Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte "A"

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

KIRBY J

RE THE MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND
MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS  RESPONDENT

EX PARTE "A"  APPLICANT/PROSECUTOR

Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte "A"
[2001] HCA 77
21 December 2001
P16/2001

ORDER

1.Application refused.

2.   Applicant/prosecutor to pay second respondent's costs of and incidental to the application.

Representation:

C M Chang for the applicant/prosecutor (instructed by Verschuer Edward Solicitors)

No appearance for the first respondent

M T Ritter for the second respondent (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

  1. KIRBY J.   This is another application for an order nisi for constitutional writs and other relief in a migration matter concerning a person who claims to be entitled to a protection visa as a refugee.

    The facts

  2. The applicant, who is known by the initial "A", is a Burmese national.  A number of facts about his case are not disputed.  In 1988, he was studying at a university in Rangoon.  In September of that year he was taken into custody following his participation in widespread public demonstrations, amounting to an uprising against the military government of that country.  In his application for a protection visa, the applicant says that he was rounded up at 3 a.m., arrested and imprisoned in a specified place "where I was tortured and interrogated for 24 days"[1].  Immediately following this assertion, the applicant stated:

    "On [October] 14 I was transferred to the big Insein prison where I was given hard labour for six months.  In the prison where [sic] many young students and I suffered political discrimination, blackmail, physical torture."

    [1]Applicant quoted in the reasons of the Full Federal Court sub nom "W204/00A" v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 437 at [44].

  3. The applicant claimed that he was not charged with an offence but eventually released from prison in April 1989.  He said that he had thereafter barely spoken "about the atrocious [sic] in the prison"[2].  A medical certificate dated November 1989, issued by a doctor in Rangoon, certified that the applicant had been given treatment "due to physical and mental illness, and received treatment during the month of November, 1988".  However, the certificate recommended that the applicant proceed with his education.  The applicant did this after the Burmese universities reopened in 1990.  He claimed that he was required to sign an undertaking that he would not engage in political activity again.  He did this and stated that he did not breach that undertaking in Burma.  Later, he transferred to a university in Mandalay.  However, he returned to the university in Rangoon in 1993 and in August of that year he was awarded a degree.

    [2][2001] FCA 437 at [45].

  4. The applicant stated that, after his detention, all his movements were closely monitored by agents of the Burmese government and that he had continued to suffer discrimination, despite having long ceased engagement in political activity.

  5. The applicant…

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Details
Case
[2001] HCA 77
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an application to the High Court of Australia for constitutional writs and other relief by a Burmese national, identified as "A", who sought a protection visa. The applicant claimed to fear persecution in his home country due to his participation in political demonstrations and subsequent alleged torture and imprisonment. His application had previously been considered by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, the Refugee Review Tribunal, and the Federal Court, all of whom had made decisions adverse to him.

The legal issues before the High Court included whether an arguable breach of natural justice by the Minister's delegate was rendered irrelevant by a subsequent merits review by the Refugee Review Tribunal. The court was also required to consider whether the Tribunal had breached procedural requirements of the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth) by failing to refer to an allegation of torture, and whether natural justice was breached by the non-disclosure of country information to the applicant. Further issues involved the Tribunal's treatment of the applicant's protest activities in Australia post-arrival, and whether there was a reasonably arguable case for the grant of an order nisi. Additionally, the court considered whether the applicant was out of time for constitutional writs in the High Court's original jurisdiction, and if the delay in commencing High Court proceedings pending the conclusion of earlier proceedings was explained and reasonable.

Kirby J reasoned that while the applicant's complaints about the delegate's conduct, including alleged bias and prejudice during the interview, were noted, they did not give rise to a reasonable argument for relief. This was primarily because the delegate's decision had been superseded by the Refugee Review Tribunal's rehearing and fresh determination. The Tribunal's decision, which was the subject of the current application, was not demonstrably influenced by any unfairness in the delegate's process. Furthermore, Kirby J found that the applicant's delay in commencing High Court proceedings was explained and reasonable, and that it was arguable that any time default would be excused by the Full Court.

The application for an order nisi was refused. The applicant was ordered to pay the second respondent's costs of and incidental to the application.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Application refused.

