WACB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GLEESON CJ,
McHUGH, GUMMOW, KIRBY AND HEYDON JJ

WACB  APPELLANT

AND

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL
AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS  RESPONDENT

WACB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs

[2004] HCA 50

7 October 2004
P92/2003

ORDER

1.    Appeal allowed with costs.

2.Set aside the orders of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia made on 21 August 2002 and, in place thereof, order that:

a)    the appeal to the Full Court be allowed with costs, and

b)    order 2 of the orders of French J made on 26 October 2001 be set aside.

On appeal from the Federal Court of Australia

Representation:

J L Cameron for the appellant (instructed by Freehills)

D M J Bennett QC, Solicitor-General of the Commonwealth with P R Macliver for the respondent (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

  1. GLEESON CJ, McHUGH, GUMMOW AND HEYDON JJ.   This appeal from the Full Court of the Federal Court (Whitlam, North and Stone JJ)[1] arises out of an objection to competency taken by the respondent ("the Minister") before the Federal Court.  French J upheld that objection and dismissed the application[2].  The Full Court agreed.  The objection[3] was that the appellant's application for judicial review of a decision by the Refugee Review Tribunal ("the RRT") had been lodged out of time.  At first instance, in the Full Court, and in this Court, the appellant's case has been presented by counsel appearing pro bono.  As will become readily apparent, without that assistance the appellant would have lacked any means effectively to utilise his access to the exercise of the judicial power of the Commonwealth.  The legal issues are of a highly technical nature.

    [2](2001) 113 FCR 524.

    [3]Taken pursuant to O 54B r 3 of the Federal Court Rules ("the Rules") made under the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).

  2. Of central importance is the construction of s 478 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ("the Act") as it stood before the commencement of the Migration Legislation Amendment (Judicial Review) Act 2001 (Cth) (the privative clause amendment), but after the commencement of the Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No 1) 1998 (Cth) ("the 1998 Act"). The importance of the changes introduced by the 1998 Act will become apparent later in these reasons. At the relevant time, Pt 8 of the Act, headed "Review of decisions by Federal Court", included s 478 which stated:

    "(1)An application under section 476 or 477 must:

    (a)be made in such manner as is specified in the Rules of Court made under the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976; and

    (b)be lodged with the Registry of the Federal Court within 28 days of the applicant being notified of the decision.

    (2)The Federal Court must not make an order allowing, or which…

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Details
Case
[2004] HCA 50
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal by WACB, an illiterate and unaccompanied minor in immigration detention, against a decision of the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs. The dispute concerned whether WACB had lodged his application for review of a Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) decision within the 28-day time limit prescribed by section 478(1)(b) of the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth). The core of the issue was the interpretation of "notified of the decision" within that section, particularly whether merely being informed of the outcome of the RRT's decision was sufficient notification, or if the provision of the written statement of reasons was a prerequisite.

The legal issues before the Court were twofold: first, whether the applicant was "notified of the decision" under section 478(1)(b) by being verbally informed of the RRT's outcome, or if the formal written statement of reasons was a necessary component of notification for the purpose of triggering the 28-day time limit for seeking Federal Court review. Second, the Court was asked to consider whether the Minister's obligations as a statutory guardian under the *Immigration (Guardianship of Children) Act 1946* (Cth) were relevant to the construction of section 478(1)(b) of the *Migration Act*.

The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the orders of the Full Court of the Federal Court. The Court reasoned that section 478(1)(b) requires the provision of the written statement of the RRT's decision to constitute notification for the purpose of commencing the time limit for seeking judicial review. The Court emphasised that this interpretation was consistent with the subject, scope, and purpose of the relevant provisions of the *Migration Act*, which are designed to facilitate, rather than obstruct, the limited entitlement to judicial review. The Court found that the written statement is the essential medium for notification, as it equips the applicant with the necessary information to frame an application to the Federal Court, even if the applicant requires legal assistance to do so. The Court concluded that the Minister's obligations as a statutory guardian were not relevant to the construction of section 478(1)(b).

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal allowed with costs.

2. Set aside the orders of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia made on 21 August 2002 and, in place thereof, order that:

a) the appeal to the Full Court be allowed with costs, and

b) order 2 of the orders of French J made on 26 October 2001 be set aside.

