FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Rajamanikkam [2000] FCA 1023
MIGRATION - application for protection visa - Tribunal decision set aside by judge at first instance - appeal to Full Court - Tribunal identified eight factors which led it to conclude that applicant had concocted primary claim - whether factors identified by Tribunal were based on particular facts which did not exist - whether such facts constituted “critical facts” if some only of the factors identified were based on facts that did not exist, whether ground of review under s 476(1)(g) and (4)(b) of Migration Act 1958 (Cth) made out.
MIGRATION - Tribunal found that it was reasonable for the applicant to relocate - whether Tribunal failed to refer to material relevant to relocation in its reasons - whether this failure contravened s 430(1) of Migration Act 1958 (Cth) in circumstances - whether Tribunal’s finding affected by its view on applicant’s credibility.
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ss 5(1)(h), 5(3)(b)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 430, 476(1)(a), 476(1)(g), 476(4)(b)
Yilan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 854 distinguished
Curragh Queensland Mining Ltd v Daniel (1992) 34 FCR 212 distinguished
Ngo Quang Thuat v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (O’Connor J,
24 November 1998, unreported) referred to
Guden v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 236 referred to
Chen v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 34 followed
Pfizer Ltd v Birkhett [1999] FCA 1778 referred to
State Rail Authority of New South Wales v Earthline Constructions Pty Ltd (In Liq) (1999) 160 ALR 588 referred to
Ismail v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 1555 distinguished
Vichlenkova v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 1338 applied
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairsv Singh [2000] FCA 845 applied
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407 referred toMINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS v RAJAMANIKKAM
N 1421 of 2000
KIEFEL, NORTH & MANSFIELD JJ
3 AUGUST 2000
BRISBANE
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
N 1421 OF 2000
BETWEEN:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION
AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
APPELLANTAND:
NADASARA RAJAMANIKKAM and
BALAMBIKAI RAJAMANIKKAM
RESPONDENTSJUDGES:
KIEFEL, NORTH & MANSFIELD JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
3 AUGUST 2000
WHERE MADE:
BRISBANE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay to the respondents their costs of the appeal to be taxed.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
N 1421 OF 2000
BETWEEN:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION
AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
APPELLANTAND:
NADASARA RAJAMANIKKAM and
BALAMBIKAI RAJAMANIKKAM
RESPONDENTSJUDGES:
KIEFEL, NORTH & MANSFIELD JJ
DATE:
3 AUGUST 2000
PLACE:
BRISBANE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THE COURT:
This is an appeal from a decision of a judge of the Court given on 19 November 1999. His Honour granted an application for…
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- Case
- [2000] FCA 1023
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the grounds of review, particularly focusing on sections 476(1)(g) and 476(4)(b) of the Migration Act 1958, which relate to decisions based on non-existent facts. The court found that the Tribunal's decision was indeed based on the non-existence of critical facts and that it failed to make necessary findings on the respondents' claims regarding relocation. The reasoning highlighted that a decision is flawed if it is based on a particular fact for which there is no evidence, and that the burden of negating the existence of such a fact lies on the applicant, though it may be significant. The court concluded that the Tribunal's decision was flawed under these provisions, and thus upheld Einfeld J's findings.
In its orders, the court dismissed the appeal and directed the appellant to pay the respondents' costs of the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay to the respondents their costs of the appeal to be taxed.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Einfeld J also concluded that the respondents had made out the second ground of review. Again, as those matters are raised on this appeal, it is not necessary at this point to rehearse his Honour’s reasons in detail at this point.Consideration of s 476(1)(g) and (4)(b) Section 476(1)(g) and (4)(b) of the Act are analogous to s 5(1)(h) and 5(3)(b) of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (“the ADJR Act”). Because s 476(4)(b) relates to non-jurisdictional facts, the circumstances in which it is available are limited: see the discussion of the Full Court (French, R D Nicholson and Finkelstein JJ) in Yilan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 854 at [54-58]. Counsel agreed that the observations of Black CJ (with whom Spender and Gummow JJ agreed) in Curragh Queensland Mining Ltd v Daniel (1992) 34 FCR 212 (“Curragh”) concerning those provisions of the ADJR Act are aptly applied to ss 476(1)(g) and (4)(b). The Chief Justice said at 220-221 on the expression “particular fact” in s 5(3)(b):“If the existence of a particular fact is seen to be critical to the making of a decision then the decision will be based on the existence of that particular fact. In Bond’s case (supra) Mason CJ said (at 357) that s 5(3)(b) was directed to “proof of the non-existence of a fact critical to the making of the decision” [my emphasis]. See also Luu v Renevier (1989) 91 ALR 39 at 47 where a Full Court of this Court (Davies, Wilcox and Pincus JJ) used the word “critical” to distinguish unsupported findings of fact that go to the validity of a decision from findings relating only to a matter of peripheral importance that may not affect the validity of a decision.Section 5(3)(b) does not require the identification of some single particular fact that may be said to be the foundation of the decision. A decision may be based upon the existence of many particular facts; it will be based upon the existence of each particular fact that is critical to the making of the decision. A small factual link in a chain of reasoning, if it is truly a link in a chain and there are no parallel links, may be just as critical to the decision, and just as much a fact upon which the decision is based, as a fact that is of more obvious immediate importance. A decision may also be based on a finding of fact that, critically, leads the decision-maker to take one path in the process of reasoning rather than another and so to come to a different conclusion.If a decision is in truth based, in the sense I have described, on a particular fact for which there is no evidence, and the fact does not exist, the decision is flawed whatever the relative importance of the fact.”Then, on the expression “and that fact did not exist”, the Chief Justice said at 223:“Since the ground in s 5(1)(h) is a “no evidence” ground, and since s 5(3)(b) requires, in that context, that it be established that the person who made the decision based the decision on the existence of a particular fact as a requirement for making out the ground, the concluding words “and that fact did not exist” must be taken to impose an additional requirement. In Television Capricornia Pty Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (1986) 13 FCR 511 at 519-521 Wilcox J examined the history and meaning of s 5(3)(b). His Honour observed that whilst it might have been thought appropriate to provide for an administrative decision to be struck down where the decision was based upon the assumption of a particular fact of which the decision-maker had no evidence, a deliberate decision was made in drafting the ADJR Act to restrict more tightly the operation of the ground. By reference to the background to the provision his Honour considered that it was understandable that, when parliament turned to non-jurisdictional findings of fact in s 5(3)(b), it required the applicant for review to show more than that there was no evidence before the decision-maker of the fact found, or assumed, as the basis of the decision. The applicant was required to negative the fact and, as his Honour noted, this may constitute a heavy burden, especially where the facts are obscure. But the language of s 5(3)(b) shows that its concluding words do impose an additional requirement and the history of the section, discussed by Wilcox J in Television Capricornia (supra), tends to confirm that this is so.”