SZJGV v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZJGV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCAFC 105

MIGRATION – effect of s 91R(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) – s 91R(3) of the Act can only sensibly be applied once preliminary findings of fact have been made – as the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) was not satisfied the applicant’s conduct in Australia satisfied s 91R(3)(b) of the Act, s 91R(3) required the Tribunal to disregard the applicant’s conduct in Australia – the Tribunal breached s 91R(3) of the Act and therefore committed a jurisdictional error

WORDS & PHRASES – “disregard any conduct engaged in by the person in Australia”

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 91R(3)

SZHAY v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 199 FLR 148 cited
SZIBK v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2006] FMCA 1167 cited
SZGDA v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FMCA 1152 cited
SZHFE v Minister for Immigration and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) [2006] FCA 648 cited
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Mohammed (2000) 98 FCR 405 cited
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Farahanipour (2001) 105 FCR 277 cited

SZJGV v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP and REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

NSD 955 OF 2007

SZJXO v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP and REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
NSD 1424 OF 2007

SZKBK v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP and REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
NSD 1520 OF 2007

SPENDER, EDMONDS AND TRACEY JJ
19 JUNE 2008
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 955 OF 2007

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

SZJGV
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGES:

SPENDER, EDMONDS AND TRACEY JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

19 JUNE 2008

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be allowed.

2.The orders of the Federal Magistrates Court made on 15 May 2007 be set aside.

3.The application for review of the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal be allowed with costs.

4.The matter be remitted to the Refugee Review Tribunal, differently constituted, to be heard and determined according to law.

5.The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 1424 OF 2007

APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL AND ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

SZJXO
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGES:

SPENDER, EDMONDS, TRACEY JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

19 JUNE 2008

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for leave to appeal be granted.

2.The appeal be allowed.

3.The orders of the Federal Magistrates Court made on 2 July 2007 be set aside.

4.The application for review of the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal be allowed with costs.

5.The matter be remitted to…

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Details
Case
[2008] FCAFC 105
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeals before the court involved three Chinese nationals, SZJGV, SZJXO, and another whose identity is not specified, challenging the decisions of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) to deny their applications for protection visas. Each appellant argued that the RRT had erred in considering their conduct in Australia when determining their eligibility for refugee status, contrary to section 91R(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). This section stipulates that conduct in Australia must be disregarded in assessing an applicant's well-founded fear of persecution unless the applicant proves the conduct was not intended to strengthen their refugee claim. The Minister for Immigration & Citizenship contended that section 91R(3) does not prohibit the RRT from considering conduct in Australia for fact-finding purposes but limits its use in determining refugee status if the conduct was not for strengthening the refugee claim.

The court was tasked with interpreting section 91R(3) to determine whether the RRT's consideration of the appellants' conduct in Australia was permissible. Specifically, the court needed to ascertain if the RRT could take into account such conduct at all when making decisions about the appellants' refugee status, or if there were circumstances under which it could do so. The resolution of these issues hinged on a precise understanding of the scope and application of section 91R(3).

The court held that section 91R(3) does not preclude the RRT from considering conduct in Australia for fact-finding purposes. However, once facts have been established, including any conduct in Australia, the RRT must adhere to section 91R(3) and disregard such conduct in determining whether an applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution, unless the conduct was engaged in for purposes other than strengthening the refugee claim. The court noted that the appellants' interpretation of section 91R(3) could lead to absurd outcomes, and thus rejected their submissions. The court also considered extrinsic materials, such as the Second Reading Speech and Explanatory Memorandum, which indicated that section 91R(3) was intended to reverse certain judicial decisions that allowed refugee status to be granted based on conduct in Australia intended to render the applicant a refugee sur place.

Consequently, the court allowed the appeals, set aside the orders of the Federal Magistrates Court, allowed the applications for review of the RRT decisions, and remitted the matters to the RRT for re-hearing. The Minister was ordered to pay the appellants' costs of the appeals and applications for leave to appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The orders of the Federal Magistrates Court made on 15 May 2007 be set aside.

