SZQXV v Minister for Immigration - [2012] FMCA 389

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZQXV v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR

[2012] FMCA 389

MIGRATION – Review of decision of Refugee Review Tribunal – Tribunal as arbiter of religious faith – consideration of the applicant’s conduct in Australia – findings on credibility – no jurisdictional error – application dismissed.

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.91R, 422B, 424A, 425, 425A, 426, 426A, 441A, 441C, 476
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), r.4.35D

Plaintiff S15 /2002 v The Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476
NAOA v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 241
SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] HCA 63; (2006) 228 CLR 152; (2006) 231 ALR 592
Minister for Immigration v Jia Legeng [2001] HCA 17; (2001) 205 CLR 507
SBBS v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 361; (2002) 194 ALR 749
VFAB v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 872; (2003) 131 FCR 102
Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte H [2001] HCA 28; (2001) 179 ALR 425
NAHI v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10
WALT v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2007] FCAFC 2
SBCC v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCAFC 129
SZQTB v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2012] FMCA 32
SZOPF v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2010] FMCA 924
WAEE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184
NABE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (No.2) [2004] FCAFC 263; (2004) 144 FCR 1
SZJGV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCAFC 105
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; (1996) 185 CLR 259
Re Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham [2000] HCA 1
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZLSP [2010] FCAFC 108; (2010) 187 FCR 362; (2010) 272 ALR 115
Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin [1990] HCA 21; (1990) 170 CLR 1; (1990) 93 ALR 1
Kioa v West [1985] HCA 81; (1985) 159 CLR 550; (1985) 62 ALR 321
Commissioner for Australian Capital Territory Revenue v Alphaone Pty Ltd [1994] FCA 1074; (1994) 49 FCR 576
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Miah [2001] HCA 22; (2001) 206 CLR 57; (2001) 179 ALR 238
Saeed v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] HCA 23
SZBYR v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2007] HCA 26; (2007) 235 ALR 609

Applicant:

SZQXV

First Respondent:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP

Second Respondent:

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

File Number:

SYG 2791 of 2011

Judgment of:

Nicholls FM

Hearing dates:

3 and 11 May 2012

Date of Last Submission:

11 May 2012

Delivered at:

Sydney

Delivered on:

18 May 2012

REPRESENTATION

The Applicant:

In Person

Appearing for the Respondents:

Mr O Jones

Solicitors for the Respondents:

Clayton Utz

ORDERS

The application made on 7 December 2011 is dismissed.
The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs set in the amount of $6,240.00.

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

SYG 2791 of 2011

SZQXV

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP

First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

This is an application made on 7 December 2011, pursuant to s.476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”), seeking review of the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”), made on 10 November 2011, which affirmed the decision of a delegate of the first respondent to refuse a protection visa to the applicant.

Background

The applicant is a national of the People’s Republic of China (“China”). She arrived in Australia on 18 April 2011 and applied for a protection visa on 18 July 2011 (Court Book – “CB” – CB 2 to CB 26). She was assisted in her application by a migration agent (CB 1 and CB 27 to CB 29).
On 20 July 2011 the applicant’s representative provided to the Tribunal a statement in which the applicant set out her claims to be a refugee (CB 37 to CB 41). In essence this was that she feared persecutory harm on the basis of her Christian religion.
The applicant claimed that she and her husband, whom she met in 1995, were committed Christians. It appears that in October 2000 she and her husband were arrested while participating in church activities. Given the applicant’s general statements about the attitude of the Chinese authorities, this appeared to be a “local” or unregistered church. They were detained and beaten. Her husband was only released after she paid a “bond”.
They attempted to complain, but the applicant and her husband discovered that the “deputy captain” at the police station was a relative of a local government official who had wanted to acquire their successful pharmaceutical factory at a low price. Their refusal of his purchase offer angered him and he had threatened to kill her husband. While they pressed their complaints further, their factory was closed down because of their involvement with illegal gatherings and their religious beliefs.
Her husband was attacked by several men as they walked out of a restaurant. She believed they drove away in a government vehicle. Her husband was severely injured and hospitalised. Her anger drove her to make more complaints to government authorities. This “irritated” government officials and she and her husband were treated as criminals and, ultimately, made homeless. Her husband died in January 2001 as a result of injuries arising from the beatings and long term depression.
In November 2010, having “fully recovered” from schizophrenia, she was again arrested by police while praying at home with “sisters” from her church. She was detained and beaten. She sought protection in Australia.
The applicant engaged different migration agents on 4 August 2011 (CB 47 to CB 49). Those agents sent a further statement from the applicant, setting out her claims, to the Minister’s department (CB 57 to CB 61).
That statement provided that the local church, to which she adhered, was Catholic (in context the “non-official” Catholic Church in China). It emphasised that when arrested in October 2000, with others, only she and her husband were detained.
In setting out her claims as they were said to have appeared in her Departmental file, the delegate made reference to the applicant having claimed that at Christmas 2000 she was sexually assaulted by several unknown men (CB 73.7). This does not appear in either of the applicant’s two written statements, both of which are in evidence before the Court in the Court Book.

