Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Mohammed

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Mohammed [2000] FCA 576

MIGRATION – refugees – refugee “sur place” – political opinion – imputed political opinion – asserted fear of persecution based on activities abroad – letter sent from country of residence to country of origin – pretext to generate refugee status – whether good faith requirement in Convention – need to refer to words of Convention – “well-founded fear of persecution” – “by reason of” – respondent’s first application for protection visa refused and refusal confirmed by Refugee Review Tribunal – respondent sent letter to country of origin referring to unsuccessful application, failure to render military service, and political activities post departure – letter intercepted by security agency in that country – further application for refugee status permitted –sole purpose of letter to create pretext for claim to well-founded fear of persecution – whether Tribunal entitled to disregard letter and consequences therefrom.

Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

Danian v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Court of Appeal (Civil Division), unreported 28 October, 1999, United Kingdom approved
Banstanipour v Immigration and Naturalisation Service (1992) 980 F 2d cited
Somaghi v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (Lockhart J, 22 November 1990, unreported) considered
Somaghi v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1991) 31 FCR 100 discussed
Chan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379 cited
R v Home Secretary; Ex parte Bugdaycay [1987] 1 AC 514 cited
R v Home Secretary, Ex parte Mehari [1994] QB 474 cited
T v Home Secretary [1996] AC 742 cited
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559 cited
Cisternas-Estay v Immigration and Naturalisation Service 531 F2d 155 (3d Cir 1976) cited
Mohamed Aahmed Urur v Minister of Employment and Immigration (1988) 91 NR 146 (Fed CA) cited
Manzila v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (September 22, 1998) Imm-4757-97 (FCTD) cited
Ngongo v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (October 25, 1999) IMM-6717-98 (FCTD) cited
Re HB Refugee Appeal:2254/94 discussed
R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal Ex parte B [1989] Imm AR 166 cited
R v Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex parte Gilgham [1995] Imm AR 129 cited
M v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1996] 1 WLR 507 cited
R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal, Ex parte Senga (unrep 9 March 1994) cited

Heshmati v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (Lockhart J, 22 November 1990, unreported) considered
Heshmati v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1991) 31 FCR 123 discussed
Chen Shi Hai v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] HCA 19 cited
Immigration and Naturalisation Service v Cardozo-Fonseca (1987) 480 US 421 cited
Immigration and Naturalisation Service v Elias-Zacarias (1992) 502 US 478 cited
Jaharzi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1995) 61 FCR 293 cited
Li Shi Ping v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 35 ALD 557, (1994) 35…

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Details
Case
[2000] FCA 576
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Mohammed, the primary concern was whether the Refugee Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) erred in law when determining that the respondent was not entitled to the status of a refugee sur place. The respondent, a Sudanese national who had been found not to be a refugee by a differently-constituted Tribunal, had sent a letter to his country of origin, Sudan, with the purpose of creating a pretext for invoking a claim to a well-founded fear of persecution. The Tribunal assumed the letter had been sent but did not make an express finding on this matter. The central legal issue was whether the Tribunal correctly interpreted and applied the law in determining the respondent's refugee status, particularly whether it adequately assessed the risk of persecution if the respondent were returned to Sudan.

The court found that the Tribunal had misunderstood and incorrectly interpreted the law. The Tribunal's failure to address the question it had to decide, specifically whether the respondent’s actions gave rise to a well-founded fear that serious harm would occur if he were returned to Sudan, was a significant error. The court highlighted that the Tribunal should have made an assessment of any potential harm to the respondent and acknowledged any risk to his basic human rights upon his return. The court emphasized the importance of properly determining the respondent's status given the history of extreme acts by Sudanese authorities, including grave infringements of human rights of those with dissenting political opinions. The court concluded that the Tribunal's error was such that it led to an incorrect outcome.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. The Appellant is to pay the Respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

