Samawi v Faraone - [2025] NSWSC 970

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: Samawi v Faraone [2025] NSWSC 970
Hearing dates: 6, 7 August 2025
Decision date: 28 August 2025
Jurisdiction: Equity - Real Property List
Before: Leeming JA
Decision:
1. The 6 page translations of emails at pp 539-547 of Exhibit A, supplied to my Associate by email dated 8 August 2025, will be incorporated within Exhibit A.
2. Declare that the property at 35 xxxxx Street, Stanhope Gardens in the State of New South Wales, being the land contained in folio identifier 101/270391, is held by the plaintiff on trust for the first defendant.
3. Paragraphs 1-3 of the Summons filed 28 November 2024 dismissed.
4. Paragraphs 2-13 of the Amended First Cross-Summons filed 6 August 2025 dismissed.
5. The parties to supply by email to my Associate agreed orders, or in default of agreement, the orders each seeks and submissions in support of such orders by 4pm Tuesday 9 September 2025.
6. The matter to be listed before me for directions at 9.30am on Wednesday 10 September 2025.

Catchwords:
EQUITY — proprietary estoppel — common intention constructive trust — land in name of daughter — whether father and daughter proceeded on basis that he would be responsible for property expenses and would retain beneficial ownership — nature of father’s contribution to the purchase price — whether daughter entitled to indemnity for expenses paid by her

Legislation Cited:
Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 56
Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) s 66G
Duties Act 1990 (NSW) s 32
Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) s 91
Residential Tenancies Act 2010 (NSW) s 119
Trustee Act 1925 (NSW) s 59
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) rr 6.3, 42.1

Cases Cited:
Baumgartner v Baumgartner (1987) 164 CLR 137; [1987] HCA 59
Bijkerk Investments Pty Ltd v Bikic [2020] NSWSC 1336
Butterfield v Public Trust [2017] NZCA 367; [2017] NZCCLR 27
Calverley v Green (1984) 155 CLR 242; [1984] HCA 81
Camden v McKenzie [2008] 1 Qd R 39; [2007] QCA 136
Elder’s Trustee and Executor Co Ltd v Higgins (1963) 113 CLR 426; [1963] HCA 48
Enright v Newton [2021] 2 NZLR 412; [2020] NZCA 529
Galati v Deans [2023] NSWCA 13
Gautam v Health Care Complaints Commission [2021] NSWCA 85
Goodrich Aerospace Pty Ltd v Arsic (2006) 66 NSWLR 186; [2006] NSWCA 187
Halikos Hospitality Pty Ltd & Ors v INPEX Operations Australia Pty Ltd [2020] NTCA 4
Jess v Cooloola Milk Pty Ltd (2022) 292 FCR 284; [2022] FCAFC 75
Kramer v Stone [2024] HCA 48; 99 ALJR 126
Muschinski v Dodds (1985) 160 CLR 583; [1985] HCA 78
Naaman v Jaken Properties Australia Pty Ltd [2025] HCA 1; 99 ALJR 295
Nelson v Nelson (1995) 184 CLR 538; [1995] HCA 25
Nolan v Collie (2003) 7 VR 287; [2003] VSCA 39
Pirrottina v Pirrottina [2025] NSWCA 55
Priestley v Priestley [2017] NSWCA 155
Quach v MLC Ltd(No 6) [2021] FCA 271
Rowley v Ginnever [1897] 2 Ch 503
Sidhu v Van Dyke (2014) 251 CLR 505; [2014] HCA 19
Transport for NSW v Hunt Leather Pty Ltd (2024) 115 NSWLR 489; [2024] NSWCA 227

Category: Principal judgment
Parties: Raffaella Samawi (Plaintiff/Cross-defendant)
Giuseppe Faraone (First Defendant; Cross-claimant)
Claudia Faraone (Second Defendant)
Representation:
Counsel:
M Young SC (Ms Samawi)
A Kaufmann (Mr and Ms Faraone)
Solicitors:
Finn Roache Lawyers (Ms Samawi)
Lexington Law (Mr and Ms Faraone)

File Number(s): 2024/443525
Publication restriction: Nil

JUDGMENT

LEEMING JA: Ms Raffaella Samawi proceeds by way of summons against her parents Mr Giuseppe Faraone and Ms Claudia Faraone, seeking a declaration that they are trespassers upon property in Stanhope Gardens of which she is the registered proprietor and an order that they vacate the land within 14 days. Sadly, this is the suburban home which all members of the family of eight have called home for at least some of their lives. I shall refer to it as “No 35”. Mr Giuseppe Faraone, by a cross-summons amended with leave on the first day of the hearing, seeks orders that No 35 is held on trust for him and an appointment of trustees for sale pursuant to s 66G of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW), or alternatively, a declaration that No 35 stands charged to secure for his benefit the repayment of the amounts contributed to the acquisition, improvement and/or maintenance of the property.

Family background

I do not understand anything in this section to be controversial. Mr Giuseppe Faraone was born in Italy in 1959. He married Ms Claudia Faraone in 1983. The couple had six children: Fabiola (born 1985), Raffaella (born 1986), Serena (born 1989), Debora (born 1994), Sonia (born 1997), and Luca (born 2006). Claudia and her five daughters migrated to Australia in 1997, with Giuseppe coming later and continuing to reside in Italy during the northern hemisphere summer holidays. Fabiola married Mr Christopher Bonomo in 2006. Raffaella married Mr Mark Samawi in 2015 (according to the marriage certificate). Without intending disrespect or undue informality, I will follow the course employed by counsel and refer to family members by their given names.
Giuseppe said that his wife and daughters moved to Australia in 1997 while he remained in Italy, working as a high school teacher and in a family business (a sports bar) which mainly operated in the Italian summer holidays. Between 1997 and 2008 he travelled between Italy and Australia to manage the sports bar. The family rented in Dean Park and later (from about 2000) in Woodcroft.
When the daughters began working, they paid board of around $150 per week. Giuseppe said that in around 2006, each of Fabiola, Raffaella and Serena were paying $150 each week. Fabiola said that her parents took half her wages as board, until she began to work, unpaid, in a family business (although Giuseppe says she was paid), and that when Christopher moved into Woodcroft, he paid $150 per week board on her behalf. Raffaella said she worked as a waitress at a restaurant and the Blacktown Workers Club from 2002 to early 2006, and claimed that she paid $200 per week board. Serena said she paid board of about $150 per week in 2006.
To anticipate what follows, when in 2010 No 35 became owned by Raffaella, some family members (including Claudia) paid rent to her, including pursuant to formal written residential tenancy agreements. Raffaella says that this reflected the fact that she was the owner of the property. Giuseppe and Claudia say that this was a device to obtain the benefit of tax deductions, at least for periods when Raffaella was not living at No 35, and did not depart from the common understanding that the house was Giuseppe’s, with the payments of rent being used to service the mortgage and pay other property expenses.
Giuseppe and Claudia separated in 2005 and were divorced in 2006. Giuseppe said that “[a]lthough we divorced and I rented a separate place in the Central Coast, we were amicable and I still spent a lot of time around the family and in the family home and continued supporting them financially”. Raffaella did not dispute that in terms, but said that Giuseppe would mostly be in Italy between May and September, was not regularly at No 35, and “would come and go as he pleased”. Serena said “Dad was still around the family home regularly and was welcome around the house”.
Raffaella, Fabiola and their husbands Mark and Christopher gave evidence in the plaintiff’s case and were cross-examined. Giuseppe, Claudia and Serena gave evidence in the defendants’ case and were cross-examined.
As is obvious from the relationship between the parties and the fact that Fabiola gave evidence in Raffaella’s case, while Serena gave contradicting evidence in her parents’ case, this is a family which is deeply divided. Although Giuseppe separated from Claudia in around 2006, the pair are now reconciled, at least for the purposes of this litigation where they made common cause. Both live in No 35. There was a large falling out between Giuseppe and Raffaella in 2012, based upon her choice of boyfriend, and later husband, Mark. As will be seen below, the emails exchanged at that time, when Raffaella left home, were central to the litigation. In litigation in which a great deal was in issue, there was no dispute about this. Giuseppe gave evidence in his affidavit that:

115 Raffaella lived [at No 35] from the 2010 settlement to about January 2012 when she moved out to live with boyfriend Mark at Baulkham Hills. Raffaella came back on and off, including 2014 when they cancelled the wedding, then 2016 for 3-4 months, 2018 for 3-4 months. Each time was after a domestic violence incident with Mark we would take Raffaella and her child in urgent circumstances and store all her belongings and she would go back to Mark after a few months.
116 I took an AVO out against Mark for 2 years to protect my daughter. Mark was charged for breaching the AVO and spent time in prison and rehab. This was a significant reason for the falling out with Raffaella because she would keep going back to Mark after and when she did she turned against us.

Those were paragraphs 115 and 116 of Giuseppe’s affidavit. Raffaella responded in terms to paragraphs 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 117, 118 and 119 of his affidavit. She made no response to paragraph 116. In response to paragraph 115, she said that she had never stored her belongings at No 35, but had paid for third party storage (and annexed receipts), and said that:

I started dating Mark from 7 February 2011. I moved in with him and his family by around September 2011 as my relationship with my family began to breakdown with Giuseppe disapproving of Mark because of his Arab ethnicity.

Mark also put on an affidavit responding to Giuseppe’s evidence. He did not respond to paragraph 115. He said that the apprehended violence order was not taken out by Giuseppe, and that Raffaella did not reside at No 35 during his separations from her, but would stay with an uncle at Colyton. He said “I preferred to avoid Giuseppe because he has never liked me due to my Arab ethnicity”.
Records of the Local Court were tendered which show a series of applications made by the police in separate proceedings brought in 2015, 2017, 2018, 2020 and 2024 at least some of which appear to involve apprehended violence orders against a person of his name in various courts in western Sydney (Ex 1 p 107). Mark acknowledged that the police had taken over a prosecution after an original complaint by Raffaella in 2018, although he said that subsequently she did not wish to press charges (T 71). A little strangely, Mark was unable to recall the circumstances concerning charges also brought against a person of his name in 2020, although he did not deny that he was the man accused of domestic violence offences (T 73).
It is reasonable to assume that Mark and Raffaella may attribute to Giuseppe the fact that Mark was imprisoned.
Further, this litigation is not the first time Raffaella has sought to exclude her parents from No 35. She commenced proceedings in NCAT, where she was unsuccessful, on the bases that by 2023 there was no residential tenancy agreement and there were defects concerning the termination notice. The reasons of the tribunal constituted by a Senior Member were in evidence (CB 1076-1082). No one submitted that the outcome of that litigation gave rise to any issue estoppel or res judicata relevant to the present proceedings. My present view is that s 91 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) does not apply to the reasons (because the decision of the Consumer and Commercial Division was one following a hearing at which the rules of evidence did not apply, with the consequence that NCAT was, for that purpose, not an “Australian court”; cf the disciplinary proceedings heard and determined in NCAT considered in Quach v MLC Ltd (No 6) [2021] FCA 271 at [8]-[10]). However, I heard no submissions on this, and I have not relied on the reasons.
There were many paragraphs of Serena’s affidavit to which Raffaella made a response, but she did not respond to the final two paragraphs of the affidavit, nor was there cross-examination on them:

63 I last saw Raffaella in late 2024 at Rouse Hill shopping centre. I approached her and we had a conversation to the following effect:
Me “I just want to talk to you”
Raffaella “I don’t wanna talk to you”
Me “What are you doing?”
Raffaella “That’s my fucking house”
Me “Are you genuinely expecting us all to lie because none of us are going to say that if it goes to Court”
Raffaella “What do you mean”
Me “Do you understand the implications that this has for you? You committed fraud”
Raffaella “What are you talking about? Ive got a fucking barrister. I haven’t committed any fraud. You guys signed the rental agreements”
Me “Cos you made us”
Raffaella “You were all adults”
Me “You asked us to because of your tax”
64 Our conversation ended shortly after that and I have not seen Raffaella since.

Thus there are deep divisions in this family, and that is reflected in their starkly divergent evidence about the central issues, which concern the basis on which Raffaella acquired title to No 35 and the way in which the mortgage was serviced.
Speaking very broadly, the real issue in this trial arises on the cross-claim. It is whether Giuseppe is correct to say that he serviced the mortgage over No 35 and made many other payments towards the upkeep and improvements of the land, in addition to the original $280,000, which was not a gift. According to him, and he is supported by Serena and to a lesser extent Claudia, No 35 was in Raffaella’s name but she did not have beneficial title, the purpose of her having the trappings of beneficial title was in order for her to obtain tax benefits from the interest payments withdrawn from her account, and at all times the land was held beneficially by Giuseppe.
On the other hand, Raffaella maintains, and she is supported by Christopher, Fabiola and Mark, that she paid for all of the mortgage payments and other expenses and improvements to No 35, with the result that her legal ownership is unfettered by any interest on the part of Giuseppe or Claudia recognised by equity.
Of course, it is possible that the position is intermediate between those extremes.
There are other less important issues, concerning the payment of various expenses including building work on No 35, and whether Giuseppe provided his labour on various improvements to No 35. And there are numerous factual issues peripherally related to the cross-claim, including those which bear on the nature of an amount of $280,000 provided by Giuseppe to Christopher when No 35 was first acquired.