The Delegate

The applicant was interviewed by the Minister’s delegate on 17 August 2011 (CB 80). It must be said that the reasoning adopted by the delegate was difficult to follow. At best it can be ascertained that the delegate found her account of events in 2000 to 2001 to be “coherent and plausible”, but that these events were not related to her “current claims of persecution” (CB 81). No reason is given for this finding.
The delegate accepted the applicant was a Christian, a member of the local Catholic community since birth, and that she had attended meetings of underground Catholic groups in China. The delegate came to this conclusion after asking “several questions about Christian and, in particular, Catholic faith …” (CB 81).
However the delegate found the applicant’s “testimony” in regard to the events of November 2010 to be inconsistent, and that she may have embellished this account (CB 81)
The delegate’s decision turned on the finding that the applicant did not have the type of profile that would attract the attention of the authorities. Further, that she had remained in China for months after these claimed events occurred and was able to leave China in a way that suggested she was not of interest to the authorities (CB 82).

The Tribunal

The applicant applied for review to the Tribunal on 6 September 2011 (CB 85 to CB 89). She was invited to, and attended, a hearing before the Tribunal on 26 October 2011 (CB 96 and CB 164). The Tribunal’s account of what occurred is set out in its decision record ([22] at CB 173 to [69] at CB 184).
The Tribunal found that the applicant had never been a Catholic in China and that she had never engaged in underground Catholic religious practice as she had claimed ([88] at CB 190).
The reasons for this were that the Tribunal found a number of inconsistencies in the applicant’s different accounts of her claims and that some of her evidence was implausible. These inconsistencies included differences as to what she was asked to do by police, her place of claimed detention, her delay in leaving China, and the delay in applying for protection in Australia.
The Tribunal found that she had made false claims about her religion and its practice and, given the inconsistencies and implausabilities in her evidence, was not a credible witness ([87] at CB 189).
The Tribunal relied on a number of matters, including the deficiencies in her evidence about Catholic practice and beliefs, to find that the applicant lacked even a basic knowledge of Catholicism when compared with her claim to have been a practicing Catholic for many years (see in particular [88] at CB 190 and [94] at CB 191).
This led the Tribunal to form the view that the applicant’s knowledge of Christianity, such as it was, was recently learned by her for the purpose of strengthening her refugee claims. The Tribunal rejected her factual account of having been detained and assaulted by police in 2000 and 2010 ([94] – [95] at CB 191).
The Tribunal also considered a letter from Father McGee, of St Dominic’s Catholic Church in Sydney, which stated that the applicant sought protection in Australia because of harassment and persecution in China because of her Catholic faith (see CB 154 and [100] at CB 192). The Tribunal gave little weight to Father McGee’s opinion. It gave reasons for this.
The Tribunal did accept that the applicant had attended “mass” on three occasions at Father McGee’s church, and that she attended “mass” regularly while in the Villawood Immigration Detention Facility (“VIDF”) (she had been located and detained by immigration authorities prior to her making the application for a protection visa) ([102] at CB 192). The Tribunal disregarded this conduct pursuant to s.91R(3) of the Act, given its finding that this conduct was not engaged in other than for the purpose of strengthening her refugee claims ([102] at CB 192).
The Tribunal found that, as it did not accept the applicant’s claims to be a genuine Catholic, or relevant past claimed events, she would therefore not join an underground church if she returned to China in the foreseeable future. Therefore she would not face a real chance of persecution in China for the reason claimed ([107] at CB 193).
The Tribunal also addressed the contention raised in the written submissions by the applicant’s representative that her chances of persecution would be increased on return because she had applied for protection in Australia ([106] at CB 193). The Tribunal found that the authorities in China would not necessarily find out, but that in any event her application, given she did not have a high political profile, would be seen as an attempt to remain in Australia rather than as political disloyalty. It relied on Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (“DFAT”) advice in this regard.

