Ganegoda v Minister for Immigration

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GANEGODA v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2020] FCCA 135

Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Partner visa – where applicant and sponsor married by an arranged marriage – where sponsor ended relationship before applicant arrived in Australia – where temporary visa cancelled – applicant did not hold temporary visa at time of application – where Secretary issued certificates in respect of certain documents – where certificates invalid – procedural unfairness – whether a possibility that application for review would have been any different – application dismissed.

PRACTICE & PROCEDURE – Where certificates given under s 375A – where certificates conceded to be invalid – judicial review then turns on whether nondisclosure of certificates was material to decision – where Minister seeks order for confidentiality and to prevent disclosure of information to applicant – where applicant self-represented on judicial review – applicant referred for pro bono assistance – where undertaking of pro bono counsel not to disclose documents or information to applicant – Minister redacts documents covered by certificates – where extent of redactions may prevent counsel evaluating issues on review – practical approach to framing orders facilitating adequate disclosure.

Legislation:

Court Suppression and Non-publication Orders Act 2010 (NSW), ss.7, 8
Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth), s.88F
Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth), r.12.02
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.5, 65, 116, 352, 359A, 375A, 474, 476
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Sch.2, cll.100.22, 100.221

Cases cited:

Chen v Migration Agents Registration Authority (No.1) [2016] FCA 649
CHZ19 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No.2) [2019] FCA 1112
Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163
Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 264 CLR 123
HT v The Queen [2019] HCA 40
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA (2019) 264 CLR 421
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Lay Lat (2006) 151 FCR 214
Parvin v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 86
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476
Tam v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 780

Other texts cited:

Daly, A Typology of Materiality (2019) 26 AJ Admin L 134

Applicant: SAMEERA CHINTHAKA GANEGODA
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Second Respondent: ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
File Number: MLG 1068 of 2017
Judgment of: Judge A Kelly
Hearing dates: 15 October, 5 December 2019
Date of Last Submission: 5 December 2019
Delivered at: Melbourne
Delivered on: 4 February 2020

REPRESENTATION

The Applicant:

In Person (15 October 2019)

Mr J. Barrington (5 December 2019)

Counsel for the Respondents:

Mr T. Goodwin (15 October 2019)

Mr V. Murano (5 December 2019)

Solicitors for the Respondents: Clayton Utz

ORDERS

  1. The name of the first respondent be amended in the title of the proceeding to Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs.

  2. The application dated 24 May 2017 be dismissed.

  3. The applicant pay the costs of the first respondent fixed at $7,464.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
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Details
Case
[2020] FCCA 135
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an application for judicial review brought by the applicant, Mr Ganegoda, against the Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs. The dispute arose from the cancellation of the applicant's temporary visa and the subsequent dismissal of his application for a partner visa. A key element of the case involved the Secretary issuing certificates in respect of certain documents, which were later conceded to be invalid.

The court was required to determine whether the non-disclosure of these invalid certificates to the applicant was material to the decision to affirm the delegate's decision to dismiss the partner visa application. This involved considering whether the applicant had been denied a procedural fairness by not being informed of the existence of these documents, and if so, whether this denial had any practical impact on the outcome of the review. The court also had to consider the appropriate approach to disclosure of information in the context of judicial review, particularly where the Minister sought confidentiality orders and the applicant was self-represented.

The court applied the principle that the onus of proof for materiality rests with the applicant, unless the decision made was the only legally available one. In this instance, the court found that affirming the delegate's decision was the only lawful outcome, as the applicant did not meet the eligibility requirements for a permanent visa at the time of the decision. Crucially, the applicant conceded that the information contained within the documents subject to the invalid certificates was irrelevant. Therefore, the court concluded that there was no practical injustice arising from the denial of an opportunity to respond to admittedly irrelevant documents, and the impugned information was not a reason for affirming the delegate's decision.

The application for judicial review was dismissed, and the applicant was ordered to pay the first respondent's costs fixed at $7,464.

Orders

Orders of the court

ORDERS

The name of the first respondent be amended in the title of the proceeding to Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs.

The application dated 24 May 2017 be dismissed.

The applicant pay the costs of the first respondent fixed at $7,464.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

In SZMTA, the plurality identified that the onus of proof was to be applied in relation to the question of materiality like any ordinary question of fact to be determined by the inferences drawn from the evidence. Their Honours framed the proposition in this way:[39]Where materiality is in issue in an application for judicial review, and except in a case where the decision made was the only decision legally available to be made, the question of the materiality of the breach is an ordinary question of fact in respect of which the applicant bears the onus of proof. Like any ordinary question of fact, it is to be determined by inferences drawn from evidence adduced on the application. (emphasis added)[39] (2019) 264 CLR 421, [46]. It was common ground that to be granted a permanent visa, the applicant needed to satisfy cl 100.221 of Sch 2 to the Regulations. At the time of decision, he was required to meet the requirements of sub-cll (2), (2A), (3), (4) or (4A) of cl 100.221 of Sch 2. The applicant did not meet those requirements because, at the time of its decision, he was not, relevantly, the holder of a temporary visa. In my view, at the time of decision, affirming the delegate’s decision was the only decision legally available to be made by the Tribunal. Assessed from the perspective of whether the breach operated to deny the applicant an opportunity to adduce evidence, the evaluation is not to be undertaken in a vacuum. Critically, the applicant accepted that the information contained in the documents the subject of the certificates was irrelevant. Considered in that way, there could have been no practical injustice arising from a denial of an opportunity to file evidence in response to documents that were admittedly irrelevant. This conclusion is reinforced by consideration of the statutory context considered above. In particular, nothing in the Reasons provides any basis for a conclusion that the impugned information had been the reason or a part of the reason for affirming the delegate’s decision. Nor do those Reasons provide a basis for a conclusion that the Tribunal regarded that information as being in any way material to the findings that it made. Further, in terms of whether the breach operated to deny the applicant an opportunity to make submissions, I consider that the applicant framed the counterfactual on which he relied too narrowly. Admittedly, if apprised of the existence of the certificates, a legal option may have been open to the applicant to seek an adjournment.[40] However, the evaluation of materiality is not to be undertaken from the perspective of what the court would do if informed of the relevant facts. As Colvin J made clear in CHZ19 (No.2), [41] the question of materiality requires consideration as to what might have occurred if there had been compliance with the obligation to notify the applicant of the existence of the certificates.[42] [40] Cf SZMTA, (2019) 264 CLR 421, [46].[41] CHZ19 v Minister for Home Affairs (No.2) [2019] FCA 1112, [34], [46] (Colvin J). [42] Ibid, see also Daly, A Typology of Materiality (2019) 26 AJ Admin L 134, 138.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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