Chhour v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

Link copied
Case Copied 32 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Chhour v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 911

MIGRATION – review of decision of Refugee Review Tribunal – whether decision based on particular fact which did not exist – whether Tribunal failed to consider applicant’s claim as refugee sur place – whether Tribunal failed to set out findings on material questions of fact – whether Tribunal identified a wrong issue, asked a wrong question, ignored relevant material or relied on irrelevant material.

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) Pt 8, ss 430(1), 476(1)(a), 476(1)(b), (c), (e), (g), 476(4)(b)

Curragh Queensland Mining Limited v Daniel (1992) 34 FCR 212 at 220-221 applied
Inderjit Singh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1998] FCA 1366 referred to
Chopra v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 480 referred to
Fernando v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 962 referred to
Guden v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 58 ALD 352 referred to
Charaev v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 865 referred to
Indatissa v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1119 referred to
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Indatissa [2001] FCA 181 at [26] to [28] applied
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Al-Miahi [2001] FCA 744 at [35], [36]-[40] applied
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 180 ALR 1 at 22 applied
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v “X” [2001] FCA 858 at [18] referred to
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Singh (2000) 98 FCR 469 not followed
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Tedella [2001] FCA 832 at [21] referred to
Khan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 736 at [15] referred to
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 29 at 39-42 referred to
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Anthonypillai [2001] FCA 274 referred to

SOKUN CHHOUR v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

V384 OF 2000

WEINBERG J
17 JULY 2001
MELBOURNE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V384 OF 2000

BETWEEN:

SOKUN CHHOUR
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

WEINBERG J

DATE OF ORDER:

17 JULY 2001

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for review be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V384 OF 2000

BETWEEN:

SOKUN CHHOUR
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

WEINBERG J

DATE:

17 JULY 2001

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an application under Pt 8 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) to review a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the RRT”) made on 5 May 2000. By that decision the RRT affirmed a decision by a delegate of the respondent not to grant the applicant a protection visa.

    Background

  2. The applicant…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Chhour v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2001] FCA 911
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Chhour v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs involves the applicant challenging a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) that rejected his claim for refugee status. The dispute centred on the RRT’s reliance on a discrepancy between the applicant's account of an incident in May 1996 and that of a witness, Mr Van Dy, as a basis for its decision. The matter was heard in the Federal Court of Australia, where the applicant raised several grounds for review of the RRT's decision.

The primary legal issues the court had to address were whether the RRT's decision was based on a particular fact that did not exist and whether there was any evidence or other material to justify the decision. Specifically, the court had to consider whether the RRT's reliance on the supposed discrepancy was sufficient to constitute a basis for its decision under section 476(1)(g) of the Migration Act, as qualified by section 476(4)(b). The court examined whether the decision was made without any evidence or material to justify it, and whether the decision was based on a particular fact that did not exist.

The Federal Court, following the Full Court's reasoning in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Indatissa, held that the applicant's ground of review was not made out. The court found that the RRT's decision was not critically based on the existence of the alleged discrepancy. Moreover, the court held that for the ground to be valid, there must be no evidence or material to justify the decision. The court determined that as long as there was some evidence or material supporting the RRT's decision, the ground of review could not succeed. Given the existence of evidence supporting the RRT's findings, the court dismissed the application for review.

The court ordered that the application for review be dismissed and that the applicant pay the respondent’s costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for review be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Indatissa a Full Court comprising Sundberg, Emmett and Conti JJ observed at [26] to [28]:“There are three requirements for establishing the ground of s 476(1)(g), as qualified by s 476(4)(b). The first requirement, to be found in s 476(1)(g) itself, is that there was no evidence or other material to justify the making of the decision. The second requirement, as found in the first limb of s 476(4)(b) is that the decision under review is based on the existence of a particular fact. The third requirement, found in the second limb of s 476(4)(b), is that that fact did not exist. Unless each of those requirements is satisfied, the ground is not be made out.It is not sufficient simply to establish the two matters referred to in s 476(4)(b). That paragraph qualifies s 476(1)(g). It does not constitute a definition of what will amount to there being no evidence or other material to justify the making of the relevant decision. That is to say, it is not sufficient to show that a decision was based on the existence of a particular fact and that that fact did not exist. If that was sufficient, any decision of a Tribunal based on the existence of a particular fact could be challenged in the Federal Court by adducing evidence designed to persuade the Federal Court to reach a different conclusion concerning the existence of that fact. Such an approach is demonstrably unsound. It is beyond question that the power of the Court under s 476(1) generally and s 476(1)(g) in particular does not extend to a re-examination of any of the factual matters ventilated before the Tribunal.In other words, it is only if it can be shown that there was no evidence or other material to justify a decision that it is necessary to consider s 476(4). If there is before the Tribunal any evidence or material capable of supporting the particular fact on the existence of which the decision is based, the ground cannot be made out.” (emphasis added) The reasoning of the Full Court in Indatissa is sufficient, by itself, to dispose of the applicant’s first ground of review. Even if it be the case that the supposed discrepancy between his account of the May 1996 incident, and that given by Mr Van Dy, did not exist, and even if that discrepancy can be characterised as “a particular fact” which did “not exist”, s 476(1)(g), taken together with s 476(4)(b), requires, as a first step, that the decision of the RRT be “based … on the existence of” that particular fact. In addition, there must be “no evidence or other material to justify the making of the decision” in order for this ground to be made out. Provided there is before the RRT “any evidence or material capable of supporting the particular fact on the existence of which the decision is based”, there is evidence to “justify” the making of the decision. Turning to the first of the conditions which the applicant must satisfy to make good this ground of review, it is difficult to see how it can be said that the RRT relevantly “based” its decision on the existence of the supposed discrepancy. No doubt the existence of that discrepancy was a matter which it took into account in rejecting the applicant’s claim to have been involved in the May 1996 incident. However, it was hardly “critical” to the decision, whether in a causative, or any other sense.

Decision

Reasons for decision

WEINBERG J

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: WEINBERG J

Full text does not contain this section.