SZSLF v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZSLF v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 64

Citation: SZSLF v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 64
Appeal from: SZSLF v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor (No 1) [2013] FCCA 1521
SZSLF v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor (No 2) [2013] FCCA 1522
Parties: SZSLF v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File number: NSD 2158 of 2013
Judge: ROBERTSON J
Date of judgment: 11 February 2014
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – whether Federal Circuit Court erred in finding no jurisdictional error on the part of the Refugee Review Tribunal – whether Federal Circuit Court erred in refusing an adjournment application – oral application by appellant that the Federal Court receive further evidence on appeal – whether the further evidence would have produced or would be likely to have produced a different result had it been available at the trial

Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 27
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 65, 424AA, 424A, 425

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 36.57

Cases cited: Commissioner for Australian Capital Territory Revenue v Alphaone Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 576
Gerlach v Clifton Bricks Pty Ltd (2002) 209 CLR 478
Guss v Johnstone [2000] FCA 1455
Kedem v Johnson Lawyers Legal Practice Pty Ltd [2014] FCAFC 3
SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152
SZQJH v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCAFC 147
Date of hearing: 11 February 2014
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 65
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr JR Young
Solicitor for the Appellant: G & S Law Group
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Ms S Burnett of Clayton Utz
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent submitted save as to costs

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 2158 of 2013

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

SZSLF
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

ROBERTSON J

DATE OF ORDER:

11 FEBRUARY 2014

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application that the Court receive further evidence on appeal be refused.

2.The appeal be dismissed.

3.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs in the fixed sum of $1,900.

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 2158 of 2013

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

SZSLF
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

ROBERTSON J

DATE:

11 FEBRUARY 2014

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

  1. The applicant for a Protection (Class XA) visa under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Migration Act), to whom I will refer as the appellant, is a national…

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Details
Case
[2014] FCA 64
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of SZSLF v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the appellant, SZSLF, appealed against the decision of the Federal Circuit Court which dismissed his application for review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal. The appellant contended that the Federal Circuit Court erred in finding no jurisdictional error on the part of the Refugee Review Tribunal and in refusing an adjournment application. The appellant also sought for the Federal Court to receive further evidence on appeal. The court had to decide whether the Federal Circuit Court erred in its findings and whether the Federal Court should receive further evidence on appeal.

The court considered the arguments raised by the appellant regarding the jurisdictional error and the adjournment application. The court found that the appellant's contentions were without merit as there was no legal error on the part of the Federal Circuit Court. The court also noted that the appellant had not demonstrated that the further evidence would have produced or would be likely to have produced a different result had it been available at the trial. The court exercised its discretion under section 27 of the Federal Court Act and refused the application for the Court to receive further evidence on appeal.

The court dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellant to pay the first respondent's costs in the fixed sum of $1,900. The court held that there was no legal error on the part of the Federal Circuit Court in its findings and in refusing the adjournment application. The court also found that the appellant had not demonstrated that the further evidence would have produced or would be likely to have produced a different result had it been available at the trial. The court exercised its discretion under section 27 of the Federal Court Act and refused the application for the Court to receive further evidence on appeal.

The final orders of the court were that the application that the Court receive further evidence on appeal be refused, the appeal be dismissed, and the appellant pay the first respondent’s costs in the fixed sum of $1,900.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application that the Court receive further evidence on appeal be refused.

2. The appeal be dismissed.

3. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs in the fixed sum of $1,900.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Section 27 of the Federal Court Act is in the following terms:27 Evidence on appealIn an appeal, the Court shall have regard to the evidence given in the proceedings out of which the appeal arose, and has power to draw inferences of fact and, in its discretion, to receive further evidence, which evidence may be taken:(a) on affidavit; or(b)by video link, audio link or other appropriate means in accordance with another provision of this Act or another law of the Commonwealth; or(c) by oral examination before the Court or a Judge; or(d) otherwise in accordance with section 46. As the Full Court said recently in Kedem v Johnson Lawyers Legal Practice Pty Ltd [2014] FCAFC 3 at [74] the power is not confined to “fresh evidence”, that is, evidence of which an appellant was unaware at the time of the original hearing and could not have obtained with reasonable diligence. But in many cases it would be “most material” to consider whether the evidence could have been called at trial. The discretion is not at large, despite the absence of any express limitations. As the Full Court also said (at [76]), one important consideration in determining whether the power in s 27 of the Federal Court Act should be exercised is whether the further evidence would have produced, or at least would be likely to have produced, a different result had it been available at the trial. I proceed to consider the application under s 27 by reference to whether or not the further evidence sought to be adduced has that cogency. According to the submissions made by counsel for the appellant by reference to the transcript of the hearing before the Tribunal, on the second day of the hearing the Tribunal raised as an issue of concern whether members of the YCL went to the appellant’s home in the village and damaged it. The Tribunal said that it had “some difficulty” believing that if the YCL did go that the appellant’s wife would wait a few months before telling the appellant. In my opinion, at the appropriate level of generality or specificity (see SZQJH v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCAFC 147), the issue was whether members of the YCL went to the appellant’s home and damaged it. That issue would have fed directly into the appellant’s claim for refugee status. That was a critical issue or factor on which the decision was likely to turn and, in my opinion, the Tribunal was obliged to make the appellant aware of that issue and did so: Commissioner for Australian Capital Territory Revenue v Alphaone Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 576 at 591E; SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152 (SZBEL) at [38]-[40]. Remembering that the Tribunal is not a contradictor, this is the appropriate level of specificity to which the s 425 or procedural fairness obligation attached: see SZBEL at [47]. Contrary to the appellant’s submission, the fact that the Tribunal member said “Okay” did not, in context, found the conclusion for which the appellant contends, that is, that the Tribunal had reasonably led the appellant to believe that part at least of his account was accepted.

