Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Adata (Vic) Pty Ltd (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Adata (Vic) Pty Ltd (No 2)

[2015] FCA 272

Citation: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Adata (Vic) Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] FCA 272
Parties: AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION AND CONSUMER COMMISSION v ADATA (VIC) PTY LTD ACN 099 814 749, ADATA (CARRIERS) PTY LTD (ACN 072 129 321) and WAYNE WRIGHT
File number: NTD 19 of 2014
Judge: REEVES J
Date of judgment: 26 March 2015
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for dispensation of rule 4.01(2) – second interlocutory application on same issue – whether second application based on change of circumstances – whether second application an abuse of process – relevant principles
Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth)
Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW)
Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW)
Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic)
Cases cited: Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd v Phillip Morris Inc (1981) 148 CLR 170
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Adata (Vic) Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 1453
Australian Equity Investors, An Arizona Limited Partnership v Colliers International (NSW) Pty Ltd (No 3) [2011] FCA 100
Brimaud v Honeysett Instant Print Pty Ltd (Supreme Court of New South Wales, McLelland J, 19 September 1988, unreported)
Carr v Finance Corporation of Australia (No 1) Ltd (1981) 147 CLR 246
DA Christie v Baker [1996] 2 VR 582
Fletcher v Besser [2010] NSWCA 30
Hall v Nominal Defendant (1966) 117 CLR 423
Langdale v Danby [1982] 1 WLR 1123
NA Retail Solutions Pty Ltd v St George Bank Ltd (2010) 267 ALR 599; [2010] FCA 290
National Parks and Wildlife Service v Pierson (2002) 55 NSWLR 315; [2002] NSWCA 273
Nominal Defendant v Manning (2000) 50 NSWLR 139; [2000] NSWCA 80
P Dawson Nominees Pty Ltd v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (No 2) (2009) 255 ALR 466; [2009] FCA 413
Symes v Holbrook [2005] FCAFC 219
Tropical Reef Shipyard Pty Ltd v QBE Insurance (Australia) Ltd (No 2) (2010) 274 ALR 626; [2010] FCA 1093
Vivo International Pty Ltd v Tivo Inc [2012] FCA 1167
Wickstead v Browne (1992) 30 NSWLR 1
Windsor v Sydney Medical Service Co-operative Ltd (No 2) [2009] FCA 704
Date of hearing: 6 February 2015
Place: Brisbane (via videolink to Darwin)
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 55
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr D Star
Solicitor for the Applicant: Mr J Love, Norton Rose Fulbright
Solicitor for the First and Second Respondents: The First and Second Respondents did not appear
Solicitor for the Third Respondent: Mr Wright appeared on his own behalf

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NORTHERN TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NTD 19 of 2014

BETWEEN:

AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION AND CONSUMER COMMISSION
Applicant

AND:

ADATA (VIC) PTY LTD ACN 099 814 749
First Respondent

ADATA (CARRIERS) PTY LTD (ACN 072 129 321)
Second Respondent

WAYNE WRIGHT
Third Respondent

JUDGE:

REEVES J

DATE OF ORDER:

26 MARCH 2015

WHERE MADE:

BRISBANE (VIA VIDEOLINK…

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Details
Case
[2015] FCA 272
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Adata (Vic) Pty Ltd (No 2), the dispute involved an application by the third respondent, Mr Wright, seeking dispensation from Rule 4.01(2) of the Federal Court Rules 2011. Mr Wright sought to appear for two corporate respondents in proceedings initiated by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission. The application was the second by Mr Wright on the same issue, and the ACCC opposed the application on the basis that it was an abuse of process. The court was required to decide whether Mr Wright's second application was permissible under the principles relevant to the re-agitation of an issue previously determined in an earlier decision.

