Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Mitolo Group Pty Ltd

Link copied
Case Copied 56 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Mitolo Group Pty Ltd [2019] FCA 1257

File number: VID 758 of 2018
Judge: MURPHY J
Date of judgment: 2 August 2019
Date of publication of reasons: 9 August 2019
Catchwords: CONSUMER LAW – unfair contract terms – where respondents entered into small business contracts with potato growers – where ACCC alleged that certain terms of the contracts were ‘unfair’ within the meaning of s 24 of the Australian Consumer Law – where the first respondent entered into contracts with potato growers which did not specify a method or formula to determine the price to be paid to the grower or specify whether the price would be determined before or upon the delivery of the produce – where the ACCC alleged that the first respondent thereby contravened cll 12 and 32 of the Competition and Consumer (Industry Codes - Horticulture) Regulations 2017 – where respondents reached agreement with ACCC in relation to proposed declarations, injunctions, a pecuniary penalty and a compliance program – principles relevant to making agreed orders and declarations including as to the appropriate penalty – appropriateness of agreed declarations, injunctions, pecuniary penalty and compliance program
Legislation:

Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act2001 (Cth)

Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth)

Crimes Act 1914 (Cth)

Competition and Consumer (Industry Codes – Horticulture) Regulations 2017

Trade Practices (Horticulture Code of Conduct) Regulations 2006

Cases cited:

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Artorios Ink Co Pty Ltd (No 2) [2013] FCA 1292

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd (1997) 145 ALR 36

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Cascade Coal Pty Ltd (No 4) [2018] FCA 1243

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Cement Australia Pty Ltd [2017] FCAFC 159; (2017) 258 FCR 312

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Chrisco Hampers Australia Ltd [2015] FCA 1204; (2015) 239 FCR 33

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v CLA Trading Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 377

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 1405

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Leahy Petroleum (No 2) [2005] FCA 254; (2005) 215 ALR 281

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Optus Mobile Pty Ltd [2019] FCA 106

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v SMS Global Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 855

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v TPG Internet Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] FCA 629

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v TPG Internet Pty Ltd [2013] HCA 54; (2013) 250 CLR 640

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Valve Corporation (No 5) [2016] FCA 741

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Yellow Page Marketing BV (No 2) [2011] FCA 352; (2011) 195 FCR 1

Australian Energy Regulator v Snowy Hydro Limited (No 2) [2015] FCA 58

Bianca Hope Rinehart v Georgina Hope Rinehart [2014] FCA 1241

Commonwealth v Director, Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate (2015) [2015] HCA 46; 258 CLR 482

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Mitolo Grou... and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2019] FCA 1257
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) brought proceedings against Mitolo Group Pty Ltd (the respondents) in the Federal Court of Australia, alleging that the respondents had contravened the Australian Consumer Law (ACL) by including unfair contract terms in their small business contracts with potato growers. The respondents, who are prominent in the fresh potato wholesale and packing industry, entered into contracts with potato growers that did not specify a method or formula for determining the price to be paid, nor the timing of the price determination. The ACCC argued that these contracts contravened the ACL's prohibition on unfair contract terms in small business contracts. The respondents agreed to declarations, injunctions, a pecuniary penalty, and a compliance program as part of the settlement.

The court was required to determine whether the contract terms were unfair and, if so, what orders and declarations should be made. The court reviewed the nature of the contracts, the terms in question, and the impact of these terms on the growers. The court also considered the principles relevant to making agreed orders and declarations, including the appropriateness of the penalty and the necessity of the declarations and injunctions.

The court found that the contract terms were indeed unfair as they significantly disadvantaged the growers without providing any corresponding benefits. The court noted the lack of price determination mechanisms, unilateral price-setting rights, and other restrictive clauses that prevented growers from mitigating risks or seeking alternative buyers. The court accepted the agreed orders and declarations as they were consistent with the public interest, within the court's jurisdiction, and appropriate given the contraventions identified. The court made the agreed declarations, injunctions, and imposed the pecuniary penalty, along with mandating a compliance program to ensure future compliance with the ACL.

