Dissanayake v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Dissanayake v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 976

Migration Act 1958 s 424(1), 425(1), 427(1)(d), 476(1)(a),

Ahmed v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 184 ALR 343 applied
Hernandez v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 725 applied
Kulwant Singh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1996] FCA 1013 applied
Kabir v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 184 ALR 295
Masood v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 405 applied
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Anthonypillai (2001) 106 FCR 426 applied
Li v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 96 FCR 125 applied
De Silva v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 98 FCR 364 applied
Xiao v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1472 applied
Sreeram v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 106 FCR 578 applied
Tin v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1109 applied
Kola v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 476 applied
Algama v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 476 applied
Chaddha v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 92 applied
Abebe v The Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 510 applied
Applicant F v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 304
Guo v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1996) 40 ALD 445 cited
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Wu (1996) 185 CLR 259 cited
Brakni v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 48 cited
Chokov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 823 cited
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559 cited
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Rajalingham (1999) 93 FCR 220 applied
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 180 ALR 1 cited
Curragh Queensland Mining Ltd v Daniel (1992) 34 FCR 212 applied
Li v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 96 FCR 125 distinguished

ROHAN SHIVANTHA DISSANAYAKE and ROHAN MILROY DILHAN DISSANAYAKE v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

V 350 OF 2001

SUNDBERG J
7 AUGUST 2002
MELBOURNE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 350 OF 2001

BETWEEN:

ROHAN SHIVANTHA DISSANAYAKE
FIRST APPLICANT

ROHAN MILROY DILHAN DISSANAYAKE
SECOND APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

SUNDBERG J

DATE OF ORDER:

7 AUGUST 2002

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The application be dismissed.

2.        The applicants pay the respondent’s costs of the application.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 350 OF 2001

BETWEEN:

ROHAN SHIVANTHA DISSANAYAKE
FIRST APPLICANT

ROHAN MILROY DILHAN DISSANAYAKE
SECOND APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

SUNDBERG J

DATE:

7 AUGUST 2002

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BACKGROUND

  1. The applicants are father and son.  They are citizens of Sri Lanka who arrived in Australia…

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Details
Case
[2002] FCA 976
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Dissanayake v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs, the applicant sought leave to amend the grounds of review in an appeal against a decision of the Migration Review Tribunal (MRT). The Tribunal had determined that the applicant, a Sri Lankan national, did not meet the definition of a refugee under the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. The respondent opposed the application to amend the grounds of review. The legal issues before the court involved whether the Tribunal erred in its interpretation of the law and application of facts, and whether the Tribunal failed to properly consider the totality of the evidence. The applicant argued that the Tribunal incorrectly treated a breach of law constituting a criminal act as determinative of, and inconsistent with, the existence of a Convention-based motive for such an act. The applicant also contended that the Tribunal failed to consider the totality of the evidence, including the claim that the father was conducting a campaign or vendetta against the applicant, and that the Tribunal did not adequately account for the father's longstanding membership in the United National Party. The court found that the Tribunal did not err in its interpretation of the law and that the Tribunal had adequately considered the totality of the evidence. The court concluded that the Tribunal's decision was not flawed by any procedural error or misapplication of the law. Accordingly, the application to amend the grounds of review was dismissed, and the applicants were ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the application.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The applicants pay the respondent’s costs of the application.

