FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Cascade Coal Pty Ltd (No 4) [2018] FCA 1243
File number: NSD 584 of 2015 Judge: FOSTER J Date of judgment: 20 August 2018 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – whether the Court should make an order pursuant to ss 37AE, 37AF and 37AG of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) suppressing part of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment in support of a final order dismissing the whole of the present proceeding on the ground that such an order is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), ss 37AE, 37AF and 37AG Cases cited: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Cascade Coal Pty Ltd (No 3) [2018] FCA 1019
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Cascade Coal Pty Ltd (No 1) (2015) 331 ALR 68
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Valve Corporation (No 5) [2016] FCA 741
Date of hearing: 10 August 2018 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations Sub-area: Economic Regulator, Competition and Access Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 50 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr MJ O’Meara on 13 July 2018 and Mr R Yezerski on 10 August 2018 Solicitor for the Applicant: Australian Government Solicitor Solicitor for the First, Tenth and Eleventh Respondents: Ms A Cameron of HWL Ebsworth Lawyers Solicitor for the Third Respondent: Mr W Reid of Ashurst Australia Solicitor for the Fifth and Ninth Respondents: Mr Torq Murray of Torq Murray Law Counsel for the Seventh Respondent: Mr A Chhabra Solicitor for the Seventh Respondent: Deutsch Partners Solicitor for the Second, Fourth, Sixth and Eighth Respondents: The Second, Fourth, Sixth and Eighth Respondents did not appear ORDERS
NSD 584 of 2015 BETWEEN: AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION AND CONSUMER COMMISSION
Applicant
AND:
CASCADE COAL PTY LTD (ACN 119 180 620)
First Respondent
MINCORP INVESTMENTS PTY LIMITED (ACN 132 441 868)
Second RespondentLOYAL COAL PTY LTD (ACN 132 497 913) (and others named in the Schedule)
Third Respondent
JUDGE:
FOSTER J
DATE OF ORDER:
20 AUGUST 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Copy letters from the Director of Public Prosecutions to Hanna Legal dated 23 July 2018 and 31 July 2018 respectively be marked as Exhibit A.
2.The seventh respondent (Moses Obeid) have leave to rely upon an Amended Interlocutory Application in accordance with the draft Amended Interlocutory Application dated 20 July 2018 furnished to the parties as an annexure to Written Submissions dated the same day and filed herein.
3.Any requirement that the said Amended Interlocutory Application be filed and served be dispensed with.
4.The Amended Interlocutory Application be dismissed.
5.There be no orders as to the costs of the Amended Interlocutory Application.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
FOSTER J:
On 6 July 2018, I dismissed the whole of this proceeding and made a costs order in favour of most of the respondents.…
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- Case
- [2018] FCA 1243
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court dismissed the application, finding it had been made prematurely. It noted that any assessment of prejudice to the administration of justice would require consideration of the interest in transparency and open justice. The Court emphasized the importance of safeguarding the public interest in open justice and that suppression orders should operate for no longer than necessary. The Court also highlighted that the extent and importance of the matters over which confidentiality was sought could only be properly assessed in light of evidence and submissions at the remedies hearing.
In reaching its decision, the Court took into account the fact that the Director of Public Prosecutions did not consider there was a significant risk of prejudice to Mr. Obeid's upcoming criminal trial. The Court concluded that the application did not satisfy the high threshold for a suppression order, as mere embarrassment or inconvenience was not sufficient. The Court dismissed the application and made no orders as to the costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Copy letters from the Director of Public Prosecutions to Hanna Legal dated 23 July 2018 and 31 July 2018 respectively be marked as Exhibit A.
2. The seventh respondent (Moses Obeid) have leave to rely upon an Amended Interlocutory Application in accordance with the draft Amended Interlocutory Application dated 20 July 2018 furnished to the parties as an annexure to Written Submissions dated the same day and filed herein.
