Sun v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Sun v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 495

IMMIGRATION – refugee claim for asylum based on persecution for association with Falungong religion – delegate refused protection visa in detail – mistaken reference to name of applicant at beginning of delegate’s position but correct name shown at end of decision – application for review sought on ground that decision not related to applicant – application for review prepared by migration agent – application disclosed residential address of applicant and business address of applicant’s migration agent for service – subsequently migration agent changed business address – applicant did not in fact change residential address – notifications by Tribunal of time and place of hearing sent to both applicant and migration agent returned by post office to Tribunal – further attempts to communicate time and hearing to applicant through migration agent unsuccessful – applicant did not appear at hearing – one finding of Tribunal based partly on applicant’s reluctance to appear at hearing – issue as to whether other findings of Tribunal similarly based – evidence as to why applicant did not appear admitted – held that most material findings of Tribunal not based on applicant’s non-appearance at Tribunal – application for review dismissed – whether discretion of Court referrable to applicant’s conduct should be in any event exercised adversely to applicant.

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) subss 476(1)(g) and 476(4)(b)

Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Indatissa & Anor (2002) 64 ALD 1 followed
Harunor v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 853 referred to
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Mohammad (2000) 101 FCR 434 considered
Mulla v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 934 considered
Curragh Queensland Mining Ltd v Daniel & Others (1992) 34 FCR 212 applied
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Li Yue [2000] FCA 856 referred to
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Rajamanikkam [2000] FCA 1023 referred to
Abbasi v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1274 referred to

MING SUN v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

N 1240 OF 2001

CONTI J
24 APRIL 2002
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 1240 OF 2001

BETWEEN:

MING SUN
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

CONTI J

DATE OF ORDER:

24 APRIL 2002

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The Application for Review be dismissed.

2.The Applicant pay the Respondent’s costs of the proceedings.

Note:   Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 1240 OF 2001

BETWEEN:

MING SUN
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

CONTI J

DATE:

24 APRIL 2002

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Application for Review

  1. This is an application for review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) made on 9 July 2001. The Tribunal affirmed…

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Details
Case
[2002] FCA 495
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Sun v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia was called upon to review the Minister’s decision to refuse a protection visa to the applicant, Sun. The case involved a complex interplay between the legal principles outlined in sections 476(1)(g) and 476(4)(b) of the Migration Act, and how these provisions interact in the context of judicial review. The applicant argued that the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) erred in affirming the delegate's decision, while the Minister maintained that the decision was justified under the relevant legislative framework.

The central legal issue before the Court was whether the RRT had erred in its assessment of the evidence and material before it when affirming the delegate's decision. Specifically, the Court had to determine if the application of sections 476(1)(g) and 476(4)(b) in the context of the RRT's decision-making process was appropriate. The applicant contended that the RRT failed to adequately consider certain evidence, which, if considered, would have led to a different outcome. The Minister, on the other hand, argued that the RRT's decision was correct and that the Court should not re-evaluate the evidence before the RRT.

The Court examined the established principles from Indatissa and other relevant cases, confirming that the power of the court under section 476(1) does not extend to a re-examination of factual matters considered by the tribunal. The Court held that for a ground of review under section 476(1)(g) to be established, it must be shown that there was no evidence or other material to justify the decision, without engaging in a qualitative assessment of the evidence before the tribunal. The Court also reiterated that it is not permissible to adduce new evidence before the Court to contradict evidence that was before the tribunal. The weight to be given to such evidence is a matter entirely for the tribunal.

After considering the arguments and the applicable legal principles, the Court found that the RRT had not erred in its decision to affirm the delegate's refusal of the protection visa. The Court held that the applicant had not demonstrated that there was no evidence or other material before the RRT to justify the decision, and that the RRT's assessment of the evidence was not flawed.

ORDERS:
1. The Application for Review be dismissed.
2. The Applicant pay the Respondent’s costs of the proceedings.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The Application for Review be dismissed.

2. The Applicant pay the Respondent’s costs of the proceedings.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

CONTI J
In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Indatissa and Another (2002) 64 ALD 1, at [27-28], [31-32] and [34], the following principles of interpretation of the operation of the above sub-sections were analysed by a Full Court (Sunberg and Emmett JJ and myself) as follows:“[27]It is not sufficient simply to establish the two matters referred to in s 476(4)(b). That paragraph qualifies s 476(1)(g). It does not constitute a definition of what will amount to there being no evidence or other material to justify the making of the relevant decision. That is to say, it is not sufficient to show that a decision was based on the existence of a particular fact and that that fact did not exist. If that was sufficient, any decision of a tribunal based on the existence of a particular fact could be challenged in the Federal Court by adducing evidence designed to persuade the Federal Court to reach a different conclusion concerning the existence of that fact. Such an approach is demonstrably unsound. It is beyond question that the power of the court under s 476(1) generally and s 476(1)(g) in particular does not extend to a re-examination of any of the factual matters ventilated before the tribunal.[28]In other words, it is only if it can be shown that there was no evidence or other material to justify a decision that it is necessary to consider s 476(4). If there is before the tribunal any evidence or material capable of supporting the particular fact on the existence of which the decision is based, the ground cannot be made out.[31]...In order to satisfy the ground contained in s 476(1)(g) it is necessary, but not sufficient, to satisfy the requirements of s 476(4). Section 476(1)(g) requires that there be no evidence or other material to justify the decision. That, however, does not involve a qualitative assessment, in an application to the court for review, of the evidence and material before the tribunal. If it did justify such an approach, review by the court would entail a reconsideration of the weight that should be given to the evidence and other material before the tribunal.[32]It is not permissible, in order to establish the ground in s 476(1)(g) to adduce evidence to contradict evidence or other material that was before the tribunal. The weight to be attached to such evidence and material is a matter entirely for the tribunal. If it were permissible to adduce further evidence before the court whenever the evidence and material before the tribunal did not point strongly to the conclusion that the decision was justified, the court would be called upon to reassess the weight afforded to evidence or other material by the tribunal. That was clearly not parliament’s intention.…[34]Assuming that the asserted fact relied on by the respondents for the purpose of s 476(4)(b) does satisfy the requirements of that provision (which was not conceded by the Minister) and assuming that that fact was shown, by the additional evidence, not to exist, it is still necessary to demonstrate that there was no evidence or other material before the tribunal from which that fact could be found…”Indatissa has since been applied in numerous first instance cases in the Court, for example in Harunor v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 853 at [16], where Heerey J broadly described the operation subss 476(1)(g) and (4)(b) in combination as follows:“… More generally, however, the grounds under s 476(1)(g) and as qualified by s 476(4)(b) are only applicable where there was no evidence or other material to justify the making of the decision; that is to say, the decision to refuse the grant of a protection visa.”The Minister relied upon the dicta in Indatissa in the presentation of his case, and the Applicant sought to distinguish the same from application to the circumstances postulated by the Applicant.Procedural circumstances leading to the RRT affirming the Delegate’s decision not to grant a protection visa

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: CONTI J

Full text does not contain this section.