FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SZSLF v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 64
Citation: SZSLF v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 64 Appeal from: SZSLF v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor (No 1) [2013] FCCA 1521
SZSLF v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor (No 2) [2013] FCCA 1522Parties: SZSLF v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL File number: NSD 2158 of 2013 Judge: ROBERTSON J Date of judgment: 11 February 2014 Catchwords: MIGRATION – whether Federal Circuit Court erred in finding no jurisdictional error on the part of the Refugee Review Tribunal – whether Federal Circuit Court erred in refusing an adjournment application – oral application by appellant that the Federal Court receive further evidence on appeal – whether the further evidence would have produced or would be likely to have produced a different result had it been available at the trial
Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 27
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 65, 424AA, 424A, 425Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 36.57
Cases cited: Commissioner for Australian Capital Territory Revenue v Alphaone Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 576
Gerlach v Clifton Bricks Pty Ltd (2002) 209 CLR 478
Guss v Johnstone [2000] FCA 1455
Kedem v Johnson Lawyers Legal Practice Pty Ltd [2014] FCAFC 3
SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152
SZQJH v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCAFC 147Date of hearing: 11 February 2014 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 65 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr JR Young Solicitor for the Appellant: G & S Law Group Solicitor for the First Respondent: Ms S Burnett of Clayton Utz Solicitor for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent submitted save as to costs
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 2158 of 2013
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: SZSLF
AppellantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First RespondentREFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
ROBERTSON J
DATE OF ORDER:
11 FEBRUARY 2014
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application that the Court receive further evidence on appeal be refused.
2.The appeal be dismissed.
3.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs in the fixed sum of $1,900.
Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 2158 of 2013
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: SZSLF
AppellantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First RespondentREFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
ROBERTSON J
DATE:
11 FEBRUARY 2014
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
The applicant for a Protection (Class XA) visa under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Migration Act), to whom I will refer as the appellant, is a national…
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- Case
- [2014] FCA 64
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the arguments raised by the appellant regarding the jurisdictional error and the adjournment application. The court found that the appellant's contentions were without merit as there was no legal error on the part of the Federal Circuit Court. The court also noted that the appellant had not demonstrated that the further evidence would have produced or would be likely to have produced a different result had it been available at the trial. The court exercised its discretion under section 27 of the Federal Court Act and refused the application for the Court to receive further evidence on appeal.
The court dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellant to pay the first respondent's costs in the fixed sum of $1,900. The court held that there was no legal error on the part of the Federal Circuit Court in its findings and in refusing the adjournment application. The court also found that the appellant had not demonstrated that the further evidence would have produced or would be likely to have produced a different result had it been available at the trial. The court exercised its discretion under section 27 of the Federal Court Act and refused the application for the Court to receive further evidence on appeal.
The final orders of the court were that the application that the Court receive further evidence on appeal be refused, the appeal be dismissed, and the appellant pay the first respondent’s costs in the fixed sum of $1,900.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application that the Court receive further evidence on appeal be refused.
2. The appeal be dismissed.
3. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs in the fixed sum of $1,900.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The proceedings were dismissed with costs. CONSIDERATION I first consider the procedural question of whether it is appropriate to seek leave to appeal in the present circumstances. I note that the Minister opposed leave to appeal being granted on the basis that there was no substance in the grounds directed to the adjournment issue. The question is whether the leave application was unnecessary because, upon entry of the final judgment, any interlocutory order which affected the final result can be challenged in the appeal against the final judgment: Gerlach v Clifton Bricks Pty Ltd (2002) 209 CLR 478 at [6] per Gaudron, McHugh and Hayne JJ. It seems to me in the present circumstances that either the refusal of the adjournment affected the final result in terms of a breach of s 425 or associated failure to afford procedural fairness to the appellant, in which case an appeal as of right lay, or the refusal of an adjournment did not have that effect, in which case leave to appeal should be refused for lack of utility. See, for example, Guss v Johnstone [2000] FCA 1455 at [16] per Sackville J (Drummond and Dowsett JJ agreeing). In the present case the appellant put that the final judgment of the Federal Circuit Court was affected because the appellant was not in a position to advance anything himself in relation to the claimed jurisdictional error and did not tender before the Federal Circuit Court the transcript of the hearings before the Tribunal. I approach the grounds of appeal accordingly. I note that the appellant submitted that the error by the primary judge was that her Honour had not taken into account the critical issue of whether there was a reasonable likelihood the appellant would be prejudiced by the moving forward of the hearing date at a late stage in the cycle. The appellant also submitted that the primary judge should have recused herself and should have referred the adjournment application to another judge of the Federal Circuit Court. As I have said, although it is not necessary for me to deal with those matters, as the appellant accepted that everything that would have been put to the Federal Circuit Court had been put to this Court on the hearing of the appeal, I am not persuaded of legal error in relation to either of these contentions. As to the former point, counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant being unrepresented before the Federal Circuit Court when he wished to be represented was sufficient reason for the adjournment being granted when he had not consented to the change of hearing date. In my opinion that contention is too broad to be accepted. The answer would depend on the particular circumstances. Here there had been no indication before the changed hearing date that there was any difficulty with the change. An application for an adjournment being then made it was appropriate for the primary judge to explore those circumstances, as her Honour did. Counsel for the appellant also submitted that the normal course where a court proposed to bring a hearing forward would be that the parties would first be contacted as to whether this would raise any difficulty. The later the change, the more likely was it that there would be difficulty.