Sarancharkh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Sarancharkh v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1461

MIGRATION – review of decision of Refugee Review Tribunal – whether no evidence or other material to justify the making of the Tribunal’s decision – whether s 476(l)(g) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) can apply where there is a finding by the Tribunal of the non-existence of a fact – application of s 476(4)(b) considered

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 476(1)(g), 476(4)(b)

Zaknic Pty Ltd v Svelte Corporation Pty Ltd (1995) 61 FCR 171 cited
Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 cited
Television Capricornia Pty Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (1986) 13 FCR 511 referred to
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Indatissa [2001] FCA 181 cited
Kheirollahpoor v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1350 considered
N258/00A v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 101 FCR 478 followed
Curragh Queensland Mining Ltd v Daniel (1992) 34 FCR 212 followed

MAHMOOD SARANCHARKH v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

N 1024 OF 2001

HILL J
19 OCTOBER 2001

SYDNEY

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 1024 OF 2001

BETWEEN:

MAHMOOD SARANCHARKH
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

HILL J

DATE OF ORDER:

19 OCTOBER 2001

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.   The application be dismissed.

2.   The applicant pay the costs of the respondent Minister.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 1024 OF 2001

BETWEEN:

MAHMOOD SARANCHARKH
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

HILL J

DATE:

19 OCTOBER 2001

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. The applicant, Mr Mahmood Sarancharkh, applies to the Court for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (the “Tribunal”) affirming the decision of the respondent Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs not to grant to him a protection visa.

  2. The applicant relies upon two grounds in his amended application for review. The first, authorised by s 476(1)(g) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the “Act”), is that there was no evidence or other material to justify the making of the decision. The ground is particularised as follows:

    “a.The Tribunal based its decision on a finding of fact that the applicant had an argument with his father and then decided to convert to Christianity, there was no evidence of that fact, and that fact did not exist.

    b.The Tribunal based its decision on a finding of fact that the applicant’s father did not spread a rumour that the applicant had converted to Baha’i, there was no evidence of the asserted fact, and that fact did not exist.

    c.The Tribunal based its decision on a finding of fact that the applicant’s father did not report the applicant to Etalaat, there was no evidence of the asserted fact, and that fact…

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Details
Case
[2001] FCA 1461
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Sarancharkh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, the applicant, who had converted to Christianity from Islam, sought to challenge a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) which found that he would not be at risk of persecution if returned to Iran. The applicant sought to introduce additional evidence, including affidavits from family members and statements from Iranian witnesses, to argue that he faced a real chance of persecution due to his conversion and family disputes. The Federal Court of Australia was tasked with determining whether the RRT's decision was legally sound and whether the applicant's claims warranted judicial review.

The court examined whether the RRT's findings were supported by evidence and whether the applicant's father had reported him to the authorities, or spread rumours about his conversion to the Baha’i faith. The court noted that the RRT had already assessed the credibility of the applicant’s claims and had found no evidence to support the allegations. The court also considered the admissibility of the additional evidence, finding that the unsworn statements were not on oath and thus should not be given much weight. Despite this, the court concluded that even if the evidence had been admitted, it would not have altered the outcome of the RRT's decision.

Ultimately, the court found that the applicant had not shown that there was no evidence or material to justify the RRT's decision. The RRT had properly considered the applicant's claims and had ample evidence to conclude that the applicant was not at risk of persecution based on his conversion and family disputes. The court dismissed the application for judicial review and ordered the applicant to pay the Minister’s costs.

