Hickey and Australian Postal Corporation (Compensation)

Link copied
Case Copied 74 min read

Hickey and Australian Postal Corporation (Compensation) [2018] AATA 3930 (18 October 2018)

Division:GENERAL DIVISION

File Number(s):      2015/0729

2015/3786

Re:Kim Hickey

APPLICANT

AndAustralian Postal Corporation

RESPONDENT

DECISION

Tribunal:Member L M Gallagher

Date:18 October 2018

Place:Perth

Application 2015/0729

The Tribunal affirms the decision under review.

Application 2015/3786

The Tribunal finds that it does not have jurisdiction to review the decision.

...[sgd].................................................................

Member L M Gallagher

CATCHWORDS

COMPENSATION – Commonwealth employee – depression – whether liable under section 14 – whether depression contributed to, to a significant degree, by employment – whether depression suffered as a result of reasonable administrative action taken in a reasonable manner – decision under review affirmed

COMPENSATION – Commonwealth employee – L5/S1 disc-prolapse on the left with a sequale of soft tissue injury right foot – whether no present liability under sections 16 and 19 – no jurisdiction to review determination

LEGISLATION

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) – s 43, s 43(1)

Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) – s 4(1), s 5A(1), s 5A(2), s 5B,
s 5B(1), s 14, s 14(1), s 16, s 19, s 54(1), s 54(2), s 60(1), s 62(1), s 62(4), s 64

CASES

Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336
Comcare v Drinkwater [2018] FCAFC 62
Comcare v Martin (2016) 258 CLR 467
Comcare v Martinez (No 2) (2013) 212 FCR 272
Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Reeve (2012) 199 FCR 463
Cross and Comcare [2018] AATA 52
Drenth v Comcare (2012) 128 ALD 1; [2012] FCAFC 86
Georges and Telstra Corporation Limited [2009] AATA 731
Golds v Comcare [1999] FCA 1481
Lim and Comcare [2015] AATA 189
Lock and Comcare [2018] AATA 2386

Re Lynch v Comcare (2010) 114 ALD 394

SECONDARY MATERIALS

Sutherland P, Ballard JO, Anforth A, Annotated Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (11th ed, The Federation Press and SoftLaw Community Projects, 2018)

REASONS FOR DECISION

Member L M Gallagher

18 October 2018

APPLICATIONS

  1. Mr Hickey seeks the review of two decisions made by delegates of the Australian Postal Corporation (“APC”). Two separate applications were made and heard together. They are:

    Application 2015/0729

  2. On 12 November 2014 (R1, T36), a delegate of the APC affirmed a determination dated 31 July 2014 (R1, T26), which determined that the APC was not liable to pay compensation to Mr Hickey under section 14 of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) (“SRC Act”) in relation to a claimed injury described as “depression.”

  3. On 13 February 2015, Mr Hickey applied to the General Division of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“Tribunal”) for a review of the APC’s determination dated 12 November 2014 (R1, T1).  This is Application 2015/0729. 

    Application 2015/3786

  4. On 30 June 2015 (R2, T110), a delegate of the APC affirmed a determination dated 15 January 2015 (R2, T109) in relation to Mr Hickey’s “L5-S1 disc prolapse on the left with a sequale of soft tissue injury right foot” which determined that the APC had no…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Hickey and Australian Postal Corporation (Compensation) and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2018] AATA 3930
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an application by Mr Hickey for a review of a determination by the Australian Postal Corporation (APC). Mr Hickey sought compensation for depression, alleging it was contributed to, to a significant degree, by his employment. The APC had determined that Mr Hickey's depression was a result of reasonable administrative action taken in a reasonable manner, which would exclude it from being a compensable injury under the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (SRC Act).

The primary legal issue before the Tribunal was whether Mr Hickey's depression constituted a compensable "injury" under the SRC Act. This required the Tribunal to determine if the depression was a "disease" as defined by the Act, meaning it was contributed to, to a significant degree, by his employment. Crucially, the Tribunal also had to consider whether the depression was suffered as a result of reasonable administrative action taken in a reasonable manner, which would operate as an exclusion from compensation.

The Tribunal applied the principles established in cases such as *Re Lynch*, *Cross*, and *Dunstan v Comcare* to assess the "reasonable administrative action" exclusion and the "significant degree" threshold for contribution. It noted that "significant degree" means "substantially more than material" and requires an evaluative exercise. The parties had agreed that Mr Hickey's psychological condition was an ailment contributed to to a significant degree by his employment, thus meeting the definition of a "disease". Therefore, the central question became whether the reasonable administrative action exclusion applied. The Tribunal's reasoning focused on the objective assessment of the administrative actions and whether they were irrational, absurd, or lacked natural justice.

