Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Farahanipour

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Farahanipour
[2001] FCA 82

MIGRATION – definition of “refugee” – refugee sur place – whether fear well-founded when sole ground for apprehension based on self-generated conduct in country of residence  – conflicting Full Court decisions – one decision favouring constructional approach implying good faith condition – later decision to the contrary – whether primary judge in error in following most recent Full Court decision

WORDS AND PHRASES – meaning of word “pretext”

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 476(1)(e)

1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Art.1A and Protocol
UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status (1979)
New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary
The Macquarie Dictionary
A Grahl-Madsen, The Status of Refugees and International Law (1966), Vol 1
Cambridge International Documents Series, Vol 7

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Mohammed (2000) 98 FCR 405, followed

Somaghi v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1991) 31 FCR 100, distinguished

Heshmati v The Minister for Immigration, Local Government & Ethnic Affairs
(Federal Court of Australia, Lockhart J, 22 November 1990, unreported), referred to

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Prathapan (1998) 86 FCR 95, applied

Australian Securities Commission v Marlborough Gold Mines Ltd (1993) 177 CLR 485, applied

Qantas Airways Ltd v Cornwall (1998) 84 FCR 483, applied

Bank of Western Australia v Commissioner of Taxation (1994) 55 FCR 233, applied

Danian v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2000] Imm A.R 96, followed
Bastanipourv Immigration & Naturalization Service (1992) 980 F 2d 1129, referred to
Secretary of State for the Home Department v Ahmed [2000] 1 NLW 1, referred to

Wang v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (unreported [2000] FCA 1599), referred to

Omar v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1430, followed
Iftikhar Ahmed v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2000] 1 NLR 1, referred to

Mohammed v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [1999] 56 ALD 210, referred to

Somaghi v Minister of Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (22 November 1990, unreported), referred to

Re HB Refugee Appeal 2254/94, referred to

Batcheller v Batcheller [1945] Ch 169, referred to
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Ibrahim [2000] HCA 55, followed

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS v GHOLAMREZA FARAHANIPOUR and MOJGAN GHASEMPOUR
W 85 of 2000

RYAN, TAMBERLIN and R D NICHOLSON JJ
16 FEBRUARY 2001
PERTH

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

W 85 of 2000

ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Appellant

AND:

GHOLAMREZA FARAHANIPOUR
First Respondent

MOJGAN GHASEMPOUR
Second Respondent

JUDGES:

RYAN, TAMBERLIN and R D NICHOLSON JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

16 FEBRUARY 2001

WHERE MADE:

PERTH

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the respondents’ costs of appeal, such costs to be taxed in default…

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Details
Case
[2001] FCA 82
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Farahanipour, the appellant sought to review a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) which had directed the reconsideration of a refusal to grant a protection visa to the respondents. The respondents, who were Iranian nationals, had claimed that they were refugees due to a well-founded fear of persecution if returned to Iran, based on their anti-government political views. The central issue for the court was whether the fear of persecution claimed by the respondents was genuinely well-founded, despite the artificial means by which the circumstances giving rise to this fear were engineered. The court also had to consider whether the term “well-founded” in the Convention definition of a refugee could be interpreted to imply that the fear must not be based on fraudulent or bad-faith actions by the applicant.

The court held that the term “well-founded” should be interpreted in its ordinary English sense, implying that the fear must have a credible basis in fact, but not necessarily excluding fears arising from actions that are fraudulent or in bad faith. The court found that the first respondent was genuinely motivated by a fear of persecution due to his anti-government activities in Iran, even though he had manufactured some of the circumstances to create this fear. The court concluded that the primary judge was correct in following the majority decision in Mohammed, which interpreted the Convention similarly, and therefore dismissed the appeal. The court found no basis to impose a secondary moral connotation on the term “well-founded” that would exclude fears arising from fraudulent actions by the applicant.

The court ordered that the appeal be dismissed and that the appellant pay the respondents’ costs of the appeal. The costs were to be taxed if the parties could not agree on the amount.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the respondents’ costs of appeal, such costs to be taxed in default of agreement

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

It would be unhelpful, given the present state of the authorities, to propose yet another gloss on the word “pretext” or to attempt to apply the elusive concept of “fraud” in this context. There is a clear finding that, in procuring the publication of the “Arash” article, the first respondent was actuated solely by the purpose of creating or reinforcing a fear of persecution were he to return to Iran. Such a fear may be no less genuine despite the artifice by which the circumstances which gave rise to it have been engineered. The epithet attached by the Convention to the requisite fear of being persecuted is “well-founded”. As a matter of ordinary English usage, that connotes only that the fear have a sound or credible basis in fact. I am unable, without some process of implication, to accord the expression a secondary, moral, connotation to the effect that the fear have a basis in facts not tainted by fraud or bad faith on the part of the applicant. Nor, as I understand it, do the corresponding words “avèc raison d’etre” in the equally authoritative French version of the Convention support a secondary connotation of that kind. Conclusion For reasons which I have endeavoured to explain, and principally by reference to the trend of authorities in several jurisdictions concerned to interpret the same Article of an international Convention, I consider that the learned primary Judge was correct in regarding himself as bound to follow the majority in Mohammed. I would therefore dismiss the appeal with costs. This is an appeal from a decision of Carr J who dismissed an application by the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (“the Minister”) for review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the RRT”). The RRT had remitted the matter for reconsideration by a Ministerial delegate with a direction that the respondents were persons to whom Australia owed protection obligations. A Ministerial delegate had previously decided to refuse to grant a protection visa to the respondents. The term “refugee” is defined in Art 1A of the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the subsequent Protocol as any person who:“Owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality or membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.” The first respondent claimed before the RRT that he was a refugee because he had a well-founded fear that if returned to Iran there was a real chance that he would be persecuted by reason of his anti-government political views as perceived by the Iranian authorities. His claim was partly based on his alleged anti-government conduct and expression of political opinion whilst in Iran. The RRT concluded that the applicant was not a credible witness and rejected his evidence as to these activities on the basis of inconsistencies and discrepancies in his case as indicated in the material and statements placed before it, including country information.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established