133,000 – de facto spouse contributed $63,000 – whether because the de facto spouse contributed $63,000 towards the purchase price of the first property the bankrupt held part of his legal interest in the first property as trustee for the de facto spouse on a resulting trust – bankrupt held part of his interest on resulting trust – whether because the bankrupt and de facto spouse raised money on the security of the first property to purchase a second property the bankrupt held his legal interest in the second property on resulting trust in the same proportion he held his legal interest on resulting trust in the first property – no resulting trust over the second property – orders for sale made on the basis that the bankrupt held and the trustee in bankruptcy now holds part of the bankrupt’s legal interest in the first property on resulting trust.  
Legislation:

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 58(1), 116(1), 121(1), 129AA
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 144(1)

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 79

Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) ss 66F(1), 66F(2), 66G

Cases cited:

Blatch v Archer [1774] EngR 2

Bosanac v Commissioner of Taxation [2022] HCA 34

Calverley v Green (1984) 155 CLR 242

Coshott v Prentice [2014] FCAFC 88

Davies v National trustees Executors and Agency Co of Australasia Ltd [1912] VLR 397

Dyer v Dyer [1788] EngR 266

Pascoe v Dyason [2011] NSWSC 1217

Payne v Parker [1976] 1 NSWLR 191

Russell v Scott (1936) 55 CLR 440

S v S [1972] AC 24

Trustees of Property of Cummins v Cummins [2006] HCA 6

Yalda v Consulate General of the Republic of Iraq, Sydney [2021] FCCA 499

Division: General
Number of paragraphs: 118
Date of last submission/s: 21 December 2023
Date of hearing: 31 August 2023 and 24 October 2023
Place: Sydney
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr J Parrish
Solicitor for the Applicant: Daniela Fazio Lawyers Pty Ltd
The Respondents: Appeared in person

ORDERS

SYG 887 of 2023

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

IN THE MATTER OF DAMIEN CRAIG COSTER

BETWEEN:

BRUCE GLEESON IN HIS CAPACITY AS TRUSTEE OF THE PROPERTY OF DAMIEN CRAIG COSTER, A REGULATED DEBTOR (DISCHARGED)

Applicant

AND:

NICOLE EGGLETON

First Respondent

DAMIEN CRAIG COSTER

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE MANOUSARIDIS

DATE OF ORDER:

12 JANUARY…

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Details
Case
[2024] FedCFamC2G 11
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Gleeson (Trustee), in the matter of Coster v Eggleton was heard in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Div 2). The dispute involved the application by the Trustee in bankruptcy for orders to sell two properties. The Trustee sought the orders pursuant to section 66G of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW), given that the bankrupt, Coster, had been discharged and the de facto spouse, Eggleton, was the registered proprietor of both properties at the time of bankruptcy. The central legal issues were whether Eggleton had contributed $63,000 of her own money towards the purchase price of the first property and, if so, whether this contribution resulted in Coster holding part of his legal interest in the first property on a resulting trust for Eggleton. Additionally, it was contested whether, due to the bankrupt and de facto spouse raising money on the security of the first property to purchase a second property, Coster held his legal interest in the second property on resulting trust in the same proportion as his legal interest on resulting trust in the first property.

The court examined the evidence presented to determine the source of the $63,000 contributed towards the purchase of the first property. The incontrovertible facts established that Eggleton received a compensation payment of $84,615.36 around 13 October 1995, shortly before the purchase of the first property. The court found that the source of the $63,000 was almost entirely the compensation payment Eggleton received. The evidence suggested that Eggleton deposited the compensation cheque into her sole account before it was closed to open a joint account with Coster for the home loan. This evidence was not challenged, and Coster testified that he had no savings at the time. Therefore, the court accepted that Eggleton contributed at least $63,000 from the compensation payment towards the purchase price of the first property.

The court further determined that because Eggleton contributed $63,000 towards the purchase price of the first property, Coster held part of his legal interest in the first property on a resulting trust for Eggleton. However, the court found that no resulting trust arose over the second property, as the proportion of the legal interest held on resulting trust in the second property did not correspond to the proportion held in the first property. Consequently, the court made orders for the sale of the properties on the basis that the bankrupt held and the Trustee in bankruptcy now holds part of the bankrupt’s legal interest in the first property on resulting trust.