Decision

Reasons for decision

As I have said, the appellant submitted that it was open to this Court to determine the matter of jurisdictional error for itself. I agree. I do not accept the appellant’s submission that the matter should be remitted to the Federal Circuit Court. Nothing was pointed to suggesting that any practical injustice would flow from this Court dealing with the matter and counsel for the appellant accepted that the argument there would be the same as the argument here.CONCLUSION For these reasons, the appeal is dismissed. The Minister applied for a fixed costs order in the sum of $1,900 and relied for this purpose on an affidavit of Sharon Anne Burnett, sworn on 11 February 2014. The appellant submitted that relevant to the exercise of the Court’s discretion to order costs was that the appellant had been deprived of the benefit of a hearing in the Federal Circuit Court. Since, as I have indicated, I am not persuaded that there was any legal error on the part of the Federal Circuit Court in proceeding as it did, the appropriate order is that the appellant pay the costs of the first respondent. The appellant accepted, in that event, that it was appropriate to fix the costs in the sum of $1,900, as sought by the Minister, and I so order.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The proceedings were dismissed with costs. CONSIDERATION I first consider the procedural question of whether it is appropriate to seek leave to appeal in the present circumstances. I note that the Minister opposed leave to appeal being granted on the basis that there was no substance in the grounds directed to the adjournment issue. The question is whether the leave application was unnecessary because, upon entry of the final judgment, any interlocutory order which affected the final result can be challenged in the appeal against the final judgment: Gerlach v Clifton Bricks Pty Ltd (2002) 209 CLR 478 at [6] per Gaudron, McHugh and Hayne JJ. It seems to me in the present circumstances that either the refusal of the adjournment affected the final result in terms of a breach of s 425 or associated failure to afford procedural fairness to the appellant, in which case an appeal as of right lay, or the refusal of an adjournment did not have that effect, in which case leave to appeal should be refused for lack of utility. See, for example, Guss v Johnstone [2000] FCA 1455 at [16] per Sackville J (Drummond and Dowsett JJ agreeing). In the present case the appellant put that the final judgment of the Federal Circuit Court was affected because the appellant was not in a position to advance anything himself in relation to the claimed jurisdictional error and did not tender before the Federal Circuit Court the transcript of the hearings before the Tribunal. I approach the grounds of appeal accordingly. I note that the appellant submitted that the error by the primary judge was that her Honour had not taken into account the critical issue of whether there was a reasonable likelihood the appellant would be prejudiced by the moving forward of the hearing date at a late stage in the cycle. The appellant also submitted that the primary judge should have recused herself and should have referred the adjournment application to another judge of the Federal Circuit Court. As I have said, although it is not necessary for me to deal with those matters, as the appellant accepted that everything that would have been put to the Federal Circuit Court had been put to this Court on the hearing of the appeal, I am not persuaded of legal error in relation to either of these contentions. As to the former point, counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant being unrepresented before the Federal Circuit Court when he wished to be represented was sufficient reason for the adjournment being granted when he had not consented to the change of hearing date. In my opinion that contention is too broad to be accepted. The answer would depend on the particular circumstances. Here there had been no indication before the changed hearing date that there was any difficulty with the change. An application for an adjournment being then made it was appropriate for the primary judge to explore those circumstances, as her Honour did. Counsel for the appellant also submitted that the normal course where a court proposed to bring a hearing forward would be that the parties would first be contacted as to whether this would raise any difficulty. The later the change, the more likely was it that there would be difficulty.