Sunchen Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Sunchen Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2010] FCA 21

Citation: Sunchen Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2010] FCA 21
Parties: SUNCHEN PTY LTD v COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION and ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
File number(s): NSD 1643 of 2008
Judges: PERRAM J
Date of judgment: 29 January 2010
Catchwords:

TAXATION – Goods and services tax – input taxed supply – whether property is residential premises used predominantly for residential accommodation – whether determined by objective assessment of premises or by intentions of purchaser – s 40-65 A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999 (Cth)

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – Judicial review – negative findings of fact and no evidence ground – s 5(1)(h), s 5(3) Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth)

Legislation: Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 44
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) s 5, 5(1)(h), 5(1)(g), 5(2)(a), 5(2)(b), 5(3)(a), 5(3)(b)
A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999 (Cth) s 9.5, 11.5(b), 11.20, 40.35, 40.65(1)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Cases cited: Abila v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1186 referred to
Aung v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1562 applied
Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 applied
Curragh Queensland Mining Ltd v Daniel (1992) 34 FCR 212 applied
Dunstan v Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission (No 2) [2005] FCA 1885 referred to
Guden v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 58 ALD 352 referred to
He v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 446 applied
Marana Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2004) 141 FCR 299 considered
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Rajamanikkam (2002) 210 CLR 222 considered
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24 referred to
N258/00A v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 101 FCR 478 applied
Nezovic v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (No. 2) (2003) 133 FCR 190 referred to
Ordenzia v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 35 applied
Toyama Pty Limited v Landmark Building and Developments Pty Ltd (2006) 197 FLR 74 applied
Sarancharkh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1461 applied
Sean Investments Pty Ltd v Mackellar (1981) 38 ALR 363 referred to
SGFB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 422 referred to
Sunchen Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2008] AATA 838 affirmed
VAAW of 2001 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 202 referred to
Date of hearing: 30 June and 20 August 2009
Date of last submissions: 24 June 2009
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 55
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr M Brabazon SC with Mr D Perrignon
Solicitor for the Applicant: Jordan Antonopoulous & Co Solicitors
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr M Wigney SC
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitors

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL…

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Details
Case
[2010] FCA 21
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Sunchen Pty Ltd, the taxpayer, contested a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) that it was not entitled to a GST input tax credit for a property it purchased. The case involved the interpretation of the "residential premises for use as residential accommodation" requirement under the relevant Australian legislation. The taxpayer argued that it intended to redevelop the property for residential purposes and that the AAT erred in not considering evidence of inquiries made to a builder and an architect regarding the redevelopment costs. The court needed to determine whether the AAT had misconstrued the statutory requirement and whether it had failed to consider relevant evidence in making its decision.

The court examined whether the AAT had properly interpreted the statutory requirement and whether it had considered all relevant evidence. The court noted that the taxpayer's intention to profit by resale did not necessarily mean the premises would be used for residential purposes. The AAT found that the taxpayer did not have a rough estimate of the redevelopment costs at the time of purchase, which, along with other objective circumstances, indicated a low likelihood of the redevelopment occurring. The court held that the AAT's application of the Toyama decision was correct and that the taxpayer's evidence about the cost estimates was not a statutorily mandated consideration. The court concluded that the AAT's findings were supported by the evidence and that the taxpayer's grounds for appeal were not substantiated.

The court dismissed the taxpayer's appeal, confirming the AAT's decision that the property was for use as residential accommodation and that the taxpayer was not entitled to the GST input tax credit. The court found no error in the AAT's interpretation of the statutory requirement or in its consideration of the evidence. The questions posed on the appeal were answered in the negative, and the application was dismissed. The court upheld the AAT's decision, affirming that it was correct and should not be disturbed.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

