Dunstan v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Dunstan v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (No 2)
[2005] FCA 1885

DEFAMATION – whether communications reporting on the views of co-workers about the applicant’s suitability for particular work were in the circumstances defamatory – whether the communications were subject to qualified privilege – whether malice on the part of the publisher established – claim dismissed

MISFEASANCE IN PUBLIC OFFICE – communications reporting on suitability of applicant to return to particular work location – whether communications actuated by malice or undertaken recklessly indifferent to existence of power to make them – claim dismissed

DISCRIMINATION – applicant complained of sex harassment by co-worker – both applicant and co-worker relocated to different work locations – other workers in applicant’s work area reluctant to him returning there – claim of sex discrimination against officers of employer and employer for treating applicant as male differently from treatment which would have been given to female in same or similar circumstances – claim dismissed

DISCRIMINATION – inquiry into claim of sex discrimination not continued as complaint lacking in substance – elapse of three years and nine months between complaint and decision – decision of officer to refer complaint for public inquiry – whether applicant denied procedural fairness – whether delay constitutes denial of procedural fairness – whether decision of officer (not Sex Discrimination Commissioner) to refer complaint for public inquiry effective

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977
Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth)
Racial Discrimination Act 1976 (Cth)
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Act 1986 (Cth)
Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth)
Public Service Act 1999 (Cth)
Defamation Act 1901 (NSW)
Defamation (Amendment) Act 1909 (NSW)
Seat of Government Acceptance Act 1909 (Cth)
New South Wales Acts Application Act 1984 (ACT).

Dunstan v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [2004] FCA 284 considered
Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 (Kioa)
Re Pergamon Press Ltd [1971] Ch 388 considered
F Hoffman-La Roche & Co v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [1975] AC 295 considered
NAIS v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] HCA 77 considered
Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 considered
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairsv Rajamanikkam (2002) 210 CLR 222 considered
Curragh Queensland Mining Ltd v Daniel (1992) 34 FCR 212 considered
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 considered
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 39 considered
Sanders v Snell (1998) 196 CLR 329 at 346-350 considered
Northern Territory v Mengel (1995) 185 CLR 307 considered
Pemberton v Attorney-General [1978] Tas SR 1 considered
Tampion v Anderson [1973] VR 715 considered
Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd v Marsden (1998) 43 NSWLR 158 considered
Mirror Newspapers Ltd v Harrison (1982) 149 CLR 293 considered
Guise v Kouvelis (1947) 74 CLR 102 considered
Calwell v Ipec Australia Ltd (1975) 135 CLR 321 considered
Howe & McColough v Lees (1910) 11 CLR 361 considered
Musgrave v Commonwealth (1937) 57 CLR…

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Details
Case
[2005] FCA 1885
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Dunstan v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (No 2) involves the applicant, Dunstan, who is claiming damages for misfeasance in public office against the third, fourth, and fifth respondents, who were officers of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC) and the Australian Taxation Office (ATO). The applicant alleges that between September 1993 and July 1997, the respondents published false and misleading information about him and his employment, as well as about his sex discrimination complaint, which caused him detriment. The central legal issue in this case is whether the respondents misfeased in public office by publishing false and misleading information about the applicant and his employment and the sex discrimination complaint. The court had to determine whether the respondents acted with the intention to harm the applicant by their actions or whether they merely acted negligently or without proper consideration of the applicant's interests.

The court found that the applicant's claims of misfeasance in public office should be dismissed. The court rejected the applicant's allegations that the third and fifth respondents, along with other officers of the HREOC, attempted to conceal discrimination by the ATO against him by colluding about the contents of their various documents, misdescribing the nature of the applicant's complaints, and taking other steps to avoid criticism and delay proper consideration of the applicant's circumstances. The court concluded that the applicant's allegations of a conspiracy to harm him were unfounded and that the respondents' actions were not motivated by a desire to cause him harm. Instead, the court found that the respondents acted with the intention of fulfilling their public duties and did not intend to cause the applicant detriment.

As a result, the court dismissed the applicant's claims against the respondents. The court found that the applicant's allegations of misfeasance in public office were unfounded and that the respondents did not act with the intention to harm the applicant. The court also found that the applicant's claims for damages at common law for misfeasance in public office should be dismissed. The court ordered that the application be dismissed against the respondents and that the parties be given the opportunity to make submissions as to costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application is dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

The third claim is against the third, fourth and fifth respondents. It is for damages at common law for misfeasance in public office in that between September 1993 and July 1997 the third, fourth and fifth respondents in discharge of their public duties published false and/or misleading information to the first, second and sixth respondents concerning the applicant and his employment and concerning the sex discrimination complaint: Nine communications on the part of the third respondent are identified, one on behalf of the fourth respondent and two on the part of the fifth respondent (the misfeasance in public office claim).BACKGROUND Much of the background information is, as one would expect, uncontested. It is convenient to record the management structure within the IT Services Group of the ATO at material times, including the roles of the third respondent, the fourth respondent, and the fifth respondent. The fifth respondent worked with computers from 1965. He worked with the ATO from February 1985 as First Assistant Commissioner and head of the IT Services Group from then to 1 October 1997 when he retired from the service. He had 1200 or so staff under his control throughout Australia, including 600 in the Australian Capital Territory. The persons under his supervision included the applicant, following the applicant’s transfer to the ATO in 1987. From 1985 to 1992-1993 the structure in the ATO was ‘line management’. The applicant was accountable to the third respondent then Computer Systems Officer Grade 5 (the equivalent of Senior Information Technology Officer Grade A) and the Director, Database Services, managing the Data Services Section (sometimes called in evidence the Data Administration Section and which I shall call the Data Services Section) where both the applicant (from 1990) and X worked. The third respondent reported in turn to the fourth respondent, who worked at the SDS level. The fourth respondent in turn reported to the fifth respondent. The fifth respondent reported to the Commissioner of Taxation. The administrative system was changed to ‘portfolio management’ in 1992/1993 so that the third respondent (and others at that level) reported directly to the fifth respondent. The fourth respondent joined the service in 1968. He worked in the ATO between 1970 and 1972, then from 1986 to 1997 as Assistant Commissioner in the IT Services Group of the ATO. In that position he performed the role of senior manager in the IT Services Group. His immediate supervisor was the fifth respondent. On occasions in 1993 and 1994 the fourth respondent acted in the office of the fifth respondent when the fifth respondent was away. From 1997 until his retirement on 13 November 2002, the fourth respondent held the position as First Assistant Commissioner in the IT Services Group, later known as ATO Technology. During that time he had overall responsibility for the management and operations of that division of the ATO. The fourth respondent’s direct involvement with the applicant of any significance was only from 1994. He was the supervisor of the third respondent.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

