Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Rajamanikkam

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Rajamanikkam [2000] FCA 1023

MIGRATION - application for protection visa - Tribunal decision set aside by judge at first instance - appeal to Full Court - Tribunal identified eight factors which led it to conclude that applicant had concocted primary claim - whether factors identified by Tribunal were based on particular facts which did not exist - whether such facts constituted “critical facts” if some only of the factors identified were based on facts that did not exist, whether ground of review under s 476(1)(g) and (4)(b) of Migration Act 1958 (Cth) made out.

MIGRATION - Tribunal found that it was reasonable for the applicant to relocate - whether Tribunal failed to refer to material relevant to relocation in its reasons - whether this failure contravened s 430(1) of Migration Act 1958 (Cth) in circumstances - whether Tribunal’s finding affected by its view on applicant’s credibility.

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ss 5(1)(h), 5(3)(b)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 430, 476(1)(a), 476(1)(g), 476(4)(b)

Yilan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 854 distinguished
Curragh Queensland Mining Ltd v Daniel (1992) 34 FCR 212 distinguished
Ngo Quang Thuat v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (O’Connor J,
24 November 1998, unreported) referred to
Guden v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 236 referred to
Chen v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 34 followed
Pfizer Ltd v Birkhett [1999] FCA 1778 referred to
State Rail Authority of New South Wales v Earthline Constructions Pty Ltd (In Liq) (1999) 160 ALR 588 referred to
Ismail v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 1555 distinguished
Vichlenkova v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 1338 applied
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairsv Singh [2000] FCA 845 applied
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407 referred to

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS v RAJAMANIKKAM

N 1421 of 2000

KIEFEL, NORTH & MANSFIELD JJ
3 AUGUST 2000
BRISBANE

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 1421 OF 2000

BETWEEN:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION
AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
APPELLANT

AND:

NADASARA RAJAMANIKKAM and
BALAMBIKAI RAJAMANIKKAM
RESPONDENTS

JUDGES:

KIEFEL, NORTH & MANSFIELD JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

3 AUGUST 2000

WHERE MADE:

BRISBANE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The appeal be dismissed.

2.        The appellant pay to the respondents their costs of the appeal to be taxed.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 1421 OF 2000

BETWEEN:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION
AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
APPELLANT

AND:

NADASARA RAJAMANIKKAM and
BALAMBIKAI RAJAMANIKKAM
RESPONDENTS

JUDGES:

KIEFEL, NORTH & MANSFIELD JJ

DATE:

3 AUGUST 2000

PLACE:

BRISBANE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

  1. This is an appeal from a decision of a judge of the Court given on 19 November 1999.  His Honour granted an application for…

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Details
Case
[2000] FCA 1023
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Rajamanikkam involves the appeal by the Minister against a decision of Einfeld J, who granted judicial review of a decision by the Refugee Review Tribunal affirming the decision of a delegate not to grant protection visas to the respondents, an elderly Sri Lankan Tamil couple. The husband, Mr Rajamanikkam, sought a protection visa on the basis of being a refugee, while his wife's application was contingent on his success. The Tribunal concluded that the husband had concocted his claims and found that it would be reasonable for the couple to relocate within Sri Lanka, thereby denying the protection visas. The legal issues before the court were whether the Tribunal's decision was based on non-existent facts and whether it failed to make findings on material claims regarding relocation within Sri Lanka.

The court examined the grounds of review, particularly focusing on sections 476(1)(g) and 476(4)(b) of the Migration Act 1958, which relate to decisions based on non-existent facts. The court found that the Tribunal's decision was indeed based on the non-existence of critical facts and that it failed to make necessary findings on the respondents' claims regarding relocation. The reasoning highlighted that a decision is flawed if it is based on a particular fact for which there is no evidence, and that the burden of negating the existence of such a fact lies on the applicant, though it may be significant. The court concluded that the Tribunal's decision was flawed under these provisions, and thus upheld Einfeld J's findings.

