Islam v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Islam v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1574

MIGRATION - application for protection visa - Refugee Review Tribunal’s decision based on findings as to credit - whether evidence to support decision - whether findings as to credit a “particular fact” - whether a “particular fact” refers to an objective fact capable of being disproved - distinction between a finding of fact and a conclusion based on facts or reasoning from facts - nature of findings on credibility - whether non-existence of a particular fact establishes no evidence ground

WORDS & PHRASES - “particular fact”

Statutes

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 476(1)(g), 476(4)(b)

Cases

Chen v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 34 Applied

Lia v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 65 Applied

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Indatissa [2000] FCA 181 Applied

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Rajamanikkam [2000] FCA 1023 Referred to

ZAHIRUL ISLAM v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
W157 OF 2001

SACKVILLE, KIEFEL, HELY JJ
PERTH
8 NOVEMBER 2001

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

W157 OF 2001

ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

ZAHIRUL ISLAM
APPELLANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

SACKVILLE, KIEFEL and HELY JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

8 NOVEMBER 2001

WHERE MADE:

PERTH

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal, including the notice of contention.

Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

W157 OF 2001

ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

ZAHIRUL ISLAM
APPELLANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

SACKVILLE, KIEFEL and HELY JJ

DATE:

8 NOVEMBER 2001

PLACE:

PERTH

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

  1. The appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh and arrived in Australia on 20 May 1999.  His application for a protection (Class AZ) visa, made on 2 June 1999, was refused by the Minister’s delegate on 11 August 1999.  This appeal concerns a second review of that decision by the Refugee Review Tribunal, an earlier determination by the Tribunal, differently constituted, having been set aside by order of this Court.  The appeal is from a judgment of a Judge of the Court who dismissed the appellant’s application for review of the Tribunal’s second decision, made on 31 July 2000, affirming the delegate’s refusal to grant a visa.

  2. The appellant claimed that he had left his country in April 1999.  He said that he did so because he was a student and a member of the BNP political party, which had lost government in 1996.  He had continued to work for it afterwards.  As a result the ruling party had victimised him and tried to kill him;  made threats amounting to extortion;  damaged his mother’s house and injured his…

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Details
Case
[2001] FCA 1574
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Islam v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, the appellant contested the Tribunal's decision to reject his claim for a protection visa based on his credibility. The Tribunal found that the appellant fabricated his testimony and evidence, concluding that he was not a credible witness. Consequently, the Tribunal did not accept his claim of a fear of persecution in Bangladesh. The case was brought before the court to determine whether the Tribunal's decision was legally sound, particularly focusing on whether there was sufficient evidence to justify the decision under Section 476(1)(g) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).

The central legal issues revolved around whether the Tribunal's findings concerning the appellant's credibility and the fabrication of evidence constituted particular facts that did not exist, as required by Section 476(4)(b) of the Act. The primary judge had previously held that the Tribunal's conclusion that the appellant had fabricated reasons for issues with certain documents amounted to a particular fact that did not exist. However, the judge did not find this to be a ground for review because the Tribunal's view on the documents was supported by independent evidence. The judge also concluded that the facts concerning the closure of the appellant's business were adequately substantiated.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the Tribunal's finding about the fabrication of explanations for difficulties with the documents was a particular fact that did not exist, concluding the matter in his favour. The respondent, however, contended that the decision in Rajamanikkam was not applicable to the facts of this case and that what was involved here was a conclusion, not a finding of fact. The court found the respondent's contention to be correct.

The court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellant pay the respondent's costs of the appeal, including the notice of contention. This decision underscores the importance of distinguishing between factual findings and conclusions when reviewing decisions under the Migration Act.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal, including the notice of contention.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

The case concerns an appellant who made an application for a protection visa, claiming he had a fear of persecution in Bangladesh. The Tribunal found the appellant was not a credible witness and had fabricated his testimony and evidence. The primary judge found that the Tribunal had concluded the appellant fabricated reasons concerning problems in two documents and that the appellant closed his business in February 1999, conducting it until April 1999. The appellant sought judicial review of the Tribunal's decision, arguing that the Tribunal's finding that he had fabricated reasons for perceived difficulties with the documents amounted to a particular fact that did not exist.