Background

Background to the litigation

The task on this appeal is to construe the phrase "notified of the decision" in s 478(1)(b), in light of the subject, scope and purpose of the relevant provisions of the Act.The facts The appellant is a male who alleges that he was born in Afghanistan in 1985. He arrived in Australia by boat on 17 December 2000 and is an unlawful non‑citizen within the meaning of the Act. At the time of his arrival, and at all relevant times, the appellant was an unaccompanied minor who allegedly could neither read nor write in either English or his native language, and had received no education in Afghanistan other than lessons in the Koran at his local mosque. On 1 January 2001, he applied for a protection visa. The application was prepared by a migration agent. On 25 January 2001, a delegate of the Minister refused the appellant's application. The appellant applied for review of the delegate's decision by the RRT. On 15 March 2001, the RRT affirmed the delegate's decision. The substantive reasons given by the RRT for affirming the delegate's decision are not relevant to the issues in this appeal. At all material times for the purposes of this appeal, the appellant was in immigration detention at the Curtin immigration reception and processing centre ("the Curtin centre") near Derby in Western Australia. On 16 March 2001, a facsimile transmission was sent to the Curtin centre from the Melbourne Registry of the RRT. The facsimile comprised 18 pages. The coversheet was addressed to the Manager of the Curtin centre and requested that the Manager "immediately pass the accompanying correspondence and decision" to the appellant. It was followed by a two page letter from the Deputy Registrar in the Melbourne Registry of the RRT and addressed to the appellant at the Curtin centre, a debit note for a "RRT $1,000 Post Decision Fee", and 14 pages of reasons of the RRT, all in English. The letter informed the appellant that the RRT had decided that he was not entitled to a protection visa. It also told him that he had the right to seek review of the decision by the Federal Court, and that an application for review must be lodged with that Court within 28 days of notification of the decision. The letter included the statement "I strongly advise you to seek legal advice if you wish to seek review by the Court". If the appellant had "any questions about [his] current residency status in Australia", he was told to "contact [his] regional office" of the Minister's Department. There was an address for service (a firm of migration agents in Melbourne[4]) provided by the appellant to the RRT that differed from that of the Curtin centre. However, at the relevant time, the provisions of the Act respecting review by the RRT did not provide for delivery of the decision to a representative if the applicant was in immigration detention.[4]See Pt 3, Div 3 of the Act. What then was communicated to the appellant was the subject of disputed evidence before the primary judge. The primary judge found that the appellant had been told by the Manager, speaking through an interpreter whose name the appellant did not remember, that the RRT had refused his application for a protection visa and that he had 28 days within which to apply for judicial review by the Federal Court[5]. According to the appellant, the documents were then handed to Ms Alamar, a counsellor employed by the company managing the Curtin centre, who took him into another room and told him, it would appear in the Dari language, that the RRT had refused his application because they did not believe he was an Afghan.[5](2001) 113 FCR 524 at 538.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

HUGH, GUMMOW AND HEYDON JJ KIRBY J
Accordingly, an examination of the legislative history of the notification provisions, and the various methods of notification inserted by the 1998 amendments, reinforces the importance of the written statement as the medium of notification.Conclusions as to construction As remarked earlier in these reasons, Pt 8, which includes s 478, is headed "Review of decisions by Federal Court". These provisions confer upon certain unsuccessful visa applicants (and in some circumstances the Minister[26]) an entitlement, limited in scope, to seek judicial review in the Federal Court. Section 478 is facilitative of that entitlement, not destructive of it. While an applicant must lodge the application within 28 days from the date of notification and the Court may not extend that period, nevertheless the Act confers an entitlement to review, albeit one with a limited threshold. This state of affairs may be contrasted with the power given to the Federal Court by s 11(1)(c) of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) to extend the time limit which otherwise applies to the institution of applications for judicial review.[26]See s 479 of the Act. The restriction in s 478 is of a different character to that of typical statutes of limitation which operate to impose a limit of time upon an existing right of action. They operate to bar the prosecution of actions otherwise not subject to such a time limit. In that sense, statutes of limitation are preventative. However, s 478 does not "bar an existing cause of action"; rather, "[i]t imposes a condition which is of the essence of a new right"[27]. Thus, s 478(1)(b) and s 478(2) restrict what otherwise would be the conferral upon the Federal Court of jurisdiction by the Parliament under ss 76(ii) and 77(i) of the Constitution. The new jurisdiction so conferred is remedial in nature, although the remedy is confined by the time restriction upon the institution of the proceeding. The provision of information to the unsuccessful visa applicant by the RRT is a necessary step to equip the applicant with the wherewithal to institute such a proceeding in the Federal Court.[27]Australian Iron & Steel Ltd v Hoogland (1962) 108 CLR 471 at 488; Rudolphy v Lightfoot (1999) 197 CLR 500 at 507‑508 [10]-[11]. Paragraph (a) of s 478(1) stipulates that an application to the Federal Court be made in the manner specified by the Rules. At the relevant time, those Rules[28] required that an application be in accordance with Form 56. This required the applicant to describe how he or she was aggrieved by the decision, the grounds for the application, and the orders sought. That information may be acquired for use in this way by an examination of the reasons of the RRT indicated in the written statement.[28]O 54B r 2(1). In oral argument, the Minister referred to various matters said to be of a practical nature, and bearing upon the lodgment of applications in the Federal Court. It was said that an applicant armed with the written statement would be in no better position than if he or she had merely been told of the outcome in the RRT. This was said to be because most applicants (like the appellant in this case) do not have the appropriate skills to frame an application which complies with the Rules. No doubt it was with that in mind that the RRT in its letter to the appellant urged him to seek legal advice if he wished to seek review by the Federal Court. However that may be, the inquiry before the Court is one of statutory construction and it does not assist to consider whether this particular appellant could, unaided, have understood the reasons even if they had been provided to him on 16 March 2001.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: HUGH, GUMMOW AND HEYDON JJ, KIRBY J