Three introductory propositions

The procedural history of the litigation

Until some three months before the trial, Giuseppe and Claudia were unrepresented. They served short affidavits which may have been prepared without legal assistance and which were ultimately not read. This may explain some aspects of the way the litigation was prepared; it also caused the vacation of a hearing originally listed on 17 July 2025.
Giuseppe and Claudia did not file pleadings. They did file a document titled “First Cross-claim Cross-Summons” but that was a cross-summons, identifying prayers of relief but making no allegations of material fact or law. This represented a departure from the rules. Giuseppe and Claudia sought relief by way of a constructive trust, and r 6.3(e) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) applied. I am not critical of Raffaella for permitting the matter to go to trial on a summons and affidavit, because it was in everyone’s interest, and accorded with the overriding purpose in s 56 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), for there to be a trial sooner rather than later. (Indeed, Raffaella’s claim for an order that Giuseppe and Claudia vacate the land on its face engages r 6.3(f) of the UCPR, although it is difficult to see any utility in a pleading of a registered proprietor’s claim for possession.) The reason for mentioning the absence of any pleading is that it has meant that the allegations on which Giuseppe bore the onus were not clearly identified in advance of that trial, and that Raffaella did not have the opportunity to admit or deny them. At the end of the day, little turned on this. The history of legal title to the property is clear. There is continuing uncertainty as to the precise consideration paid for No 35 when Christopher and Fabiola transferred title to Raffaella, but that is unlikely to have been cured by pleadings. There was no dispute that Giuseppe had supplied $280,000 to the original purchase price, although the character of that contribution was keenly disputed.

Payments of money

It is as well to explain the legal and practical aspects of the deposits and withdrawals of “cash”, the borrowings of money to acquire property and its repayment by electronic “transfer”.
There is no doubt that, speaking strictly, Raffaella paid the totality of the purchase price of No 35. She did so with funds borrowed by her, against the security of a registered mortgage in favour of CBA over No 35. Even if (as Giuseppe contends) he made all of the mortgage repayments in point of fact, that does not prevent Raffaella being the sole purchaser. A person who acquires property with borrowed funds is nonetheless the purchaser: Calverley v Green (1984) 155 CLR 242 at 257; [1984] HCA 81. Nor is that affected even if another person is solely responsible for servicing the mortgage debt; as Baumgartner v Baumgartner (1987) 164 CLR 137; [1987] HCA 59 illustrates, where the man and woman jointly borrowed to fund the purchase price, and the man alone made mortgage repayments, the money provided by the woman as joint borrower represented a contribution by her to the purchase price.
There is also no doubt that Raffaella, once again speaking strictly, paid every mortgage repayment. That is because CBA (and later Macquarie Bank) debited “funds” in Raffaella’s 920 account for the purpose of making regular weekly or monthly payments in reduction of the loan account. On no occasion were those debits anything other than an adjustment of the running balances in Raffaella’s accounts: the 920 account and the account reflecting the debt secured by the mortgage over No 35. It is necessary and appropriate to analyse the position not at the artificially strict legal level summarised above, but at the level of practical reality (which, in strict point of law, involves a deal of tracing in equity through a mixed account). Giuseppe’s claim was that he made money available into Raffaella’s 920 account in order for there to be funds which could meet a debit from that account to credit Raffaella’s debt secured by the mortgage. Giuseppe claimed that he made those deposits, sometimes by electronic funds transferred from his own account with Westpac, and sometimes by cash deposits involving a deposit of bank notes at a CBA branch (mostly Rouse Hill or Blacktown) to the credit of Raffaella’s account, and that claim carried with it the proposition that the debit from Raffaella’s account a few days later in reduction of her debt secured by the mortgage is to be regarded as a payment by him. I shall refer below to the electronic transfer from an account controlled by Giuseppe on 24 January 2012 of $4,455, representing precisely four of what were then the automatic weekly mortgage payments of $1,113.75, following Raffaella’s advice to him that “[y]our repayments are $4,455 and are due the 1^st of every month”.
None of the parties or witnesses had any difficulty in understanding the practical reality of what has been (somewhat laboriously) summarised above. And this is a case where, consistently with the reasoning in Muschinski v Dodds (1985) 160 CLR 583; [1985] HCA 78 and Baumgartner v Baumgartner, the availability and appropriateness of relief in equity by means of a constructive trust turns on the practical reality of payments and their traceable proceeds. Another, simpler, way of making the same point is to observe that the legal truth that strictly speaking Raffaella paid for the entirety of the purchaser price (from funds borrowed by her) and the entirety of the repayments of that debt (from debits from her 920 account) is no answer to the claim that she holds No 35 on constructive trust by reason of an assumption shared by her and Giuseppe that she would be a trustee and he would make it possible for her to pay the purchase price and service the mortgage debt.

Approach to factual findings

Because the parties are diametrically opposed on the main issue, and many other issues, and because those issues concern the payment of money over many years, commencing nearly two decades ago, the appropriate course is to commence with an overview of the competing accounts in the testimonial evidence, in the light of which I shall proceed to address the documentary business records which I am satisfied are reliable. That includes the conveyancing and title records (which are very incomplete) and the banking records (which are voluminous but also materially incomplete), on both sides. The approach accords with what was said by Keane JA in Camden v McKenzie [2008] 1 Qd R 39; [2007] QCA 136 at [34], which in turn accorded with what had been said in Goodrich Aerospace Pty Ltd v Arsic (2006) 66 NSWLR 186; [2006] NSWCA 187 at [28]-[29]:

Usually, the rational resolution of an issue involving the credibility of witnesses will require reference to, and analysis of, any evidence independent of the parties which is apt to cast light on the probabilities of the situation.

That is not a proposition of law, but reflects an obvious practical reality, and has been regularly applied: see for recent appellate examples Jess v Cooloola Milk Pty Ltd (2022) 292 FCR 284; [2022] FCAFC 75 at [15], Gautam v Health Care Complaints Commission [2021] NSWCA 85 at [25] and [64]; Halikos Hospitality Pty Ltd & Ors v INPEX Operations Australia Pty Ltd [2020] NTCA 4 at [44].

Overview of testimonial evidence

Claudia and Giuseppe said that the family had discussions in 2006 regarding the purchase of property. Claudia recalled a conversation with Giuseppe, Fabiola, Christopher, Raffaella and Serena, in which Giuseppe stated, “We’ll buy the first house and you can all live with your mum in there. It’s gotta go in Chris and Fabiola’s name and you all pay board at home and I’ll look after the loan”. Giuseppe recalled very similar words.
In the middle of 2006, Giuseppe claimed to have approached the real estate agent Mr Lee (who managed the property they were renting) who put Giuseppe in contact with Mr Lee’s daughter, Ms Sue Lee, who had an agency in Stanhope Gardens. He stated that he had a conversation with Christopher and Fabiola to the effect that:

I will put cash from the sale of my apartment in Italy, extra money that comes in from my business. And whatever is the difference, we will put a loan under your name and I will pay everything, the loan and rates. You don’t need to do anything, except keep paying the board.

Giuseppe said that he gave Christopher $35,000 to $40,000 towards the deposit for No 35, which derived from the sale of a takeaway shop owned by Giuseppe for $80,000, the proceeds of which going into Fabiola’s bank account as Giuseppe was overseas Giuseppe claimed that Fabiola owed additional amounts that she had kept from this sale in the form of $8,757.78, which Fabiola signed. As will be seen, there was a deposit of $35,000 in Fabiola’s account at this time, however, Fabiola contended that it was her money, deriving from the sale of a business which she owned (see paragraph 38 of her affidavit and T 59).
However, it was common ground that Giuseppe contributed a payment of $280,000 to the settlement of the purchase of No 35. That sum derived from the proceeds of sale of a property in Italy which had long been in his family. His evidence was that he “did not gift the property to Christopher and Fabiola” as this was “about seventy percent (70%) of [his] net worth at that time” and he “could not afford to give $280,000 away to one child in [his] circumstances”. Fabiola and Christopher disputed this. They said that the money was a gift, and that that is borne out by a letter signed by Giuseppe saying that it was a gift.
Giuseppe also claims to have contributed $50,000 to Christopher and Fabiola’s wedding, as well as their honeymoon to the Canary Islands and furniture for the Premises. This is controversial, but peripheral to the main issues.
Giuseppe also said that he paid for Council rates, water rates, property expenses, and loan repayments. Raffaella acknowledged that he made some payments, but that for the most part she paid the ongoing expenses as well as the loan repayments.
Giuseppe also said that he performed regular work on the property, including, inter alia, concreting, changing doors, blinds, tiles, and retaining walls. He also claimed to have spent $20,000 on replacing all doors to solid timber doors, $10,000 cedar blinds, $2,200 for bricks, $1,500 for plumbing materials and drainage work, and $5,000 on flyscreens and sliding doors. Giuseppe has retained the original records of all Council and development records. For her part, Raffaella contended that while Giuseppe was involved in dealing with tradesmen, especially after he returned to live at the property, he did not perform construction work, and he paid for none of it.
The house at No 35 was purchased in Christopher’s name in 2006. The entire family (except Giuseppe) then moved into No 35. One year later, Fabiola and Christopher bought the property next door, No 37. They moved out of No 35 and into No 37 once it was built. Giuseppe claimed to have “paid the holding deposit for that property of about $2,000”. During Fabiola’s second pregnancy, Fabiola and Christopher moved back into No 35 (and recommenced paying board) before then returning to No 37. Giuseppe claimed that Fabiola and Christopher rented out No 37 during this period, and paid board of $450 total per week. In 2010, Claudia stated that all her children except Fabiola were living in No 35.
Claudia recalled that Fabiola said she no longer wanted the house in her name. That led, according to Claudia, to a conversation between Serena, Raffaella and their parents concerning who would take over No 35. Giuseppe said that Christopher and Fabiola were also present. Claudia’s evidence was that Raffaella said, “I’ll take the loan on” before Giuseppe said, “Ok, I’ll keep paying everything”. Claudia’s understanding was that Giuseppe would keep paying for everything and it would go into Raffaella’s name to help her buy a house. It was then transferred from Christopher and Fabiola to Raffaella’s name, with Giuseppe signing as a witness to the transfer.
Raffaella said that she did not believe that Giuseppe owned No 35, and that she had offered to buy No 35 as an investment, knowing that Fabiola and Christopher could not service the mortgage along with No 37, and in order to provide a home for her mother and her younger siblings.
The memorandum of transfer of No 35 from Christopher and Fabiola to Raffaella, dated 2 November 2010, acknowledged receipt of the consideration of $385,000. Giuseppe signed the transfer as a witness.
There is a dispute concerning a payment of $40,000 made at about this time. According to Claudia, Raffaella approached her parents complaining that Fabiola had taken out a loan in this amount against the property to finance work on her own house. Claudia said that a dispute arose between the sisters and that ultimately Raffaella paid the $40,000, which Claudia asserted was owed to Giuseppe. Giuseppe said that during the transfer process, Fabiola enquired whether Raffaella could borrow $40,000 against the loan for No 35, for renovations at No 37. The amount was subsequently repaid. On the other hand, Fabiola, Christopher and Raffaella said that the amount was a break cost for the loan.
Between 2010 and 2022, Raffaella entered into residential tenancy agreements with members of the family in respect of No 35. Giuseppe contended that this was done on the advice of an accountant, who advised Raffaella that she could reduce her tax liabilities by declaring that she was leasing the property, notwithstanding that she was in fact residing in the property. Raffaella contends that her accountant had been “negatively gearing my assets negligently and without my knowledge”. She said that this led to a tax debt owed by her of approximately $65,000, which amount was “reduced on account of [the accountant’s] negligence”. A document lodged with the Administrative Appeals Tribunal in proceedings commenced in 2015 records an agreement that Raffaella’s tax liability be amended by reducing the penalties for the financial years ended 30 June 2012 and 2013 to $8,267.64 and $6,433.56, and a note stated that Raffaella accepted the substantive tax liability for those two income years (CB 587). No other documents filed in the Tribunal or relating to the reassessment of Raffaella’s tax liability were in evidence.
Claudia said that she had many conversations with Raffaella when she said words to the effect “Mum I will never kick you out of here, I know this is dad’s house”.
Raffaella married Mark in 2015. The couple had been living at No 35, but in around 2012 moved into a house in Baulkham Hills and later Plumpton. Claudia said that various occasions of domestic violence caused Raffaella to return periodically to No 35.
Giuseppe moved into No 35 full time in 2019.
In 2022, when Claudia, Luca and Giuseppe were living in No 35, the other members of the family having moved out with their partners, Raffaella, Mark and their son Isaac moved in. Raffaella said that prior to moving in, she had a conversation with her parents expressing her desire to move into the property. She says that they agreed that Giuseppe and Claudia would continue to live there until they found a new place to live, and that this was on the condition that the parents would contribute to half of the living expenses, including the mortgage, groceries and bills, and that Luca would also reside there while he was finishing school. Raffaella says that despite this agreement, she paid most of the bills and living expenses, and her parents only contributed to the electricity bill and paid rent of $1,000 per fortnight.
In contrast, Giuseppe said that the arrangement when Raffaella and Mark moved in was that those two would pay half of the property expenses as rent, which was intended to be a temporary arrangement until they could “buy [him] out” of No 35.
While the family was living together in No 35, Giuseppe and Claudia entered into a lease for an apartment in The Entrance. Raffaella says that they still continued to reside part-time in No 35, while moving their belongings. Giuseppe says that Raffaella had asked them to move out due to Mark’s preferences, and that they did so but continued to pay half of the property expenses, on the understanding that Raffaella would pay him $700,000 for the property in accordance with the original arrangement.
Giuseppe says, however, that Raffaella was unable to obtain a loan in this amount to buy the property. He says that he was told by a broker that he was unable to obtain a loan himself due to his age and income.
In contrast, Raffaella said that she and Mark decided to sell the property in 2022, and offered to sell it to Giuseppe for $1.1m. Raffaella and Mark left the premises. She said that Giuseppe attempted to obtain a loan but was unsuccessful. In 2023, Giuseppe advised that he had obtained approval for finance, but Raffaella said that when she asked him for documentation, he claimed ownership of the property and threatened legal action against her. She said she has been denied access to the property since May 2023. The present proceedings were commenced after her application in NCAT was dismissed.