The Tribunal affirmed the APC's decision, finding that Mr Hickey's depression was a result of reasonable administrative action taken in a reasonable manner. Consequently, the depression was excluded from the definition of an injury under the SRC Act, and Mr Hickey was not entitled to compensation for this condition. The Tribunal also addressed a separate issue regarding liability under sections 16 and 19 of the SRC Act for a disc prolapse and foot injury, determining it had no jurisdiction to review the APC's determination on those matters as they had not been determined by the APC in a way that created a present liability.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

On 28 July 2015, Mr Hickey applied to the Tribunal for a review of the APC’s determination dated 30 June 2015 (R2, T1). This is Application 2015/3786. BACKGROUND Mr Hickey was born in 1958. Mr Hickey has been employed by the APC for approximately 25 years. In or around 1993, Mr Hickey worked as a Postal Transport Officer (“PTO”) (R2, T7, page 21). On 27 September 1993, Mr Hickey signed an incident report which stated that on that day he had “pain in lower back, servere [sic] when lifting left leg” following his attempt to pull a hanging mailbag, that was three quarters full, up and away from the mail bag hooks in a street pillar post box (R2, T5, page 18). On 28 September 1993, Dr A Perse (General Practitioner) provisionally diagnosed Mr Hickey with facet joint irritation (R2, T6). On 7 October 1993, Mr Hickey lodged a claim for rehabilitation and compensation regarding the injury he claims to have suffered on 27 September 1993 (R2, T7). On 18 October 1993, the APC accepted liability under section 14 of the SRC Act for Mr Hickey’s injury suffered on 27 September 1993, then described as “facet joint irritation” (R3, ST2). The determination dated 18 October 1993 also accepted liability under section 19 of the SRC Act for the period from 28 September 1993 to 5 October 1993. With regard to section 16 of the SRC Act, the determination dated 18 October 1993 stated that “[a]ny reasonable medical expenses for your accepted work related condition will be considered for payment.” It is unclear to the Tribunal whether the expression “will be considered for payment” is an expression of acceptance of liability under section 16 of the SRC Act by the APC and no arguments were canvassed by the parties in this regard, either in writing, or at hearing. On the evidence before it, the only two instances where it appears that Mr Hickey made a claim for medical expenses under section 16 of the SRC Act in relation to his “L5/S1 disc prolapse on the left” is for, firstly, travel costs on 12 November 2012 and a series of invoices for household maintenance services (lawn mowing, gardening) provided between 7 November 2011 and 23 November 2012 (R2, T86). It appears that Mr Hickey had provided copies of the relevant invoices in this regard (R2, T87). The second instance relates to a claim for a pair of air sole shoes with inner arch support, which was accepted by the APC on 28 June 2010. These expenses were the subject of determinations by the APC dated 21 December 2012 (R2, T86) and 28 June 2010 (R2, T81) for which it determined it was liable under section 16 of the SRC Act to compensate Mr Hickey. Similarly, the only instance where it appears that Mr Hickey made a claim for compensation under section 19 of the SRC Act in relation to his “L5/S1 disc prolapse on the left” was for the closed period from 28 September 1993 to 5 October 1993 (R3, ST2). Therefore, in the Tribunal’s view, it cannot be said that the APC’s determination dated 18 October 1993 was one which had the effect of determining more generally that the APC was presently liable, as at that date, to pay compensation to Mr Hickey under sections 16 and 19 of the SRC Act. Rather, the Tribunal considers the determination dated 18 October 1993 determined the APC’s liability under section 14 of the SRC Act. Indeed the APC has taken the same view in its determination dated 30 June 2015 (R2, T110), which refers to liability for section 14 only having been accepted on 18 October 1993 and that claims pursuant to sections 16 and 19 of the SRC Act would be considered on a case by case basis, as and when they were made (one under section 19 of the Act already having been, in effect, made, for the closed period in the determination).