In its orders, the court dismissed the appeal and directed the appellant to pay the respondents' costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay to the respondents their costs of the appeal to be taxed.

Background

Background to the litigation

This is an appeal from a decision of a judge of the Court given on 19 November 1999. His Honour granted an application for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) of 29 September 1998 which affirmed a decision of a delegate of the appellant not to grant protection visas to the respondents. He ordered that the application of the respondents for review by the Tribunal of the delegates’ decision be remitted to the Tribunal for a fresh hearing.Background The respondents are husband and wife. They are elderly Sri Lankan Tamils. They arrived in Australia on visitors’ visas on 24 May 1996 and soon after lodged a combined application for protection visas under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”). It was a requirement for the grant of those visas that the delegate, and on review the Tribunal, be satisfied that the respondents were persons to whom Australia owes protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol (using those terms as defined in the Act) (“the Convention”). In practical terms, that meant that the respondents were required to satisfy the delegate, and on review the Tribunal, that they were refugees within the meaning of Article 1A(2) of the Convention. Only Mr Rajamanikkam claimed to be a refugee; Mrs Rajamanikkam sought a protection visa as a member of the family unit. Her application therefore stands or falls with that of Mr Rajamanikkam. It is convenient in that circumstance to refer to Mr Rajamanikkam as “the respondent’ hereafter in these reasons. We shall refer to Mr Rajamanikkam and Mrs Rajamanikkam together as “the respondents”. The respondent is a retired medical practitioner. He was born in Jaffna in 1921. He is able to read, speak and write Tamil and English, and he is able also to converse moderately well in Singhalese. For thirty-three years, he worked for the Sri Lankan Department of Health Services, working for lengthy periods in the Hill Country in the Central province, in the Kandy district, in the Ratnapura district, in the Eastern province, and in the Badulla district. From 1971 until his retirement from that department in 1976, he worked in his home district of Point Pedro near Jaffna. In 1976, the respondent started a private medical practice in the Jaffna area. He closed that practice in 1989. He ascribed that action to troubles he had experienced from 1984 variously with the Sri Lankan authorities, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (“LTTE”), and the Indian Peace Keeping Force (“IPKF”). In January 1992, the respondent went to Trincomalee and again started a medical practice. In May 1996 he left Trincomalee for Colombo. He attributed his departure to troubles experienced with the LTTE, and the Sri Lankan army in conjunction with a Tamil militant group supporting the government, probably the Eelam Peoples Revolutionary Liberation Front (“the EPRLF”). In May 1996, the respondents obtained a visa to visit Australia, and they left for Australia on 23 May 1996. The respondents have two daughters living in Australia.The claims