2. Applicant/prosecutor to pay second respondent's costs of and incidental to the application.

Background

Background to the litigation

This is another application for an order nisi for constitutional writs and other relief in a migration matter concerning a person who claims to be entitled to a protection visa as a refugee.The facts The applicant, who is known by the initial "A", is a Burmese national. A number of facts about his case are not disputed. In 1988, he was studying at a university in Rangoon. In September of that year he was taken into custody following his participation in widespread public demonstrations, amounting to an uprising against the military government of that country. In his application for a protection visa, the applicant says that he was rounded up at 3 a.m., arrested and imprisoned in a specified place "where I was tortured and interrogated for 24 days"[1]. Immediately following this assertion, the applicant stated:"On [October] 14 I was transferred to the big Insein prison where I was given hard labour for six months. In the prison where [sic] many young students and I suffered political discrimination, blackmail, physical torture."[1]Applicant quoted in the reasons of the Full Federal Court sub nom "W204/00A" v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 437 at [44]. The applicant claimed that he was not charged with an offence but eventually released from prison in April 1989. He said that he had thereafter barely spoken "about the atrocious [sic] in the prison"[2]. A medical certificate dated November 1989, issued by a doctor in Rangoon, certified that the applicant had been given treatment "due to physical and mental illness, and received treatment during the month of November, 1988". However, the certificate recommended that the applicant proceed with his education. The applicant did this after the Burmese universities reopened in 1990. He claimed that he was required to sign an undertaking that he would not engage in political activity again. He did this and stated that he did not breach that undertaking in Burma. Later, he transferred to a university in Mandalay. However, he returned to the university in Rangoon in 1993 and in August of that year he was awarded a degree.[2][2001] FCA 437 at [45]. The applicant stated that, after his detention, all his movements were closely monitored by agents of the Burmese government and that he had continued to suffer discrimination, despite having long ceased engagement in political activity. The applicant left Burma in August 1994 and subsequently returned there. His last departure from Burma was in December 1996. He then came to Australia where his sister is a permanent resident. The applicant's two departures from Burma were made possible by the issue to him of a Burmese passport. The applicant suggested that this had been obtained by the payment of a very large sum of money to officials in the Burmese passport department. He claimed that in 1997, whilst in Australia, he had contacted the Burmese Embassy to have his passport extended. He was asked whether he was involved in any political activities in Australia. He wrote a letter saying that he was not involved in politics. The Burmese Embassy then extended his passport for one year[3].[3]Recorded sub nom "H" v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1605 at [9].

Decision

Reasons for decision

KIRBY J
At least in the circumstances of the present case, therefore, I consider that it is arguable that, if he were otherwise entitled to relief, a Full Court of this Court would overlook or excuse the time defaults of the applicant and exercise its discretion on that ground in the applicant's favour[15]. It follows that I reject both of the preliminary objections of the Minister.[15]Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Miah (2001) 75 ALJR 889 at 929-930 [223]-[224]; 179 ALR 238 at 294.Natural justice and the delegate's decision The first basis upon which the applicant asserted jurisdictional error concerned his complaints about the decision of the delegate. Put shortly, the applicant submitted that the delegate had exhibited actual bias against him and prejudice both in the manner in which the interview leading to the decision had been conducted and in the decision itself. In support of this argument, the applicant referred to a finding stated in the reasons of French J. There, his Honour said[16]:"The interview as it appeared from the transcript was notable for the intrusive and challenging approach taken by the delegate. Given the tone of the interview, a decision adverse to [the applicant] could confidently have been anticipated."[16][2000] FCA 1605 at [5]. The transcript of the interview before the delegate was placed before this Court. I have read it and I agree with the comment of French J. There is, of course, a fine line between a decision-maker's fairly putting to a person affected an adverse impression (so that that person may respond) and doing so in a way that indicates pre-judgment and bias[17]. The former is a proper course and may on occasion be required by the rules of fair procedure. The latter is an impermissible course. It may invalidate the administrative decision that follows.[17]Galea v Galea (1990) 19 NSWLR 263 at 279; Anderson v Judges of the District Court (NSW) (1992) 27 NSWLR 701. For a number of reasons, I do not consider that this complaint gives rise to a reasonable argument for relief in the present case. First, in these proceedings, the applicant sought and obtained review by the Tribunal of the delegate's decision. That review involved a rehearing and a determination by the Tribunal of its own decision based on the new, additional and different evidence and material that had been placed before the Tribunal. Secondly, the application for relief in this Court is directed solely to the decision of the Tribunal. It is that decision which the applicant seeks to have quashed. There is no relief directed to the decision of the delegate. Indeed, no such relief would be appropriate, given that the delegate's decision was overtaken by the decision of the Tribunal. Thirdly, although it is true that every person is entitled to a correct and validly made primary decision[18] and that, in this field of the law, primary decisions on the facts can (even unconsciously) influence what follows in the Tribunal and on judicial review, in this case I see no such unfairness in what the delegate did so as to strike fatally at the validity of the Tribunal's later decision. Apart from recording the fact of the delegate's decision as a matter of procedural history, the Tribunal does not appear to have been influenced by that decision.[18]Miah (2001) 75 ALJR 889 at 923 [190]; 179 ALR 238 at 285.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: KIRBY J

