Indatissa v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Indatissa v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1119

MIGRATION – review of decision of Refugee Review Tribunal – evidence or other material to justify the making of the decision by the Tribunal – non-existence of a particular fact – whether discrepancy in evidence constitutes a “particular fact” - whether decision was “based on” particular fact – whether assumed existence of particular fact contributed significantly to ultimate decision.

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(2) , 476(1)(g), 476(4)(b)

Curragh Queensland Mining Limited v Daniel (1992) 34 FCR 212 at 224 followed
Lay Kon Tji v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1998) 158 ALR 681 at 698 referred to
Yilan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 854 referred to
N258/00A v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 993 referred to
Chopra v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 480 distinguished
Inderjit Singh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1998] FCA 1366 referred to
Guden v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 236 referred to
Charaev v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 865 at pars 19-24 referred to
Fernando v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 962 at pars 18, 20, 25-27 distinguished
Macedonian Teachers’ Association of Victoria Inc v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1998) 91 FCR 8 at 30 referred to
State of Victoria v Macedonian Teachers’ Associations of Victoria Inc (1999) 91 FCR 47 at 49 referred to
March v Stramare (E & MH) Pty Limited (1991) 171 CLR 506 referred to
Royall v The Queen (1991) 172 CLR 378 referred to
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Li Yue [2000] FCA 856 distinguished
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Singh [2000] FCA 845 referred to

PUBUDU KUMAR INDATISSA & ANOR v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

V 713 of 1999

WEINBERG J
10 AUGUST 2000
MELBOURNE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 713 OF 1999

BETWEEN:

PUBUDU KUMAR INDATISSA
FIRST APPLICANT

JENNIFER VIJAYANTHI INDATISSA
SECOND APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

WEINBERG J

DATE OF ORDER:

10 AUGUST 2000

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal made on 26 November 1999 be set aside.

2.The application for protection visas be remitted to that body, differently constituted, to be dealt with according to law.

3.The respondent pay the applicants’ costs of and incidental to this application.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 713 OF 1999

BETWEEN:

PUBUDU KUMAR INDATISSA
FIRST APPLICANT

JENNIFER VIJAYANTHI INDATISSA
SECOND APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

WEINBERG J

DATE:

10 AUGUST 2000

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an application for review of a decision made by the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) on 26 November 1999. The…

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Details
Case
[2000] FCA 1119
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Indatissa v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs involves an application for judicial review of a decision made by the Refugee Review Tribunal on 26 November 1999. The Tribunal had upheld a decision by a delegate of the respondent that neither the applicants, nor their two sons, qualified for the grant of protection visas. The applicants, Sri Lankan citizens, sought judicial review of this decision under section 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The applicants claimed that they were owed a duty of care by the Tribunal, which had failed to properly consider the credibility of evidence before it, and that this constituted a jurisdictional error. The central legal issue was whether the decision of the Tribunal was based on a particular fact that did not exist, as required by section 5(3)(b) of the Act.

The court found that the decision was based on the existence of a particular fact that did not exist. It held that if the existence of a particular fact is critical to the making of a decision, then the decision will be based on the existence of that particular fact. The court distinguished between facts that are critical to the decision and those that are of peripheral importance. In this case, the fact that the applicants had allowed Tamils to stay at their home was seen as critical to the Tribunal's decision. However, the applicants claimed that they were not aware of any political connections the Tamils may have had, and allowed them to stay only because there was nowhere else for them to go. The court found that the Tribunal's decision was based on a fact that did not exist because the applicants did not know of the Tamils' political affiliations.

The court ordered that the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal be set aside, and that the application for protection visas be remitted to the Tribunal, differently constituted, to be dealt with according to law. The respondent was also ordered to pay the applicants' costs of and incidental to this application. The decision highlights the importance of ensuring that decisions are based on facts that actually exist, particularly when those facts are critical to the outcome.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal made on 26 November 1999 be set aside.

2. The application for protection visas be remitted to that body, differently constituted, to be dealt with according to law.

