FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
CRX19 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 1059
File number(s): SYG 1724 of 2019 Judgment of: JUDGE KAUR-BAINS Date of judgment: 18 October 2024 Catchwords: MIGRATION – judicial review -protection visa- no evidence ground only available in relation to positive findings- negative findings where Tribunal not satisfied and rejects evidence as not being credible are not open to challenge on no evidence judicial review ground - application dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36, 476, 477 Cases cited: Sunchen Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2010) 114 ALD 49 Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 32 Date of hearing: 14 October 2024 Place: Sydney Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person by Microsoft Teams Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mr J Fyfe of Minter Ellison Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Submitting Appearance save as to costs ORDERS
SYG 1724 of 2019 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: CRX19
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE KAUR - BAINS
DATE OF ORDER:
18 OCTOBER 2024
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The name of the First Respondent is amended to Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs.
2.The application is dismissed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Judge Kaur-Bains
On 9 July 2019 the applicant filed an application in this Court, seeking judicial review of a decision of the second respondent (Tribunal) dated 21 June 2019. The Tribunal affirmed a decision not to grant the applicant a Protection (Class XA) (subclass 866) visa (visa).
This Court has jurisdiction to determine this matter pursuant to s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act). The application has been brought within the time set out in s 477 of the Act.
BACKGROUND
The applicant is a citizen of Taiwan (Republic of China). On 28 February 2013, the applicant first arrived in Australia together with his then wife, as the holder of a Class (TZ) (subclass 417) (working holiday) visa. The applicant then held subsequent holiday visas until he applied on 26 March 2015 for a protection visa. In the protection visa application, the applicant claimed to have owned a food stall in Taiwan and to have been harassed by gang members seeking to extort protection money. The applicant alleged he refused to pay, and reported the gangsters to police, but this angered the gangsters (CB 30-32).
The applicant’s then wife was…
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- Case
- [2024] FedCFamC2G 1059
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the Tribunal made an error in law by rejecting the applicant's claims without sufficient evidence. Specifically, the court needed to determine if the Tribunal’s negative findings were supported by evidence and whether the no evidence ground of judicial review was applicable in the context of negative findings. The court examined the Tribunal’s reasoning and whether it appropriately considered the applicant’s evidence and explanations for his claims.
The court found that the no evidence ground of judicial review was not applicable to negative findings, where the decision-maker rejects evidence as not credible. The court referenced several authorities that supported the view that negative findings could be made by simply rejecting evidence as not credible, and thus, the no evidence ground should not be available. The court concluded that the Tribunal’s decision to reject the applicant’s claims was based on its assessment of the credibility of the evidence and that the Tribunal did not err in law. The court held that the Tribunal was entitled to reject the applicant's claims if it found his evidence not credible, and this did not constitute a legal error warranting judicial review.
The court dismissed the application for judicial review, affirming the Tribunal's decision. The reasoning provided by the Tribunal was deemed sufficient, and the court found no legal error in the Tribunal’s rejection of the applicant’s claims.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
I explained to the applicant at the outset, that this Court could not engage in merits review or grant him a protection visa but could only review the Tribunal’s decision to see if there was a legal error.CONSIDERATION The applicant did not file written submissions. I asked the translator at the hearing to interpret to the applicant each of the grounds, which the interpreter did. Grounds 1 and 2 Ground 1 contends that the Tribunal did not have evidence to make the negative finding in relation to the applicant’s additional details as to his expanded claims set out in [13] of this judgment. Ground 2 contends that the Tribunal did not have evidence to make the negative finding based on the fact that the applicant said he had returned to Taiwan in 2004 to pay his insurance debt in person. I asked the applicant if he wanted to say anything to me about these two grounds. The applicant said he had nothing to add. The Minister contended that the Tribunal at [24] of the reasons did not accept the applicant’s core claims, essentially, because it did not accept the applicant’s evidence. The reasons included the Tribunal’s concerns set out at [23(a)] to [23(f)] of the reasons and summarised at [14(a)] to 14(f)] of this judgment. The Minister said that the concern outlined at [23(a)] of the reasons was that the applicant’s claims had grown since his initial visa application in significant respects. The concern outlined at [23(e)] of the reasons was that the applicant would go back to Taiwan in 2014, for the purpose of paying health insurance debts in person, if he had a genuine fear of harm in Taiwan. The applicant was given an opportunity by the Tribunal to address its concerns, but the Tribunal did not ultimately accept the applicant’s explanations as credible. I note that the no evidence ground of judicial review is only available in relation to positive findings. Negative findings, where the Tribunal is not satisfied that something has occurred, can be made simply by rejecting evidence as not being credible. In Sunchen Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2010) 114 ALD 49 at [43] to [45] His Honour Perram J states:[43] At the level of principle there is a difference between a finding of a positive fact for which there is no evidence, and a finding that something is not the case where there is some evidence to show that it is in fact so. In the former case, it is not rationally possible to justify the finding for there is no material from which it can proceed: ex nihilo nihil fit. Setting aside such a finding does not therefore impermissibly trespass into the arena of fact finding. Rather, it enforces the procedural requirement that fact finding be based on some evidence.[44] The analysis is quite different where a negative finding that something is not the fact is involved. If there exists evidence which contradicts that negative finding — that is, suggests that something is the fact — it remains rationally possible for the decision-maker to arrive at the same conclusion simply by rejecting that evidence as not credible. For example, where a decision-maker finds that a visa applicant has a criminal record and does so in the absence of any evidence to that effect, it is easy to conclude that the finding is vitiated for, on the material, only the opposite conclusion can rationally be reached. Where, however, a decision-maker finds that a pension applicant did not work during a 6 month period, that conclusion is not logically excluded by evidence from the applicant that she did in fact work, for it is possible for the decision-maker to disbelieve the applicant and therefore arrive at the same conclusion.[45] For that reason, the no evidence ground should not be available where the finding challenged is in substance a negative one. The authorities in this court support, I believe, that approach: see N258/00A v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 101 FCR 478; [2000] FCA 993 at [27] per Katz J; Aung v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1562 at [38] per Katz J; Ordenzia v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 35 at [27] per Katz J; He v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 446 at [38] per Ryan J; Abila v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1186 at [21]–[25] per Tamberlin J; Sarancharkh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1461 at [43]–[45] per Hill J. I do not regard the Full Court’s decision in Guden v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 58 ALD 352; [2000] FCA 236 as being to the contrary. It follows that this ground is not made out.(emphasis added)