Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Cascade Coal Pty Ltd (No 4)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Cascade Coal Pty Ltd (No 4) [2018] FCA 1243

File number: NSD 584 of 2015
Judge: FOSTER J
Date of judgment: 20 August 2018
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – whether the Court should make an order pursuant to ss 37AE, 37AF and 37AG of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) suppressing part of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment in support of a final order dismissing the whole of the present proceeding on the ground that such an order is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice
Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), ss 37AE, 37AF and 37AG
Cases cited:

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Cascade Coal Pty Ltd (No 3) [2018] FCA 1019

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Cascade Coal Pty Ltd (No 1) (2015) 331 ALR 68

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Valve Corporation (No 5) [2016] FCA 741

Date of hearing: 10 August 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Economic Regulator, Competition and Access
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 50
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr MJ O’Meara on 13 July 2018 and Mr R Yezerski on 10 August 2018
Solicitor for the Applicant: Australian Government Solicitor
Solicitor for the First, Tenth and Eleventh Respondents: Ms A Cameron of HWL Ebsworth Lawyers
Solicitor for the Third Respondent: Mr W Reid of Ashurst Australia
Solicitor for the Fifth and Ninth Respondents: Mr Torq Murray of Torq Murray Law
Counsel for the Seventh Respondent: Mr A Chhabra
Solicitor for the Seventh Respondent: Deutsch Partners
Solicitor for the Second, Fourth, Sixth and Eighth Respondents: The Second, Fourth, Sixth and Eighth Respondents did not appear

ORDERS

NSD 584 of 2015
BETWEEN:

AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION AND CONSUMER COMMISSION

Applicant

AND:

CASCADE COAL PTY LTD (ACN 119 180 620)

First Respondent

MINCORP INVESTMENTS PTY LIMITED (ACN 132 441 868)
Second Respondent

LOYAL COAL PTY LTD (ACN 132 497 913) (and others named in the Schedule)

Third Respondent

JUDGE:

FOSTER J

DATE OF ORDER:

20 AUGUST 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Copy letters from the Director of Public Prosecutions to Hanna Legal dated 23 July 2018 and 31 July 2018 respectively be marked as Exhibit A.

2.The seventh respondent (Moses Obeid) have leave to rely upon an Amended Interlocutory Application in accordance with the draft Amended Interlocutory Application dated 20 July 2018 furnished to the parties as an annexure to Written Submissions dated the same day and filed herein.

3.Any requirement that the said Amended Interlocutory Application be filed and served be dispensed with.

4.The Amended Interlocutory Application be dismissed.

5.There be no orders as to the costs of the Amended Interlocutory Application.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

FOSTER J:

  1. On 6 July 2018, I dismissed the whole of this proceeding and made a costs order in favour of most of the respondents.…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 1243
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In this case, the applicant, Moses Obeid, sought an order to suppress specific paragraphs from the Court's Reasons for Judgment to prevent prejudice to the administration of justice. The case involved claims against several corporate entities and individuals for alleged contraventions of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010. The primary legal issue was whether the Court should suppress parts of its Reasons for Judgment in support of a final order dismissing the proceeding. The Court considered the necessity of such an order to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice, as required by sections 37AE, 37AF, and 37AG of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976.

The Court dismissed the application, finding it had been made prematurely. It noted that any assessment of prejudice to the administration of justice would require consideration of the interest in transparency and open justice. The Court emphasized the importance of safeguarding the public interest in open justice and that suppression orders should operate for no longer than necessary. The Court also highlighted that the extent and importance of the matters over which confidentiality was sought could only be properly assessed in light of evidence and submissions at the remedies hearing.

In reaching its decision, the Court took into account the fact that the Director of Public Prosecutions did not consider there was a significant risk of prejudice to Mr. Obeid's upcoming criminal trial. The Court concluded that the application did not satisfy the high threshold for a suppression order, as mere embarrassment or inconvenience was not sufficient. The Court dismissed the application and made no orders as to the costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Copy letters from the Director of Public Prosecutions to Hanna Legal dated 23 July 2018 and 31 July 2018 respectively be marked as Exhibit A.

2. The seventh respondent (Moses Obeid) have leave to rely upon an Amended Interlocutory Application in accordance with the draft Amended Interlocutory Application dated 20 July 2018 furnished to the parties as an annexure to Written Submissions dated the same day and filed herein.