3. The respondent pay the applicants’ costs of and incidental to this application.

Background

Background to the litigation

This is an application for review of a decision made by the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) on 26 November 1999. The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the respondent that neither the applicants, nor their two sons, were entitled to the grant of protection visas. The application for review is brought pursuant to s 476 of the Migration Act1958 (Cth) (“the Act”).Background The first applicant is a citizen of Sri Lanka and was born in that country in 1968. Both he and his wife, who is the second applicant, are of Sinhalese ethnicity. He arrived in this country, together with his wife and elder son, on 7 July 1996. He did not, however, apply for a protection visa until June 1997. Prior to his departure from Sri Lanka the first applicant completed tertiary studies in that country and was employed as an assistant marketing manager. His employer was a Tamil. He acquired many Tamil friends whom he met during the course of his employment.The applicants’ case The first applicant claimed that he and his wife had resided in a large, four bedroom house in Colombo. About twice a month various Tamil friends and their relatives had stayed overnight at their home while these people finalised their arrangements to leave Sri Lanka. He claimed that he was not aware, at the time, of any political connections that these people may have had. He permitted them to stay at his home because at that time Tamil homes were constantly being raided by the police and the army. There was nowhere else for them to stay. The first applicant claimed that in about October 1996, several months after he arrived in this country, he was telephoned by his mother and told that a group of soldiers had raided the family home and arrested a number of Tamils who were staying there at the time. These Tamils were suspected of being involved with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (“LTTE”). He was told that the house had been damaged, and that both his parents had been subjected to harassment. He was also told that his father had been interrogated about the Tamil visitors, and that he had been physically mistreated by the soldiers who questioned him. The first applicant claimed that it was only after this telephone conversation that he first appreciated that there may have been a connection between the Tamils who had stayed at his home, and the LTTE. He claimed further that he understood that the number of Tamils who came to stay at the family home had increased significantly after he left Sri Lanka. He was told that these stays had now become a weekly occurrence. He claimed that it then became apparent to him that the Tamils had taken advantage of the willingness of his parents to provide sanctuary to those who were in a desperate plight. The first applicant claimed that for some reason that he could not explain why the Sri Lankan authorities mistakenly believed that he continued to reside in that country. The army continually questioned his parents about his whereabouts. He claimed that he had been told that a group of soldiers had raped his sister and indecently assaulted his mother as a form of payback for his involvement with members of the LTTE.

Decision

Reasons for decision

WEINBERG J
In Curragh Black CJ (which whom Spender and Gummow JJ agreed) said at 220-221:“The fact in question was clearly a “particular fact” and, in my view, the decision was “based” upon it. If the existence of a particular fact is seen to be critical to the making of a decision then the decision will be based on the existence of that particular fact. In Bond’s case (supra) Mason CJ said (at 357) that s 5(3)(b) was directed to “proof of the non-existence of a fact critical to the making of the decision” [my emphasis]. See also Luu v Renevier (1989) 91 ALR 39 at 47 where a Full Court of this Court (Davies, Wilcox and Pincus JJ) used the word “critical” to distinguish unsupported findings of fact that go to the validity of a decision from findings relating only to a matter of peripheral importance that may not affect the validity of a decision.Section 5(3)(b) does not require the identification of some single particular fact that may be said to be the foundation of the decision. A decision may be based upon the existence of many particular facts; it will be based upon the existence of each particular fact that is critical to the making of the decision. A small factual link in a chain of reasoning, if it is truly a link in a chain and there are no parallel links, may be just as critical to the decision, and just as much a fact upon which the decision is based, as a fact that is of more obvious immediate importance. A decision may also be based on a finding of fact that, critically, leads the decision-maker to take one path in the process of reasoning rather than another and so to come to a different conclusion.If a decision is in truth based, in the sense I have described, on a particular fact for which there is no evidence, and the fact does not exist, the decision is flawed whatever the relative importance of the fact. Accordingly, I agree with the conclusion of Lee J in Akers v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1988) 20 FCR 363 at 374 that there is no reason to read s 5(3)(b) in a way that would limit its operation to a predominant reason for the decision under review.” (emphasis added) In Chopra v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 480 a Full Court comprising Lee, Whitlam and Weinberg JJ dealt with the conditions necessary for s 476(4)(b) of the Act to be met. In that case, the Court was not persuaded that the decision to refuse the appellant a protection visa was, in any relevant sense, based on the existence of the particular fact identified as being a fact which did not exist. That fact seemed to the Court to have been of peripheral importance. It was but one of a number of matters taken into account by the Tribunal, any one of which would have been sufficient to lead it to refuse the application. It was not, in that sense, “critical” to the making of the decision. In Inderjit Singh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1998] FCA 1366 I concluded that the Tribunal’s decision was based on the existence of two particular facts, neither of which existed. These “facts” were firstly a finding that the applicant’s account of events had been a “recent invention” (when in truth he had given essentially the same account on several prior occasions), and secondly an attribution to the applicant of an embellishment of an account which he had never, in fact, put forward. Inderjit Singh was, however, a case where, absent the particular fact which had been wrongly found to exist, it could not realistically be said that there was “evidence or other material to justify the making of the decision”.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: WEINBERG J

The court examined the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal and identified that it was based on a particular fact that did not exist. In doing so, the court referred to the legal principle established in Bond’s case, which states that a decision is directed to “proof of the non-existence of a fact critical to the making of the decision.” The court further explained that a decision may be based on many particular facts, and each fact that is critical to the making of the decision is a fact upon which the decision is based. The court found that if a decision is based on a particular fact for which there is no evidence, and the fact does not exist, the decision is flawed. This principle was applied to the case at hand, where the Tribunal's decision was deemed to be based on a particular fact that did not exist. The court compared this case to Chopra v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs and Inderjit Singh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, where the decisions were not based on critical particular facts that did not exist. The court found that the particular fact in this case was indeed critical to the making of the decision, and therefore the decision of the Tribunal was flawed. The ratio decidendi of this decision is that a decision based on a particular fact that does not exist, and that is critical to the making of the decision, is flawed.