FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Indatissa v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1119
MIGRATION – review of decision of Refugee Review Tribunal – evidence or other material to justify the making of the decision by the Tribunal – non-existence of a particular fact – whether discrepancy in evidence constitutes a “particular fact” - whether decision was “based on” particular fact – whether assumed existence of particular fact contributed significantly to ultimate decision.
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(2) , 476(1)(g), 476(4)(b)
Curragh Queensland Mining Limited v Daniel (1992) 34 FCR 212 at 224 followed
Lay Kon Tji v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1998) 158 ALR 681 at 698 referred to
Yilan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 854 referred to
N258/00A v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 993 referred to
Chopra v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 480 distinguished
Inderjit Singh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1998] FCA 1366 referred to
Guden v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 236 referred to
Charaev v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 865 at pars 19-24 referred to
Fernando v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 962 at pars 18, 20, 25-27 distinguished
Macedonian Teachers’ Association of Victoria Inc v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1998) 91 FCR 8 at 30 referred to
State of Victoria v Macedonian Teachers’ Associations of Victoria Inc (1999) 91 FCR 47 at 49 referred to
March v Stramare (E & MH) Pty Limited (1991) 171 CLR 506 referred to
Royall v The Queen (1991) 172 CLR 378 referred to
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Li Yue [2000] FCA 856 distinguished
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Singh [2000] FCA 845 referred toPUBUDU KUMAR INDATISSA & ANOR v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
V 713 of 1999
WEINBERG J
10 AUGUST 2000
MELBOURNE
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
V 713 OF 1999
BETWEEN:
PUBUDU KUMAR INDATISSA
FIRST APPLICANTJENNIFER VIJAYANTHI INDATISSA
SECOND APPLICANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENTJUDGE:
WEINBERG J
DATE OF ORDER:
10 AUGUST 2000
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal made on 26 November 1999 be set aside.
2.The application for protection visas be remitted to that body, differently constituted, to be dealt with according to law.
3.The respondent pay the applicants’ costs of and incidental to this application.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
V 713 OF 1999
BETWEEN:
PUBUDU KUMAR INDATISSA
FIRST APPLICANTJENNIFER VIJAYANTHI INDATISSA
SECOND APPLICANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT
JUDGE:
WEINBERG J
DATE:
10 AUGUST 2000
PLACE:
MELBOURNE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
This is an application for review of a decision made by the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) on 26 November 1999. The…
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- Case
- [2000] FCA 1119
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the decision was based on the existence of a particular fact that did not exist. It held that if the existence of a particular fact is critical to the making of a decision, then the decision will be based on the existence of that particular fact. The court distinguished between facts that are critical to the decision and those that are of peripheral importance. In this case, the fact that the applicants had allowed Tamils to stay at their home was seen as critical to the Tribunal's decision. However, the applicants claimed that they were not aware of any political connections the Tamils may have had, and allowed them to stay only because there was nowhere else for them to go. The court found that the Tribunal's decision was based on a fact that did not exist because the applicants did not know of the Tamils' political affiliations.
The court ordered that the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal be set aside, and that the application for protection visas be remitted to the Tribunal, differently constituted, to be dealt with according to law. The respondent was also ordered to pay the applicants' costs of and incidental to this application. The decision highlights the importance of ensuring that decisions are based on facts that actually exist, particularly when those facts are critical to the outcome.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal made on 26 November 1999 be set aside.
2. The application for protection visas be remitted to that body, differently constituted, to be dealt with according to law.
3. The respondent pay the applicants’ costs of and incidental to this application.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: WEINBERG J
The court examined the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal and identified that it was based on a particular fact that did not exist. In doing so, the court referred to the legal principle established in Bond’s case, which states that a decision is directed to “proof of the non-existence of a fact critical to the making of the decision.” The court further explained that a decision may be based on many particular facts, and each fact that is critical to the making of the decision is a fact upon which the decision is based. The court found that if a decision is based on a particular fact for which there is no evidence, and the fact does not exist, the decision is flawed. This principle was applied to the case at hand, where the Tribunal's decision was deemed to be based on a particular fact that did not exist. The court compared this case to Chopra v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs and Inderjit Singh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, where the decisions were not based on critical particular facts that did not exist. The court found that the particular fact in this case was indeed critical to the making of the decision, and therefore the decision of the Tribunal was flawed. The ratio decidendi of this decision is that a decision based on a particular fact that does not exist, and that is critical to the making of the decision, is flawed.