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The following witnesses gave oral evidence and were cross-examined at the hearing:(a)Mr Hickey;(b)Mr Barrie Slinger, Orthopaedic Surgeon;(c)Mr Bryan Watkins, union representative;(d)Dr Desmond Williams, Orthopaedic Surgeon;(e)Dr Haroon Riaz, Psychiatrist;(f)Ms Pratiksha Shah, APC employee;(g)Mr Glen Resuggan, APC employee;(h)Mr Colin Bailey, APC employee;(i)Mr Fredrick J Phillips, Orthopaedic Surgeon;(j)Mr Michael Alexeeff, Orthopaedic Surgeon;(k)Ms Donna Vecchio, APC employee;(l)Ms Jennifer Porter, APC employee; and(m)Ms Debra Thornborough-Owen (nee Ms Debra Payne), APC employee.Evidence before the Tribunal The Tribunal received the following evidence:·Mr Hickey’s witness statement dated 16 October 2016, including bundle of documents (marked A – O,) and referred to within his statement (A1);·medical report of Dr Essa Rasool (General Practitioner) dated 18 January 2017, with briefing letter from W G McNally Jones Staff dated 4 January 2017 (A2);·curriculum vitae of Mr Barrie Slinger (Orthopaedic Surgeon), undated (A3);·medical report of Mr Barrie Slinger dated 31 October 2016 (A4);·supplementary medical report of Mr Barrie Slinger dated 7 June 2017, with briefing letter from W G McNally Jones Staff dated 29 May 2017 (A5);·witness statement of Mr Bryan Watkins dated 6 June 2017, with attachments (A6);·curriculum vitae of Dr Desmond Williams (Orthopaedic Surgeon), undated (A7);·medical report of Dr Desmond Williams dated 3 January 2017, with briefing letters (2) from W G McNally Jones Staff dated 8 September 2016 and 17 November 2016 (A8);·supplementary report of Dr Desmond Williams dated 7 June 2017, with briefing letter from W G McNally Jones Staff dated 29 May 2017 (A9);·supplementary medical report of Dr Desmond Williams dated 18 June 2017 (A10);·intervertebral disc diagrams, side and cross view, extracted from Grants Atlas of Anatomy, undated (A11);·medical report of Dr Haroon Riaz (Psychiatrist) dated 24 February 2017, with briefing letter from W G McNally Jones Staff dated 1 December 2016 (A12);·witness statement of Mr Craig Power dated 16 December 2016 (A13);·medical report of Dr Frederick Ng (Consultant Psychiatrist) dated 20 September 2016, with briefing letter from W G McNally Jones Staff dated 8 September 2016 (A14);·supplementary medical report of Dr Frederick Ng dated 5 June 2017, with briefing letters (2) from W G McNally Jones Staff dated 25 May 2017 and 30 May 2017 (A15);·supplementary report of Dr Haroon Riaz dated 13 June 2017, with briefing letters dated 25 May 2017 and 30 May 2017 (A16);·letter from Mr Michael Alexeeff (Orthopaedic Surgeon) dated 30 May 2017, with enclosure (A17);·T-Documents, consisting of:oa 101 page set of T-Documents (T1 – T40) in Application 2015/0729 (R1);oa 269 page set of T-Documents (T1 – T110) in Application 2015/3786 (R2); andoa 520 page set of supplementary T-Documents (ST1 – ST23, 2 volumes) in Application 2015/0729 and Application 2015/3786 (R3);·Patient Health Summary from the Ridge Baldivis Medical Centre, including surgery consultation records by Dr Essa Rasool, various dates (R4);·medical report of Dr Haroon Riaz dated 4 May 2011 (R5);·medical report of Mr Fredrick Phillips (Orthopaedic Surgeon) dated 28 October 2016, with briefing letter from Moray & Agnew Lawyers dated 14 October 2016 (R6);·supplementary medical report of Mr Fredrick Phillips dated 16 May 2017, with briefing letter from Moray & Agnew Lawyers dated 12 May 2017 (R7);·curriculum vitae of Mr Fredrick Phillips, undated (R8);·medical report of Dr Lawrence Terace (Consultant Forensic Psychiatrist) dated 26 October 2016, with briefing letter from Moray & Agnew Lawyers dated 10 October 2016 (R9);·supplementary report of Dr Lawrence Terace dated 17 May 2017, with briefing letter from Moray & Agnew Lawyers dated 12 May 2017 (R10);·supplementary report of Dr Peter McCarthy (Psychiatrist) dated 23 May 2017, with briefing letter from Moray & Agnew Lawyers dated 12 May 2017 (R11);·index of documents provided to Mr Fredrick Phillips, numbered 1(a) – 1(m), 2 to 7 (R12);·index of documents provided to Mr Michael Alexeeff, numbered 1, 2(a) – 2(m), 3 to 12 (R13);·witness statement of Ms Donna Vecchio dated 23 May 2017, with annexures (R14);·witness statement of Ms Jennifer Porter dated 23 May 2017, with annexures (R15); ·witness statement of Ms Joanne Roberts dated 22 May 2017 (R16);·witness statement of Ms Debra Thornborough-Owen dated 19 May 2017, with annexures (R17);·witness statement of Ms Pratiksha Shah dated 24 May 2017, with annexures (R18); ·witness statement of Mr Glen Resuggan dated 22 May 2017, with annexures (R19); and·witness statement of Mr Colin Bailey dated 23 May 2017 (R20).