3. Any requirement that the said Amended Interlocutory Application be filed and served be dispensed with.

4. The Amended Interlocutory Application be dismissed.

5. There be no orders as to the costs of the Amended Interlocutory Application.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

I intend not to grant the relief sought by Moses Obeid in his Amended Interlocutory Application. These are my Reasons for coming to that conclusion.BACKGROUND At [1]–[22] of my Reasons, I explained the general structure of this proceeding and the essence of the ACCC’s claims against the various respondents. At those paragraphs, I said:In the period from the late 1980s until about 2011, Edward Moses Obeid (Eddie Obeid) was a prominent politician in NSW. He was a member of the Legislative Council throughout the period from 1991 to 2011. He was a power broker in the Australian Labor Party who exercised significant influence in that Party at all times during those years. Eddie Obeid has nine children—five sons and four daughters. Four of Eddie Obeid’s sons feature in the events which are the subject of this proceeding. Two of those sons, Moses Edward Obeid and Paul Edward Obeid, played a significant part in those events. Two other sons, Damien Edward Obeid and Gerard Edward Obeid, were also involved. Members of the Obeid family conducted numerous business transactions together. Frequently, they deployed the following structure:(a)A company would be used as the entity that would enter into the particular transaction. The directors and shareholders of that company would be associates of the Obeid family such as a family friend, an accountant, a lawyer or business adviser;(b)The shareholders of the transacting company would hold the shares in that company on trust for one or more members of the Obeid family or their relatives, or on trust for other companies or trusts, the ultimate controllers and beneficiaries of which were one or more members of the Obeid family, their spouses or their relatives; and(c)The directors of the transacting company would act on the instructions of one or more members of the Obeid family and for their benefit.Business structures with the features which I have described at [3] above were used by the Obeid family in and in connection with the transactions which are under scrutiny in the present case.An important object sought to be achieved by the Obeid family by the use of such structures was to conceal the involvement of the Obeid family in those transactions from all except those who necessarily needed to know of that involvement. The conduct of Moses Obeid and Paul Obeid in 2008 and 2009 is at the heart of the present case. In this proceeding, the applicant, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC), claims relief against eleven respondents. The first six named respondents are corporate entities and the remaining five respondents are individuals. The ACCC claims declarations against all respondents, civil penalties against all respondents, disqualification orders against the individual respondents and costs in respect of alleged contraventions of ss 45(2)(a)(i), 45(2)(b)(i) and 44ZZRK (in respect of cartel provisions where the purpose conditions in s 44ZZRD(3)(a)(iii) and in s 44ZZRD(3)(c) are satisfied) of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (CCA) by the corporate respondents. The individual respondents are all alleged to be liable as accessories to the alleged contraventions by the corporate contraveners. The alleged contravening conduct took place in early June 2009. For this reason, the Court must apply s 4D and s 45 of the CCA in the form in which those sections then stood. Since 2009, s 45 has been substantially amended and s 4D has been repealed (as to which, see Act No 114 of 2017). In addition, the Court must apply s 44ZZRD and s 44ZZRK in the form in which those sections stood in 2009. Those sections have been renumbered by Act No 114 of 2017. Finally, I note that the joint venture defence provided for in relation to certain contraventions of the CCA has been reformulated by Act No 114 of 2017. The applicable sections in 2009 were ss 4J, 76C and 44ZZRP.The references to sections of the CCA in these Reasons for Judgment are to the applicable sections in the form in which they stood in June 2009. These Reasons for Judgment address questions of liability only. That is, by these Reasons for Judgment, I determine whether any declaratory relief should be granted to the ACCC and, if so, the form of that relief. In the event that it is necessary to address the ACCC’s claims for civil penalties and disqualification orders, those claims will be dealt with at a later date. The corporate respondents are:1. Cascade Coal Pty Ltd (ACN 119 180 620) (Cascade); 2.Mincorp Investments Pty Limited (ACN 132 441 868) formerly called Voope Pty Limited (Voope); 3. Loyal Coal Pty Ltd (ACN 132 497 913) (Loyal Coal) formerly called Monaro Coal Pty Ltd (ACN 132 497 913) (Monaro Coal); 4. Locaway Pty. Limited (ACN 066 616 484) (Locaway); 5. Coal & Minerals Group Pty Ltd (ACN 144 641 092) (CMG); and6. Southeast Investment Group Pty Limited (ACN 143 535 620) (Southeast). The individual respondents are:7. Moses Edward Obeid;8. Paul Edward Obeid;9. Richard Jonathan Poole;10. John Vern McGuigan; and11. James William McGuigan.Relevantly, the alleged contraventions of s 45 of the CCA are based upon the proposition that certain provisions contained in two letter