Legal title to the properties

Legal title to No 35 was transferred to Christopher, in late 2006. In 2009, Christopher transferred an interest for nominal consideration to Fabiola so that they became joint tenants from 6 April 2009. In 2010, Christopher and Fabiola sold No 35 to Raffaella, who at all times thereafter has been sole registered proprietor.
Two other properties are relevant to the litigation. One is the neighbouring residential house, No 37, which Christopher and Fabiola purchased in 2008. Christopher said they did so using the equity in No 35. The second is vacant land in Queensland, which Raffaella accepted she purchased at a discount with the assistance of her father. Although at one stage she threatened to sell it, she retained title until 2023 (see below). There are many fewer documents available concerning No 37 and the Queensland land than there are concerning No 35. As it turns out, the financial records concerning the Queensland land assist in understanding the basis on which Raffaella acquired title to No 35 in 2010.

The acquisition of No 35 in 2006

Documents prepared in October 2006 by a mortgage advisor who operated under the name “Aussie Mortgage Market” were in evidence. They show that Christopher’s application was approved by “Homeside Lending”, a business name for a division of the National Australia Bank Ltd (NAB).
Through the advisor, Christopher sought a 30-year first home owner’s mortgage, in the amount of $323,000. The Loan Submission Notes state that a deposit of $35,000 had been paid, and anticipated that Chistopher would receive the $7,000 First Home Owners Grant. The application was processed on the basis that Christopher’s annual income as a concreter was $46,000 based on his group certificate for the previous 4½ months with Nepean Concreting, and that his annual income based on year to date figures would be around $50,000.
The application was accompanied by a letter signed by Giuseppe:

16^th October 2006
To Whom It May Concern:
I Giuseppe Faraone give Christopher Bonomo a Non Refundable Cash Gift of the amount of $280,000.00 as amount towards purchasing a House.
If you should have any inquires [sic] please contact me on (0408 xxx xxx)

Interpolating here, Raffaella said that the letter bore its ordinary meaning. Giuseppe said it was a document intended only to permit the loan to be made. He was squarely confronted with the fact that on his case it was a false document designed to cause a bank to lend money on a false basis.
The contract for sale of land from third party vendors to Christopher stated a purchase price of $545,000 with a deposit of $54,500.
The settlement sheet for the conveyance was not in evidence. However, as will be seen below, Fabiola’s Westpac account shows deposits of $20,334.08 on 19 September 2006 and $324,218.46 on 18 October 2006 (Ex 1 76, 79). There are withdrawals at Blacktown of $13,708 on 25 September, $12,065 on 2 November and $242,712.11 on 9 November 2006. This is consistent with Giuseppe’s evidence that the $280,000 “came from a property that I sold in Italy, Minturno where I lived with Claudia and the children before coming to Australia” (CB 71).
The loan documents and account statements for No 35 when owned by Christopher and later co-owned by Fabiola were not in evidence. But there is no reason to doubt that the purchase price was other than as was recorded on the contract for sale of land. Accordingly, slightly more than half of the purchase price was paid by the admitted $280,000 transfer of money sourced from the sale of property in Italy.
A “Homeside Lending” deposit book was in evidence, which recorded deposits totalling $46,150 from the period 9 December 2006 until 16 January 2009. There was an issue whether Christopher or Giuseppe paid those deposits. Christopher maintained he paid them all. Giuseppe said in cross-examination:

Q. The mortgage was paid out of a bank account that was in Christopher’s name, correct?
A. Yes, yes, because that was the only way to do it, there was no other way to do it. If he’s on the title, the money must come out from that.
Q. And there was some rent paid to Christopher shortly after he purchased the property from time to time, correct?
A. He was paying the money into his account as board for the property, him and Fabiola. And plus I used to do all the payment with the bank book, all the money deposited were made by me and you can see my writing on the booklet, made every month the deposit.
Q. You know that Christopher was depositing money in that account?
A. No, no, he never put a cent into that.

On the other hand, Christopher said he made the payments:

Q. And if you turn over the page to page 3, there are a number of deposit receipts there that appear to be paid to you or your account. Correct?
A. Yep.
Q. I want to suggest to you that you knew at the time, those payments were made by Giuseppe in cash into this account. Do you accept that?
A. No, I don’t.
Q. All right. You certainly didn’t make those payments, did you?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. How can you be certain now that you did make those payments, Mr Bonomo?
A. Because I paid for the mortgage.

There was no handwriting evidence concerning the deposit book receipts.
There is no dispute that Giuseppe contributed $280,000 towards the purchase of No 35. There is a lively dispute as to the character of that contribution, whether it was a gift or a loan or a contribution of part of the price of land owned beneficially by him.

Acquisition of No 35 by Raffaella in 2010 – the conveyancing documents

The sale of No 35 by Christopher and Fabiola to Raffaella was scheduled to complete on 1 December 2010, and all indications are that that occurred on that date.
There are three seemingly contemporaneous business records bearing on the conveyance of No 35 to Raffaella in 2010. All were tendered by Raffaella.
The first is a document on the letterhead of the solicitor who had acted for Christopher in 2006, and who appears to have acted for both sides in 2010. The letter in the form tendered is dated 14 June 2023 and is not signed, but that is consistent with an electronic version with a “floating” date having been obtained around a year before Raffaella commenced proceedings. The document contains a heading which includes “Your Ref NO.:90000970558 – SSR18979272”. It identified, in addition to small amounts for the firm and for bank cheques, five payments that were required on settlement:

Bank Cheque – Commonwealth Bank of Australia $431,356.66;

Pay-out of Personal Loan of Raffaele [sic] Faraone $35,000.00

Pay-out of Current Home Loan of Raffaele [sic] Faraone $165,500.00

Pay into CBA Personal Account of Raffaele [sic] Faraone $14,333.34.

Bank Cheque – Office of State Revenue $23,185.00.

The second is what appeared to be an internal Commonwealth Bank document relating to the settlement of No 35 (CB 1038). It bears the same reference “SSR18979272” and the same account number 90000970558, described Raffaella as the purchaser, identifies her solicitor, the property, states that a certificate of title, discharge of mortgage, notice of sale, transfer and final search are to be collected, and adds the following “Special Instructions”:

REpay & close CBA H/L 418958507 @ CBA P/L 637498803
MOrtgage: Raffaella Faraone
Avai funds $626,665.0 (total loan amount $626,815.00 less add sec fee $150.00)

The third are documents which Raffaella described as (and which bear the appearance of being) the loan application for No 35 (CB 508-515). These stated that the amount of the loan was $670,315, it was a 30 year loan by an owner-occupier who was not a first home owner, the interest rate was 6.99% calculated by reference to an “Employee Benefits Program”, the purchase price was $615,000, that Raffaella had cash or savings available for purchase of $5,383.62 but was relying on an “equity gift” of $167,000, that the stamp duty was $23,165, and that there would be repayment of existing loans in the amount of $199,436.79. The contemplated fees included $127.90 for “Registration of discharge of mortgage (QLD)”. The document stated the proposed monthly mortgage repayments would be $5,265.
It will be seen below that the financial records which are available largely corroborate what was recorded on Raffaella’s loan application.
If the settlement sheet and the loan application are regarded as accurate, then the transfer was assessed at a value of $615,000. That may be derived from the stamp duty calculations. In 2012, s 32 of the Duties Act 1990 (NSW) stated that for dutiable transactions where the dutiable value was more than $300,000 but not more than $1,000,000, the duty was $8,990 plus $4.50 for every $100 by which the dutiable value exceeded $300,000, and 4.5% x $315,000 + $8,990 = $23,165, which is $20 less than the amount stated in the letter and the application, and that $20 may be accounted for by the nominal duty of $10 paid on other dutiable documents in accordance with s 18 where ad valorem duty has been paid.) Further, the amount of $615,000 coincides with the stated purchase price in a loan application made by her to the CBA.

Raffaella’s banking records demonstrate that after 1 December, there are regular loan repayments of $1,113.75 on 3, 10 and 17 December 2010, rising to $1,120 on 24 and 31 December, withdrawn from her “320” account and credited to a new “603” account (throughout these reasons, I shall abbreviate account numbers by their last three digits). I shall address these in more detail below. Those amounts are consistent with a 30 year loan at 6.99% on a principal of $670,315. (To explain why: a 30 year loan involves 360 monthly repayments of principal and interest, and 6.99% per annum is 0.005825 per month. Monthly repayments of principal and interest over a 30 year term may be calculated by the formula P x R x (1+R)^360 / ((1+R)^360)-1). Thus the repayments are $670,315 x 0.005825 x 1.005825^360 / (1.005825^360 – 1) = $4,455 to the nearest dollar, which is precisely 4 x $1,113.75, being the repayments on 3, 10 and 17 December 2010. It seems that it was determined (following a course taken by many borrowers), to make weekly repayments of one quarter of the monthly figure (thereby making 52 rather than 48 payments each year; an email from Raffaella to Christopher dated 29 March 2014 (CB 577) mentions this, which must have been familiar to Raffaella (who is described as a “Mobile Banker”): “as you are paying monthly, you are not shaving anything off the interest, you are paying the bare minimum”.)
The memorandum of transfer (CB 1037) stated that the consideration was $385,000. The transfer was stamped, but at $10. The $10 stamp contained a handwritten dated “1/12/10” which corroborates with the banking documents concerning the day of settlement.
No contract for sale of land or memorandum of transfer with ad valorem duty was tendered. It is clear that the $385,000 stated on the transfer was a considerable undervalue. It is substantially less than the price paid by Christopher in an arms-length transaction in 2006. It is consistent with a document signed by Christopher and Fabiola dated 26 October 2010 stating that they gave No 35 to Raffaella “for the amount of $383k and the equity for the property is [being] given to her as a gift” (CB 504).
I now come to an important point. Taking the documents tendered by Raffaella at face value, far more was borrowed than was needed to acquire title to No 35 from Christopher and Fabiola. The settlement sheet states that some $200,000 of the amounts required at settlement would be used to discharge a “Personal Loan of Raffaele [sic]” and a “Current Home Loan of Raffaele [sic]”. The settlement sheet also stated that some $14,333 would be paid into her personal account. The accuracy of those propositions is borne out by a close analysis of the banking statements. In the months prior to 1 December 2010, there were regular repayments from Raffaella’s 320 account of a “507” account and a separate “803” account. The debits associated with the 507 and 803 accounts cease after 1 December 2010. To anticipate what follows, I have concluded that:

The account ending in 507 is the same account associated with regular debits from Raffaella’s 920 account since at least 20 February 2008, consistently with the Queensland land, and thus it appears that “CBA H/L” is a reference to a home loan, and that loan was repaid on 1 December 2010.

