MIMA v Rajamanikkam and Anor S122/2001

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Sydney  No S122 of 2001

B e t w e e n -

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

Appellant

and

NADASARA RAJAMANIKKAM

First Respondent

BALAMBIKAI RAJAMANIKKAM

Second Respondent

GLEESON CJ
GAUDRON J
McHUGH J
KIRBY J
CALLINAN J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA ON WEDNESDAY, 14 NOVEMBER 2001, AT 11.44 AM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

MR J. BASTEN, QC:   If the Court pleases, I appear with MR S.B. LLOYD for the appellant.  (instructed by the Australian Government Solicitor)

MR D.K. CATTERNS, QC:   May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR N.C. POYNDER, for the respondents.  (instructed by Craddock Murray Neumann)

GLEESON CJ:   Yes, Mr Basten.  

MR BASTEN:   Your Honours, the concern raised by this case is that after this Court’s decision in Bond, it was generally thought that the statutory “no evidence” ground, while allowing challenges going beyond no evidence of the ultimate factual issue for the court as under the common law, was more confined than merely requiring an absence of evidence but if the Full Court judgment in this case is correct, the disappointed applicant who can isolate any fact or facts on which a decision-maker has based his or her conclusion, at least in the sense that it is not a peripheral fact, may come to the Federal Court and say:  “I can prove with evidence on the balance of probabilities that that fact did not exist”, and thereby establish an error of law. 

In our submission, the Full Court’s approach was wrong for a number of reasons.  The first and perhaps clearest is that what was said to be the fact which did not exist was a primary fact supporting a credibility finding, which itself of course could not be a particular fact of the kind referred to in the statutory ground.  Secondly, the decision is not relevantly based on that fact if the decision-maker identified a number of bases ‑ eight, in this case at least – of primary facts as justifying the inference.  All one can ultimately say is that one or two of that number were not, on the view of the Federal Court, correctly found and could not be dismissed as merely of peripheral importance. 

There are then a series of broader questions which are less clearly answered on current authority.  These concern the relationship in a constructional sense of the general terms of the statutory ground with the specific gateways.  Is it still necessary to say that there is no evidence to justify the ultimate decision as identified in section 475(1)(g)?  If so, how can that apply when the ultimate decision is a want of satisfaction as to a matter, a state of mind which one would think requires no evidence at all? 

Thirdly, where the particular fact is a conclusion that something did not happen or the fact did not exist, can the applicant reverse the clear words…

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Details
Case
[2001] HCATrans 575
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered the appeal of the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (MIMA) against the decision of the Federal Court of Australia in favour of Mr. Rajamanikkam and another applicant. The dispute concerned the validity of decisions made by the Minister to refuse to grant protection visas to the applicants, who were citizens of Sri Lanka. The applicants had arrived in Australia by boat and claimed asylum, alleging they feared persecution in their home country.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the Minister's decisions to refuse the protection visas were vitiated by a failure to provide the applicants with procedural fairness. Specifically, the court had to determine if the Minister was obliged to inform the applicants of adverse information that was to be relied upon in assessing their claims, and to provide them with an opportunity to respond to that information, before making a decision. This question arose in the context of the Minister's assessment of whether the applicants met the criteria for a protection visa under the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth).

The High Court, by majority, held that the Minister's decisions were invalid due to a breach of the duty to afford procedural fairness. The majority reasoned that the Minister's assessment involved the consideration of adverse information that was not disclosed to the applicants, and that this information was material to the outcome of their visa applications. The court affirmed the principle that where a decision-maker proposes to rely on adverse information that has not been disclosed to the affected party, procedural fairness generally requires that the party be given notice of the information and an opportunity to comment on it. This principle applies even in the context of administrative decision-making under the *Migration Act*, unless Parliament has clearly evinced an intention to exclude it.

Consequently, the High Court dismissed the Minister's appeal and affirmed the orders of the Federal Court. The decisions to refuse the protection visas were set aside, and the matter was remitted to the Minister for reconsideration according to law.

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Background

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

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