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Tribunal also decided the claim on an independent basis, even if it was wrong in its assessment that the respondent had no problems in Trincomalee in 1996. It considered that it would be reasonable for the respondents to relocate within Sri Lanka either to Colombo, or to the north to Jaffna or Point Pedro, or to the Central area (presumably, the Tamil speaking Hill Country it later referred to). It was in terms applying the decision in Randhawa v Minister for Immigration Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 52 FCR 437 (“Randhawa”).The decision of Einfeld J So far as they are relevant to this appeal, the grounds of review argued before Einfeld J were that:(a)there was no evidence or other material to justify the making of the decision: s 476(1)(g), because the decision was based on the existence of particular facts that did not exist: s 476(4)(b). The particular facts which were said not to exist were the inconsistencies the Tribunal discovered in the respondent’s evidence referred to in its factors (1), (3), (4) and (6) above, and facts upon which the Tribunal’s views in factors (5) and (8) above, were expressed. Thus, the respondents sought to challenge the findings underlying the Tribunal’s conclusion that the respondent had concocted his claims.(b)The Tribunal failed to make findings on material claims made by the respondent as to why he was unable to relocate to either Colombo, Jaffna or Point Pedro or the Central area: s 476(1)(a) and (e). The respondents contended that the Tribunal was obliged to make those findings by reason of s 430 of the Act. His Honour was satisfied that, in respect of each of the factors weighing against his credit, the respondents had made out the first ground of review. As those matters are also the subject of this appeal, it is not necessary to rehearse his Honour’s conclusions in detail at this point. His Honour also found that the Tribunal’s reasons for reaching its conclusion that the respondent concocted his claims to the Tribunal were not explained, so that the requirements of s 430 of the Act were not satisfied. (It may be observed that it was not a ground of review maintained on this appeal that the Tribunal had failed to comply with s 430 so as to give rise to the ground of review available under s 476(1)(a) of the Act in respect of those findings). Einfeld J also concluded that the respondents had made out the second ground of review. Again, as those matters are raised on this appeal, it is not necessary at this point to rehearse his Honour’s reasons in detail at this point.Consideration of s 476(1)(g) and (4)(b) Section 476(1)(g) and (4)(b) of the Act are analogous to s 5(1)(h) and 5(3)(b) of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (“the ADJR Act”). Because s 476(4)(b) relates to non-jurisdictional facts, the circumstances in which it is available are limited: see the discussion of the Full Court (French, R D Nicholson and Finkelstein JJ) in Yilan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 854 at [54-58]. Counsel agreed that the observations of Black CJ (with whom Spender and Gummow JJ agreed) in Curragh Queensland Mining Ltd v Daniel (1992) 34 FCR 212 (“Curragh”) concerning those provisions of the ADJR Act are aptly applied to ss 476(1)(g) and (4)(b). The Chief Justice said at 220-221 on the expression “particular fact” in s 5(3)(b):“If the existence of a particular fact is seen to be critical to the making of a decision then the decision will be based on the existence of that particular fact. In Bond’s case (supra) Mason CJ said (at 357) that s 5(3)(b) was directed to “proof of the non-existence of a fact critical to the making of the decision” [my emphasis]. See also Luu v Renevier (1989) 91 ALR 39 at 47 where a Full Court of this Court (Davies, Wilcox and Pincus JJ) used the word “critical” to distinguish unsupported findings of fact that go to the validity of a decision from findings relating only to a matter of peripheral importance that may not affect the validity of a decision.Section 5(3)(b) does not require the identification of some single particular fact that may be said to be the foundation of the decision. A decision may be based upon the existence of many particular facts; it will be based upon the existence of each particular fact that is critical to the making of the decision. A small factual link in a chain of reasoning, if it is truly a link in a chain and there are no parallel links, may be just as critical to the decision, and just as much a fact upon which the decision is based, as a fact that is of more obvious immediate importance. A decision may also be based on a finding of fact that, critically, leads the decision-maker to take one path in the process of reasoning rather than another and so to come to a different conclusion.If a decision is in truth based, in the sense I have described, on a particular fact for which there is no evidence, and the fact does not exist, the decision is flawed whatever the relative importance of the fact.”Then, on the expression “and that fact did not exist”, the Chief Justice said at 223:“Since the ground in s 5(1)(h) is a “no evidence” ground, and since s 5(3)(b) requires, in that context, that it be established that the person who made the decision based the decision on the existence of a particular fact as a requirement for making out the ground, the concluding words “and that fact did not exist” must be taken to impose an additional requirement. In Television Capricornia Pty Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (1986) 