In conclusion, the court made the agreed declarations, issued injunctions, imposed a pecuniary penalty of $2.5 million, and ordered a compliance program, reflecting the court's disapproval of the contravening conduct and its support for the public interest in enforcing consumer protection laws.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Clause 32 of the Code provides that the price that is to be paid by a merchant for the purchase of a grower’s horticulture produce is:(a)an amount agreed in writing between the merchant and the grower either before, or immediately upon, delivery of the produce to the merchant; or(b)an amount calculated by a method or formula specified in the horticulture produce agreement.THE FACTS I have drawn the following from the SOAF and the joint submissions, sometimes directly. The respondents’ business operations are based primarily in South Australia and New South Wales. They grow and supply potatoes to retail and wholesale markets and also buy potatoes from other growers to supplement their supply. The potatoes were washed, sorted, graded and packed by the respondents according to customer specifications before being sold. As I have said, Mitolo is Australia’s largest fresh potato wholesaler and packer. The growers from whom the respondents buy potatoes are small businesses. The respondents entered into the following contracts for the purchase of potatoes from growers:(a)between about 6 December 2016 and 26 April 2017, contracts with six growers (the Original Contracts); (b)between about 25 July 2017 and 20 February 2018, contracts with 19 growers (the Revised Contracts).Each of the contracts provided for the growing and supply of potatoes to the respondents by the grower for a specific season and had a term which did not exceed 12 months. The majority of the potatoes grown and supplied under the relevant contracts were grown from varieties of seed potatoes supplied to the growers by the respondents to which the respondents had access under licence agreements (PBR Licences) with the owners of the Plant Breeders Rights (PBR) and intellectual property in those varieties (Licensed Varieties). Under the terms of the PBR Licences the respondents were only permitted to allow third parties access to, and use of, the Licensed Varieties on certain conditions relating to protection of the PBR and intellectual property rights in the Licensed Varieties.The unfair contract terms Each of the contracts was subject to Part 2-3 of Chapter 2 of the ACL in that it was, within the meaning of s 23 of the ACL:(a)a standard form contract within the meaning of s 23(1)(b) of the ACL; and(b)a small business contract because:(i)each of the growers employed less than 20 persons within the meaning of s 23(4) of the ACL; and(ii)the term of the contracts did not exceed 12 months and the upfront price payable for supply under the contracts did not exceed $300,000. Each of the relevant contracts contained the following proforma terms:(a)the price determination and variation clause: the relevant contracts did not specify any predetermined price or basis for calculating the price of potatoes to be supplied. This clause permitted the respondents to:(i)unilaterally set and to vary for any reason, the price that it paid to the grower for the supply of potatoes by the grower to the respondents;(ii)set the price at the time of supply, curtailing the grower’s ability to manage risk;(iii)set the price at any level including an amount that may have been less than the grower’s cost of production, for any reason; and(iv)set the price without any obligation upon the respondents to negotiate with the growers and without any corresponding benefit to the grower.There was no corresponding right given to the grower to obtain a change in the scope or scale of the supply of potatoes to the respondents, to permit the grower to sell the potatoes to any other potential purchaser or to terminate the contract;(b)the unilateral variation of terms clause: this clause permitted the respondents to unilaterally vary terms described as its “standard terms and conditions”. The clause was relevant to the determination of price but not confined in its operation to price-related terms. The clause permitted the respondents