SAAS v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SAAS v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs

[2002] FCA 726

MIGRATION – application for protection visa – review of decision of Refugee Review Tribunal – whether Tribunal erred in assessment of applicant’s claim to be a refugee sur place – validity of s 91R(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – validity of s 91R(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – characterisation of provisions relating to the grant of protection visas - scope of Commonwealth legislative power to enact laws with respect to external affairs, immigration and aliens – whether provisions supported by only one possible head of Commonwealth legislative power – dual characterisation.

Australian Constitution, ss 51(xix), 51(xxvii), 51(xxix)
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s 39B
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 5, 14, 30, 31, 36(2), 48A, 91A – 91X, 91R(1), 91R(2), 91R(3), 91S, 91T, 91U, 424A, 474, 475A
Migration Legislation Amendment (Judicial Review) Act 2001 (Cth)
Migration Regulations, reg 866.222A – 866.225

Actors and Announcers Equity Association of Australia v Fontana Films Pty Ltd (1982) 150 CLR 169 – referred to
Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1 – referred to
Cunliffe v Commonwealth (1994) 124 ALR 120 – referred to
Ex parte De Braic (1974) 124 CLR 162 – referred to
Horta v Commonwealth (1994) 181 CRL 183 – referred to
Kartinyeri v Commonwealth (1998) 195 CLR 337 – referred to
Lim v Minister for Immigration (1992) 176 CLR 1 – cited
Melbourne Corporation v The Commonwealth (1947) 74 CLR 31 – referred to
Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273 – referred to
Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 – referred to
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Farahanipour (2001) 181 ALR 535 – referred to
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Mohammed (2000) 98 FCR 405 – cited
O’Keefe v Calwell (1949) 77 CLR 261 – cited
Polites v Commonwealth (1945) 70 CLR 60 – referred to
R v Hickman; Ex parte Fox and Clinton (1945) 70 CLR 598 – referred to
R v Macfarlane; Ex parte O’Flanagan (1923) 32 CLR 518 – referred to
R v Patterson; Ex parte Taylor (2001) 182 ALR 657 – discussed
Re F; Ex parte F (1986) 161 CLR 376 – applied
The Grain Pool of Western Australia v The Commonwealth (2000) 202 CLR 479 – applied
Victoria v Commonwealth (1996) 187 CLR 416 – referred to

SAAS v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

S.207 of 2001

MANSFIELD J
11 JUNE 2002
ADELAIDE

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

S.207 OF 2001

BETWEEN:

SAAS
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

MANSFIELD J

DATE OF ORDER:

11 JUNE 2002

WHERE MADE:

ADELAIDE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The application is dismissed.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT…

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Details
Case
[2002] FCA 726
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of SAAS v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs involves the applicant, a non-citizen, seeking judicial review of a decision by the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) to deny his application for a protection visa. The applicant, represented by pro bono counsel, argued that the RRT failed to properly consider his claims regarding his conversion to Christianity and the potential risk of persecution in Iran if he were to return. The court was required to decide whether the RRT's decision was legally sound and whether the applicant's claims were substantiated under the applicable legislative framework.

The court addressed several key legal issues, including the validity of section 91R(3) of the Migration Act, which sets out the criteria for a protection visa. The applicant argued that the section was invalid as it was enacted under an incorrect source of legislative power. The court, however, found that the section was a valid exercise of the external affairs power under the Australian Constitution, as it was necessary for the implementation of Australia's obligations under the Refugees Convention. The court further found that the applicant had not demonstrated any procedural unfairness or impediment to his presentation of evidence, and that the RRT had adequately considered his claims.

In conclusion, the court rejected the applicant's grounds for review and dismissed the application for judicial review. The RRT's decision to deny the applicant a protection visa was upheld, as the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant met the criteria for refugee status under the Refugees Convention. The court found no basis to declare the RRT's decision null and void.