Application to the Court

The application to the Court is in the following bare terms:
“1. The Tribunal made a Jurisdictional error by incorrectly considering my practice of my religion in Australia.
2. R.R.T member rejects my true story as fabrication.
3. Denial of natural justice I am not agree the decision which from the R.R.T”

Before the Court

The final hearing of this matter was initially scheduled for 3 May 2012. While the applicant was brought to the Court from the VIDF, it was clear she was unwell. In these circumstances, the hearing was adjourned to 11 May 2012.
On that occasion, the applicant appeared in person and was assisted by an interpreter in the Mandarin language. Mr O Jones appeared for the first respondent.
Despite being put on notice at the first Court date as to the paucity of her grounds in revealing jurisdictional error in the Tribunal’s decision, and despite being given the opportunity to obtain legal advice from a lawyer on the panel of the Court’s “RRT Legal Advice Scheme”, nothing further was put before the Court by the applicant.
For the applicant to succeed in these proceedings the Court would, at the very least, need to discern jurisdictional error in the Tribunal’s decision (Plaintiff S15/2002 v The Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476). While the applicant appeared to understand that (with her reference to “jurisdictional error” in her application to the Court), the matters asserted in that application are not, for the most part, directed to any recognisable jurisdictional error. Further, the grounds of the application lack such particularity as to make the assertions made by them meaningless.
Before the Court however the applicant made complaints that can be broadly grouped as follows:
1)The Tribunal’s decision was “unfair”.
2)At the hearing the Tribunal member did not “look fairly” at her case and did not appear to listen to her.
3)The Tribunal’s decision was based on the member’s subjective opinion about the situation in China. In particular the Tribunal relied on an “opinion” by a “professor” about “country circumstances”.
4)The Tribunal used its “subjective opinion” to assess her Christian faith.
The complaint of unfairness is dealt with below under the heading “Ground Three”.
The applicant’s complaint about what occurred at the hearing with the Tribunal suffers from at least two difficulties.
First, the applicant has brought no evidence to the Court to support her assertions of what she said occurred at the Tribunal hearing. In these circumstances it is not open to the Court to draw any inferences simply on what the applicant says from the Bar Table (NAOA v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 241).
Second, the only relevant evidence before the Court of what occurred is the account of the hearing contained in the Tribunal’s decision record. That account does not support the applicant’s complaint, but rather reveals a long and detailed exchange with the applicant.
In my view, it is clear that the Tribunal’s attempt to put to the applicant that it was having difficulty in accepting aspects of her claims and explanations, and pointing out inconsistencies in her account (see for example [51] at CB 180 to [57] at CB 181, [59] at CB 182, [62] at CB 182 to CB 183 and [69] at CB 184) have been misunderstood as the Tribunal refusing to accept her claims and evidence, rather than a proper discharge of its procedural fairness obligation to provide the applicant with a meaningful opportunity to put and explain her case, and to know the case against her.
To the extent that the Tribunal was simply acting to expose the issues in her case pursuant to s.425 of the Act (SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] HCA 63; (2006) 228 CLR 152; (2006) 231 ALR 592 (“SZBEL”), then the Tribunal can hardly be said to have fallen into legal error.
The applicant told the Court, when the question of the lack of evidence was put to her, that she had a copy of the hearing (“CD”). She did not ask the Court to listen to any, or all, of the CD. Nor did she indicate that the CD would reveal that the Tribunal’s account was inaccurate.
The complaint that the Tribunal relied on a “subjective” opinion, that is the opinion of a “professor” which it adopted as its own view of events in China, does not indicate any assertion of jurisdictional error beyond perhaps an attempt to say that the Tribunal was biased, or that bias could reasonably be apprehended.
As to this, the relevant tests are set out and explained in a range of authorities (Minister for Immigration v Jia Legeng [2001] HCA 17; (2001) 205 CLR 507 at [69] per Gleeson CJ and Gummow J and at [127] per Kirby J, SBBS v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 361; (2002) 194 ALR 749 at [43] per Tamberlin, Mansfield and Jacobson JJ, VFAB v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 872; (2003) 131 FCR 102 and Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte H [2001] HCA 28; (2001) 179 ALR 425).
As is made clear by the authorities, given the serious nature of such charges, going as they do to the Tribunal member’s integrity, such complaints must be distinctly made and clearly proven (Jia Legeng at [127] per Kirby J). Neither is available to the applicant in the current circumstances on the evidence presented.
As to the complaints about the professor’s report, which assessed country information about China, in the circumstance this could only be a reference to the Tribunal’s reference at the hearing to a report from Dr Richard Madsen, a professor of Sociology at the University of California, at San Diego (see [30] at CB 175 and [74] – [77] at CB 185).
The Tribunal was entitled to rely on that report, as indeed it was open to it to have regard to other country information available to it. The choice, weight and assessment of such information is for the Tribunal (NAHI v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10). The applicant was clearly put on notice of this information and given the opportunity to respond. No jurisdictional error is revealed.
The applicant’s fourth complaint, about the assessment of her religious faith, is dealt with below under the headings “Ground One” and, in particular, “Ground Two”. As a preliminary matter however, I did raise with Mr Jones at the hearing that the Tribunal’s account of the hearing did have the hallmarks of an approach to its task which could give rise to a concern that it had set itself up as the “arbiter” of religious doctrine (WALT v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2007] FCAFC 2 at [29] per Mansfield, Jacobson and Siopis JJ and SBCC v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCAFC 129 at [45] per French, Lander and Besanko JJ).
I have described this before as the “pub quiz” approach, where matters of religious faith appear to be approached with a predetermined list of questions (for example, recite all of the “rosary” ([35] at CB 176), what significant Christian event occurs in August ([42] at CB 177), name the sacraments ([45] at CB 178), and the like), rather than an analysis of an applicant’s expression of their faith (SZQTB v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2012] FMCA 32 at [ 72] to [98] and SZOPF v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2010] FMCA 924 at [38] to [46]).
I also raised at the hearing the reference in the delegate’s report to the applicant having made a claim that she had been sexually assaulted in China by “unknown men” (see [10] above).
The Tribunal’s otherwise extensive decision record makes no reference to any such claim. It is the case that a failure to deal with a claim, or an aspect of a claim, expressly made or clearly arising from the circumstances presented may lead to jurisdictional error (Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184 and NABE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (No.2) [2004] FCAFC 263; (2004) 144 FCR 1). It is not clear whether, if made by the applicant, such a statement constitutes a claim or an aspect of a claim, or a piece of evidence in support of her claims to have been seriously harmed in the past.
The reference in the delegate’s long list (at CB 73 to CB 74) is the only reference to this matter in the evidence before the Court. Neither of the applicants’s written statements to the delegate made any reference to it whatsoever. Nor is there any mention of it in those parts of the delegate’s references to the interview.