Background

Background to the litigation

At the hearing the applicant sought leave to add additional grounds of review. This was opposed by the respondent. I said I would deal with the application in my reasons for decision. One of the new grounds is a further alleged error of law, namely that the Tribunal treated a “breach of the law constituting a criminal act as determinative of, and inconsistent with, the existence of a Convention‑based motive for such an act”. When dealing with the claim that the two men were responsible for vandalising the father’s house, the Tribunal said:“The Tribunal accepts that this incident may have taken place however it does not accept that it was related to the applicant’s informing on the assassination attempt or his political activities. As stated above, the applicant was an ordinary supporter who, as he himself claimed in his written statement to the Tribunal, had never faced such incidents before. The Tribunal finds that this incident was not related to the applicant’s political profile or activities but was rather a criminal act.”The applicant treats this passage as though it asserts a dichotomy; that a criminal act cannot be Convention‑based persecution. That is what the Tribunal was held to have done in Chokov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 823. But here the Tribunal said no such thing. It first found the incident was not related to the father’s political profile or activities, and then said it was a criminal act. The natural reading of the words “but was rather a criminal act” is that “it was a criminal act that was not relevantly Convention‑based”. The submission is an exemplar of fine toothcombism. I will allow the amendment even though it must fail.Incorrect application of law to facts The contention here is that the Tribunal failed to consider the totality of the evidence; that it considered the claims in isolation and thereby overlooked the fact that the applicants clamed that the two men were conducting a campaign or vendetta against the father. It thereby failed to consider what motive there may have been for such conduct. It also failed to consider whether the campaign or vendetta may have supported the father’s claim to have reported the two men to the police. It was said that the Tribunal’s piecemeal approach caused it to fail to stand back and look at the totality of the evidence and consider whether, viewed as a whole, it tended to support the claims. Reliance was placed on the observations of Kirby J in Wu at 293:“the decision‑maker must not, by a process of factual findings on particular elements of the material which is provided, foreclose reasonable speculation upon the chances of persecution emerging from a consideration of the whole of the material. Evaluation of chance, as required by Chan cannot be reduced to scientific precision. That is why it is necessary, notwithstanding particular findings, for the decision‑maker in the end to return to the question: ‘What if I am wrong’? Otherwise, by eliminating facts on the way to the final conclusion, based upon what seems ‘likely’ or ‘entitled to greater weight’, the decision‑maker may be left with nothing upon which to conduct the speculation necessary to the evaluation of the facts taken as a whole, in so far as they are said to give rise to a ‘real chance’ of persecution.”At the beginning of the Findings and Reasons part of its decision, the Tribunal noted that it was obliged to consider the totality of the evidence. It then did so, and made the findings recorded in pars 9 to 14 above. It then stated that it had considered the evidence as a whole in concluding that the applicants did not satisfy the Convention definition of a refugee.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The next matter is the claim that the Tribunal failed to take account of the fact that the father had been a longstanding member of the UNP. The evidence about membership as opposed to support of the UNP was rather confused. In the father’s statement forming part of his visa application the words “supporter” and “member” are used interchangeably. At the hearing the father said he was a member and not just a supporter. At first he said he was a paid‑up member. Later he said he was not a paid‑up member because in his constituency there was no such thing. In a statement made after the hearing, he said:“I also wish to mention that UNP supporters holding good positions in their party branch usually do not pay to become members. Most of them like me contribute a lot to the party. Thereafter the branch do not ask them to pay to become members and in many cases the branch pay the membership fee if necessary. This is the case in other branches too. Only ordinary members pay and become members of the party.”Although the evidence about paid‑up membership is inconsistent, the father’s evidence at the hearing was that he was a member and not just a supporter. The Tribunal was accordingly wrong when it said he was not a member of the UNP. But that mistake did not give rise to a failure to exercise jurisdiction in the sense discussed in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 180 ALR 1 at pars 81‑84. The important point is that the Tribunal accepted that the father was involved in the UNP’s activities “in the manner described”. That is a reference to his claim that he organised meetings in his constituency, attracted new members, was involved in a poster campaign and monitored security when speakers addressed meetings. See par 9 above. It accepted that he had been involved in politics since 1975 and that he was actively engaged during election times “as claimed”. It accepted that he participated in a demonstration in 1995, that he may have been told by police not to organise protests, and that he may have participated in the January 1999 demonstration. Thus the Tribunal substantially accepted his claim to involvement with the UNP. That it wrongly described him as a supporter rather than a member does not deprive the Tribunal of jurisdiction to make the decision it did. It was a mistake of fact. The error did not affect the exercise of the Tribunal’s power. See Yusuf pars 82 and 84. In the circumstances of the case the application of the wrong label to the capacity in which accepted activities were engaged in is of no moment. It is inconceivable that the Tribunal would have come to a different conclusion if it had treated the father as a member rather than a supporter. It dealt comprehensively with each of his claims as to his actual involvement with the UNP. The applicant relied on the same mistake under the ground in s 476(1)(c) – decision not authorised by the Act or the regulations. What I have said above applies to this ground as well.No evidence

Decision

Reasons for decision

SUNDBERG J
The Tribunal did not accept the father’s claim that he received threatening calls, and in this connection referred to his profile and the fact that he had not experienced such problems when he was more actively involved in the party. It rejected his claim that he could not rely on police protection, and noted that he had submitted to the Tribunal copies of statements/reports he made to the police of the incidents from August 1999. It did not accept that the police had been instructed not to assist him because of his political opinion.Conclusion The Tribunal concluded that the father was not pursued because of his political opinion or because he had reported two men to the police. It followed that it did not accept that he will be pursued by the two men. It found he does not face a real chance of persecution for his political opinion or any other Convention reason if he returned to Sri Lanka now or in the reasonably foreseeable future.GROUNDS OF REVIEWFailure to observe procedures Two failures to observe procedures for the purposes of s 476(1)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) were asserted. The first was the Tribunal’s failure to make inquiries of the appropriate Sri Lankan authorities or obtain information, or at least to consider whether to use its powers to do so, to determine whether the information supplied by the applicants as to the identity of the two men and the court records corroborated their claim. It was said that the Tribunal regarded the information as critical to their case, and had asked them for the information they later provided, “indicating that this was all the Tribunal required to corroborate their claims”. It was submitted that the Tribunal “gave the impression that it would obtain any further information if only the court records could be provided”. Section 424(1) provides:“In conducting the review, the Tribunal may get any information that it considers relevant. However, if the Tribunal gets such information, the Tribunal must have regard to that information in making the decision on the review.”Section 427(1) provides in part:“For the purpose of the review of a decision, the Tribunal may:…(d)require the Secretary to arrange for the making of any investigation, or any medical examination, that the Tribunal thinks necessary with respect to the review, and to give to the Tribunal a report of that investigation or examination.”While ss 424(1) and 427(1)(d) empower the Tribunal to make enquiries and obtain information, neither implies there is a duty to do so. Nor does a failure to consider whether to make inquiries or obtain information constitute a reviewable error. See Ahmed v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 184 ALR 343 at pars 35‑39, Hernandez v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 725, Kulwant Singh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1996] FCA 1013, Kabir vMinister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 184 ALR 295, Masood v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 405 and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Anthonypillai (2001) 106 FCR 426 at par 86. So far as it relies on s 427(1)(d), the applicants’ submission invites the Court to substitute its own opinion as to what it thinks necessary for that which the Tribunal thinks necessary.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: SUNDBERG J

Full text does not contain this section.