agreements signed on 5 June 2009 (one of which was varied on 6 June 2009) were exclusionary provisions (as to which, see ss 4D, 45(2)(a)(i) and 45(2)(b)(i) of the CCA). The s 44ZZRK contraventions are founded upon the proposition that the same two letter agreements contain cartel provisions (as to which see ss 44ZZRD(1)(a)(ii), 44ZZRD(3)(a)(iii) and 44ZZRD(3)(c)). In particular, the ACCC relies upon s 44ZZRD(3)(a)(iii) which relevantly provided that a provision of a contract, arrangement or understanding is a cartel provision if the provision has the purpose of directly or indirectly preventing, restricting or limiting the supply, or likely supply, of goods or services to persons or classes of persons by any or all of the parties to the contract, arrangement or understanding and if at least two of the parties to the contract, arrangement or understanding are or are likely to be, or, but for any contract, arrangement or understanding, would be or would be likely to be, in competition with each other in relation to the supply of those goods or services. The ACCC also relies upon s 44ZZRD(3)(c) which relevantly provided that the purpose condition in s 44ZZRD(1)(a)(ii) would be satisfied if the alleged cartel provision had the purpose of directly or indirectly ensuring that one of the statutorily stipulated outcomes in the nature of bid rigging was achieved in relation to requests for bids for the supply or acquisition of services. The ACCC alleges that certain of the corporate respondents were parties to the contract, arrangement or understanding which contained the alleged exclusionary provisions and cartel provisions and that all of the corporate respondents gave effect to those provisions. The ACCC alleges that the corporate respondents contravened s 44ZZRK of the CCA by giving effect to the cartel provisions contained in the arrangements made on 5 and 6 June 2009. One letter agreement (the Buffalo Agreement) concerned the establishment of a coal mining venture in the Mt Penny coal exploration area in NSW. The entities expressly identified in that agreement as parties to the arrangements reflected therein were Cascade and Buffalo Resources Pty Limited (ACN 137 486 385) (Buffalo). The obligations of Buffalo under the arrangement recorded in the letter were expressed, at least in part, as obligations of Buffalo and “… its associates and related parties including Gardner Brook and Loyal Coal Pty Ltd”.The other letter agreement (the Landowners Agreement) concerned the acquisition by Cascade of three rural properties located more or less above the likely mine site near Mt Penny (Cherrydale Park (Cherrydale), Donola and Coggan Creek). The entities expressly identified in that agreement as parties to the arrangements reflected therein were Cascade, United Pastoral Group Pty Limited (ACN 127 743 453) (UPG), Geble Pty Ltd (ACN 132 441 877) (Geble) and Justin Kennedy Lewis Pty Ltd (ACN 133 940 388) (JKL). As at 5 June 2009, Geble was already the registered proprietor of Donola and JKL was the purchaser under a Contract for the Sale of Coggan Creek which had not yet been completed. As at that date, Locaway, in its capacity as the trustee of the Moona Plains Family Trust, was still the registered proprietor of Cherrydale although steps were under way to replace it on the title to that property with UPG who was, by June 2009, the trustee of that Trust. UPG had changed its name to Rothshire Group Pty Limited on 27 September 2007 but that fact appears to have gone unnoticed by the Obeids when they began to involve UPG in the present matters in 2008. The two letter agreements were interdependent.The Buffalo Agreement was amended by a further letter agreement between Cascade and Buffalo on 6 June 2009 (the Buffalo Agreement Variation). The respondents conveniently fall into four groups. At the commencement of the hearing before me, each of those groups was separately represented. The groups were:• Cascade, John McGuigan and James McGuigan (the Cascade respondents);• Locaway, Southeast, Moses Obeid and Paul Obeid (the Obeid respondents); • Loyal Coal; and• CMG and Poole (the CMG respondents). James McGuigan is the son of John McGuigan. At all relevant times, John McGuigan was a director of Cascade.At all material times, Poole was a director of Cascade and of CMG. When the hearing commenced, Voope (the second respondent) was unrepresented. It had not filed an Address for Service nor had it ever been represented at any pre-trial directions hearing or case management hearing. It has never filed a Defence. For these reasons, on Day 2 of the hearing, Senior Counsel for the ACCC applied for an order pursuant to r 30.21(1)(b)(i) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (FCR) that the hearing proceed generally against Voope notwithstanding its absence when this proceeding was called on for trial. I made that order on 5 April 2016. Thereafter, the ACCC’s case against Voope proceeded notwithstanding its absence. On 29 March 2017, well after the trial had concluded, Deutsch Partners filed a Notice of Acting – Change of Lawyer in respect of Voope and the other Obeid respondents. In these Reasons, I will generally refer to particular individuals by their surname alone. I mean no disrespect by taking that approach. The exceptions to this general approach are the Obeids and the McGuigans. For obvious reasons, it is necessary to refer to those persons by their Christian name as well as their surname.