The account ending in 803 is an account which is associated with a deposit of $12,273.11 on 18 November 2009 and repayments thereafter of $180. It seems probable that “CBA P/L” is a reference to a personal loan, and that loan too was repaid on 1 December 2010.

Finally, there is a deposit into Raffaella’s 920 account on 1 December of $14,032.45.
All this aligns with what is stated on the settlement sheet. Unusually, this is not a case where the whole of the funds at settlement are directed to discharging existing secured indebtedness on the property and paying the “equity” to the vendor. This is a case where some $214,000 of the $615,000 borrowed against a registered mortgage over No 35 was used to pay existing debt owed by Raffaella or to place some $14,000 in her hands. The rest was used to pay for stamp duty or to discharge the debt owed by Christopher and Fabiola on their mortgage.

The banking records

It is unusual for a daughter to be seeking to evict her father and mother. It is also unusual for there to be such diametrically opposed testimony. Raffaella says that she paid all of the mortgage payments (and before then, Christopher says that he paid them). Giuseppe says he made funds available for the payments to be made, and that No 35 was always his.
Giuseppe says that the $280,000 which contributed to the purchase of No 35 in 2006 reflected the fact that it was beneficially his. Raffaella says that the document he signed at the time was true, that it was a gift, reflecting his eldest daughter’s marriage and unpaid wages he owed her.
The starting point is to examine the financial records – which are both voluminous and far from complete – which the parties have chosen to place into evidence. It is quite clear that payments for the mortgage came from Raffaella’s 920 account. To that extent, Raffaella’s claim is correct. But what was the source of the funds in the 920 account?
Hundreds of pages of details of family members’ bank accounts were tendered. This occurred in two forms. There were 90 pages in small typeface which appeared to be a printout of internal CBA records (for each transaction had an 11 digit “CBA receipt number”); each page of the spreadsheet has around 80 rows, so that there are in excess of 7,000 transactions in the period from 1 December 2010 to 31 December 2019. Pages 792-842 are transactions in Raffaella’s account ended 920, which is the account from which many mortgage repayments were made. Pages 844-881 are transactions in Claudia’s account ended 674. These are said to be, and have the appearance of being, documents produced by the Commonwealth Bank in answer to a subpoena, based on the bank’s internal records.

Raffaella’s bank statements

There were also many pages in more familiar form of monthly (or sometimes six-monthly) bank statements. Most but not all of Raffaella’s 920 account were tendered, from February 2008 until February 2025. Statement 1 is missing. It should not be thought that the pages were placed in the Court Book in anything like chronological order, although it was not a large task to place them into such order so that sense could made of them. It may be that some other judicial officer has to repeat the task, for whose benefit I record that pages 1 and 3 but not page 2 of each of Statements 4, 7, 8 and 9, and pages 1, 3 and 5 (but not 2 or 4) of Statement 11 were tendered. The whole of statements 37-40 (for the period 14 May 2017 to 14 May 2018) were missing, although the transactions during that period may be found in the CBA printout.
Raffaella refinanced with Macquarie Bank in March 2019, although mortgage repayments continued to be made from the 920 account. The loan drawdown amount on 20 March 2019 was $760,000 (CB 710), secured by a registered mortgage (CB 1032). Monthly repayments started at $3,425.05, reducing to $3,085.64 from 20 May 2021, and rising sharply in 2022, when interest rates increased from 3.49% to 3.99% to 4.49% to 4.74% to 4.99% to 5.24% in the second half of that year (see CB 731) finishing the year at $4,210.44 per month. There were further rate rises in March and May 2023 leading to monthly repayments of $4,648.23, and further rises later that year. I shall return to the repayments, some of which bear directly upon the central issue in this trial.
Also tendered were 11 pages of Statement 9 of Raffaella’s CBA account ending 782, for the period 31 May – 30 November 2022 (CB 985-995). All but one entry (a payment of $180 on 5 October described as “babysitting”) was redacted, as were the running account balances. It is clear however (because there are more than 200 transactions) that this was an active account. Around 70 of the transactions are credits, and the masking of many is similar (one full line and a small portion of the second line) which is consistent with a recurring payment such as a salary. Why this account was almost entirely redacted is unclear to me. Raffaella also tendered some earlier bank statements (a Westpac account from July 2006 to January 2007), but aside from showing her salary, little turns on them.
A page was tendered which seemingly contains CBA bank account numbers, the account type and the denomination for family members (CB 843). Omitting duplications, there are 22 in all. Two were held by Fabiola (one in her own name, one a joint account with Christopher), one by Claudia (the 674 account), one a joint account of Luca and Claudia. Those four account were “Standard Branch” accounts. The rest were accounts in the name of Raffaella, either by herself or with Mark. Six were “NetBank” accounts. There were the following “Standard Branch” accounts: in Raffaella’s sole name: 670, 694, 920, 963, 619, 627 and 450, as well as accounts in Raffaella’s and Mark’s names: 971, 860, 879, 921 and 269. There were also NetBank accounts in Raffaella’s sole name (327, 782, 320) and in the couple’s names (689, 020, 550). One of the CBA statements (CB 1115) contains this text:

Using NetBank, the CommBank app or CommBiz (for business and institutional customers), you can manage your money securely online anywhere, anytime and you can access a range of handy features, including:
Transferring money between your accounts in real-time
Transferring money to a BSB and Account Number or paying money to someone using PayID
Setting up a recurring transfer or scheduling a transfer for later
Paying your bills using PayTo, BPAY® or direct debit

One thing is pellucidly clear. Although the parties tendered hundreds of pages and thousands of transactions, most of Raffaella’s bank accounts with CBA were not tendered, including those showing such income as she was paid or the accounts from which transfers into the 920 account were made.

The defendants’ bank statements

For the defendants, CB 554-567 were pages of Giuseppe’s Westpac bank account 751 from statements 5 to 15 covering small parts of the period December 2009 to October 2012. The reproduction was highly selective – precisely two of the 7 or more pages of each of Statement 5, 6, 7 and 8 were reproduced, nothing from Statements 9 and 10, two pages from Statement 11, nothing from Statements 12 or 13 and two pages from Statements 14 and 15. Raffaella rightly observed that those pages, which did show entries corresponding to the payment of occasional property expenses, fell far short of establishing Giuseppe’s claim that he paid all such expenses.
Scattered through volumes 2 and 3 of the courtbook (between CB 614 and 1106) were a complete set of statements 68-81 of Claudia’s 674 CBA account, covering the period from 1 May 2018 until 30 April 2025, occupying somewhat more than 100 pages. These overlap slightly with the CBA printout for the same account from 13 December 2010 to 31 December 2019. Were there any doubt about it, the transactions on the 29 pages of statements 68-71 correspond precisely with the last 7 pages of the CBA printout for the 674 account.
Thus there is a fairly comprehensive documentary account of the entirety of Claudia’s account with CBA from 2010 to date, and highly selective extracts made available by Giuseppe for the same period. It should be noted that it is not known to me what steps were taken by way of discovery, notice to produce or subpoena to banks by either side. I proceed on the basis that the parties have chosen to litigate their dispute on the basis of the limited information made available in the court book and the cross-examination bundle (Exhibit 1).

Fabiola’s Westpac account

Finally, tendered through the defendants’ cross-examination were statements 29-34 of Fabiola’s 694 Westpac account, for the period from 29 November 2005 – January 2007. These show a deposit of $35,000 on 21 December 2005, a series of large withdrawals all at Blacktown in 2006 ($3,400 in January; $4,000, $1,000, $1,000, $3,000 in February; $3,000 in March, and $1,000, $8,000, $1,000 on the 1, 2 and 4^th of May which with other more general expenses reduced the balance to less than $1,000. On 11 August 2006, there is a further deposit of $35,000, which was withdrawn in full on 23 August. On 19 September 2006, there is a deposit of $20,334.08, stated to be €12,250, from “Grillo Anna”, whom Fabiola accepted was her grandmother who still lived in Italy (T57.47). Some $13,708 was withdrawn the following week, and the rest over the next few weeks. Then, on 18 October 2006, there is a deposit of $324,218.46, also from Anna Grillo, representing €197,000. $10,000 was withdrawn by an online transaction described “BPAY TO WESTPAC CARDS” on 18 October. There follow withdrawals of $14,510 on 27 October 2006, $12,065 on 2 November 2006 and finally $242,712.11 on 9 November 2006 leaving some $32,000 in the account.

The purposes of the analysis of the banking records

There are four main purposes for reviewing the banking records.

First, an analysis of the banking records for 2008-2010 will explain how Raffaella became liable for the Queensland property, how she serviced that loan and why it was discharged at settlement on 1 December 2010.

Secondly, an analysis of the records from 2010 to date will show that a large contributor of funds to the 320 account (so that Raffaella’s debt to CBA (later Macquarie Bank) could be repaid) were cash deposits which had been withdrawn from Claudia’s account into which fortnightly payments of social security were made. To a much lesser extent, there are also deposits which appear to be associated with Fabiola and Serena.

Thirdly, by aligning the banking records with emails, text messages and social media communications between Raffaella and Giuseppe, Raffaella’s proposition that Giuseppe never provided funds to make any mortgage payments can be tested and, ultimately, refuted.

Fourthly, an analysis is required in order to resolve the issue identified by the parties whether Raffaella or Giuseppe paid amounts of $14,900 for solar panels and $8,000 for timber flooring.

The acquisition of Qld land in 2007

In May 2007, Raffaella had been employed by Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA) for just over a year, according to her loan application (CB 194). Her annual income was recorded as $39,584. She sought to borrow $140,837 to purchase land at Hay Point in Queensland. The application said the price was $180,000, and that she would also be repaying $9,000 in existing personal loans (with Esanda). Part of the consideration – some $40,000 – was described as “Gift”. The application was assessed on the basis that it would be a 30 year mortgage, at an interest rate of 7.34%, with repayments of $1,190 per month.
As will be seen below, the transaction proceeded. The best evidence of the conveyance is found in business records annexed to letters in an exchange between solicitors acting for the parties in 2023, including a settlement statement dated 11 July 2007, which included payments of $94,542.23 to Adelaide Bank and $29,509.76 to G & C Faraone. The solicitors denied that Giuseppe and Claudia paid for the transfer, or for any of the costs to date. Raffaella annexed a capital gains worksheet prepared by her accountant which records the property having been bought for $130,000, sold for $170,000, but having incurred some $120,000 in expenses between 2007 and 2023 (mostly interest of $82,657) with the result that she claimed a capital loss of $80,161 (CB 1108) which was lodged on her tax return (CB 1107).
The Queensland land is not part of the issues in this litigation. However, it remains relevant in two ways. First, Giuseppe’s case is that he helped his children acquire land, and Raffaella accepts that that occurred when she acquired the Queensland land. Secondly, and more importantly, the money borrowed by Raffaella to acquire the Queensland land was an important aspect of the settlement on 1 December 2010 of the conveyance to her of No 35.
Raffaella’s banking records for her 920 account for 2007 were not tendered, and those for 2008 and 2009 are incomplete. However there are regular debits of $1,237 described as “COMMONWEALTH BANK LN REPAY 418958507” on 20 February, 20 March and 21 April. Those debits are preceded by amounts which are just sufficient to leave the account in surplus. See for example the first page of Statement 3:

The next transaction (not reproduced in the portion extracted above) is the repayment of $1,237 on 21 April to the 507 account.
It is clear that someone was monitoring the account so as to ensure that $1,237 (and not much more) was available on the 20^th or 21^st of each month. The labels given to some of the deposits are suggestive: “car march and dad” and “PAPA HOME LOAN”.
By 20 May 2008, the repayments had risen to $1,329 per month. Then by November 2008 they had reduced to $1,147 and then to $1,037 in December, January (I presume – the page is missing), February and then $932 in March. Then something strange occurs. Page 1 of Statement 7 discloses a cash deposit of $15,000 on 16 April 2009 (CB 209). The closing balance on 20 April 2009 exceeds $15,000. Page 2 of Statement 7 is missing, and Statement 8 commences on 1 May 2009 with an opening balance of $3,072.34. Hence there was a withdrawal of some $12,000 between 21 and 30 April 2009. Because the computer generated printout only starts in 2010, there is nothing in evidence that sheds light on this.
Commencing on 18 May 2009, there are two streams of monthly repayments: $932 to the 507 loan account, and a new recurring debit of $279 to a new account ending in 008. The 008 debits cease on 18 November 2009. On that date, it seems likely that Raffaella refinanced some credit card debt and entered into a new loan facility.

