Northern Territory of Australia v Yao

Link copied
Case Copied 43 min read

CITATION:Northern Territory of Australia v Yao [2024] NTSCFC 1

IN THE MATTER of an appeal under the Return to Work Act 1986 (NT)

PARTIES:NORTHERN TERRITORY OF AUSTRALIA

v

YAO, Lie

TITLE OF COURT:  FULL COURT OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY

JURISDICTION:  ON REFERENCE from the Supreme Court exercising Territory jurisdiction

FILE NO:2022-01845-SC

DELIVERED:  22 March 2024

HEARING DATE:  14 April 2023

JUDGMENT OF:  Grant CJ, Kelly and Brownhill JJ

CATCHWORDS:

WORKERS COMPENSATION – Reasonable management action – Onus of proof

Referral of questions of law to the Full Court pursuant to s 21(1) of the Supreme Court Act – Whether employer or worker bears legal and evidential onus of proof that mental injury is excluded by reason of s 3A(2) of the Return to Work Act – Operation of provision is to lay down general rule of liability for injury and introduce by way of exclusion mental injury caused by special element in form of reasonable management action – Employer pleaded reasonable management action as defence to worker’s claim – Legal onus on employer to prove defence – Both parties carried an evidential onus.

Return to Work Act 1986 (NT) s 3A

Australian Telecommunications Commission v Barker [1990] FCA 700; 12 AAR 490, Beezley v Repatriation Commission (2015) 150 ALD 11, Bropho v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (2004) 135 FCR 105, Bushell v Repatriation Commission (1992) 175 CLR 408, Catholic Education Office of WA v Granitto [2012] WASCA 266, Comcare v Martin (2016) 258 CLR 467, Comcare v O'Dea (1997) 150 ALR 318, Corbett v Northern Territory of Australia [2015] NTSC 45, Currie v Dempsey (1967) 69 SR (NSW) 116, Darling Island Stevedoring & Lighterage Co Ltd v Jacobsen (1945) 70 CLR 635, Director of Public Prosecutions v United Telecasters Sydney Ltd (1990) 168 CLR 594, Hart v Comcare (2005) 145 FCR 29, Horne v Sedco Forex Australia (1992) 106 FLR 373, Metropolitan Coal Co Ltd v Pye (1936) 55 CLR 138, Millar v ABC Marketing and Sales Pty Ltd [2012] NTSC 21, O’Brien v Sacred Heart Primary School [2000] VCC 44, Parker & Anor v Q-Comp [2008] QSC 175, Purkess v Crittenden (1965) 114 CLR 164, Robertson v Territory Insurance Office [2005] NTSC 74, SA Mental Health Services Inc v Margush [1995] SASC 5246, Swanson v Northern Territory of Australia [2006] NTSC 88; (2006) 204 FLR 392, Vines v Djordjevitch (1955) 91 CLR 512, referred to.

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:

Appellant:D McConnel SC with J Nottle

Respondent:  K Sibley

Solicitors:

Appellant:Hunt & Hunt Lawyers

Respondent:  Halfpennys Lawyers

Judgment category classification:    B

Number of pages:  35

IN THE FULL COURT OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
OF AUSTRALIA
AT DARWIN

Northern Territory of Australia v Yao [2024] NTSCFC 1

No. 2022-01845-SC

BETWEEN:

NORTHERN TERRITORY OF AUSTRALIA

Appellant

AND:

LIE YAO

Respondent

CORAM:    GRANT CJ, KELLY & BROWNHILL JJ

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(Delivered 22…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Northern Territory of Australia v Yao and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2024] NTSCFC 1
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Northern Territory of Australia, as the employer, and Ms. Yao, the worker, were the parties involved in this matter before the Full Court of the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory. The dispute concerned the onus of proof in relation to a defence raised by the employer that the worker's mental injury was excluded from compensation under section 3A(2) of the *Return to Work Act* because it arose from reasonable management action.

The legal issues before the Court were whether the employer or the worker bore the legal and evidential onus of proving that a mental injury was excluded by reason of section 3A(2) of the *Return to Work Act*. This provision operates to establish a general rule of liability for injury, while introducing an exclusion for mental injury caused by the specific element of reasonable management action.

The Court reasoned that, in conformity with general principles concerning the legal onus of proof, the employer bears the legal onus of establishing any assertion that an injury was the result of reasonable management action. This approach has been the practice in the Northern Territory. While other Australian jurisdictions have similar exclusionary provisions for injuries caused by reasonable administrative or disciplinary action, the approach to the legal onus in relation to these provisions is not uniform. The Court noted that the progenitor of section 3A was found in Commonwealth legislation, which has a substantial body of authority concerning its construction and operation, but no authority directly addressing the question of onus of proof in a judicial context. The Court observed that common law concepts of onus of proof are rarely appropriate for administrative tribunals exercising non-judicial power.

The Court determined that the employer carried the legal onus to prove the defence of reasonable management action. Both parties also carried an evidential onus in relation to this defence.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The present matter falls to be determined having regard to those general principles concerning the legal onus of proof. Decisions on analogous provisions in other jurisdictions In conformity with those general principles, up to this point in time the cases and practice in the Northern Territory have proceeded on the basis that once the worker has established that an injury arose out of or in the course of employment, the employer will then bear the onus of establishing any assertion that the injury was the result of reasonable management action. Those cases and practice are discussed later in these reasons. A number of other Australian jurisdictions have provisions in varying terms excluding injuries caused either wholly or substantially by reason of reasonable administrative or disciplinary action. However, the approach to the question of legal onus in relation to those provisions is neither uniform nor settled. The progenitor of s 3A of the Act was the definition of ‘injury’ in s 4(1) of the Commonwealth Employees’ Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth), which came into operation on 1 December 1988.[15] The definition excluded injuries suffered by an employee as the result of reasonable disciplinary action taken against the employee, reasonable administrative action in relation to the employee, or a failure on the part of the employee to obtain a promotion, transfer or benefit in connection with his or her employment. The Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2007 (Cth) made significant amendments to the exclusions in the definition of ‘injury’ with effect from 13 April 2007. The definition of ‘injury’ was transferred to a new s 5A, which uses similar terms to s 3A of the Act but is quite differently structured. Subsection 5A(1) defines injury with reference to the common conceptions of injury simpliciter, disease and aggravation, and then immediately excludes injury suffered ‘as a result of reasonable administrative action taken in a reasonable manner in respect of the employee’s employment’. Subsection 5A(2) then provides a non-exhaustive definition of the term ‘reasonable administrative action’. There is a large body of authority in the federal jurisdiction dealing with the construction and operation of those exclusionary provisions in their various forms since 1988. However, no authority has been identified in that jurisdiction which addresses the questions of law which have been referred to this Court. That may be attributable to the fact that under the Commonwealth scheme neither the original decision-maker, nor the Administrative Appeals Tribunal as the review tribunal, exercises judicial power. As the Full Federal Court observed in Australian Telecommunications Commission v Barker:[T]he Tribunal spent some time in dealing with questions as to onus or burden of proof as discussed in cases such as Commonwealth v Muratore [(1978) 141 CLR 296]; McDonald v Director-General of Social Security [(1984) 1 FCR 354] and Re Twyman and Commonwealth [(1987) 13 ALD 402]. Likewise, in this appeal, counsel for Mrs Barker based his address on issues as to onus of proof. Yet, common law concepts of onus of proof are rarely appropriate for the Administrative Appeals Tribunal even in compensation cases, as was pointed out in McDonald v Director-General of Social Security and Reitano v Commonwealth noted in (1985) 9 ALN N201.[16]

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established