The court considered the principles relevant to the re-agitation of an issue, noting the divergent views in the authorities. The court held that there was no new material or new evidence not available at the time of the first application, as the financial information about the corporate respondents was plainly available to Mr Wright at the time of his first application. The court also found that there was no material change in circumstances since the first application, as the acquisition of pro bono legal assistance did not constitute a significant change. The court concluded that Mr Wright's current application was not distinguishable from the first one, and therefore, it should be rejected. The court dismissed the third respondent's application and ordered that the third respondent pay the ACCC's costs of and incidental to the application.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The third respondent’s application filed 6 February 2015 is dismissed.

2. The third respondent is to pay the applicant’s costs of and incidental to its application filed 6 February 2015.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

As I have indicated above, I propose to consider Mr Wright’s current application with reference to the circumstances outlined in P Dawson, and taking into account both what justice requires in the circumstance of this case and the overarching purpose of civil litigation expressed in s 37M of the Federal Court Act.No new material or new evidence not available at the first application Turning, then, to the first circumstance in P Dawson: there is new material or new evidence which was not available at the time of the first application. For the following reasons, I do not consider the financial information Mr Wright has now provided in relation to the corporate respondents meets that description. As the sole director and shareholder of the corporate respondents, the information about the corporate respondents’ financial position was plainly available to Mr Wright at the time of his first application. The only explanations he has offered as to why he did not present this evidence at the time of his first application were those advanced in his oral submissions, where he said he was “remiss” and “unaware that such evidence needed to be provided”. Even if I were to accept these statements in his oral submissions as his explanations, I do not consider they provide a satisfactory explanation for his failure. If mere negligence were to be accepted as a sufficient explanation, it is self-evident that the opportunities to make successive interlocutory applications would be almost limitless. And, while Mr Wright’s lack of knowledge of the Court’s procedures – he is not a lawyer, nor legally trained – is perhaps understandable, that state of affairs simply reinforces the overriding reason why I rejected his first application: the delays and inefficiencies that would likely occur if he were to be allowed to appear for the corporate respondents. In those circumstances, to accept his ignorance of the Court’s procedures as a satisfactory explanation would be quite perverse. In any event, as the Commission correctly submitted, the financial impecuniosity of the corporate respondents was not contested by it during the first application and their impecuniosity was not relied upon as a significant factor in my decision to refuse Mr Wright’s first application.No material change in circumstances The second circumstance identified in P Dawson is: there has been a material change in circumstances since the first application. On this aspect, Mr Wright has relied upon the fact that he is now receiving pro bono legal assistance, which assistance was not available to him at the time of his first application. There is also another matter that Mr Wright did not expressly refer to in his submissions. It is, that, in his first application, he only sought dispensation from r 4.01(2) of the Rules in relation to the first respondent, whereas in his current application he has sought that dispensation for both corporate respondents. I mention this matter to dispose of it – I do not consider it constitutes a material change of circumstances.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The primary issue raised by this application is whether Mr Wright should be precluded from bringing it in circumstances where he failed on his first application in connection with the same issue.PRINCIPLES RELEVANT TO THE RE-AGITATION OF AN ISSUE DETERMINED IN AN EARLIER DECISIONA complicated issue Before turning to the submissions of the parties on this application, it is convenient to outline the principles relevant to the re-agitation of an issue that has been the subject of an earlier decision of a court; in particular, to a situation where a court is asked to consider a second interlocutory application by a party, where that party has previously failed in a decision on an interlocutory application on the same, or a similar, issue. The circumstances in which a court would reconsider such an application are complicated. They depend upon a range of factors, including: the status of the earlier order, that is, whether it was a final order, or an interlocutory one; the reasons advanced for the reconsideration of the matter, for example, the acquisition of fresh evidence to support the application; and the nature of the application, that is, whether it involved a question of practice and procedure, or whether it sought some relief prescribed by a statute, or whether it sought prerogative relief, to name just a few. The complications involved are aptly demonstrated by the divergent views expressed on this