It is true that, in the abstract, to say that the taxpayer had the intention to profit by resale tells one nothing about whether the premises were to be used for one purpose or another. A purchaser may intend to purchase premises for profitable resale and use them for residential purposes or some other purpose. However, this issue does not arise in the abstract. It arises on the taxpayer making an affirmative case that it intended to redevelop the site. The Tribunal considered two possibilities: an intention to redevelop the site; or, failing that, an intention to hold the premises and to sell them at a later time. The Tribunal embraced the latter view. There was no reversal of the onus of proof; there was simply a rejection of the taxpayer’s case.No evidence issues The Tribunal found that the taxpayer did not, at completion, have a rough estimate of the cost of the redevelopment. That conclusion formed, it is tolerably plain, an element in a factual mosaic which showed that however much the taxpayer subjectively intended to undertake the redevelopment, the chances of that occurring were low. This was encapsulated in the Tribunal’s reasons in these terms:83.Even on the basis that Toyama is binding on the Tribunal, the judgment of His Honour White J makes it clear that the subjective intentions of the Applicant are not to be considered in isolation and must be considered in the light of the prevailing objective circumstances, nearly all of which are against the Applicant. It is clear also that the facts in Toyama are, in important respects, distinguishable.(emphasis added) The taxpayer submits that the Tribunal’s finding that it did not have a rough estimate of the costs at the time of completion is incorrect. It says that the evidence before the Tribunal was that such a rough estimate had indeed been obtained. There was in that circumstance – and this is the controversial step – no evidence that the taxpayer had not obtained any form of rough estimate. There was evidence before the Tribunal that a rough estimate had indeed been obtained. The affidavit of Mr Jian Wei Sun, sworn 29 February 2008, contained evidence that he had asked Mr Mark Yacoub, a builder, what he thought the construction costs would be and Mr Yacoub had responded that it would likely be between $200,000 and $220,000 per unit. Further, Mr Sun also gave evidence that he had asked an architect, Mr Ian Bassett, to provide him with a quotation for engineering plans. That quotation was in fact in evidence before the Tribunal. It follows, I think, that the Tribunal’s statement that the taxpayer “did not at the time of completion even have any form of rough estimate” is problematic. Elsewhere in its reasons for judgment the Tribunal found Mr Sun to be lacking in credit. It is possible that the Tribunal’s statement is capable of being construed as a rejection of Mr Sun’s evidence about the quotes, although this is very difficult to reconcile with the objective fact that Mr Bassett’s bill did exist. On balance, the better view is that the Tribunal overlooked the material in reaching the conclusion that it did.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The taxpayer submits that the Tribunal failed to take into account inquiries which were made by it of a builder and an architect. Those inquiries showed, as the argument was developed, that the thesis that the taxpayer did intend to carry out the development was more likely. Were the issue before this Court whether I agreed with the Tribunal’s process of fact finding I might well be inclined to see the force of the point. However, what is involved in these proceedings is not merits review. Accepting this, the taxpayer seeks to characterise the error involved as a failure to take into account a relevant consideration. However, that ground is available only if the consideration said to have been overlooked was required by law to be examined. That question is to be answered by reference to the scope, purpose and ambit of the Act. So viewed, the taxpayer’s inquiries of the builder and the architect cannot be characterised as statutorily mandated. Accordingly, neither this ground nor the ground in s 5(2)(b) of the ADJR Act is made out.Conclusion The Tribunal was correct to apply Toyama. No basis is shown for disturbing its findings. The questions posed on the appeal were as follows:(a)Did the Tribunal misconstrue the requirement in s. 40-65(1) of the Act that the premises be “residential premises for use as residential accommodation” by:(a)determining that the premises were residential premises for use as residential accommodation because the property would be used as residential accommodation for the foreseeable future; and (b)failing to ask whether as at the date of supply the likely future predominant use of the property was use as residential accommodation;(c)determining that the property was for use as residential accommodation where on the facts as fount it was not open to it so to decide. They should all be answered “No” and the application otherwise dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

These two arguments were also put by the taxpayer under the equivalent ground in s 5(2)(a) of the ADJR Act. The decision of the Deane J in Sean Investments Pty Ltd v Mackellar (1981) 38 ALR 363 at 375 demonstrates that this ground is not, in substance, different to the common law ground. It follows that it is not made out either. The relevant consideration issues The taxpayer submits that the Tribunal failed to take into account inquiries which were made by it of a builder and an architect. Those inquiries showed, as the argument was developed, that the thesis that the taxpayer did intend to carry out the development was more likely. Were the issue before this Court whether I agreed with the Tribunal’s process of fact finding I might well be inclined to see the force of the point. However, what is involved in these proceedings is not merits review. Accepting this, the taxpayer seeks to characterise the error involved as a failure to take into account a relevant consideration. However, that ground is available only if the consideration said to have been overlooked was required by law to be examined. That question is to be answered by reference to the scope, purpose and ambit of the Act. So viewed, the taxpayer’s inquiries of the builder and the architect cannot be characterised as statutorily mandated. Accordingly, neither this ground nor the ground in s 5(2)(b) of the ADJR Act is made out.Conclusion The Tribunal was correct to apply Toyama. No basis is shown for disturbing its findings. The questions posed on the appeal were as follows:(a)Did the Tribunal misconstrue the requirement in s. 40-65(1) of the Act that the premises be “residential premises for use as residential accommodation” by:(a)determining that the premises were residential premises for use as residential accommodation because the property would be used as residential accommodation for the foreseeable future; and (b)failing to ask whether as at the date of supply the likely future predominant use of the property was use as residential accommodation;(c)determining that the property was for use as residential accommodation where on the facts as fount it was not open to it so to decide. They should all be answered “No” and the application otherwise dismissed.