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Tribunal notes the discussion of the meaning of “contributed to, to a significant degree” in paragraphs 128 to 135 of Deputy President Boyle in the decision of Cross and Comcare [2018] AATA 52 (the “Cross decision”):Meaning of “contributed to, to a significant degree”128. The key issue with establishing a compensable “disease” under the Act is that the employee must prove that the employment contributed, to a significant degree, to the disease. 129. Previously, the Act defined “disease” to mean an ailment or aggravation that was “contributed to in a material degree by the employee’s employment by the Commonwealth or a licensed corporation”. The significant degree threshold was inserted on 13 April 2007 in response to Parliament’s view that [sic] way in which the courts had interpreted the phrase “material degree” under the previous definition of “disease” had had the effect of significantly reducing the extent to which employment must have contributed to a disease for it to be compensable.130. Relevantly, the Explanatory Memorandum to the Safety, Rehabilitation And Compensation And Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2006 states:The initial legislative intent was to establish a test requiring a claimant to prove that his or her employment was ‘more than a mere contributing factor in the contraction of the disease’ (see the Second Reading speech to the Commonwealth Employees’ Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 – subsequently renamed as the SRC Act). The phrase ‘contributed to in a material degree’ was intended to ensure that the Commonwealth was not liable to pay compensation for diseases which have little, if any, connection with employmentHowever, the courts have read down the expression ‘in a material degree’ to emphasise the causal connection between the employment and the condition complained of rather than the extent of the contribution. The purpose of the proposed amendment is to assist in reinstating the intended policy behind the Commonwealth workers’ compensation scheme by limiting access to compensation claims for diseases to which work has only made a very minor contribution.131. The Full Court of the Federal Court in Dunstan v Comcare [2011] FCAFC 108 noted that the intention of changing the threshold was “to impose a more stringent test of the causal relationship between employment and disease”. The Court said that the test was intended to be broader than the “daily duties, or specific aspects of the workplace environment” and was intended simply to refer to “employment as a factor that operated actively to bring about the condition” (Dunstan at [40]).132. “Significant degree” is defined in s 5B(3) of the Act to mean “a degree that is substantially more than material”. 133. In Crouch v Comcare [2013] AATA 608, Deputy President Handley stated at [40]:A “significant degree” means “substantially more than material” (s 5B(3)) in a context where “material” in itself means something of substance (see above Sahu-Khan).134. In Comcare v Power [2015] FCA 1502, Judge Katzmann relevantly stated that:[78] A contribution to a degree that is substantially more than material must necessarily be substantially greater than one which is trivial....[83] In Comcare v Canute (2005) 148 FCR 232; 89 ALD 258; [2005] FCAFC 262 at [68] (Canute), however, French and Stone JJ took issue with the application of this approach to the definition of “disease” in the SRC Act. Although their Honours accepted that a “but for” test was inappropriate, after referring to the Minister’s second reading speech on the introduction of the Bill which became the SRC Act, they said:the changes brought about by the enactment of the SRC Act were intended to require that the contribution be “more than a mere contributing factor” ... Content must be given to the word “material” contained in the definition of “disease” in the legislation as it presently stands. The inclusion of this term imposes an evaluative threshold below which a causal connection may be disregarded.…[85] In Comcare v Sahu-Khan (2007) 156 FCR 536; [2007] FCA 15 at [14] (Sahu-Khan) Finn J observed that the legislative history of the definition of “disease” makes it plain that the term “material” in the phrase “in a material degree” in the SRC Act was not used to denote a contribution which was only greater than de miminis. Thus, it appears that, despite the common law approach to “material contribution”, the intention of the SRC Act was that the contribution of the employment to the disease of an afflicted employee had to be not just greater than trivial. In Sahu-Khan Finn J noted (at [15]) that the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defined “materially” to include “substantially” and “considerably”....[93] There is no room for doubt that the purpose of the 2007 amendments was to strengthen the connection necessary between the employment and the contraction or aggravation of a disease. Including a definition of “significant” as “substantially more than material” makes this abundantly clear. In other words, it is insufficient that the contribution of the employment be “more than trivial”; it had to be substantially more than trivial...