FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Dunstan v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (No 2)
[2005] FCA 1885DEFAMATION – whether communications reporting on the views of co-workers about the applicant’s suitability for particular work were in the circumstances defamatory – whether the communications were subject to qualified privilege – whether malice on the part of the publisher established – claim dismissed
MISFEASANCE IN PUBLIC OFFICE – communications reporting on suitability of applicant to return to particular work location – whether communications actuated by malice or undertaken recklessly indifferent to existence of power to make them – claim dismissed
DISCRIMINATION – applicant complained of sex harassment by co-worker – both applicant and co-worker relocated to different work locations – other workers in applicant’s work area reluctant to him returning there – claim of sex discrimination against officers of employer and employer for treating applicant as male differently from treatment which would have been given to female in same or similar circumstances – claim dismissed
DISCRIMINATION – inquiry into claim of sex discrimination not continued as complaint lacking in substance – elapse of three years and nine months between complaint and decision – decision of officer to refer complaint for public inquiry – whether applicant denied procedural fairness – whether delay constitutes denial of procedural fairness – whether decision of officer (not Sex Discrimination Commissioner) to refer complaint for public inquiry effective
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977
Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth)
Racial Discrimination Act 1976 (Cth)
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Act 1986 (Cth)
Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth)
Public Service Act 1999 (Cth)
Defamation Act 1901 (NSW)
Defamation (Amendment) Act 1909 (NSW)
Seat of Government Acceptance Act 1909 (Cth)
New South Wales Acts Application Act 1984 (ACT).Dunstan v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [2004] FCA 284 considered
Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 (Kioa)
Re Pergamon Press Ltd [1971] Ch 388 considered
F Hoffman-La Roche & Co v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [1975] AC 295 considered
NAIS v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] HCA 77 considered
Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 considered
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairsv Rajamanikkam (2002) 210 CLR 222 considered
Curragh Queensland Mining Ltd v Daniel (1992) 34 FCR 212 considered
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 considered
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 39 considered
Sanders v Snell (1998) 196 CLR 329 at 346-350 considered
Northern Territory v Mengel (1995) 185 CLR 307 considered
Pemberton v Attorney-General [1978] Tas SR 1 considered
Tampion v Anderson [1973] VR 715 considered
Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd v Marsden (1998) 43 NSWLR 158 considered
Mirror Newspapers Ltd v Harrison (1982) 149 CLR 293 considered
Guise v Kouvelis (1947) 74 CLR 102 considered
Calwell v Ipec Australia Ltd (1975) 135 CLR 321 considered
Howe & McColough v Lees (1910) 11 CLR 361 considered
Musgrave v Commonwealth (1937) 57 CLR…
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- Case
- [2005] FCA 1885
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the applicant's claims of misfeasance in public office should be dismissed. The court rejected the applicant's allegations that the third and fifth respondents, along with other officers of the HREOC, attempted to conceal discrimination by the ATO against him by colluding about the contents of their various documents, misdescribing the nature of the applicant's complaints, and taking other steps to avoid criticism and delay proper consideration of the applicant's circumstances. The court concluded that the applicant's allegations of a conspiracy to harm him were unfounded and that the respondents' actions were not motivated by a desire to cause him harm. Instead, the court found that the respondents acted with the intention of fulfilling their public duties and did not intend to cause the applicant detriment.
As a result, the court dismissed the applicant's claims against the respondents. The court found that the applicant's allegations of misfeasance in public office were unfounded and that the respondents did not act with the intention to harm the applicant. The court also found that the applicant's claims for damages at common law for misfeasance in public office should be dismissed. The court ordered that the application be dismissed against the respondents and that the parties be given the opportunity to make submissions as to costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application is dismissed.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: MANSFIELD J
In those circumstances, I would exercise my discretion to decline to grant relief to the applicant in respect of the ADJR claim, even if (contrary to my conclusion) some ground for relief under the ADJR Act were made out. I also have regard to the following further matters. The HREOC Act was amended in 1999, so that it can now only conciliate and if complaints of discrimination, conciliation is unsuccessful it must terminate its investigation. The SD Act was also amended in a complementary way at the time. There is also no power now for the first respondent to conduct the form of inquiry which the applicant sought in 1997. In fact, also, there had been, by April 1997, an extensive conciliation process during the first half of 1996 conducted by Ms Petherbridge; it had been unsuccessful. The elapse of time between April 1997 and those amendments was not due to any delaying conduct of any of the respondents in the conduct of these proceedings. Further, as the applicant accepts, the prospects of him returning to the ATO, and in particular to the DBA subsection, do not exist through subsequent conduct on his part. CONSIDERATION: THE MISFEASANCE IN PUBLIC OFFICE claim The misfeasance in public office claim is founded upon various communications by the third to fifth respondents between September 1993 and June 1997. There is no dispute about the information which was published. According to the pleadings, the third respondent published the following documents:‘i.Statement in or about March 1994 to an officer of the Sixth Respondentii.Statement on or about 28/11/94 to the Second Respondent.iii.Statement on or about 27.2.95 to an officer of the Sixth Respondent.ivLetter dated 18/9/95 to an officer of the Sixth Respondent.v.Letter dated 4/1/96 to an officer of the Sixth Respondent.vi Submission on or about 23/1/96 to the First Respondent.vii Letters on or about 24/1/96 to the Second Respondent.viii Submission on or about 4/7/96 to an officer of the Sixth Respondent.ix. Letter dated 27/11/96 to an officer of the Sixth Respondent.’It is then alleged that the fourth respondent published a minute dated 24 April 1996 to an officer of the sixth respondent, and that the fifth respondent published a statement on about 9 September 1993 to an officer of the sixth respondent, and a submission on or about 18 January 1996 to the first respondent. Each of the third, fourth and fifth respondents acknowledges that they intended that the first, second and sixth respondents would rely upon such information as they conveyed in connection with their dealings with the applicant. The applicant asserts that the effect of the information published by those respondents was that they had not discriminated against him on any grounds or sex, race or disability and had not subjected him to any detriment on the ground that he had made complaints under the SD Act, the RD Act or the DD Act. He further asserts that the information provided by those respondents sought in that material to justify their decision to remove the applicant from the DBA subsection of the ATO, and to give a commitment to X allowing her to veto the applicant’s return to the DBA subsection, and further that the material conveyed that the applicant should not be permitted to return to the DBA subsection because other staff members in that area were afraid of him and were unable to work with him or did not want him back.