Decision

Reasons for decision

His Honour dismissed the application before him, primarily upon the ground that it had been made prematurely. In support of that conclusion, at [21]–[22], his Honour said:Even apart from these doubts there is another fundamental obstacle for Valve. Any assessment of any prejudice to the administration of justice will require consideration of the interest in transparency and open justice. Section 37AE of the Federal Court of Australia Act provides that in deciding whether to make a suppression order or non-publication order, the Court must take into account that a primary objective of the administration of justice is to safeguard the public interest in open justice. Each of the matters over which Valve seeks confidentiality orders may be matters which are relevant to the assessment of remedies including pecuniary penalties. Further, s 37AJ(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act also requires that the order should operate for no longer than is reasonably necessary to achieve the purpose for which it is made. It might be open to doubt, for instance, whether it is necessary to maintain a suppression of the publication of Valve’s financial information, including in any reasons for decision which are given, even for the year 2015 beyond, say, 2017 or 2018. The extent and importance of each of these matters can only be properly assessed in light of the evidence and written submissions at the remedies hearing.Decision As mentioned at [9] above, in his current suppression order application, Moses Obeid seeks a suppression order in relation to the specific paragraphs of my Reasons identified in the landscape annexure to his Written Submission (Attachment A to these Reasons). It is apparent from Exhibit A in the present application that the DPP does not consider that there is any significant risk of prejudice to Moses Obeid’s upcoming criminal trial. Moses Obeid submitted otherwise. He submitted that:(a)All but one of the paragraphs sought to be suppressed contain factual findings made by me. Those findings are the same findings which the Crown will ask the jury to make in the upcoming criminal trial. The one paragraph sought to be suppressed which does not contain factual findings is a positive credibility assessment of Mr Brook. Mr Brook will be a crucial witness in the Crown case against Moses Obeid at his criminal trial. The Obeids are expected to challenge his credibility at that trial.(b)If the paragraphs which are sought to be suppressed are allowed into the public domain, there is a risk of displacing the jury’s function at the upcoming criminal trial. There is an appreciable risk that members of the jury may simply adopt my conclusions, the substance of which is inevitably going to be reported widely in the media. Any such displacement would amount to an irreparable prejudice to Moses Obeid by depriving him of a fair trial presided over by an independent and impartial jury.(c)There are four categories of matter which are sought to be suppressed. These are: (i)Moses Obeid possessed confidential information that belonged to the NSW Department of Primary Industries. He obtained that information by unlawful means. This gave the Obeids an undisclosed advantage in the EOI process for the allocation of a coal EL for the Mt Penny coal exploration area. (ii)Moses Obeid and members of the Obeid family sought to conceal their involvement in the relevant transactions thus manifesting a consciousness of guilt.(iii)The purpose for which Moses Obeid met with Mr Brook.(iv)The relationship between Moses Obeid and Mr Brook and the circumstances in which Mr Brook was encouraged to meet with the Directors of Monaro Mining NL, in particular, in relation to the withdrawal by that corporation from the EOI process for Mt Penny.(v)My finding that, generally speaking, Mr Brook was a credible witness.(d)There is a very substantial overlap between the findings made by me in my Reasons and the findings which the Crown will ask the jury to make in order to underpin a verdict of guilty in the criminal trial.(e)The fact that a Judge has already made the very same findings which the Crown will seek at the criminal trial is likely to influence the members of the jury to accept the Crown case. This creates a real risk of an unfair trial. The only fair remedy, in the circumstances, is to suppress the material from my Reasons identified in Attachment A to these Reasons.