The court's final orders included the appointment of Trustees for Sale over each of the properties, allowing for the properties to be sold without delay. The court emphasised the need to save costs by appointing Trustees for Sale simultaneously over both properties.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

There are facts established by the evidence which the Trustee has not challenged (incontrovertible facts) that are relevant to determining whether Ms Eggleton contributed $63,000 towards the purchase price of the GP property. These are as follows:(a)by around 13 October 1995 Ms Eggleton had received a compensation payment of $84,615.36; (b)in around October 1995 Ms Eggleton and Mr Coster entered into a contract to purchase the GP property for $133,000; (c)by 25 October 1995 CBA had approved a loan of $70,000 to assist Ms Eggleton and Mr Coster purchase the GP property; (d)by letter dated 8 December 1995 CBA confirmed to Ms Eggleton and Mr Coster that settlement of the purchase of the GP property had been effected, and CBA had handed over $121,150 in exchange “for the deeds”, noting that “[y]our equity in the transaction amounting to $51,150.85 has been debited to your account number in terms of your instructions”; and, (e)at the time of these events, Mr Coster was around 23 years of age employed as an apprentice mechanic, and Ms Eggleton was around 22 years of age. The incontrovertible facts, considered alone, compel as the only rationally available inference that the source of the $63,000 that Ms Eggleton and Mr Coster paid towards the purchase price of $133,000 for the GP property was entirely, or almost entirely the $84,615.36 compensation payment Ms Eggleton received on 13 October 1995. The Trustee has not identified any evidence that is capable of supporting as a tangible possibility that, contrary to the inference the incontrovertible facts compel to be drawn, Ms Eggleton and Mr Coster obtained the difference between the purchase price of $133,000 and the loan of $70,000 from a source other than the compensation payment of $84,615.36 Ms Eggleton received. In those circumstances, I do not accept the Trustee’s submission that the evidence on which Ms Eggleton relies constitutes “limited material” which “does not itself clearly discharge the onus” that lies on Ms Eggleton to prove that she contributed the $63,000 or a lesser amount that in any event exceeded the amount Mr Coster contributed to the purchase of the GP property. It is the case that the incontrovertible facts leave open as a possibility that the bank account to which CBA, in its letter dated 8 December 1995, said it had debited $51,150.85 was held jointly by Ms Eggleton and Mr Coster; and that there was a credit balance in that account before Ms Eggleton received her compensation payment. As I have already noted, however, Ms Eggleton has deposed that she deposited the compensation cheque into her “sole account before it was closed to open a combined account between” the respondents “for the home loan”. This part of Ms Eggleton’s evidence was not challenged in cross-examination; and in any event, it is supported by the evidence Mr Coster gave under cross-examination that at the time he and Ms Eggleton purchased the GP property he had no savings. If I were to accept Ms Eggleton’s and Mr Coster’s evidence in this regard, then it would be open to me to find, having regard to the incontrovertible facts, that Ms Eggleton paid at least $63,000 of the $84,615.36 into the account from which CBA, in its letter dated 8 December 1995, debited the amount of $51,150.85 which, together with the $70,000 CBA had agreed to loan, CBA paid on settlement. I consider later whether I should accept Ms Eggleton’s and Mr Coster’s evidence.Whether Blatch v Archer conditions are satisfied