Importantly, there is nothing in the Tribunal’s account of the hearing (the only account before the Court) to say that the applicant pressed or raised any such incident. Nor, equally importantly, did the applicant make any complaint to the Court that the Tribunal overlooked or ignored this matter.
In all the circumstances, I take the view that this was some mistaken reference by the delegate in his decision record. In all the circumstances, I do not find that the Tribunal overlooked any such aspect of the applicant’s claims.

Ground One

Ground one asserts jurisdictional error on the basis that the Tribunal “incorrectly” considered the applicant’s practice of religion in Australia. While it is not clear, it may be that, in the circumstances, the applicant seeks to complain about the Tribunal disregarding her Catholic Christian related activities in Australia.
As the Minister submits, that complaint is misconceived. The Tribunal did consider her claim to have practiced religion in Australia, both at St. Dominics Catholic Church and in the VIDF (see at [100] – [102] at CB 192). The Tribunal properly considered this aspect of the applicant’s claims as being a part of her wider claim to have been a practising Catholic in China and to have continued that practice after arrival in Australia.
The Tribunal’s acceptance that she had attended mass at St. Dominics Catholic Church was based on the applicant’s own evidence, as supported by the letter from Father McGee. As was its acceptance that she regularly attended mass at the VIDF ([101] at CB 192).
It should be noted that what the Tribunal did not accept from Father McGee, and gave little weight to, was his “opinion” that she had been harassed in China and would be persecuted on return ([106] at CB 192). This was reasonably open to the Tribunal on what was before it. It reasoned that his opinion was unsupported by any other evidence. The probative basis for this finding was also derived from its assessment of her claimed religious practice in China.
While the Tribunal found that the applicant had engaged in this conduct, it was not satisfied that it was done other than for the purpose of strengthening her refugee claims. This again was reasonably open to the Tribunal on what was before it. That the Tribunal was in part relying on other reasoning as to the credibility of her claims to be a practicing Catholic in China, which it rejected, does not offend the proper operation of s.91R(3) of the Act as explained by the High Court in SZJGV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCAFC 105.
Ground one does not reveal jurisdictional error.