The final orders of the court were as follows: 1. The application be dismissed. 2. The applicant pay the costs of the respondent Minister.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the costs of the respondent Minister.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Although the Tribunal did not accept that the father had either spread a rumour that the son had converted to the Baha’i faith, reported him to Etalaat or accused him of embezzlement, it made the following further comments in its reasons:“Finally the Tribunal indicated above that it did not accept that the applicant’s father had reported him to the authorities. Given that the Tribunal has not accepted he had such a problem from his father in the past, if he now returns to Iran, the Tribunal does not accept that his father would create problems for him. However even if he considers he might be at risk from his father given his conversion, then it would not be unreasonable for him to live in Tehran without contacting his father. The Tribunal also does not accept that … problems with his father … when added to his conversion to Christianity, would together mean the applicant faces a real chance of persecution because of his religion should he now return to Iran.”THE EVIDENCE SOUGHT TO BE LED ON THE APPLICATION FOR REVIEW Before me the applicant sought to adduce additional evidence said to be relevant to proving the existence of the relevant facts which it was said that the Tribunal had found not to exist but which the applicant submitted did. This additional evidence consisted of an affidavit of an uncle of the applicant (the brother of the applicant’s mother) recording a conversation with the applicant’s father during which the father was said to have stated that he would not give evidence in favour of his son, whom he regarded no longer to be his son, which affidavit was admitted subject to relevance without objection but on the basis that it was tendered only to prove the unwillingness of the applicant’s father to give evidence in these proceedings. There was also an affidavit from the applicant’s mother and, in addition, another affidavit from the uncle of the applicant. Both of these affidavits were objected to. Further, application was made that I take evidence by telephone from two people in Iran, whose voices another witness could be called to identify. Ultimately, signed statements of the two Iranese witnesses, unsworn, were accepted in evidence but subject to relevance. The evidence was admitted solely to prove that the applicant’s father had told each of the two witnesses that the applicant had converted to the Baha’i faith, and that the applicant’s father effectively regarded the applicant as no longer being his son but rather as being dead to him. In a trial evidence must be on oath (see s 21(1) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) and cf s 47 of the Federal Court of Australia Act1976 (Cth)) with the consequence that an unsworn statement would not be admissible in evidence. An application for judicial review is a trial for this purpose. In any event, there was ultimately no objection to the admission of the statements in evidence for the limited purpose referred to, subject to a submission that because the statements were not on oath I should not afford them much weight. As I said in the course of argument, there was no reason why I should disbelieve either witness. What use one might make of the evidence was, however, another matter. The fact that the father did say to both witnesses that the son had converted to the Baha’i faith did not prove that the father spread that rumour to all and sundry and certainly did not prove that the father had told or would tell the authorities (the Etalaat, or otherwise). Ultimately, I do not find this evidence of any assistance.

Decision

Reasons for decision

HILL J
The third “particular fact” relied upon is what is said to be a finding by the Tribunal that the father had not reported the applicant to Etalaat. For the reasons given earlier, this submission must likewise fail. First, there is not as I have suggested at [42] in relation to the Baha’i error a finding that the father did not report the applicant to Etalaat. Second, if there is a finding to that effect, it is a finding of a negative fact and for that reason the submission fails. Finally, it must be said that there is no admissible evidence in this Court that the father did report the applicant to Etalaat. There is evidence that the father refused to participate in the present hearing. That, no doubt, would negate any adverse inference that might be drawn by the father not having given evidence but has no other relevance. Evidence that the father reported the mother to a different body, namely, the religious police would not prove the existence of the fact said to exist, namely, that there had been a reporting of the applicant to Etalaat.CONCLUSION It follows in my view that the no evidence ground cannot succeed because neither of the limbs of s 476(4) have been made out. This relieves me of the necessity to undertake a detailed consideration of whether the applicant could have shown that there was no evidence or other material before the Tribunal to justify its decision, whether that decision be considered to be the satisfaction of the Tribunal that the applicant was not a refugee or a conclusion that, objectively, he was not. I should say, however, that in my view the applicant has not shown that there was no evidence or other material before the Tribunal which would justify its decision. There was a considerable body of evidence upon which the Tribunal could find, as it did, that a person who converted from Islam to Christianity, but did not openly proselytise, was not at risk of persecution, whether on religious or political grounds. Details of the second ground of review particularised by the applicant in the amended application have been set out earlier in these reasons. Not surprisingly, little attention was given to this ground because it is clear that the Tribunal did address these matters in the passage complained of. A Tribunal clearly addresses an issue when it does not accept the applicant’s claims which go to that issue and this is what the Tribunal did. For these reasons, I am of the view that the application must be dismissed and the applicant pay the Minister’s costs of it.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: HILL J