MANSFIELD J
For those reasons, as I indicated above, the defamation claim will be dismissed.conclusion The lengthy nature of these reasons for judgment reflects the extensive period over which relevant events occurred, and the complexity of the circumstances confronting the parties from time to time. I endeavoured to confine them to relevant matters. Relevance across such a time span and such a breadth of dealings arose mainly from the significant allegations made by the applicant about the motives of the respondents, in particular of the third and fifth respondent, in their dealings with him. Those allegations are as vehemently made in the initial application of 22 April 1997 as elsewhere, although they find expression also in certain of the applicant’s submissions. At one point, somewhat cryptically, he said: to a man with a hammer, every problem is a nail. Whether or not that is an appropriate euphemism is a matter of opinion. But, in the end, I have rejected the claims of the applicant that the third and fifth respondents, with others including officers of the first respondent, attempted to conceal discrimination by the ATO against him by colluding about the contents of their various documents, by misdescribing the nature of the applicant’s complaints, and by other steps contrived to avoid criticism and to delay proper consideration of the applicant’s circumstances. As I observed above, to his credit, the applicant tempered those allegations during the hearing to the point that in his final oral submissions he no longer sought a finding that the third and fifth respondents were aiming to hurt him by their conduct. He maintained the claim that they recklessly ignored his interests in giving priority to their decision to great him and X equally. However, in sections of his final written submissions, the more directly critical claims made against those respondents were also preserved, including that they, together with the first respondent, manipulated the response to the applicant’s various communications to frustrate the proper addressing of his return to the DBA subsection. I have indicated why I reject those allegations. In the result, in my judgment, the application should be dismissed against the respondents. I so order. I will give the parties the opportunity to make submissions as to costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: MANSFIELD J

In those circumstances, I would exercise my discretion to decline to grant relief to the applicant in respect of the ADJR claim, even if (contrary to my conclusion) some ground for relief under the ADJR Act were made out. I also have regard to the following further matters. The HREOC Act was amended in 1999, so that it can now only conciliate and if complaints of discrimination, conciliation is unsuccessful it must terminate its investigation. The SD Act was also amended in a complementary way at the time. There is also no power now for the first respondent to conduct the form of inquiry which the applicant sought in 1997. In fact, also, there had been, by April 1997, an extensive conciliation process during the first half of 1996 conducted by Ms Petherbridge; it had been unsuccessful. The elapse of time between April 1997 and those amendments was not due to any delaying conduct of any of the respondents in the conduct of these proceedings. Further, as the applicant accepts, the prospects of him returning to the ATO, and in particular to the DBA subsection, do not exist through subsequent conduct on his part. CONSIDERATION: THE MISFEASANCE IN PUBLIC OFFICE claim The misfeasance in public office claim is founded upon various communications by the third to fifth respondents between September 1993 and June 1997. There is no dispute about the information which was published. According to the pleadings, the third respondent published the following documents:‘i.Statement in or about March 1994 to an officer of the Sixth Respondentii.Statement on or about 28/11/94 to the Second Respondent.iii.Statement on or about 27.2.95 to an officer of the Sixth Respondent.ivLetter dated 18/9/95 to an officer of the Sixth Respondent.v.Letter dated 4/1/96 to an officer of the Sixth Respondent.vi Submission on or about 23/1/96 to the First Respondent.vii Letters on or about 24/1/96 to the Second Respondent.viii Submission on or about 4/7/96 to an officer of the Sixth Respondent.ix. Letter dated 27/11/96 to an officer of the Sixth Respondent.’It is then alleged that the fourth respondent published a minute dated 24 April 1996 to an officer of the sixth respondent, and that the fifth respondent published a statement on about 9 September 1993 to an officer of the sixth respondent, and a submission on or about 18 January 1996 to the first respondent. Each of the third, fourth and fifth respondents acknowledges that they intended that the first, second and sixth respondents would rely upon such information as they conveyed in connection with their dealings with the applicant. The applicant asserts that the effect of the information published by those respondents was that they had not discriminated against him on any grounds or sex, race or disability and had not subjected him to any detriment on the ground that he had made complaints under the SD Act, the RD Act or the DD Act. He further asserts that the information provided by those respondents sought in that material to justify their decision to remove the applicant from the DBA subsection of the ATO, and to give a commitment to X allowing her to veto the applicant’s return to the DBA subsection, and further that the material conveyed that the applicant should not be permitted to return to the DBA subsection because other staff members in that area were afraid of him and were unable to work with him or did not want him back.