to alter terms of the contract without the consent of, or reference to, the grower. There was no corresponding right given to the grower. Growers did not have the right, in response to a variation by the respondents, to terminate the contract or to obtain a change in the scope or scale of the supply of potatoes to the respondents or to enable the grower to sell the potatoes to any other potential purchaser. In the case of the Original Contracts the respondents were not obliged to provide any prior notice of any variation to its standard terms and conditions and in the case of the Revised Contracts it was obliged to provide at least four weeks’ notice;(c)the exclusivity clause: this clause prevented growers from selling potatoes to any alternative purchaser, even where the alternative purchaser could have been willing to buy potatoes that the respondents rejected as not meeting its specifications. That was so, notwithstanding that the terms of the contracts did not oblige the respondents to take or pay for all potatoes which met the contract requirements and there was no specified price or method of calculating price provided for in the contracts which conferred any corresponding benefit on the grower;(d)the rejection for not meeting specifications clause: this clause, except in one case where it was struck out, permitted the respondents to:(i)reject potatoes if they failed to meet specifications, without any mechanism for a review or challenge to that determination by the grower;(ii)unilaterally change the specifications at any time; and(iii)request to purchase the rejected potatoes. In the case of the Original Contracts the clause did not address the price of such a purchase. In the case of the Revised Contracts the clause referred to a price to be agreed. Under the terms of the contracts the grower was prevented from selling the rejected potatoes to any other potential purchaser without the consent of the respondents. There was no corresponding obligation on the respondents not to unreasonably withhold consent. Nor was there any obligation on the respondents to determine any failure to meet specifications within a specified or reasonable period of time;(e)the sale of grower’s land clause: this clause prevented the grower from selling or otherwise disposing of the land on which the Licensed Varieties of potatoes supplied by the respondents were grown, or management rights over that land, unless the grower required the prospective purchaser to enter into a Commercial Ware Potato Grower Agreement with the respondents. The clause did not place any obligation on the respondents not to unreasonably withhold consent;(f)the non-disparagement clause: this clause may have had the effect of:(i)preventing the grower from raising with or disclosing to third parties legitimate issues or concerns that may have indirectly had a negative effect on the reputation of the respondents’ business or Licensed Varieties of seed potatoes, including where that may have been justified. There was no corresponding clause for the benefit of the grower;(ii)limiting the steps that a grower could take in seeking to enforce its contractual rights against the respondents and limiting the evidence that the grower could adduce in any proceeding in which it sought to enforce such rights; and(iii)exacerbating detriment caused by other unfair terms by limiting the growers’ ability to challenge the validity of those terms insofar as that may have had a negative effect on the reputation of the Licensed Varieties or the respondents’ business; and(g)the support clause: this clause required the grower to provide support to the respondents or the owner of the intellectual property rights in the Licensed Varieties in any action to maintain or protect their intellectual property rights, whether or not that course may have benefitted the grower and whether or not the matter concerned the grower or arose because of the fault of the grower. It allowed the respondents to obtain, at no cost to it, the benefit of the grower’s assistance. The grower may have been required to incur costs or be inconvenienced with no benefit to it and with no corresponding right or entitlement to payment or compensation;(collectively the Impugned Terms).The Code