It will be seen that funds of $12,273.11 were deposited on 18 November 2009, with a description which ends in 803. The following day, it appears that $6,227.48 of Bankwest credit cards were repaid. Thereafter, there are weekly debits of $180 credited to the 803 account, a one-off debit of $932, and later regular debits of $240 credited to the 507 account. The pattern of modest weekly payments of $180 to the 803 account and around $260 or $270 or $280 to the 507 account continues until November 2010.
The 920 account for the period from 4 November to 3 December 2010 is revealing:

.

The repayments to both the 803 and the 507 accounts thereafter stop. On 1 December 2010 there is a deposit of “SURPLUS FUNDS Admin” of $14,032.45, and on 3 December is the first loan repayment of $1,113.75 to a new account number ending in 603.
Pausing there, that very closely resembles the banking records earlier mentioned, to the effect that at settlement, Raffaella’s existing home loan (for the Queensland land) and personal loan would be repaid, and there would be some $14,333 deposited into Raffaella’s account.

Contributions from Claudia’s social security payments

It is convenient to start with calendar year 2011, the first calendar year after Raffaella became the registered proprietor of No 35. Her 920 account shows the following.
There are weekly repayments, in amounts of $1,120 (from 7 January until 23 September) and $1,113.75 (from 30 September until 30 December 2011). These are shown both on the spreadsheet, and on Statements 13 and 14 for that account (CB 341-357). The latter show the following:

First, there are no regular salary credits into that account.

Secondly, the balance prior to 28 April 2011 never exceeds $3,100, despite the fact that more than a thousand dollars is being debited each week. That comes about in large measure because there are in most weeks cash deposits in the order of $1,000.

Raffaella highlighted another source of funds to that account, namely, payments expressed to have been made by bank transfer by Fabiola. There are precisely 12 such deposits, all styled “Transfer from FABIOLA BONOMO NetBank”. They are as follows: $126 (3 Feb), $1,000 (10 Feb), $500 (18 Feb), $300 (26 Feb), $100 (3 Mar), $1,400 (11 Mar), $300 (27 Mar), $420 (21 Apr), $430 (23 Jun), $430 (27 Jul), $430 (25 Aug), $430 (21 Sep), $430 (27 Oct), $430 (21 Dec). In addition, although not highlighted in her table, is a credit of $811 on 30 November 2011 described as “Transfer from FABIOLA BONOMO NetBank tax money”. Those payments which exceed $6,000 contribute only just over one tenth of the mortgage repayments.

There are three relatively large transactions in this period: a credit of $20,000 on 28 April 2011 described as “746473218 Admin”, a debit of $14,400 on 30 June 2011 described as “Transfer to other Bank NetBank solar system pay”, and a deposit of $8,800.42 on 3 November 2011 described as “Chq Dep Branch Wpnt Blacktown”. Otherwise every transaction is no more than $1,500. Interestingly, the largest credit of $20,000 on 28 April 2011 bears the same number 746473218 as every mortgage repayment, which is consistent with it being further drawn down (or there being a “redraw”), but it is impossible to express any concluded view. The $14,400 debit relates to the solar panels and I shall return to it. The third deposit is mysterious.

There are two further recurring types of deposits into the account over this period: cash deposits and transfers from the 694 account. The latter have descriptions which are (or are very similar to) “Transfer from xx2694 NetBank home loan”. These were made on 14 Jan, 26 Jan, 11 Feb, 25 Feb, 11 Mar, 24 Mar, 7 Apr, 21 Apr, 5 May, 20 May, 4 Jun and 17 Jun. Those fortnightly deposits then stop, and there is a deposit of $1,000 on 30 June with a slightly different description “Transfer from xx2694 NetBank home loan repay”. There follow 18 Jul $950 “Transfer from xx2694 NetBank transfer”, 28 Jul $1,100 “Transfer from xx 2694 NetBank home loan”, 12 Aug $1,000, 26 Aug $1,000, 8 Sep $1,000, two on 22 September to which I shall return, 20 Oct $1,000, 3 Nov $1,000, 16 Nov $1,000, 2 Dec $1,000, 16 Dec $1,000.

On 22 September there are two unusual deposits:

It will be seen that both purport to be transfers from the xx2694 account in the amounts of $1,000, but one is described as “from raff”. It is clear that the person or persons who made each transfer entered the descriptions “home loan” and “loan from raff”; evidently those descriptions were not created automatically by the bank’s computer systems, but individually by the person making the transfer. It would be unusual for the named account owner to give such a description to a deposit into her own account. It is however consistent with Giuseppe’s account that it was he rather than Raffaella who made funds available to that 920 account.

There are also deposits described invariably as “Cash Dep Branch Wpnt Blacktown” or “Cash Dep Branch Rouse Hill”, and in one case (13 Jan) at Tweed Mall. These occurred as follows: 13 Jan $700, 28 Jan $700, 4 Feb $300, 10 Feb $700, 24 Feb $700, 10 Mar $1,000, $17 Mar $50, 24 Mar $700, 24 Mar $300, 28 Mar $100, 30 Mar $700, 7 Apr $600, 21 Apr $700, 21 Apr $300, 27 Apr $200, 28 Apr $360, 5 May $700, 19 May $700, 19 May $400, 2 Jun $1,000, 16 Jun $700, 16 Jun $300, 30 Jun $700, 30 Jun $300, 8 Jul $900, 13 Jul $300, 14 Jul $700, 14 Jul $300, 22 Jul $300, 28 Jul $700, 28 Jul $300, 4 Aug $1,500, 11 Aug 700, 11 Aug $300, 19 Aug $320, 25 Aug $300, 25 Aug $700, 2 Sep $380, 8 Sep $700, 8 Sep $300, 13 Sep $300, 16 Sep $1,000, 6 Oct $700, 6 Oct $300, 20 Oct $700, 20 Oct $250, 28 Oct $150, 3 Nov $700, 3 Nov $300, 17 Nov $300, 17 Nov $700, 1 Dec $700, 1 Dec $300, 22 Dec $300, 22 Dec $700.

There is a very close correlation between withdrawals from Claudia’s account shortly after social security payments are made, and the cash deposits in Raffaella’s account. Claudia’s account shows the following withdrawals for 2011 all from ATMs mostly in Woodcroft, Blacktown and Rouse Hill (CB 844-847): 13 Jan $1,000, 28 Jan $1,100, 10 Feb $1,000, 24 Feb $1,100, 10 Mar $1,000, 7 Apr $1,100, 21 Apr $1,170, 5 May $1,160, 19 May $1,200, 2 Jun $1,190, 16 Jun $1,170, 30 Jun $1,070, 13 Jul $900, 14 Jul $1,000, 28 Jul $1,000, 4 Aug $1,700, 11 Aug $1,000, 25 Aug $1,100, 8 Sep $1,100, 22 Sep $1,100, 6 Oct $1,100, 20 Oct $1,020, 3 Nov $1,000, 17 Nov $1,050, 1 Dec $1,000, 15 Dec $1,100, 29 Dec $1,000.

The pattern linking the social security payments to Claudia and the deposits to Raffaella’s 920 account (where the money was available to meet automatic mortgage repayments) is more easily observed by the following table which records every cash withdrawal from Claudia’s account on the day on which social security was paid into her account:

Date

Withdrawal from 674

Deposit into 920

13 Jan

$1,000

$700

28 Jan

$1,100

$700

10 Feb

$1,000

$700

24 Feb

$1,100

$700

10 Mar

$1,000

$1,000

7 Apr

$1,100

$600

21 Apr

$1,170

$700 + $300

5 May

$1,160

$700

19 May

$1,200

$700 + $400

2 Jun

$1,190

$1,100

16 June

$1,170

$700 + $300

30 June

$1,070

$700 + $300

Without fail, on the day that fortnightly social security payments were received by Claudia, there was a withdrawal from her account in cash, and a deposit of an amount at least half (sometimes considerably more than half), and on one occasion (10 March) the entirety of the withdrawal, into the 920 account. It is plain that the deposits reflect the payments of social security to Claudia (they are described as “AUS GOV FAMILIES” and “Pension” in her bank statements). It is unclear who is making the cash withdrawals and deposits. Claudia gave evidence that Raffaella had given her a CBA keycard, and that “Giuseppe and I would put all our money into that account and we would then use that card for all of our expenses” (CB 61).
Very approximately, somewhat less than half of the funds used to repay the mortgage debt over this period are sourced from deposits of cash made on the same day that Claudia received social security payments.
But the cash deposits made on the same day as the withdrawals of Claudia’s social security payments do not exhaust the cash deposits; there are other cash deposits, and who made those is not revealed by the documents. In addition, there are regular $1,000 deposits from the 2694 account described as “home loan”.

Did Raffaella make all the mortgage payments on No 35 necessary to supplement the payments of board by her sisters and the deposits of Claudia’s pension?

The emails exchanged between Raffaella and Giuseppe between 6-12 January 2012, on which Raffaella was cross-examined extensively, may be connected with the transactions in the 920 account at the same time. As was observed during the hearing, the emails of January 2012 bear upon the character of the transactions, and are relatively contemporaneous to the acquisition of No 35.
Some of the emails were in Italian, and not all were translated in the Court book. The parties were invited to supply agreed translations, or I directed the parties to supply their preferred versions. That occurred, with all save one of the translations being agreed. The six page translations of emails at pp 539-547 of Exhibit A, supplied to my Associate by email dated 8 August 2025, will be incorporated within Exhibit A.
It will be recalled that Giuseppe said that Raffaella moved out of No 35 in about January 2012.
On 6 January 2012, Giuseppe sent a long email to Raffaella in Italian. Mostly it was his extremely pejorative views about Mark and her choice of him as a boyfriend. Raffaella’s translation included the following:

When we decided, by mutual agreement, to register all the assets in your name it was to be protected and not stabbed in the back like you are doing!! You also know well that having something registered in your name does not mean you own it. If your problem was to have the possibility of buying your own home, all you had to do was organize things in such a way as not to harm anyone. The ownership of the property had also been organized, if you remember, to have a return on taxes to repay it as soon as possible and now you come out and you don’t want anything registered in your name, it means that you want to put us on the street and that you want to ruin everything that had been planned even with your consent.

Raffaella’s response on 9 January (CB 533) was short, and included:

The land has gone up for Sale for $249K for the last 4 weeks. As discussed with mum, not interested in the money, they will go onto the mortgage. If you wish to sell the house then you need to take the appropriate measures to get this done. I will not be doing it for you.

Later on 9 January, Giuseppe wrote to Raffaella (in Italian) under the subject “Che delusione!!!”:

You can pick up your stuff on Wednesday, January 11, 2012, from 10:00 AM to 4:00 PM. Once you’re done loading your stuff, leave the keys with your sister!! Congratulations on your decision!!

At 8.45am on 10 January, Raffaella replied (in English):

I am working between 10-4pm. You need to provide me with another option. I can pick up either on the weekend or any day after 6pm. In addition I have stopped putting the money in the home loan, so ensure you keep on top of your repayments. Regards Raffy

At 8.38pm on 10 January, Giuseppe replied. I reproduce his email and the competing translations:

Puoi venire giovedi 12/1/12 dalle 18.00 alle 22.00. Inoltre fammi sapere esattamente l’importo del mutuo da pagare, che dovra’ essere mensile e cosa e' rimasto della differenza dei soldi ricevuii per la casa dal commercialista che abbiamo messo sul tuo conto. Ci sono stati due sconti di interessi sul mutuo e quindi lo stesso si sara’ ridotto.
Plaintiff’s translation:
You can come by on Thursday, January 12, 2012, from 6:00 PM to 10:00 PM. Also, let me know the exact amount of the mortgage you’ll be paying, which will be monthly, and how much of the remaining balance of the money you received from your accountant for the house is left in your account. There were two interest discounts on the mortgage, so it will have been reduced.
Defendant’s translation:
You can come on Thursday 12/1/12 from 6:00 PM to 10:00 PM. Also let me know exactly the amount of the mortgage to be paid, which will have to be monthly, and what remains of the difference from the money received for the house from the accountant that we put into your account. There have been two interest discounts on the mortgage and so it will have been reduced.