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The position of the DPP as made known to me was that there was no significant risk that the integrity of the upcoming criminal trial would be compromised in the event that my Reasons are published in full.CONSIDERATIONThe Relevant Principles Section 37AE and s 37AF of the FCA Act are in the following terms:37AE Safeguarding public interest in open justiceIn deciding whether to make a suppression order or non‑publication order, the Court must take into account that a primary objective of the administration of justice is to safeguard the public interest in open justice.37AF Power to make orders(1)The Court may, by making a suppression order or non‑publication order on grounds permitted by this Part, prohibit or restrict the publication or other disclosure of:(a)information tending to reveal the identity of or otherwise concerning any party to or witness in a proceeding before the Court or any person who is related to or otherwise associated with any party to or witness in a proceeding before the Court; or(b) information that relates to a proceeding before the Court and is:(i)information that comprises evidence or information about evidence; or(ii)information obtained by the process of discovery; or(iii)information produced under a subpoena; or(iv)information lodged with or filed in the Court.(2)The Court may make such orders as it thinks appropriate to give effect to an order under subsection (1). In s 37AG, the legislature specified the grounds upon which a suppression order or non-publication order might be made. In s 37AG(1)(a)–(d), four such grounds are set out. In the present case, Moses Obeid relies upon the ground specified in s 37AG(1)(a). That subsection provides that a suppression order or non-publication order may be made if the order is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice. Section 37AG(2) provides that a suppression order or non-publication order must specify the ground or grounds upon which the order is made. In Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Cascade Coal Pty Ltd (No 1) (2015) 331 ALR 68 at 73–74 [28]–[30], I said:In Hogan v Australian Crime Commission (2010) 240 CLR 651; 267 ALR 12; [2010] HCA 21 at [30] , the High Court said, in respect of the use of the word “necessary” in s 50 of the FCA Act, the predecessor to Pt VAA that it is “a strong word”. The Court observed that the collocation of necessity to prevent prejudice to the administration of justice and the necessity to prevent prejudice to the security of the Commonwealth suggests that the Parliament is not dealing with trivialities. The Court went on to hold that: “the administration of justice” spoken of in s 50 is that involved in the exercise by the Federal Court of the judicial power of the Commonwealth; this is a more specific discipline than broader notions of the public interest. The Court continued at [31]–[33] as follows: It is insufficient that the making or continuation of an order under s 50 appears to the Federal Court to be convenient, reasonable or sensible, or to serve some notion of the public interest, still less that, as the result of some “balancing exercise”, the order appears to have one or more of those characteristics (A statement by Fullerton J to like effect, with respect to the powers of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, was approved by Hodgson JA (Hislop and Latham JJ concurring) in Attorney-General (NSW) v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (2007) 73 NSWLR 635; [2007] NSWCCA 307 at [31]). If it appears to the Federal Court, on the one hand, to be necessary to make a particular order forbidding or restricting the publication of particular evidence or the name of a party or witness, in order to prevent either species of prejudice identified in s 50, or, on the other hand, that that necessity no longer supports the continuation of such an order, then the power of the Federal Court under s 50 is enlivened. The appearance of the requisite necessity (or supervening cessation of it) having been demonstrated, the Court is to implement its conclusion by making or vacating the order. The expression in s 50 “may … make such order” is to be understood in this sense. It may tend to distract attention from the particular terms of s 50 to describe the Federal Court as embarking upon the exercise of a “discretion” when entertaining an application under s 50 ( Dwyer v Calco Timbers Pty Ltd (2008) 234 CLR 124; 244 ALR 257; [2008] HCA 13 at [40] ). Once the Court has reached the requisite stage of satisfaction, it would be a misreading of s 50 to treat it as empowering the Court nevertheless to refuse to make the order, or to leave in operation the now impugned order. It would, for example, be an odd construction of s 50 which supported the refusal of an order under s 50 notwithstanding that it appeared to the Court to be necessary to make an order to prevent prejudice to the security of the Commonwealth. The threshold which a suppression order applicant must satisfy is high. Mere embarrassment, inconvenience, annoyance or unreasonable or groundless fears will not suffice.