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The respondents also agreed to give the ACCC an enforceable undertaking under s 87B of the CCA that they will not for a period of three years, whether by themselves, their servants or agents, enter into, or offer to enter into any standard form small business contract with a grower of commercial ware potatoes for the supply of commercial ware potatoes on terms which are less favourable overall than those set out in an agreed form of template contract.PRINCIPLES RELEVANT TO ORDERS AND DECLARATIONS BY CONSENT The principles relevant to making declarations and orders by consent in a civil penalty proceeding are settled. They were summarised by Gordon J in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 1405 (Coles Supermarkets) at [70]-[79] as follows:2.3.1 Orders sought by agreement…70The applicable principles are well established. First, there is a well-recognised public interest in the settlement of cases under the Act: NW Frozen Foods Pty Ltd v Australian Competition & Consumer Commission (1996) 71 FCR 285 at 291. Second, the orders proposed by agreement of the parties must be not contrary to the public interest and at least consistent with it: Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Real Estate Institute of Western Australia Inc (1999) 161 ALR 79 at [18].71Third, when deciding whether to make orders that are consented to by the parties, the Court must be satisfied that it has the power to make the orders proposed and that the orders are appropriate: Real Estate Institute at [17] and [20] and Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Virgin Mobile Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2002] FCA 1548 at [1]. Parties cannot by consent confer power to make orders that the Court otherwise lacks the power to make: Thomson Australian Holdings Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1981) 148 CLR 150 at 163.72Fourth, once the Court is satisfied that orders are within power and appropriate, it should exercise a degree of restraint when scrutinising the proposed settlement terms, particularly where both parties are legally represented and able to understand and evaluate the desirability of the settlement: Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Woolworths (South Australia) Pty Ltd (Trading as Mac’s Liquor) [2003] FCA 530 at [21]; Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Target Australia Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 1326 at [24]; Real Estate Institute at [20]–[21]; Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Econovite Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 964 at [11] and [22] and Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v The Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2007] FCA 1370 at [4].73Finally, in deciding whether agreed orders conform with legal principle, the Court is entitled to treat the consent of Coles as an admission of all facts necessary or appropriate to the granting of the relief sought against it: Thomson Australian Holdings at 164.2.3.2 Declarations74The Court has a wide discretionary power to make declarations under s 21 of the Federal Court Act: Forster v Jododex Australia Pty Ltd (1972) 127 CLR 421 at 437–8; Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission (1992) 175 CLR 564 at 581–2 and Tobacco Institute of Australia Ltd v Australian Federation of Consumer Organisations Inc (No 2) (1993) 41 FCR 89 at 99.75Where a declaration is sought with the consent of the parties, the Court’s discretion is not supplanted, but nor will the Court refuse to give effect to terms of settlement by refusing to make orders where they are within the Court’s jurisdiction and are otherwise unobjectionable: see, for example, Econovite at [11].76 However, before making declarations, three requirements should be satisfied:(1) The question must be a real and not a hypothetical or theoretical one;(2) The applicant must have a real interest in raising it; and(3) There must be a proper contradictor:Forster v Jododex at 437–8.77 In this proceeding, these requirements are satisfied. The proposed declarations relate to conduct that contravenes the ACL and the matters in issue have been identified and particularised by the parties with precision: Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v MSY Technology Pty Ltd (2012) 201 FCR 378 at [35]. The proposed declarations contain sufficient indication of how and why the relevant conduct is a contravention of the ACL: BMW Australia Ltd v Australian Competition & Consumer Commission [2004] FCAFC 167 at [35].78It is in the public interest for the ACCC to seek to have the declarations made and for the declarations to be made (see the factors outlined in ACCC v CFMEU at [6]). There is a significant legal controversy in this case which is being resolved. The ACCC, as a public regulator under the ACL, has a genuine interest in seeking the declaratory relief and Coles is a proper contradictor because it has contravened the ACL and is the subject of the declarations. Coles has an interest in opposing the making of them: MSY Technology at [30]. No less importantly, the declarations sought are appropriate because they serve to record the Court’s disapproval of the contravening conduct, vindicate the ACCC’s claim that Coles contravened the ACL, assist the ACCC to carry out the duties conferred upon it by the Act (including the ACL) in relation to other similar conduct, inform the public of the harm arising from Coles’ contravening conduct and deter other corporations from contravening the ACL.79Finally, the facts and admissions in Annexure 1 provide a sufficient factual foundation for the making of the declarations: s 191 of the Evidence Act; Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Dataline.Net.Au Pty Ltd (2006) 236 ALR 665 at [57]–[59] endorsed by the Full Court in Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Dataline.Net.Au Pty Ltd (2007) 161 FCR 513 at [92]; Hadgkiss v Aldin (No 2) [2007] FCA 2069 at [21]–[22]; Secretary, Department of Health & Ageing v Pagasa Australia Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 1545 at [77]–[79] and Ponzio v B & P Caelli Constructions Pty Ltd (2007) 158 FCR 543.