3. The application for review of the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal be allowed with costs.

4. The matter be remitted to the Refugee Review Tribunal, differently constituted, to be heard and determined according to law.

5. The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.

1. The application for leave to appeal be granted.

2. The appeal be allowed.

3. The orders of the Federal Magistrates Court made on 2 July 2007 be set aside.

4. The application for review of the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal be allowed with costs.

5. The matter be remitted to the Refugee Review Tribunal, differently constituted, to be heard and determined according to law.

6. The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the application for leave to appeal and of the appeal.

1. The appeal be allowed

2. The orders of the Federal Magistrates Court made on 16 July 2007 be set aside.

3. The application for review of the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal be allowed with costs.

4. The matter be remitted to the Refugee Review Tribunal, differently constituted, to be heard and determined according to law.

5. The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

As amended, the notices of appeal each raised the same construction point. The ground had not been relied on in argument in any of the cases in the Federal Magistrates Court. The Federal Magistrates had, however, held that they could not identify any jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal. The complaint was that the Tribunal had erred by having regard to the conduct of the appellants in Australia when determining their applications for protection visas. In so doing, the appellants contended, the Tribunal failed to comply with the stipulation, made in s 91R(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”), that such conduct must be disregarded. Section 91R(3) provides:“For the purposes of an application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person:(a)in determining whether the person has a well-founded fear of being persecuted for one or more of the reasons mentioned in Article 1A(2) of the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol;disregard any conduct engaged in by the person in Australia unless:(b)the person satisfies the Minister that the person engaged in the conduct otherwise than for the purpose of strengthening the person’s claim to be a refugee within the meaning of the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol.”The appellants contend that s 91R(3) of the Act prevents the Tribunal from having regard to an applicant’s conduct in Australia for any purposes, unless the applicant satisfies the Tribunal (which none of the appellants in the present appeals did) that the conduct was engaged in otherwise than for the purposes of strengthening the applicant’s claims to be a refugee. The Minister contends that s 91R(3) of the Act does not prevent the Tribunal having regard to conduct in Australia for the purpose of fact finding. He accepts that, once facts have been found, however, s 91R(3) precludes the use of findings concerning an applicant’s conduct in Australia to determine whether the applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution by reason of that conduct, unless the Tribunal is satisfied that the conduct was engaged in otherwise than for the purpose of strengthening his or her claims to be a refugee.THE FACTSSZJGV SZJGV is a Chinese national. He arrived in Australia on 25 January 2006. He applied for a protection visa on 2 February 2006. A delegate of the Minister refused the application on 9 March 2006. He appealed to the Tribunal. He claimed to be a refugee by reason of a fear of persecution on the ground of his political opinion and membership of a particular social group. He claimed to be a Falun Gong practitioner, who, for that reason, had been persecuted by authorities in China. At the hearing, the Tribunal questioned the appellant about his knowledge of Falun Gong exercises and the principles which underpin those exercises. It was not satisfied that he had exhibited the degree of familiarity with these matters which a Falun Gong practitioner would have been able to demonstrate. The Tribunal referred to evidence from an instructor which suggested that the appellant had been taught Falun Gong while in Australia. It concluded that: “[t]he evidence clearly points to the fact that the [appellant] attempted to join practise sites and was taught how to perform some of the exercises in Australia only recently.” It continued:“The [appellant’s] conduct and his evidence at the hearing leads the Tribunal to find that he was not a Falun Gong practitioner in China since 1997 as he claimed and that his interest in Falun Gong is a recent invention designed to assist him in his endeavour to remain in this country by strengthening his claims against a protection visa application.”It was at this point in the Tribunal’s reasons that it dealt with s 91R(3) of the Act and determined that it should disregard the appellant’s Falun Gong related activities in Australia. The Tribunal found that “the [appellant’s] Falun Gong related activities in Australia are sur place claims and are subject to s 91R(3) of the Act.” It therefore determined that it would disregard SZJGV’s “Falun Gong related activities in Australia.” The reasons continued:“As the Tribunal rejected the [appellant’s] claim that he was a Falun Gong practitioner in China, the Tribunal does not accept that he participated in or conducted sit-ins, or was questioned, interrogated or harassed by the authorities. In reaching this conclusion, the Tribunal has had regard to the following additional reasons:First …Second …Third, the totality of the [appellant’s] oral evidence shows a propensity to exaggerate and tailor his evidence in a manner which achieves his own purpose. In reaching this view the Tribunal has had regard to his lack of knowledge about Falun Gong, his recent attempts to construct a profile of a Falun Gong practitioner for himself and the contradictions, inconsistencies and the gradual shifts in his evidence regarding his protest activity in China. In view of the [appellant’s] overall credibility, the Tribunal does not accept that he was engaged in any form of protest or lone sit-in and he [sic] Tribunal does not accept that he has suffered any harm amounting to persecution in China for that reason or for the reason of his Falun Gong activities.In sum, the Tribunal considers that the [appellant’s] account of his activities in China lacks credibility. The Tribunal does not accept that the applicant practised Falun Gong in China and the Tribunal does not accept that he was of any interest to the Chinese authorities for this reason. The Tribunal disregards the [appellant’s] Falun Gong related activities in Australia. The Tribunal does not accept that he participated in or staged any form of protest activity in China. The Tribunal does not accept that he has suffered any harm amounting to persecution in China for the reason of his Falun Gong or protest activities in China. The Tribunal does not accept that the [appellant] is of any adverse interest to the Chinese authorities [for] Falun Gong related reasons or for having participated in or staged protest activities linked directly or indirectly to Falun Gong. The Tribunal is satisfied that the [appellant] does not have a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason. He is not a refugee.” (Emphasis added)SZJXO