On Wednesday 11 January, Raffaella responded:

Your repayments are $4,455 and are due the 1st of every month. I cant change January as you are already halfway in. If you need to change it to be effective the 01/02/12 you need to let me know.
The money in the account is $2,934.43 (next home loan repayment due this Friday as well as the Personal Loan, therefore the balance will come down). You also have your personal loan repayments of $366 which are also due the 1st of every month. They are currently set-up weekly to come out every Thursday for $100. Again if you need this changed you need to let me know.
Also you have the Building Insurance that comes out of the account as well and that is a monthly repayment of $93.53 on the 15th of every month.
There is also money in the MISA account of $7,410 (at the moment by having the money in there you are paying less interest in your home loan balance). Let me know if you want all this in another account and whether you will also be changing the account for all Direct Debits.
Also a refund from the ATO is still to come $7,731.57 (should be coming within the next 14 days).
Out of that I will be taking my part of $4,500 as out of the first refund I only took $2,000 and I was owed $6,500. ($5,000 from the ATO, I paid an extra mortgage repayment for one fortnight and I also paid the registration for the car). So once I take my half, let me know where you wish to have the rest of the funds. Also I will be paying the accountant my bill of $250, so ensure you pay your outstanding bill once you get the funds.
Regards
Raffy

Giuseppe responded later that evening (in Italian); the agreed translation is:

As for the personal loan, you can leave it weekly with the $100.00 every Thursday. As for the home loan, change it by February 1st. Why is the amount due $4,455 if there have been two interest discounts in the last two months? You can pay the accountant as soon as the money arrives from the ATO, with the money left after you’ve taken your share. Leave the remaining balance in the home loan account so we can pay the difference on February 1st. Leave the insurance in the same account and we'll pay it by depositing the necessary amount every 15th of the month. We must keep the house payment in your name at least until June 30th, the end of the financial year, to recover part of the investment money with your next tax return. If after that date you’d like your name removed from the property, let us know and we'll make the necessary arrangements, but always after June 30th. Of course, you’ll still have to file your next tax return in your own name, as we did in 2011. Also, you need to let me know what you want to do with your car – whether you need to take it back or we can trade it in for another, since it’s increasingly failing to start. Regards, Giuseppe.

Finally, Raffaella replied the following morning (in English):

Even though the interest rates come down the payment still remains the same as it is based on the balance of the initial loan. All that happens is less goes on the interest and more towards the principle [sic]. In regards to the car you can keep it and do as you wish with it.
Regards
Raffy

Cross-examination

Raffaella was cross-examined extensively on this chain of emails, starting with that of 6 January. She recalled receiving it, but rejected the proposition that Giuseppe was annoyed because he no longer wanted to keep the property registered in Raffaella’s name. When asked about what she understood her father to be annoyed about, Raffaella indicated that the majority of the email was about his animosity towards Mark. Raffaella rejected counsel’s suggestion that Giuseppe’s email “correctly reflected the arrangement [she] had with [her] father about the property at the time”. In response to why she failed to respond to the purportedly misrepresented state of affairs, Raffaella answered:

I didn’t really go into too much detail with my father. I was more concerned about the fact that his - his words were quite strong towards me at the time, and my choice of life decisions. I didn’t address everything on this email. I wasn’t going to get into a battle or an argument with him about what he thought was right, and as you continue to see, I continued making my home loan repayments at the time, even though I expressed that I wanted nothing to do with the family after his - his treatment towards me.

Raffaella was then taken to her response:

Q. Well, Ms Samawi, if you turn over one page, please, to 533, that was your response to this email, wasn’t it?
A. Correct, and you can see it’s very brief. I didn’t get into detail or into a keyboard war with him. I basically told him I moved out, and out of - out of spite and anger, I wanted to let him know I’m happy to just give in with the house, and not take care of it, if that’s what he needed, but I ended up continuing paying my mortgage repayments, so that my mother wouldn’t be left on the streets.
Q. Well, just starting with what you say in the first sentence, you said you permanently moved out, because you did actually move out of the house at around that time, correct?
A. No, I moved out in 2011, much earlier on.
Q. Next, you say the land - by which you mean the Queensland property - has gone up for sale for $249,000 for the last four weeks, correct?
A. Correct.
Q. Can you just explain to his Honour why you decided to volunteer that information to your father?
A. I can’t recall at the time.
Q. Well, can I suggest to you the obvious reason why you did so is because you knew you held that property for him, correct?
A. No.
Q. Can I just ask you to direct your attention to the second last, and the last, sentences, Ms Samawi? They start: “If you wish to sell the house, then you need to take the appropriate measures to get this done.” Now, by that, you were referring to [No 35], weren’t you, because that was the property with a house on it, not the Queensland property, correct?
A. I can assume so, I believe so, yes.
Q. Can you explain to his Honour why then you would be saying to Giuseppe - suggesting to Giuseppe that if he wished to sell the house, then he should get that done?
A. That was a response to my previous email. I wanted nothing to do with it. I was willing to just take care of nothing, just out of anger. And then I ended up just continuing to do what I had to do with it. Never sold, never stopped repairing.
Q. Well, I just want to suggest to you that you said those words to him because you knew you held the property for him, didn’t you?
A. No, my father wasn’t living there at the time.
Q. Well, if he wasn’t living there at the time, and you say you were angry with him, why would you effectively provide him with an option to sell the property if he wished? Why wouldn’t you have made that decision yourself?
A. He just kept getting involved in family matters, even though he was divorced from my mother.

Raffaella was then taken to her further response dated 10 January 2012 and addressed to Giuseppe (at this stage, Giuseppe’s email to her was untranslated). Counsel read the words, “[i]n addition, I have stopped putting the money in the home loan, so ensure you keep on top of your repayments”. Raffaella rejected several propositions, including that she said those words because Giuseppe was actually making repayments towards the home loan (and instead posited that the loan repayments came from her account), and that there was an arrangement whereby Giuseppe would provide funds so that Raffaella could pay the mortgage. Counsel also asked whether the payments recorded as “rent” from Giuseppe to Raffaella were really meant to be payments towards the mortgage, to which Raffaella replied that she did not recall her father paying her rent.
Counsel for the respondent took Raffaella to the email dated 11 January 2012 addressed to Giuseppe. The words “[y]our repayments are $4,455 and are due the 1^st of every month” was put to Raffaella as referring to “repayments made by [Giuseppe] towards the mortgage or loan”. Raffaella’s response was, in effect, to convey that if Giuseppe “wanted to continue to let [her] mother live there, he would have to make the repayments” or otherwise she would let the loan default (which she never did). Several propositions were then put to Raffaella, as follows:

Q. Can I suggest to you, there was never a rental agreement between you and your father, was there?
A. My father wasn’t on the rental agreement to 2018. He was never supposed to be living in the home, and if he was, it was without my knowledge.
Q. In fact, the arrangement, it’s obvious from that email, wasn’t it, was that he would at all times make repayments towards the mortgage. Correct?
A. No.
Q. Well, you say in the second paragraph - sorry. What did you mean by the second sentence? “I can’t change January, as you are already halfway in.”
A. Sorry, where am I looking?
Q. It’s the sentence following that at the top of the page. It starts, “I can’t change January, as you are already halfway in.”
A. I’m sorry, I can’t recall. This is more than 14 years ago. I can’t recall what that would’ve meant.
Q. In the next paragraph, in the final two sentences, you say, “They are currently set up weekly to come out every Thursday for $100. Again, if you need this changed, you need to let me know.” Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. The fact is, you helped your parents with their financial arrangements, didn’t you?
A. No. This is me telling him how my home loan was set up, and if he wanted to continue making payments to let my mother live in there, then he could do so, as she was inconsistent with her rent at the time, and wasn’t paying.

I interpolate that I shall return to this exchange when dealing with the solar panels. The cross-examination continued:

Q. In the fourth paragraph, you said, “There is also money in the MISA account of $7,410.” Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. That was a reference to an offset account, wasn’t it?
A. Correct.
Q. And you then say, “At the moment, by having the money in there, you are paying less interest in your home loan balance.” Do you see that?

promise: there must be a “clear and unequivocal” promise made by the party estopped (the promisor) to the party who relies on the promise (the promisee);
expectation or intention: a reasonable person in the promisor's position must have expected or intended, or the promisor must have actually expected or intended, that the promisee would rely upon the promise by some action, omission or course of conduct;
reliance: the promisee must have relied upon the promise by acting or omitting to act in the general manner that would have been expected; and
detriment: the consequence of the promisee's reliance must be that the promisee will suffer detriment if the promise is not fulfilled.

These elements are satisfied by the evidence. Christopher, Fabiola and Raffaella all participated in the transfer of No 35 to them, using money borrowed in their name supplemented by capital supplied by Giuseppe, on the basis that the property would be his beneficially. The consensus within the family satisfies the elements of promise and expectation. Giuseppe, who was parting in each case with more than half of his net wealth, proceeded on the basis that first Christopher, then Christopher and Fabiola, and then Raffaella, would keep their word and hold No 35 on trust for him.
Counsel for Raffaella contended that there was nothing resembling a “life-changing” detriment on the part of Giuseppe, as may be seen in decisions such as Sidhu v Van Dyke (2014) 251 CLR 505; [2014] HCA 19. That submission reflects the fact that decisions to stay on a farm, or in a cottage as Ms Van Dyke, need not involve the expenditure of money in order to satisfy this element of proprietary estoppel. But it is not to be thought that detriment is confined to such “like-changing” decisions. In Kramer v Stone, the majority judgment said at [40]:

In cases where the detriment suffered by a plaintiff is “a relatively small, readily quantifiable monetary outlay on the faith of the [defendant's] assurances” then, apart from interest, the likely equitable relief ordered will be compensation in the amount of the monetary outlay. By contrast, where the detriment suffered “involves life-changing decisions with irreversible consequences of a profoundly personal nature”, the likely equitable relief will be to require fulfilment of the assumption upon which the plaintiff acted, such as by a conveyance of rights, or an assessment of the monetary value of the assumption. [footnote omitted]

The $280,000 contributed by Giuseppe represented the majority of his wealth. There was no challenge to his evidence that it was some 70% of his net wealth at the time. That evidence is inherently plausible, having regard to the family’s immigration to Australia to live in rented accommodation at the time. Further, if as Raffaella submitted the money was a gift to Fabiola for her wedding and also unpaid wages, then it was shockingly unfair to the other five younger children.
The same is true of the “equity” which was contributed by Giuseppe when No 35 was transferred to Raffaella. Once again it represented the majority of Giuseppe’s wealth, and was to be used to benefit all five of the younger children.
I find that Giuseppe participated by supplying the $280,000 when No 35 was first acquired, and by supplying the $167,000 when No 35 was transferred to Raffaella, because Christopher, Fabiola and Raffaella all accepted at those times that they held the land on trust for him, and that he would ultimately be liable to meet any shortfall in mortgage repayments and other property expenses if the customary board did not suffice. In both 2006 and 2010, that was substantial detrimental reliance.
The appropriate remedy is to make good the common assumption. That is the starting point: Priestley v Priestley [2017] NSWCA 155 at [164]; Pirrottina at [98]. However, as will be seen below, that does not mean that Raffaella (to the extent that she incurred expense holding and improving the trust property) is left without remedy. But the discretion as to remedy cannot be exercised without first attending to various subsidiary issues.
Alternatively, the findings identified above suffice to conclude that there is a “common intention constructive trust”, to the extent that that is conceptually different from proprietary estoppel. The elements are found in Galati v Deans [2023] NSWCA 13 at [53]-[60] and [148]-[149]. The requirements of actual intention are, on my findings, made out, in relation to each of Giuseppe, Christopher, Fabiola and Raffaella. Each intended that the registered proprietor of No 35 would hold that land on trust for Giuseppe, who had provided most or all of the purchase price that was not borrowed, and who would service the mortgage to the extent that payments of board or rent from family members living in No 35 were insufficient. Giuseppe acted to his detriment in contributing the majority of his net wealth to the acquisition of No 35.

Did Raffaella pay for all of the mortgage repayments?

Every mortgage repayment came out of Raffaella’s 920 account. Thus in a purely legal sense, Raffaella repaid the whole of the mortgage (that is to say, the chose in action which was the 920 account between her and CBA was drawn upon by weekly and monthly debits to repay indebtedness in Raffaella’s name from CBA in 2010 and, later, Macquarie Bank in 2019).
However, contrary to her evidence, I find that Raffaella did not make all the repayments of the mortgage, in a real practical sense. On some occasions at least, Giuseppe deposited funds into the 920 account which corresponded with imminent scheduled mortgage repayments. The clearest example is the $4,455 deposited by him (as I have already found) on 24 January 2012, shortly after Raffaella told him on 11 January 2012 “[y]our repayments are $4,455 and are due on the 1^st of every month” (CB 545). But there are numerous other examples of cash deposits into the 920 account from various CBA branches. There are also electronic transfers which include the word “Lended” which seems more likely to reflect Giuseppe. And there is the striking fact that some of the deposits into the 920 account, which obviously come from Raffaella (because the transfers are from other accounts in her name) stated that “Raffy” made the payment.
I am unpersuaded that Giuseppe made all of the mortgage payments. There are some that were made by Raffaella, including her email on 11 January 2012 “I paid an extra mortgage repayment”. For many, the evidence is unclear.

Did Giuseppe pay expenses of No 35?