ORDERS:
1. The application is dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application is dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

MANSFIELD J
I also reject the contentions that the Tribunal should itself have procured further documentary evidence from Iran concerning the applicant’s interest in Christianity, or that it inhibited the applicant through his migration agent from doing so. The applicant was given the opportunity to present to the Tribunal such information as he considered might assist his claims. The suggestion that the Tribunal misled him about the need to do so is not one which, in the circumstances, I accept. That is for two reasons. The first is that the applicant was represented before the Court by senior and junior counsel. I understand their appearance for the applicant was pro bono publico. The solicitors on the record for the applicant, also acting pro bono publico, have appeared for many residents of the Woomera Immigration Reception and Processing Centre. I am confident that any such misleading statement by the Tribunal would have been the subject of instructions by the applicant and investigation by his legal representatives. They did not raise any such point on the hearing of the application. The second reason is that such an important document, if it existed and could have been procured, would have been identified by the applicant to his migration agent and presented to the Tribunal. The applicant was on notice, as a result of the decision of the delegate of the respondent, that the genuineness of his claimed conversion to Christianity was an issue for the Tribunal to address. The issue was fully ventilated before the Tribunal. Evidence in writing was procured, including from Father Monaghan and orally from Sister Higgins. The applicant should, at that time, have presented any evidence which he regarded as “important”. There is no reason apparent why he did not do so, or more significantly to indicate that the Tribunal impeded his opportunity to do so by and at the hearing.CONCLUSION For those reasons, I do not consider that the applicant is entitled to an order under s 39B of the Judiciary Act declaring the Tribunal’s decision to be null and void. In my judgment, the application should be dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: MANSFIELD J

Accordingly, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution in Iran within the meaning of the Convention and therefore found that he was not a refugee. It followed that he was not a person to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Convention and as the applicant did not satisfy the criteria set out in s 36(2) of the Act the Tribunal affirmed the decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa.CONSIDERATION OF THE GROUNDS OF REVIEW There are two aspects to the application for review of the Tribunal’s decision. The first is the contention that s 91R(3) of the Act is invalid for want of Commonwealth legislative power and that accordingly the application for a protection visa should not have been assessed against that provision. Alternately, it is claimed that if the provision is validly enacted, s 91R(3) was nevertheless wrongly applied to the applicant’s specific claims. It is convenient to consider firstly the applicant’s claim that s 91R(3) of the Act is invalid. A. The validity of s 91R(3) of the Act At the time that the applicant applied for a protection visa, s 36(2) of the Act set out a criterion which had to be met if the application was to be successful: s 65(1) of the Act. Section 36(2) is relevantly in the following terms:“A criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is:(a)a non-citizen in Australia to whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol.” The Refugees Convention and Refugees Protocol are defined respectively under s 5 of the Act as the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees done at Geneva on 28 July 1951, and the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees done at New York on 31 January 1967. The effect of s 36(2) is to require that an asylum-seeker’s application for a protection visa is determined by reference to the definition of ‘refugee’ contained in Article 1A(2) of the Convention, as set out above at par [4] of these reasons. It was submitted by counsel for the applicant that the “Commonwealth, having ratified the Convention in a manner which did not contain any reservations with respect to Article 1A ... has chosen to implement it’s [sic] obligations under international law by specific incorporation of the Convention. In doing so it has … enlivened its powers pursuant to the ‘External affairs’ head of power under s 51(xxix) of the Constitution”. Presumably by that submission it is meant that the Convention was ratified by the Commonwealth Executive, and by enacting the Act in a manner incorporating in s 36(2) a definition in the Convention, the Legislature exercised its power under s 51(xxix) of the Constitution. That submission does not expressly go so far as to assert that the Commonwealth Parliament “chose” the external affairs power as the source of power for the enactment of the protection visa provisions of the Act. Nonetheless, it is submitted that it is as a consequence of the Legislature’s “choice” to implement its obligations under the Convention by incorporation of certain provisions in the Convention, particularly in s 36(2) of the Act, that the only source of power for so doing is the external affairs power – that power being said to be the sole power in the exercise of which the Commonwealth may incorporate the terms of a Convention into domestic law by specific reference. It followed, according to the applicant, that the protection visa provisions of the Act have the sole character laws with respect to that limited aspect of external affairs pertaining to the implementation of international obligations into domestic law. As a consequence, the argument runs, the Act could not be properly characterised as a law with respect to any alternative head of power, such as the power to enact laws with respect to naturalisation and aliens pursuant to s 51(xix) or with respect to immigration pursuant to s 51(xxvii) of the Constitution. It is also argued that neither of those heads of power can support those provisions in any event. The final step in the argument is that s 91R(3) of the Act is in fact not a valid exercise of the external affairs power under s 51(xxix) of the Constitution, the only source of power available to support a provision dealing with protection visas for refugees as defined in the Convention.