The matter began as an application for judicial review of a decision made by the Tribunal. The application was brought under section 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), which provides for review of a decision on the ground that there was no evidence or other material to justify the making of the decision. The application was first heard by a primary judge who dismissed it. The appellant appealed this decision, and the appeal was heard by a higher court.

Decision

Reasons for decision

SACKVILLE, KIEFEL, HELY JJ
The Tribunal concluded that “taking all of these matters into account”, the appellant was not a credible witness, and that he had “fabricated his testimony and evidence in an attempt to substantiate his claims for a protection visa”. Since he was not a credible witness his claim to a fear of persecution in Bangladesh could not be accepted. THE DECISION OF THE PRIMARY JUDGE Section 476(1)(g) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) provides as a ground of review: “that there was no evidence or other material to justify the making of the decision.” Section 476(4) limits the operation of this provision:(a)the person who made the decision was required by law to reach that decision only if a particular matter was established, and there was no evidence or other material (including facts of which the person was entitled to take notice) from which the person could reasonably be satisfied that the matter was established; or (b)the person who made the decision based the decision on the existence of a particular fact, and that fact did not exist. The focus here is upon s 476(4)(b). His Honour the primary Judge accepted that a “particular fact” is to be distinguished from the ultimate fact in issue or a conclusion based upon a series of particular facts: Chen v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 34 [34]. His Honour also considered that there was no reason in principle why a finding of fact upon which a conclusion of lack of credibility is based could not constitute a particular fact within s 476(4)(b), depending on the circumstances of the particular case. In this regard his Honour referred to Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Rajamanikkam [2000] FCA 1023 [21]. His Honour held that “the conclusion that the applicant had fabricated reasons concerning problems in the two documents was a particular fact which did not exist”. In doing so his Honour also accepted the submission that the applicant could not have known that the documents bore the same date. He was therefore necessarily speculating about how such a coincidence might have occurred. This could not amount to a lie. His Honour did not however, consider that a ground for review was thereby established. The view the Tribunal reached concerning the documents was based also upon the independent evidence. Accordingly, it could not be said that there was no evidence to support this aspect of its decision. In relation to the issue concerning the closure of his business, his Honour held that there were two particular facts involved: that the applicant closed his business in February 1999 and that he conducted the business until April 1999. His Honour considered that neither of those facts had been shown not to exist, as s 476(4)(b) required. His Honour dismissed the application THE APPEAL The appellant relied upon his Honour’s holding that the Tribunal’s finding, that the appellant had fabricated explanations for perceived difficulties about the documents, amounted to a particular fact which did not exist. According to Mr Cox, who appeared for the appellant, this concluded the matter in the appellant’s favour. The respondent gave notice of his contention that the decision in Rajamanikkam has no application to the facts of this case. In the respondent’s submission what was here involved was a conclusion, not a finding as to a fact. We consider that contention to be correct.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: SACKVILLE, KIEFEL, HELY JJ

The court considered the ground of review under s 476(4)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) that the Tribunal based its decision on the existence of a particular fact, and that fact did not exist. The court acknowledged that a finding of fact upon which a conclusion of lack of credibility is based could constitute a particular fact within this provision, depending on the circumstances. The court held that the Tribunal's finding that the appellant fabricated reasons for perceived difficulties with the documents constituted such a particular fact that did not exist. However, the court did not consider this to be a ground for review because the Tribunal's view was also based on independent evidence.

In relation to the fabrication of reasons concerning problems in the documents, the court found that there was evidence to support the Tribunal's finding, and thus, this was not a particular fact that did not exist. Regarding the closure of the appellant's business, the court held that there were two particular facts involved: that the applicant closed his business in February 1999 and that he conducted the business until April 1999. The court found that neither of those facts had been shown not to exist.

Finally, the court considered the applicability of the decision in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Rajamanikkam [2000] FCA 1023. The court held that the respondent's contention that what was involved here was a conclusion, not a finding as to a fact, was correct. Thus, the decision in Rajamanikkam did not apply to the facts of this case. The ratio decidendi of this decision is that findings of fact upon which a conclusion of lack of credibility is based can constitute a particular fact within s 476(4)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), but this does not necessarily establish a ground for review if the decision is also supported by independent evidence.