The question in the appeal is whether the Tribunal erred in law when, having found:·that the respondent, who had previously been found by a differently-constituted Refugee Review Tribunal not to be a refugee, had thereafter sent a letter (“the Letter”) to his country of origin, Sudan; ·that he had done so with the sole purpose of creating a pretext of invoking a claim to a well-founded fear of persecution; decided that he was not entitled to the status of a refugee sur place. The Tribunal did not make an express finding that the Letter had in fact been sent, but assumed so for the purposes of making its finding about the respondent’s purpose. Factual and Procedural Background The respondent, 34 years of age, was born in Sudan and is a citizen of that country. Between 1983 and 1990 the respondent lived and worked in Iraq, returning to Sudan for holidays. When Iraq invaded Kuwait he returned to Sudan. In late 1990 or early 1991 the respondent left Sudan after becoming aware that he would be required to provide military service in the civil war being fought in his country. Between 1991 and 1997 he worked in Jordan, and in April 1997 he flew to Malaysia and later boarded a boat to Australia. The respondent arrived in Australia on 25 July 1997. On 22 September 1997 he applied under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) for a protection visa on the basis that he was a refugee. In October 1997 the Minister’s delegate refused the respondent’s application for a protection visa because there were insufficient facts on which to decide whether the respondent was a refugee “as there was no objective evidence as to his identity”. His Sudanese passport had been “lost” or destroyed at sea. On 23 December 1997 the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision. This was the first of two Tribunal decisions concerning the respondent. The Tribunal assumed that the respondent was a citizen of Sudan, but was not satisfied that he was a person to whom Australia had protection obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees as amended by the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (“the Convention”). It is necessary to refer briefly to the Tribunal’s reasons, principally because in the subsequent Tribunal decision, which is under challenge in these proceedings, the Tribunal exercised the entitlement conferred upon it by s 416 of the Act to have regard to the earlier decision and take it to be correct. The respondent’s claims before the Tribunal in 1997 were, first, that he refused to undertake compulsory military service because he was an active or known opponent of the Sudanese government. The Tribunal rejected this claim and found (as was the respondent’s evidence) that the respondent had refused to register for military service because he did not wish to kill anyone or be killed by others. The Tribunal also rejected the respondent’s second claim which was based on his alleged membership of the opposition Umma Party. The Tribunal had some doubts about whether the respondent was a member of that party, but held that even if he had joined it, he was not an active member and did not have any sort of political profile which would be of interest to the Sudanese government.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

SPENDER, FRENCH AND CARR JJ (dissent)
The respondent sought review of the Tribunal’s decision in this Court under s 476(1)(e) of the Act on the basis that the Tribunal incorrectly interpreted the law, or had incorrectly applied the applicable law to the facts. Decision at first instance The learned primary judge referred to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status (1979) which states at paragraph 96:“96. A person may become a refugee ‘sur place’ as a result of his own actions, such as associating with refugees already recognised, or expressing his political views in his country of residence. Whether such actions are sufficient to justify a well-founded fear of persecution must be determined by a careful examination of the circumstances. Regard should be had in particular to whether such actions may have come to the notice of the authorities of the person’s country of origin and how they are likely to be viewed by those authorities.” His Honour said that:“The central question to be determined by the Tribunal was whether the [respondent] held a genuine fear that he would be persecuted and whether, if he were returned to Sudan, there was a real risk that serious harm would befall the [respondent] by acts of persecution within the meaning of the Convention. In making that determination, it was not open to the Tribunal to ignore the consequences of the interception by Sudanese security authorities of the letter sent by the [respondent] to his brother.…The history of extreme acts by Sudanese authorities, involving, in particular, grave infringements of the human rights of persons to whom dissenting political opinion has been attributed, made the proper determination of the [respondent’s] status of great importance. Due to its misunderstanding, and incorrect interpretation, of the law, the Tribunal failed to address, as required by law, the question it had to decide.” His Honour held that, once it had been accepted by the Tribunal that the respondent had written to his brother, and that the Letter had been intercepted by Sudanese security personnel, the respondent’s case became one of determining whether the attention from the authorities in the country of nationality gave rise to a well-founded fear that serious harm would occur if the respondent were returned. An assessment should have been made of any potential harm to the respondent and there should have been a clear acknowledgment and assessment of any risk to basic human rights upon his return which might follow from the State’s imputation of an unacceptable political opinion. His Honour referred to the fact that, in its reasons, the Tribunal had acknowledged that the governing regime in Sudan has been recognised internationally for its systematic and brutal abuse of the human rights of the citizens of that nation. He also referred to material before the Tribunal to the effect that political opponents were often targeted, gaoled, tortured, executed, and suppressed. There were restrictions on freedom of speech and association. All levels of Sudanese society had been affected by the oppressive conduct of the government of Sudan since it came to power by military coup.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by:

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