Ground Two

In ground two the applicant complains that the Tribunal rejected her “true story” as a fabrication.
This complaint, without anything further from the applicant, does not rise above a challenge to the facts as found by the Tribunal. It merely invites the Court to engage in impermissible merits review (Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; (1996) 185 CLR 259).
As set out above, the Tribunal’s finding as to the lack of credibility of the applicant’s claim to have been a practising Catholic in China was based on its analysis of the applicant’s own evidence, its findings of inconsistencies and implausibilities in that evidence, drawing on available and relevant country information, and the applicant’s basic knowledge of Catholic practice. In all, that analysis, and the subsequent findings, were an exercise within jurisdiction (Re Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham [2000] HCA 1). (See also further below.)
As referred to above, this decision record did exhibit some hallmarks of what I have described as the “pop quiz” approach to ascertaining religious faith. Given the reliance of such an approach on some perceived authoritative text as the arbiter of religious faith, this may cause the decision maker to cross the line between applying an “arbitrary standard” of knowledge of religious doctrine and concluding, after exploring the matter, that a particular applicant’s lack of knowledge indicates that the applicant is not a genuine adherent of a religion. The first operates from the premise that all believers will have certain specific knowledge, while the second does not involve any preconception as to what knowledge all believers will demonstrate (Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZLSP [2010] FCAFC 108; (2010) 187 FCR 362; (2010) 272 ALR 115 at [37] per Kenny J).
I am satisfied, on balance, and on at least a fair reading of the Tribunal’s account of the hearing and subsequent analysis, that the Tribunal did not cross the line into jurisdictional error. I am satisfied, on balance, that the Tribunal’s approach was not necessarily what a Catholic should know, but that the applicant’s demonstrated knowledge was not commensurate with what would be expected from a Catholic Christian practitioner of the applicant’s claimed experience.

Ground Three

Ground three asserts a denial of natural justice. I should note that the applicant’s stated disagreement with the Tribunal’s decision does not, either at common law or with regard to the relevant statute, constitute a basis for asserting a denial of natural justice.
In the absence of any particularity whatsoever, it is difficult to see the exact nature of the complaint. If this is an assertion that the Tribunal’s decision was unfair then the obligation on the Tribunal is to provide a fair process, not a “fair” outcome (Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin [1990] HCA 21; (1990) 170 CLR 1; (1990) 93 ALR 1).
At common law the natural justice hearing rule, relevantly, requires that an applicant know the case against them and be given the opportunity to state their case and explanations (Kioa v West [1985] HCA 81; (1985) 159 CLR 550; (1985) 62 ALR 321, Commissioner for Australian Capital Territory Revenue v Alphaone Pty Ltd [1994] FCA 1074; (1994) 49 FCR 576 and Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Miah [2001] HCA 22; (2001) 206 CLR 57; (2001) 179 ALR 238).
On the material before the Court it appears that the Tribunal complied with its obligations in this regard. The applicant has not provided any evidence to challenge the Tribunal’s account of what occurred at the hearing. Based on that account, it is clear that the applicant was given the opportunity at the hearing to give her evidence, state her case and answer the case against her. In this latter regard, see in particular [32] at CB 175, [46] at CB 178, [51] at CB 180 to [55] at CB 181. Further, the applicant was represented by registered migration agents in relation to the review. They made submissions on her behalf which were considered by the Tribunal.
In relation to the relevant matters set out in Div.4 of Pt.7 of the Act, the operation of s.422B is the exhaustive statement of the natural justice hearing rule in relation to the matters it deals with (Saeed v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] HCA 23). The invitation to the hearing pursuant to s.425 of the Act complied with all the relevant statutory and regulatory requirements (ss.425, 425A, 426, the reference to ss.426A, 441A, 441C and r.4.35D of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth)). The applicant was clearly put on notice of the issues dispositive of the review (SZBEL).
Further, no breach of the obligation in s.424A(1) of the Act is evident, given that:
1)General country information relied on by the Tribunal fell within the exception in s.424A(3)(a) of the Act.
2)The applicant’s evidence and submissions, and what she generally gave the Tribunal and sent to the Minister’s department in writing in relation to her protection visa application, are caught by the exceptions in s.424A(3)(b) and (ba) of the Act respectively.
There was no obligation on the Tribunal to give to the applicant, for comment, its reasoning process, analysis or subjective appraisals of the evidence. Nor its views of the deficiencies of her evidence. None of these were “information” for the purposes of s.424A(1) of the Act (SZBYR v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2007] HCA 26; (2007) 235 ALR 609 at [17] – [18]).
To the extent that the words “natural justice” may conjure up some additional reference to bias, or apprehended bias, this complaint has been addressed above.

Conclusion

For the applicant to succeed she would need to be able to establish that the Tribunal had fallen into jurisdictional error in its decision. No such error is made out by any of the applicant’s grounds. Nor is such error otherwise apparent on the material before the Court. In the circumstances, the application should be dismissed. I will make an order accordingly.

I certify that the preceding sixty-nine (69) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Nicholls FM

Date: 18 May 2012