issue by the majority and dissenting judges in two seminal decisions of the Courts of Appeal of Victoria and New South Wales: DA Christie v Baker [1996] 2 VR 582 (Christie) and Nominal Defendant v Manning (2000) 50 NSWLR 139; [2000] NSWCA 80 (Manning), respectively. In P Dawson Nominees Pty Ltd v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (No 2) (2009) 255 ALR 466; [2009] FCA 413 (PDawson), Goldberg J described those divergent views as falling into two camps, as follows (at [40]):(a)what is said to be the strict view of Brooking and Hayne JJA in D A Christie Pty Ltd v Baker [1996] 2 VR 582 (“Christie”) and Mason P in Manning;(b)what is said to be the liberal view of Charles JA in Christie and of Heydon JA and Foster AJA in Manning.The Victorian Court of Appeal in Christie In Christie, the plaintiff applied to the Victorian County Court for an extension of time within which to bring proceedings, claiming damages for injuries he had suffered in the course of his employment. His application was made under s 23A of the Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic). The application was refused because he did not provide a sufficient explanation for his delay. The plaintiff did not appeal that decision but, some two years later, he made a second application under the same statutory provision to a different judge of the same Court, supported by additional evidence to better explain his original delay. The second application was granted. The primary judge found that no issue estoppel was created by the determination of the first application and the extension of time should be granted on its merits. The defendant appealed on the ground that the additional evidence provided on the second application was available to the plaintiff at the time of his first application and there was no explanation as to why it was not put forward at that time.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Since it was only made aware of Mr Wright’s current application late on the evening before the hearing, the Commission did not have the opportunity to prepare and submit written submissions on the application. Nonetheless, it made a number of oral submissions. Its primary contention was that the current application, and the material in support of it, was not distinguishable from that put forward on the first application and it should therefore be rejected. As to information that had been put forward about the corporate respondents’ financial position, the Commission submitted that impecuniosity was, at its highest, a minor factor in the rejection of Mr Wright’s first application. To emphasise this contention, it pointed out that it told the Court during the hearing of the first application that it was prepared to proceed on the assumption the corporate respondents were impecunious, without Mr Wright having to establish that fact. For that reason, the Commission submitted that the provision of this financial information did not relevantly alter the circumstances of the two applications. However, the Commission acknowledged that the pro bono legal assistance that Mr Wright had now obtained was a relevant change in circumstance from his first application. Nonetheless, it submitted that there is no evidence that Mr Wright will continue to receive that pro bono assistance in the future conduct of this proceeding.CONSIDERATION As I have indicated above, I propose to consider Mr Wright’s current application with reference to the circumstances outlined in P Dawson, and taking into account both what justice requires in the circumstance of this case and the overarching purpose of civil litigation expressed in s 37M of the Federal Court Act.No new material or new evidence not available at the first application Turning, then, to the first circumstance in P Dawson: there is new material or new evidence which was not available at the time of the first application. For the following reasons, I do not consider the financial information Mr Wright has now provided in relation to the corporate respondents meets that description. As the sole director and shareholder of the corporate respondents, the information about the corporate respondents’ financial position was plainly available to Mr Wright at the time of his first application. The only explanations he has offered as to why he did not present this evidence at the time of his first application were those advanced in his oral submissions, where he said he was “remiss” and “unaware that such evidence needed to be provided”. Even if I were to accept these statements in his oral submissions as his explanations, I do not consider they provide a satisfactory explanation for his failure. If mere negligence were to be accepted as a sufficient explanation, it is self-evident that the opportunities to make successive interlocutory applications would be almost limitless. And, while Mr Wright’s lack of knowledge of the Court’s procedures – he is not a lawyer, nor legally trained – is perhaps understandable, that state of affairs simply reinforces the overriding reason why I rejected his first application: the delays and inefficiencies that would likely occur if he were to be allowed to appear for the corporate respondents. In those circumstances, to accept his ignorance of the Court’s procedures as a satisfactory explanation would be quite perverse. In any event, as the Commission correctly submitted, the financial impecuniosity of the corporate respondents was not contested by it during the first application and their impecuniosity was not relied upon as a significant factor in my decision to refuse Mr Wright’s first application.No material change in circumstances