13 FCR 511 at 519-521 Wilcox J examined the history and meaning of s 5(3)(b). His Honour observed that whilst it might have been thought appropriate to provide for an administrative decision to be struck down where the decision was based upon the assumption of a particular fact of which the decision-maker had no evidence, a deliberate decision was made in drafting the ADJR Act to restrict more tightly the operation of the ground. By reference to the background to the provision his Honour considered that it was understandable that, when parliament turned to non-jurisdictional findings of fact in s 5(3)(b), it required the applicant for review to show more than that there was no evidence before the decision-maker of the fact found, or assumed, as the basis of the decision. The applicant was required to negative the fact and, as his Honour noted, this may constitute a heavy burden, especially where the facts are obscure. But the language of s 5(3)(b) shows that its concluding words do impose an additional requirement and the history of the section, discussed by Wilcox J in Television Capricornia (supra), tends to confirm that this is so.”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Einfeld J also concluded that the respondents had made out the second ground of review. Again, as those matters are raised on this appeal, it is not necessary at this point to rehearse his Honour’s reasons in detail at this point.Consideration of s 476(1)(g) and (4)(b) Section 476(1)(g) and (4)(b) of the Act are analogous to s 5(1)(h) and 5(3)(b) of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (“the ADJR Act”). Because s 476(4)(b) relates to non-jurisdictional facts, the circumstances in which it is available are limited: see the discussion of the Full Court (French, R D Nicholson and Finkelstein JJ) in Yilan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 854 at [54-58]. Counsel agreed that the observations of Black CJ (with whom Spender and Gummow JJ agreed) in Curragh Queensland Mining Ltd v Daniel (1992) 34 FCR 212 (“Curragh”) concerning those provisions of the ADJR Act are aptly applied to ss 476(1)(g) and (4)(b). The Chief Justice said at 220-221 on the expression “particular fact” in s 5(3)(b):“If the existence of a particular fact is seen to be critical to the making of a decision then the decision will be based on the existence of that particular fact. In Bond’s case (supra) Mason CJ said (at 357) that s 5(3)(b) was directed to “proof of the non-existence of a fact critical to the making of the decision” [my emphasis]. See also Luu v Renevier (1989) 91 ALR 39 at 47 where a Full Court of this Court (Davies, Wilcox and Pincus JJ) used the word “critical” to distinguish unsupported findings of fact that go to the validity of a decision from findings relating only to a matter of peripheral importance that may not affect the validity of a decision.Section 5(3)(b) does not require the identification of some single particular fact that may be said to be the foundation of the decision. A decision may be based upon the existence of many particular facts; it will be based upon the existence of each particular fact that is critical to the making of the decision. A small factual link in a chain of reasoning, if it is truly a link in a chain and there are no parallel links, may be just as critical to the decision, and just as much a fact upon which the decision is based, as a fact that is of more obvious immediate importance. A decision may also be based on a finding of fact that, critically, leads the decision-maker to take one path in the process of reasoning rather than another and so to come to a different conclusion.If a decision is in truth based, in the sense I have described, on a particular fact for which there is no evidence, and the fact does not exist, the decision is flawed whatever the relative importance of the fact.”Then, on the expression “and that fact did not exist”, the Chief Justice said at 223:“Since the ground in s 5(1)(h) is a “no evidence” ground, and since s 5(3)(b) requires, in that context, that it be established that the person who made the decision based the decision on the existence of a particular fact as a requirement for making out the ground, the concluding words “and that fact did not exist” must be taken to impose an additional requirement. In Television Capricornia Pty Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (1986) 13 FCR 511 at 519-521 Wilcox J examined the history and meaning of s 5(3)(b). His Honour observed that whilst it might have been thought appropriate to provide for an administrative decision to be struck down where the decision was based upon the assumption of a particular fact of which the decision-maker had no evidence, a deliberate decision was made in drafting the ADJR Act to restrict more tightly the operation of the ground. By reference to the background to the provision his Honour considered that it was understandable that, when parliament turned to non-jurisdictional findings of fact in s 5(3)(b), it required the applicant for review to show more than that there was no evidence before the decision-maker of the fact found, or assumed, as the basis of the decision. The applicant was required to negative the fact and, as his Honour noted, this may constitute a heavy burden, especially where the facts are obscure. But the language of s 5(3)(b) shows that its concluding words do impose an additional requirement and the history of the section, discussed by Wilcox J in Television Capricornia (supra), tends to confirm that this is so.”