3. Any requirement that the said Amended Interlocutory Application be filed and served be dispensed with.
4. The Amended Interlocutory Application be dismissed.
5. There be no orders as to the costs of the Amended Interlocutory Application.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The position of the DPP as made known to me was that there was no significant risk that the integrity of the upcoming criminal trial would be compromised in the event that my Reasons are published in full.CONSIDERATIONThe Relevant Principles Section 37AE and s 37AF of the FCA Act are in the following terms:37AE Safeguarding public interest in open justiceIn deciding whether to make a suppression order or non‑publication order, the Court must take into account that a primary objective of the administration of justice is to safeguard the public interest in open justice.37AF Power to make orders(1)The Court may, by making a suppression order or non‑publication order on grounds permitted by this Part, prohibit or restrict the publication or other disclosure of:(a)information tending to reveal the identity of or otherwise concerning any party to or witness in a proceeding before the Court or any person who is related to or otherwise associated with any party to or witness in a proceeding before the Court; or(b) information that relates to a proceeding before the Court and is:(i)information that comprises evidence or information about evidence; or(ii)information obtained by the process of discovery; or(iii)information produced under a subpoena; or(iv)information lodged with or filed in the Court.(2)The Court may make such orders as it thinks appropriate to give effect to an order under subsection (1). In s 37AG, the legislature specified the grounds upon which a suppression order or non-publication order might be made. In s 37AG(1)(a)–(d), four such grounds are set out. In the present case, Moses Obeid relies upon the ground specified in s 37AG(1)(a). That subsection provides that a suppression order or non-publication order may be made if the order is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice. Section 37AG(2) provides that a suppression order or non-publication order must specify the ground or grounds upon which the order is made. In Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Cascade Coal Pty Ltd (No 1) (2015) 331 ALR 68 at 73–74 [28]–[30], I said:In Hogan v Australian Crime Commission (2010) 240 CLR 651; 267 ALR 12; [2010] HCA 21 at [30] , the High Court said, in respect of the use of the word “necessary” in s 50 of the FCA Act, the predecessor to Pt VAA that it is “a strong word”. The Court observed that the collocation of necessity to prevent prejudice to the administration of justice and the necessity to prevent prejudice to the security of the Commonwealth suggests that the Parliament is not dealing with trivialities. The Court went on to hold that: “the administration of justice” spoken of in s 50 is that involved in the exercise by the Federal Court of the judicial power of the Commonwealth; this is a more specific discipline than broader notions of the public interest. The Court continued at [31]–[33] as follows: It is insufficient that the making or continuation of an order under s 50 appears to the Federal Court to be convenient, reasonable or sensible, or to serve some notion of the public interest, still less that, as the result of some “balancing exercise”, the order appears to have one or more of those characteristics (A statement by Fullerton J to like effect, with respect to the powers of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, was approved by Hodgson JA (Hislop and Latham JJ concurring) in Attorney-General (NSW) v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (2007) 73 NSWLR 635; [2007] NSWCCA 307 at [31]). If it appears to the Federal Court, on the one hand, to be necessary to make a particular order forbidding or restricting the publication of particular evidence or the name of a party or witness, in order to prevent either species of prejudice identified in s 50, or, on the other hand, that that necessity no longer supports the continuation of such an order, then the power of the Federal Court under s 50 is enlivened. The appearance of the requisite necessity (or supervening cessation of it) having been demonstrated, the Court is to implement its conclusion by making or vacating the order. The expression in s 50 “may … make such order” is to be understood in this sense. It may tend to distract attention from the particular terms of s 50 to describe the Federal Court as embarking upon the exercise of a “discretion” when entertaining an application under s 50 ( Dwyer v Calco Timbers Pty Ltd (2008) 234 CLR 124; 244 ALR 257; [2008] HCA 13 at [40] ). Once the Court has reached the requisite stage of satisfaction, it would be a misreading of s 50 to treat it as empowering the Court nevertheless to refuse to make the order, or to leave in operation the now impugned order. It would, for example, be an odd construction of s 50 which supported the refusal of an order under s 50 notwithstanding that it appeared to the Court to be necessary to make an order to prevent prejudice to the security of the Commonwealth. The threshold which a suppression order applicant must satisfy is high. Mere embarrassment, inconvenience, annoyance or unreasonable or groundless fears will not suffice.