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

I will begin by setting out in narrative form the evidence and some findings. Unless the context suggests otherwise, unqualified statements of facts are to be taken to reflect a finding of the facts stated.EVIDENCE AND SOME FINDINGS Ms Eggleton and Mr Coster are in a de facto relationship, having commenced their relationship in around 1990.[3] Mr Coster, who was born in 1972,[4] was then a motor mechanic apprentice; and Ms Eggleton worked in a café.[5] Ms Eggleton left school in 1990 when she was in year 11.[6] It is open to infer, and I find, that in October 1995 Ms Eggleton was around 22 years of age.[3] T54.35[4] T90.5[5] T54.40[6] T54.20 On 3 June 1993 Ms Eggleton was involved in a motor vehicle accident; and she made a claim for compensation. Ms Eggleton, through her solicitors, Walsh & Blair, settled her claims by 13 October 1995.[7][7] CB155Ms Eggleton receives compensation payment By letter dated 13 October 1995 Walsh & Blair informed Ms Eggleton they had received a cheque representing the amount for which Ms Eggleton settled her claim; and enclosed a cheque for $84,615.36 which, they said, represented the balance of money owing to Ms Eggleton after deducting legal costs and disbursements.[8][8] CB155Ms Eggleton and Mr Coster purchase GP property At around the time she received her compensation payment, Ms Eggleton and Mr Coster entered into a contract to purchase the GP property for $133,000. Settlement of that property occurred on 8 December 1995.[9] The instrument of transfer contained an acknowledgment by the transferors that they had received consideration of $133,000. Paragraph F of the instrument of transfer provided as follows: There are a number of documents that are relevant to identifying the source of the $133,000 the respondents used to pay for the purchase of the GP property. These are as follows:(a)A letter dated 25 October 1995 from Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA) that a loan of $70,000 had been approved “to help you buy a new house”.[10](b)A letter dated 8 December 1995 from CBA to the respondents stating:[11]We confirm settlement has been effected with your solicitor and the Bank handed over $121150.85 in exchange for deed and documents to your property.Your equity in the transaction amounting to $51150.85 has been debited to your account number in terms of your instructions.(c)A loan statement dated 30 June 1996 issued by CBA in relation to a loan account held by the respondents that records a carried forward balance of $70,600 as at 31 December 1995.[12][10] CB161[11] CB167[12] CB167Source of $63,000 that was used to purchase GP property In her affidavit Ms Eggleton says she deposited the compensation cheque into her “sole account before it was closed to open a combined account between” the respondents “for the home loan”.[13] Ms Eggleton further says that, “[a]s this occurred 25 years ago”, her bank could not provide her with the records without an “archive search which was quoted to cost $60 per hour and once they started the process, they were unable to stop until the documents are found”. Ms Eggleton says she could not afford this cost.[14] [13] CB147, [11][14] CB147, [11]

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Trustee’s lawyer responded by letter dated 25 November 2022 and headed “without prejudice, save as to costs”. After setting out, in some detail, the information the lawyers acknowledged Ms Eggleton had provided, the letter included the following:[50][50] CB304Trustee’s decisionWith respect, despite the passage of time that has been afforded to Ms Eggleton to produce direct evidence in support of her claim to a greater share of the equity in each of the Forest Hill and Glenfield Park properties, no persuasive evidence has been provided. In fact, the additional material provided under cover of your letter strengthens the Trustee's position and his 50% interest in each of the properties at the very least.The Trustee will reserve his right to make further enquiries in relation to Ms Eggleton’s serviceability of the loans (ie, her income) from the acquisition of each of the properties and more recently, where the medical certificate provided squarely states Ms Eggleton was unable to work for a period of time. During that period of time Ms Eggleton was not working, someone would have been required to maintain the mortgages for each of the properties and the council rates (in addition to living expenses). We suspect this was maintained by the bankrupt. If we are correct, then those additional mortgage repayments and other costs made by the bankrupt may constitute an equitable charge in the Trustee’s favour at the very least.With respect to Ms Eggleton’s personal injury monies, we confirm that in our recent telephone conversation with you, you indicated that Ms Eggleton's position is that the use of her personal injury award gives her a greater interest in the properties by reason of her contributions made to the acquisition/ improvements of those properties.In the initial offer, Ms Eggleton represented to the Trustee that she had received $110,926.00 (“the award”). In the without prejudice meeting with Ms Eggleton and yourself in October 2022, Ms Eggleton indicated the award was used first to purchase the Glenfield Park property and then because the Glenfield Park property was used as collateral to the security taken over the Forest Hill property, she claims a greater interest in the Forest Hill property.The 2 letters provided by Ms Eggleton from Walsh & Blair lawyers are inconsistent. We believe the Walsh & Blair 1995 letter accurately represents the award as paid to Ms Eggleton ($84,615.36) and thus able to be used at her discretion rather than the higher amount more recently advised by Walsh & Blair lawyers.Notwithstanding the above, there is no direct evidence on the papers to support Ms Eggleton’s position that she made a greater contribution to the acquisition of the Glenfield Park property. Even if there was, the parties are in a long standing defacto relationship to which we say, the principles enunciated by the High Court in Cummins(a bankrupt) v Cummins [2006] HCA 6 would apply.In our opinion, a relationship exists between the bankrupt and Ms Eggleton such thatthe presumption of advancement would apply.That said, we are instructed to make an application to the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Div 2) for orders akin to s66G of the Conveyancing Act, 1919 (NSW) so that the properties can be sold without delay. Whilst it is the Trustee's intention to seek orders from the Court that Trustees for Sale be appointed over each of the properties at the same time (in the interest of saving costs), as set out in our letter to Ms Eggleton of 30 September 2022, the Trustee proposes to first take steps to realise. . . .

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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