Faced with the myriad of detail, no attempt was made to falsify the entirety of Giuseppe’s claim that he paid all the building expenses. Counsel instead, appropriately, focussed on two relatively large items: the solar panels (which cost $14,900) in June 2011, and some timber work which cost $8,000 in May 2018.
I shall address each of these two items in turn.
The solar panels. Giuseppe said in his affidavit “I arranged and paid for Solar panels to be installed in 2011” and exhibited an invoice which he said he paid. However, Raffaella said that she took out a personal loan of $20,000 to pay for the solar panels, and then paid for the panels from her 920 account. She exhibited the loan approval as well as the invoice. The documents exhibited are for a personal loan in the amount of $15,000, approved by the CBA on 27 April 2011. However, there is a deposit of $20,000 into the 920 account on 28 April 2011 and it is reasonable to assume that the CBA increased its approval to $20,000 (CB 794), which is what Raffaella deposed to and as to which she was not cross-examined.
In closing address, Mr Young fastened upon the $14,400 for solar panels, saying “Now, we know, we can tell from the bank records that at least some of the payments that [Giuseppe] claims, he didn’t make” (T150.12). The example was a 30 June 2011 debit of $14,400 from Raffaella’s 920 account described as “solar system pay” (CB 796). The invoice was in evidence (CB 521), it was issued by “RME Renew My Energy”, addressed to Raffaella, and showed that a deposit of $500 had been paid on 29 April 2011 with an outstanding balance of $14,400. The 920 account also discloses a transfer to “RME” of $500 on 29 April 2011 (CB 794).
For the year prior to 28 April 2011, the account had little money in it. On 28 April 2011 there is a deposit of $20,000 described as “746473218 Admin” and on the following day the $500 deposit for the solar panels was withdrawn. As earlier noted there ensure regular repayments of $94 described as “LN REPAY 746473218” thereafter. This accords with Raffaella’s evidence that she “applied for and was approved for a $20,000 personal loan for the solar panels” (CB 124). In a practical sense, the $20,000 deposit was the source of funds for the solar panels. (The difference between the $14,900 needed and the $20,000 borrowed was not explained.)
The calculations approving the $15,000 loan were based on 83 monthly payments of $275 and a concluding payment of $172.45. For a loan of $20,000, the repayments would be in the order of $367 (ie. 275 x 20,000/15,000) over the same seven year period. And, sure enough, there are weekly repayments of $94 from the 920 account, commencing on 5 May 2011, and thereafter on 12, 19 and 26 May, 2, 9, 16, 23 and 30 June, rising to $100 on 7, 14, 21 and 28 July (CB 353-357), and 4, 11, 18, 25 August, 1, 8, 15, 22 and 29 September, and so on. The repayments continue at $100 per week until 16 August 2012. There follow transactions consistent with paying out the $20,000 personal loan. Page 1 of Statement 17 (CB 327) shows the last $100 repayment to the 218 account, and then a deposit of $21,064 and a transfer to the 218 account of $9,041.61 described as “PL pay out”:

Thus, it is true that Raffaella paid for the solar panels, doing so with funds borrowed by her and financed by a personal loan. However that indebtedness was serviced from the 920 account for the ensuing 15 months no differently from the mortgage, and was discharged by reason of an “investment return” received from another account on 17 August 2012.
I return to Raffaella’s email of 11 January 2012, reproduced above, which referred to “your personal loan repayments of $366 which are also due the 1^st of every month. They are currently set-up weekly to come out every Thursday for $100”. The $100 weekly debits from the 320 account are to the 218 account. That is to say, in her email of 11 January 2012, Raffaella told Giuseppe that the loan taken out in her name used to pay for the solar panels being repaid by recurring debits of $100 as “your personal loan repayments”.
That said, it is also necessary to bear in mind that Raffaella was not taken to the link between the $100 debits and her email of 11 January 2012.
The result is that it remains unclear whether Giuseppe indirectly paid for the solar panels. I make no finding one way or the other.
Timber floor. The second example selected by counsel in closing address was an amount of $8,000 paid, some seven years later, for some timber work, which included more than merely some flooring, but which was described by all in this trial as the “Timber floor”.
It was put in closing address on behalf of Raffaella:

YOUNG: So at p 834, we’ve got on 6 May 2018, again, we’ve got this greyed out entry with red underneath it.
HIS HONOUR: Yes.
YOUNG: There’s an amount of 8,000, and it says, “Timber Floor.”
HIS HONOUR: Yes.
YOUNG: And the invoice for that is at 605. It’s in vol 2. We’ve got, “Supreme timber flooring 8,000 paid.” So this, again, is something that Giuseppe’s claiming to have paid, and it’s actually come out of Raffaella’s account. Now, in relation to roofing and guttering, there are - it gets a bit more complicated. I know at least one of those is covered by insurance, so I won’t take up the time of trying to trace those rabbits down the holes, but we know at least in relation to the solar panels and flooring, Giuseppe’s claims are quite clearly wrong on the accounts.

Mr Kauffman, in response to the flooring, pointed to deposits of $55,000 less than three weeks before the $8,000 flooring invoice was paid.
The invoice for the floor was actually dated 8 May 2018. That was 2 days after funds had been transferred from the 920 account. It was sent to Giuseppe’s “dodo” email account on 15 May 2018. The documents do not suggest that a hardcopy was provided directly to Raffaella, although it may have been.
This is consistent with Giuseppe’s evidence:

If I did not pay property expenses directly I would pay them into Raffaella’s account. I transferred sums of money into the account Raffaella directed where the loan payments were coming from. I also spent from that account wit the card that Raffaella gave me for that purpose.

It is true that the $8,000 was withdrawn on 6 May 2018 to pay for flooring. However, as wa pointed out in closing address, there were deposits of $10,000 on 13-17 April made by Giuseppe (CB 597, 600-603). (These transactions would have been on statement 40 which has not been tendered, and so it is necessary to go to the CBA spreadsheet). Each deposit identified Giuseppe by name. However, Giuseppe retained his Westpac receipts, which describe each deposit as “Debt repayment”. Further, the salesperson “Connie” sent the invoice directly to Giuseppe on 15 May 2018 (CB 604). That occurred at a time when the invoice had been paid in full. If Giuseppe had no interest in No 35 or the amounts spent on flooring, it is difficult to see why that would occur.
Once again, I am not persuaded by Raffaella’s submission that Giuseppe’s claims are “quite clearly wrong”.

Did Giuseppe work on the house?

I find that Giuseppe did building work on the house. That was his evidence. Contrary to what was put to him in cross-examination, he did work for Mark which was well regarded. And it was supported by Serena’s evidence:

Q. And in the period from 2006 to 2010, do you remember that there were tradesmen that would come in - and tradesmen and contractors would come in to do work on [No 35] from time to time you remember that?
A. Yes.
Q. And your father was often there when the tradesmen arrived?
A. That’s correct.
Q. And you saw your father talk to the tradesmen and contractors, didn’t you?
A. Speak to. Assist.
Q. But you don’t know from your own knowledge, as opposed to what other people have told you, who ended up paying for those contractors, do you?
A. That’s incorrect.
Q. Well you saw people personally handing over money to contractors in your presence.
A. That’s correct, yes.
Q. And Chris was paying for those contractors, wasn’t he?
A. That’s incorrect.
Q. I see. Why do you say that?
A. Because I witnessed my father paying for these contractors.
Q. But you don’t know what money he used to pay for them do you?
A. That’s incorrect.
Q. Your father didn’t do any work personally on [No 35] in your presence, did he?
A. That’s incorrect. I’ve just told you here he did.
Q. No, you didn’t. You said, a moment ago, that you saw him dealing with contractors and paying the money.
A. And assist, I said.
Q. You didn’t say anything about doing the work.
A. And assist.
Q. I suggest to you that your father was sometimes organising the tradesmen and contractors in Chris’s absence on his behalf, but that was the limit of his involvement.
A. I would say your suggestion is incorrect.

Serena answered the questions asked, and corrected the cross-examiner when he (inadvertently) misstated her evidence that she had seen her father assist the licensed tradesmen working on the house.
Raffaella denied that Giuseppe did any work, but it is difficult to see that she would be in a position to say that from her own knowledge. There were adjectival issues whether Giuseppe had any skills relevant to building work, and whether he was licensed. He freely accepted he was not licensed, but said that where necessary he worked under the supervision of a licensed tradesman (such as an electrician). There was an attempt to cross-examine him to the effect that he had no specialised skills, but on that point I accept his evidence, which was corroborated by Serena.
I find in accordance with Serena’s evidence that Giuseppe paid the contractors who did work on the site. I also find that Giuseppe did some construction work on the site, albeit that it was often supervised by licensed tradesmen.
Other issues. A deal of time was occupied by a handwritten note, purportedly signed by Fabiola, concerning wedding expenses and, perhaps also, unpaid wages. In her affidavit, she doubted that the signature was hers; in cross-examination she was more confident that it was not. The signature resembles to the unassisted eye other instances of Fabiola’s signature at around this time. But there was no expert evidence and in any event it is unnecessary to resolve this issue. The point of the submissions on the handwritten note were to buttress the submission that the $280,000 was a gift. I do not accept that it was; I do not accept that Giuseppe gave the majority of his wealth to Christopher and Fabiola as a wedding gift or as unpaid wages.
Likewise it is not necessary to determine whether Fabiola worked in Giuseppe’s café without being paid, contrary to a document which appeared to be the expense book with handwritten payments of wages. That too was directed to the character of the $280,000.
Finally, it is not necessary to address the changed arrangement in around 2021 and 2022 when Giuseppe returned to live in No 35, or the competing evidence about efforts to transfer title at this time. That does not detract from the conclusion that Raffaella holds No 35 as a trustee, which arose from events more than 15 years earlier, although it will impact upon her entitlement to indemnity.

Other claims

In accordance with “the general principle that a trial judge should determine all issues in order to assist the appeal process and obviate the need for a retrial” (Transport for NSW v Hunt Leather Pty Ltd (2024) 115 NSWLR 489; [2024] NSWCA 227 at [99]), I turn to Giuseppe’s alternative claim that No 35 stands charged to secure the repayment of the amounts contributed to its acquisition, improvement or maintenance.
In closing address, it was confirmed that this case was confined to a claim for pecuniary relief secured by a charge assuming that a proprietary estoppel had been made out but a constructive trust was not the appropriate relief:

HIS HONOUR: I can understand a case where you make out the elements of proprietary estoppel, and then when we get to remedy you don’t get a constructive trust, you get something less. That, in principle is clear to me. What I really want to know, because it seems unlikely to be the case that everyone who does some work on someone else’s property is entitled to a charge over it. Is there some other way in which you’re advancing it, short of part of the discretionary relief for an equitable proprietary estoppel?
KAUFMANN: No, no, there’s not, your Honour.

Accordingly, let it be assumed that there was an agreement on which Giuseppe relied to his detriment, but that I am wrong to conclude that the appropriate remedy is a trust. Giuseppe claims a pecuniary entitlement reflecting the cost of the amounts he has paid since 2019.
Ex hypothesi, Giuseppe contributed $280,000 when No 35 was acquired by Christopher, and for the reasons given above, that was not a gift.
I am unpersuaded that good conscience would require Raffaella to repay Giuseppe for the cost of the various improvements to No 35. It is trite that the cost of improvements can bear little relationship to their value, and indeed many home improvements may diminish the property’s value. The extensive roofing installed which covers much of the back yard may be an example. There was no evidence of any value added to the property by any of the improvements.
I am persuaded, contrary to Raffaella’s evidence and submissions, that Giuseppe performed building work on No 35. However, the evidence does not permit me to ascribe any monetary amount to the extent to which that work improved the value of No 35.