[94] Moreover, the current test of contribution also requires an evaluative exercise to be undertaken. That is apparent both from the words used in subs (1) of s 5B and also the matters to which subs (2) draws attention... While the chapeau to the subsection states that those matters “may“ (not “shall“) be taken into account, a word which is generally permissive, properly construed it is at least arguable that in this context it is directory; in other words that “may“ means “shall“...135. The Tribunal also notes the following comments made by Member Taglieri in Reardon and Comcare [2015] AATA 360:[35] This has been settled in law and it requires the contribution by employment to be substantially more than “material”.[36] In Su v Comcare the requirement of contribution to a significant degree was expressed as follows, when approving of Justice Finn’s approach to interpretation in Comcare v Sahu-Kahn:“When determining whether any contribution of the employment is of ‘a significant degree’, matters that may be taken into account are set out in section 5B(2). The assessment of causal factors that contribute to a disease is not simply relativistic. The threshold question for the purposes of the Act is whether the employment contributes to ‘a significant degree’ ‘that is substantially more than material’. This is the “evaluative threshold below which a causal connection may be disregarded“[4]. If the contribution is to a significant degree, it is beside the point that one factor contributes to a greater extent than another. Nor does it matter that factors outside the frame of employment also contribute to a significant degree. The Act does not require employment to be the sole, proximate or dominant cause of an injury.”[37] I must be satisfied on the balance of probabilities, that contribution by employment was to a significant degree and it ought not be left in the area of possibility or conjecture. Further, whether employment contributed to a significant degree, is a question of fact to be determined by the Tribunal in each case.(Original emphasis)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In the Re Lynch decision, the Tribunal discussed the requirement for “reasonable” administrative action “taken in a reasonable manner” as (summarised in Sutherland P, Ballard JO, Anforth A, Annotated Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (11th ed, The Federation Press and SoftLaw Community Projects, 2018) at page 114 [5A.05]):· Reasonable disciplinary action must be assessed in the light of the rules of conduct or behaviour which apply to and are enforceable against an employee by virtue of their employment with the Commonwealth (at [104]).· What is reasonable is assessed objectively and relates to the specific conduct involved (at [106]).· For action to be reasonable, it must be established that there was nothing “untoward” about the actions involved. The actions must also not be “irrational, absurd or ridiculous” (at [107]).· For administrative action to be reasonable it must comply with the requirements of natural justice. In matters concerning allegations against an applicant, the applicant is entitled to the level of particularity in the complaints that would permit the applicant to understand the case against him and a reasonable opportunity to respond (at [132]-[135]).(Emphasis added)ISSUES Application 2015/0729 – the issue The issue for the Tribunal in relation to Application 2015/0729 is whether the APC is liable to pay Mr Hickey compensation pursuant to section 14 of the SRC Act from 31 July 2014 in respect of his “depression” condition. The issue at paragraph 64 above in turn requires the Tribunal to consider:(a)whether Mr Hickey suffered from an “ailment” as defined in subsection 4(1) of the SRC Act, at the relevant time?(b)if so, whether that ailment is an “injury” as defined in section 5A of the SRC Act, being either:(i)a “disease” (subsection 5A(1)(a) of the SRC Act, as defined in subsection 5B(1) of the SRC Act, being an ailment, or an aggravation of an ailment, that was contributed to, to a significant degree, by Mr Hickey’s employment with the APC); or(ii)an injury or an aggravation of an injury (other than a disease) arising out of, or in the course of, Mr Hickey’s employment with the APC, as defined in subsections 5A(1)(b) and 5A(1)(c) of the SRC Act.(c)if so, whether that “injury” as defined is a disease, injury or aggravation suffered as a result of RAA taken in a reasonable manner in respect of Mr Hickey’s employment, so as to exclude it from the definition of “injury” in accordance with subsection 5A(1) of the SRC Act (the “RAA exclusion”). During the hearing, the parties reached agreement based on the evidence that Mr Hickey’s claimed psychological condition was an ailment, that was contributed to, to a significant degree, by his employment with the APC and hence, it was a “disease” as defined. As such, the parties maintain that the key issue before the Tribunal in relation to Application 2015/0729 is whether the RAA exclusion serves to apply to Mr Hickey. If not, then Mr Hickey satisfies section 14 of the SRC Act in respect of his “depression” condition and the APC would be liable to pay him compensation.