FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Kheirollahpoor v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1350
MIGRATION – application for protection visa – refugee sur place – political opinion – asserted fear of persecution based on activities in Australia – series of about fifteen interviews on foreign language radio programme – applicant made comments critical of the Iranian regime – in all but one of those programmes applicant identified himself only by first name and by reference to his detention at Port Hedland Detention Centre – in last programme applicant identified himself by giving his full name and by referring to his place of detention – Tribunal found that sole purpose of that broadcast was to create a pretext to invoke a well-founded fear of persecution if returned to Iran – Tribunal found further that Iranian authorities would take the same view and would not persecute the applicant – whether Tribunal erred in law – whether Tribunal further erred by failing to make material findings of fact – whether Tribunal obliged to make findings as to whether the final broadcast would have enabled the Iranian authorities to identify the applicant as having made the other political broadcasts critical of the Iranian authorities – whether Tribunal erred in failing to make findings about (a) whether such broadcasts constituted a political offence under Iranian law and (b) whether persecution under such law was persecution for political opinion.
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 425, 430, 476(1)(g), 476(4)
Somaghi v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1991) 31 FCR 100 referred to
A v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 993 not followed
Yilan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 854 (25 June 1999) referred to
Nefiodova v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 179 (28 February 2000) referred to
Arudselvan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 622 referred to
Guden v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 236 followed
Pat Tai Choi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, unreported, Federal Court of Australia Judgment No. 1556, 2 December 1998 followed
Tuli v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 271 followed
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Capitly [1999] FCA 193 referred to Budiyal v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 82 FCR 166 cited
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Cho (1999) 92 FCR 315 cited
De Silva v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 765 followed
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Mohammed [2000] FCA 576 followed
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Singh [2000] FCA 845 followedKHEIROLLAHPOOR v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION
AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRSW 3 of 2000
CARR J
20 SEPTEMBER 2000
PERTH
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
W 3 OF 2000
BETWEEN:
FARSHID KHEIROLLAHPOOR
ApplicantAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND
MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RespondentJUDGE:
CARR J
DATE OF ORDER:
20 SEPTEMBER 2000
WHERE MADE:
PERTH
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.…
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- Case
- [2000] FCA 1350
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the Tribunal's decision was legally sound and based on proper consideration of the evidence. Specifically, the applicant challenged the Tribunal's finding that a letter, signed by Kheirollahpoor and other asylum seekers, was not read at a public demonstration in Sydney. The applicant argued that this finding was crucial as it influenced the Tribunal's conclusion about whether his identity had been disclosed for the purpose of prompting his visa application. The respondent argued that the Tribunal's conclusion was based on a broader assessment of credibility and other evidence rather than solely on the fact in question.
The court examined the Tribunal's reasoning and found that the Tribunal had considered the credibility of the applicant and the likelihood that a named immigration consultant would publicly disclose sensitive information. The court noted that the applicant was not present at the demonstration and had no firsthand knowledge of the events described. Additionally, the court accepted evidence from Ms. Homa Hazrati, who had attended the demonstration and confirmed that the letter was read out in full, including the applicant's name. Despite this, the court upheld the Tribunal's decision, finding that the Tribunal's reasoning was internally consistent and that the Tribunal had not erred in law or in its assessment of the evidence.
In light of the above, the court set aside the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal and remitted the matter to a differently constituted Tribunal for reconsideration in accordance with the law. The court also ordered the respondent to pay the applicant’s costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal dated 23 December 1999 be set aside.
2. The matter be remitted to a differently-constituted Tribunal for reconsideration in accordance with law.
3. The respondent pay the applicant’s costs.
Note:
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: CARR J
The second incident arose out of the Letter (referred to above) which had been signed by the applicant and four other Port Hedland detainees and sent to the Society for Democracy and Human Rights in Iran (in Australia) at some time between 23 June 1999 and 20 July 1999 (“the Letter”). The Letter was highly critical of the Iranian authorities and included the information that its signatories were seeking asylum in Australia. The applicant told the Tribunal that the Letter had been read out, at a demonstration in Sydney on 20 July 1999, by a Ms Homa Hazrati, a member of the Society. His legal representative also produced to the Tribunal a letter, dated 3 December 1999, from Ms Hazrati stating that she had heard the applicant’s message of support for the demonstration in July 1999 broadcast on the Persian language radio programme. Ms Hazrati’s letter did not state that she had read out the Letter at the demonstration. The Tribunal noted that the suggestion that she had done so appeared to have been derived from the applicant himself. It reasoned that as Ms Hazrati was an Immigration Consultant, she would be well aware of the confidentiality attaching to the refugee decision-making process and would not have named the applicant and other asylum seekers at a public demonstration, thus potentially endangering not only them but their families in Iran. The Tribunal then found as follows:“Having regard to the view I have formed of the Applicant’s credibility, and the fact that he was not in any event present at the demonstration in Sydney and therefore does not have first hand knowledge of the events he describes, I do not accept that a letter that included his name and the fact that he was an asylum seeker in Australia was read out at the demonstration in Sydney in July 1999.” [Emphasis added] At the hearing in this Court, an affidavit sworn by Ms Hazrati was admitted into evidence without objection as to its admissibility or dispute as to its contents. In summary, in her affidavit Ms Hazrati swore that she had attended a demonstration in Sydney on 20 July 1999 during which a Dr A Salek, chairperson of the Society for Democracy and Human Rights in Iran had read out the Letter in full, including the name of the applicant. The applicant contended that the Tribunal’s decision was based on a finding of fact that the Letter had not been read out at the demonstration in Sydney on 20 July 1999 when in fact it had been. The applicant submitted that if the Tribunal had found correctly in this respect, it would have been much more difficult for it to have found that the applicant’s identity had been disclosed by him for the sole purpose of prompting his claim for a protection visa. The relevant fact was, so it was put, “an essential fact”. The respondent responded to these submissions with several alternative arguments. First, the respondent contended that the passage in the Tribunal's reasons to which I have given emphasis above was a conclusion based upon other facts and conclusions rather than a “particular fact”. Those other relevant findings or conclusions previously made were said to be contained in its reasoning which I have summarised above.