Underlying the conclusions in the preceding two paragraphs is my view that Raffaella should not be held liable for the actual cost to Giuseppe, or the cost of an equivalent worker, which have not been shown to have improved the value of the land owned by her.
Then there is the question of determining to what extent in fact Giuseppe put Raffaella in funds to make mortgage repayments. On this issue Giuseppe bears the onus. He has tendered none of his own financial records to establish which of the cash deposits were made by him. I do not accept that he paid, personally, all of the repayments to the Homeside Lending account when No 35 was owned by Christopher and Fabiola. The deposits are made every month, but all of the evidence points to Giuseppe being in Italy for the Northern Hemisphere summer. Of course that would not prevent Giuseppe supplying funds for someone to deposit at the Rouse Hill branch, but Giuseppe has failed to supply any documentary evidence of this, and instead has been highly selective in supplying his own banking records.
I do accept that Giuseppe made some payments to service the mortgage, although the most consistent source of funds were the contributions made by Claudia (from the social security payments she received). I have mentioned the deposit of $4,455 above. I think it is more likely than not that many of the payments came from Giuseppe. Against that, it is also necessary to bear in mind that Giuseppe has obtained a benefit over the years of accommodation at No 35, and that ultimately on the hypothesis against which this claim falls to be tested the issue is to what extent would equity impose a remedy upon Raffaella in consequence of Giuseppe’s detrimental reliance on his assumption that he would have a proprietary interest in No 35, such remedy being moulded by what is necessary to prevent an unconscientious assertion by Raffaella of her legal rights.
On the evidence, the only substantial (in excess of $10,000) payments established, aside from the $280,000 paid in 2006, are the $57,300 paid by Giuseppe to Raffaella and Mark in April 2018 (evidenced by Giuseppe’s Westpac receipts). All were described as “debt repayments”. One of the payments was made to Mark. There was a deal of contested evidence as to what they were for. None was especially persuasive. I find that they were, as described, repayments of debt, rather than contributions to the purchase of No 35.
I would conclude by holding Raffaella liable to account for the value of the original $280,000 contribution. That reflected slightly more than half the purchase price of $545,000 in 2006. Admitted into evidence was a one page market appraisal by a local real estate agent who referred to recent sales of three comparable properties at $2.05m, $1.855m and $1.975m and who estimated that, as at 24 March 2025, the property would sell for $1.9m - $2m (CB 1096). The reasoning is slender but the conclusion is not implausible. It is overwhelmingly clear that the appreciation in value is attributable not to improvements on the property, but on the general rise in Sydney residential real estate prices. I think equity would not permit Raffaella to gain the entirety of the benefit of the capital appreciation in circumstances where slightly more than half of the acquisition costs came from Giuseppe in circumstances where it was not a gift or a loan but a capital contribution to an asset in which he retained a beneficial interest.
On the hypothesis applicable to this section of these reasons, namely that there should not be a constructive trust, I would disregard all other contributions made by Giuseppe, which are difficult to quantify, bearing in mind the limited extent to which they contributed to value and the benefits received by Giuseppe over the years, and impose a charge on the property to secure the repayment of an amount reflective of 51.4% of its value (280/545 approximately equals 51.4%), to be determined by a sale in the absence of agreement between the parties.

Conclusions and orders

For those reasons, I conclude that Giuseppe succeeds in his primary claim based on a trust. I shall make a declaration to that effect.
I have concluded that Raffaella holds No 35 on constructive trust for Giuseppe, pursuant to the common understanding they shared in 2010 whereby he would provide the balance of the purchase price not lent from CBA as well as service the mortgage payments. Pursuant to that common understanding, Raffaella obtained immediate benefits in excess of some $200,000 of personal indebtedness being repaid, a cash deposit of $15,000, and title to No 35 at a discount through a $167,000 “equity gift”, but also the obligation to repay indebtedness of some $670,000, which would require more than the payments of board from family members living in the house.
That conclusion is founded upon the documents on which Raffaella was cross-examined, my view that her answers did not materially detract from those documents being powerful admissions that the property was not hers beneficially, in contrast to the plausible explanation given by Giuseppe of his letter stating the $280,000 to be a gift, and the fact that according to the settlement sheet and as corroborated by the banking records, Raffaella obtained legal title at a substantial discount and in circumstances where she received significant pecuniary benefits.
I have also found that at least some of the mortgage repayments were made by Giuseppe in the real and practical sense deployed in these reasons – by his placing funds in her 320 account – in accordance with the original agreed position. However, I have also concluded that some (quite possibly, many) repayments were made by Raffaella without having been put in funds by Giuseppe.
To the extent that Raffaella used her own funds in order to meet the difference between board received and the obligations to make repayments to CBA and later Macquarie Bank, she was incurring expenses as a trustee, and has an entitlement to be repaid from trust assets. The starting point is statute. Section 59(4) of the Trustee Act 1925 (NSW) provides that a trustee may reimburse herself, or pay or discharge out of the trust property all expenses incurred in or about execution of the trustee’s trusts or powers. Section 5 defines trust to include a constructive trust, unless the context or subject-matter otherwise indicates or requires. The reasoning in Butterfield v Public Trust [2017] NZCA 367; [2017] NZCCLR 27 at [21]-[22] supports construing “trustee” in s 59(4) as extending to constructive trusts, at least where the trustee acts reasonably and in good faith. There are occasions when a constructive trustee is not entitled to the right of indemnity enjoyed by ordinary trustees: see Nolan v Collie (2003) 7 VR 287; [2003] VSCA 39 (a case of a constructive trust imposed as between vendor and purchaser). However, in the present case, I see no reason to displace the principle, in circumstances where the expenses incurred by Raffaella were for repayment of debt secured over the trust property and for other property expenses such as rates which were an inevitable consequence of ownership of No 35. The position was stated broadly in Rowley v Ginnever [1897] 2 Ch 503 at 507 (which concerned a constructive trustee): “when you find that a person in possession of property has expended money in improving that property, if he turns out not to be the sole and absolute owner there is a presumption in his favour that, on accounting for the property to the other persons interested, he is to be recouped the money so expended to the extent of the improvement”. The existence of such a right of recoupment appears to have been endorsed in Elder’s Trustee and Executor Co Ltd v Higgins (1963) 113 CLR 426 at 439; [1963] HCA 48, as well as in Enright v Newton [2021] 2 NZLR 412; [2020] NZCA 529 at [148].
Further, Raffaella’s entitlement to an indemnity would prima facie be secured by a lien over those trust assets: Naaman v Jaken Properties Australia Pty Ltd [2025] HCA 1; 99 ALJR 295 at [1].
There are complicated questions which remain unresolved in order to quantify Raffaella’s entitlement to an indemnity. To what extent must Raffaella account for the benefit she received in 2010? Should a distinction be drawn between the discharge of her indebtedness in respect of the Queensland land, and the discharge of her personal loan and the receipt of $14,032.45 on 1 December 2010? To what extent and at what rate does interest accrue on Raffaella’s entitlement to be reimbursed? What is the impact of the new arrangement struck in around 2021 when it was agreed that expenses be split equally? I am also conscious that at this level, both Raffaella and Giuseppe are asserting rights in equity, to which the principles in Nelson v Nelson (1995) 184 CLR 538; [1995] HCA 25 may apply, such that any relief may be qualified by an obligation to repay a benefit (such as tax benefits) wrongly claimed. Finally, there are complicated factual questions – not assisted by the absence of full banking records for either side – as to the extent to which Giuseppe in fact made funds available to Raffaella to make mortgage repayments and other expenses. None of this was argued. I do not think it would be right to shut Raffaella out of such a claim, which is consequential upon a late unpleaded cross-summons advanced by Giuseppe and Claudia shortly after they obtained legal representation and reflects an incident of the trust for which they contended. Nor would it be right for Giuseppe and Raffaella to be confined to the evidence advanced at this trial to resolve the issues summarised above.
There are a number of ways in which the resolution of the outstanding pecuniary aspects of this litigation may occur, assuming it is not possible for Giuseppe and Raffaella to reach agreement. One is a further exercise conducted by me, which would have the advantage that I have some familiarity with those financial records which the parties chose to place into evidence. Another is a hearing before another judge. A third is a referral to a referee. None is incompatible with a court-annexed mediation.
I shall permit the parties to be heard as to further orders, including costs, although it will be clear from the above that my present view is that there is no reason to depart from the default position in UCPR r 42.1 that costs follow the event in relation to the costs of the trial, although it is also possible that there should be some variation in relation to other costs (for example, costs thrown away by the vacation of the 17 July 2025 hearing).
I make the following orders (the actual address of No 35 appears in the orders entered on JusticeLink but not in these reasons):

1. The 6 page translations of emails at pp 539-547 of Exhibit A, supplied to my Associate by email dated 8 August 2025, will be incorporated within Exhibit A.

2. Declare that the property at 35 xxxxx Street, Stanhope Gardens in the State of New South Wales, being the land contained in folio identifier 101/270391, is held by the plaintiff on trust for the first defendant.

3. Paragraphs 1-3 of the Summons filed 28 November 2024 dismissed.

4. Paragraphs 2-13 of the Amended First Cross-Summons filed 6 August 2025 otherwise dismissed.

5. The parties to supply by email to my Associate agreed orders, or in default of agreement, the orders each seeks and submissions in support of such orders by 4pm Tuesday 9 September 2025.

6. The matter to be listed before me for directions at 9.30am on Wednesday 10 September 2025.

**********

Decision last updated: 28 August 2025

Medium Neutral Citation:	Samawi v Faraone [2025] NSWSC 970
Hearing dates:	6, 7 August 2025
Decision date:	28 August 2025
Jurisdiction:	Equity - Real Property List
Before:	Leeming JA
Decision:	1. The 6 page translations of emails at pp 539-547 of Exhibit A, supplied to my Associate by email dated 8 August 2025, will be incorporated within Exhibit A. 2. Declare that the property at 35 xxxxx Street, Stanhope Gardens in the State of New South Wales, being the land contained in folio identifier 101/270391, is held by the plaintiff on trust for the first defendant. 3. Paragraphs 1-3 of the Summons filed 28 November 2024 dismissed. 4. Paragraphs 2-13 of the Amended First Cross-Summons filed 6 August 2025 dismissed. 5. The parties to supply by email to my Associate agreed orders, or in default of agreement, the orders each seeks and submissions in support of such orders by 4pm Tuesday 9 September 2025. 6. The matter to be listed before me for directions at 9.30am on Wednesday 10 September 2025.
Catchwords:	EQUITY — proprietary estoppel — common intention constructive trust — land in name of daughter — whether father and daughter proceeded on basis that he would be responsible for property expenses and would retain beneficial ownership — nature of father’s contribution to the purchase price — whether daughter entitled to indemnity for expenses paid by her
Legislation Cited:	Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 56 Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) s 66G Duties Act 1990 (NSW) s 32 Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) s 91 Residential Tenancies Act 2010 (NSW) s 119 Trustee Act 1925 (NSW) s 59 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) rr 6.3, 42.1
Cases Cited:	Baumgartner v Baumgartner (1987) 164 CLR 137; [1987] HCA 59 Bijkerk Investments Pty Ltd v Bikic [2020] NSWSC 1336 Butterfield v Public Trust [2017] NZCA 367; [2017] NZCCLR 27 Calverley v Green (1984) 155 CLR 242; [1984] HCA 81 Camden v McKenzie [2008] 1 Qd R 39; [2007] QCA 136 Elder’s Trustee and Executor Co Ltd v Higgins (1963) 113 CLR 426; [1963] HCA 48 Enright v Newton [2021] 2 NZLR 412; [2020] NZCA 529 Galati v Deans [2023] NSWCA 13 Gautam v Health Care Complaints Commission [2021] NSWCA 85 Goodrich Aerospace Pty Ltd v Arsic (2006) 66 NSWLR 186; [2006] NSWCA 187 Halikos Hospitality Pty Ltd & Ors v INPEX Operations Australia Pty Ltd [2020] NTCA 4 Jess v Cooloola Milk Pty Ltd (2022) 292 FCR 284; [2022] FCAFC 75 Kramer v Stone [2024] HCA 48; 99 ALJR 126 Muschinski v Dodds (1985) 160 CLR 583; [1985] HCA 78 Naaman v Jaken Properties Australia Pty Ltd [2025] HCA 1; 99 ALJR 295 Nelson v Nelson (1995) 184 CLR 538; [1995] HCA 25 Nolan v Collie (2003) 7 VR 287; [2003] VSCA 39 Pirrottina v Pirrottina [2025] NSWCA 55 Priestley v Priestley [2017] NSWCA 155 Quach v MLC Ltd(No 6) [2021] FCA 271 Rowley v Ginnever [1897] 2 Ch 503 Sidhu v Van Dyke (2014) 251 CLR 505; [2014] HCA 19 Transport for NSW v Hunt Leather Pty Ltd (2024) 115 NSWLR 489; [2024] NSWCA 227
Category:	Principal judgment
Parties:	Raffaella Samawi (Plaintiff/Cross-defendant) Giuseppe Faraone (First Defendant; Cross-claimant) Claudia Faraone (Second Defendant)
Representation:	Counsel: M Young SC (Ms Samawi) A Kaufmann (Mr and Ms Faraone) Solicitors: Finn Roache Lawyers (Ms Samawi) Lexington Law (Mr and Ms Faraone)
File Number(s):	2024/443525
Publication restriction:	Nil

Date	Withdrawal from 674	Deposit into 920
13 Jan	$1,000	$700
28 Jan	$1,100	$700
10 Feb	$1,000	$700
24 Feb	$1,100	$700
10 Mar	$1,000	$1,000
7 Apr	$1,100	$600
21 Apr	$1,170	$700 + $300
5 May	$1,160	$700
19 May	$1,200	$700 + $400
2 Jun	$1,190	$1,100
16 June	$1,170	$700 + $300
30 June	$1,070	$700 + $300