In this case, the High Court addressed several significant issues pertaining to the procedural fairness and jurisdictional correctness of decisions made by the delegate and the Refugee Review Tribunal in the context of a Burmese national's application for a protection visa. The Court began by considering the argument that any alleged breach of natural justice by the delegate was rendered irrelevant by subsequent merits review by the Tribunal. The Court noted that the applicant had sought and obtained review by the Tribunal, which involved a rehearing and an independent determination by the Tribunal based on new evidence. The Court concluded that the delegate's decision did not fatally taint the Tribunal's decision, as the Tribunal did not appear to be influenced by the delegate's decision. This reasoning reflects the principle that procedural fairness is essential but can be rectified through subsequent independent review processes.

The Court then addressed the issue of whether there was a breach of the procedural requirements of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) in the Tribunal's failure to refer to the allegation of torture. The Court found that the Tribunal's failure to explicitly address this allegation did not constitute a jurisdictional error, as the Tribunal had considered the applicant's overall circumstances and evidence. This decision aligns with the understanding that the primary focus of the Tribunal is on the applicant's credibility and the overall refugee claim, rather than on the procedural minutiae of each piece of evidence.

Further, the Court examined whether there was a breach of natural justice in the failure to disclose country information to the applicant concerning his country of nationality. The Court held that there was no such breach, as the applicant had been provided with an opportunity to make submissions on the country information and had not demonstrated how the non-disclosure prejudiced his case. This ruling emphasizes the principle that the opportunity to make submissions is often sufficient to meet the requirements of natural justice, provided the applicant is not materially prejudiced.

The Court also considered whether the Tribunal erred in its treatment of the applicant's protest activities in Australia post-arrival. The Court found no error, noting that the Tribunal's assessment of the applicant's credibility and risk of re-persecution was comprehensive and did not overlook the post-arrival activities. This reinforces the principle that the Tribunal's determination of refugee status is based on the applicant's circumstances at the time of arrival in Australia and their risk of persecution upon return.

In addressing the question of whether there was a reasonably arguable case for the grant of order nisi, the Court considered the applicant's arguments and found that the issues raised were not sufficiently compelling to warrant the issuance of constitutional writs. The Court's decision was based on the overall merits of the applicant's case and the thoroughness of the Tribunal's review.

Regarding the issue of whether the applicant was out of time for constitutional writs in the application in the original jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court found that the applicant's prompt application following the final decision of the Full Federal Court was reasonably arguable. The Court applied discretion to overlook the time defaults, recognizing the complexity of the case and the applicant's diligence in pursuing relief.

The Court also examined whether the delay in the commencement of High Court proceedings pending the conclusion of proceedings below was explained and reasonable. The Court accepted that the delay was reasonable given the procedural steps the applicant had to undertake before seeking constitutional relief. This reflects the principle that applicants should be allowed to exhaust all available avenues of review before seeking constitutional remedies.

Finally, the Court addressed the issue of whether constitutional writs are available against the Minister and the Tribunal to prohibit further proceedings upon a decision alleged to be flawed by jurisdictional error. The Court concluded that, in the circumstances of this case, such writs were not warranted, as the issues raised did not meet the threshold for constitutional relief.

In summary, the ratio decidendi of this case is that procedural fairness and jurisdictional correctness are crucial in the context of refugee visa applications, but can be rectified through subsequent independent review processes. The Court applied principles of natural justice and procedural fairness, considering the overall circumstances and evidence presented by the applicant. The Court exercised its discretion to overlook time defaults and found that the issues raised did not warrant constitutional relief. This decision underscores the importance of thorough and fair review processes in refugee visa applications.