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

SPENDER, EDMONDS AND TRACEY JJ

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: SPENDER, EDMONDS AND TRACEY JJ

Given the possible absurdity which would arise were the appellants’ construction to be accepted, counsel for the Minister argued that these were appropriate cases in which the Court should be guided by the extrinsic materials in order to establish the true meaning of the provision. Reference was made to the Second Reading Speech and the Explanatory Memorandum which are quoted above at [8] and [9]. These materials, it was submitted, established that s 91R(3) was introduced into the Act to reverse the effect of decisions such as Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Mohammed (2000) 98 FCR 405 and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Farahanipour (2001) 105 FCR 277 which held that a person could be found to be a refugee by reason of conduct in Australia which was engaged in with the intention of rendering the person a refugee sur place.CONSIDERATION In each of the cases under consideration the appellant complains that the Tribunal had regard to evidence, adduced by the appellant, concerning the appellant’s conduct in Australia when determining that the appellant was not a refugee. The evidence was taken into account to the disadvantage of the appellant, despite the Tribunal not being satisfied that the conduct had been engaged in otherwise than for the purpose of enhancing the appellants’ claim to be a refugee. We accept the Minister’s submission that s 91R(3) can only, sensibly, be applied once primary findings of fact have been made. If, for example, an applicant claims to have engaged in conduct in Australia which causes him or her to fear persecution if returned to his or her country of origin, the Tribunal must decide whether or not that conduct has occurred. If it has not occurred then there will be nothing to disregard; nor will the occasion arise to determine whether or not paragraph (b) may have application. If it has occurred then consideration must be given to the requirements of s 91R(3). We do not understand the appellants to contend otherwise. Their submissions do, however, overreach when they assert that, if an applicant seeks to rely on his or her conduct in Australia and the Tribunal accepts that such conduct has occurred, the conduct cannot be taken into account “at all” in deciding the application. As the Minister points out, the lodging of an application for a protection visa in which particular claims are made is a relevant matter which is properly to be brought into account. Once, however, the adjudication process has commenced and primary facts have been found which include conduct engaged in by the applicant in Australia, then s 91R(3) is engaged. Once engaged, s 91R(3) precludes the decision maker from having regard to “any conduct” engaged in by the applicant in Australia unless the decision maker is satisfied that the conduct was engaged in for purposes other than strengthening the applicant’s claim to be a refugee. Inaction can constitute conduct within the meaning of s 91R(3).