Brakni v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Brakni v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs
[2001] FCA 48

IMMIGRATION – where the Refugee Review Tribunal had found that aspects of the appellant’s account of his persecution by authorities in Algeria were ‘far fetched’ – where primary judge identified possible criticisms of the Tribunal’s reasoning and factual findings – whether primary judge erred in concluding that no ground of review existed under s 476 of the Migration Act 1958.

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 430, s 476

Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611, cited
Addo v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 940, cited
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham
168 ALR 407, cited

FARID BRAKNI v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

W 143 OF 2000

SPENDER, CARR, TAMBERLIN JJ
7 FEBRUARY 2001
PERTH


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

W 143 OF 2000

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

FARID BRAKNI
APPELLANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

SPENDER, CARR, TAMBERLIN JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

7 FEBRUARY 2001

WHERE MADE:

PERTH

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the appeal, to be taxed if not agreed.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

W 143 OF 2000

BETWEEN:

FARID BRAKNI
APPELLANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

SPENDER, CARR, TAMBERLIN JJ

DATE:

7 FEBRUARY 2001

PLACE:

PERTH

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

SPENDER J:

  1. This is an appeal from the dismissal by a single judge of this court (Lee J) of an application under s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) for review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) made on 30 November 1999, which affirmed a decision of a delegate of the respondent (the Minister) not to grant a protection visa to the applicant. The grounds of permissible review of a decision of the Tribunal are specified in s 476 of the Act, and the primary judge dismissed the application for review, holding that “No ground of review under s 476 of the Act was established by the applicant’s submissions”.

    Background Facts

  2. The appellant, who is a citizen of Algeria, became an unlawful non-citizen when he entered Australia at Perth Airport on 27 July 1999.  Having left Algeria and entered Egypt in August or September 1998, he remained in Egypt for one week and then made his way down the African continent to South Africa.  After approximately eight months in South Africa, he obtained a false passport, travelled by bus to Zimbabwe, and there boarded an aircraft to Australia.

  3. Before the appellant left Algeria he made his living as the operator of a market stall selling, first, items described as “Islamic goods” and later

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Details
Case
[2001] FCA 48
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Brakni v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs involves an Algerian citizen, Brakni, who entered Australia unlawfully and applied for a protection visa, which was ultimately denied. The Refugee Review Tribunal (Tribunal) had affirmed a delegate's decision not to grant the visa, and Brakni sought judicial review of the Tribunal's decision under section 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). Lee J dismissed Brakni's application, finding that none of the grounds for review specified in section 476 were established. The primary issues before the court were whether the Tribunal had erred in its interpretation or application of the law, and whether it had failed to make material findings of fact in accordance with the requirements of the Act.

The court considered whether another tribunal might have reached different conclusions about the credibility of Brakni's evidence and the inferences drawn by the Tribunal. The court acknowledged that there were aspects of the Tribunal's findings that could be seen as unreasonable or tenuous, but ultimately held that the Tribunal was entitled to make the findings it did. The court emphasised the principle that it is not the role of the reviewing court to substitute its own view for that of the primary decision-maker. The court also noted that the Tribunal had access to information that was not before the court, and that the court was not in a position to assess the weight to be given to that information.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal. The court held that the Tribunal had not erred in law or failed to make material findings of fact, and that the appeal was without merit. The court's decision reinforces the principle that the scope of judicial review of decisions made by the Tribunal is limited, and that the court is not entitled to substitute its own view for that of the Tribunal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the appeal, to be taxed if not agreed.

Background

Background to the litigation

This is an appeal from the dismissal by a single judge of this court (Lee J) of an application under s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) for review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) made on 30 November 1999, which affirmed a decision of a delegate of the respondent (the Minister) not to grant a protection visa to the applicant. The grounds of permissible review of a decision of the Tribunal are specified in s 476 of the Act, and the primary judge dismissed the application for review, holding that “No ground of review under s 476 of the Act was established by the applicant’s submissions”.Background Facts The appellant, who is a citizen of Algeria, became an unlawful non-citizen when he entered Australia at Perth Airport on 27 July 1999. Having left Algeria and entered Egypt in August or September 1998, he remained in Egypt for one week and then made his way down the African continent to South Africa. After approximately eight months in South Africa, he obtained a false passport, travelled by bus to Zimbabwe, and there boarded an aircraft to Australia. Before the appellant left Algeria he made his living as the operator of a market stall selling, first, items described as “Islamic goods” and later “children’s clothes, groceries and foodstuffs”. The appellant claimed that in January 1996 he had been detained by police and tortured over an eight-day period. He stated that he had been arrested for selling the perfume “musk” to a suspected Islamic fundamentalist or terrorist. He claimed that in the period following his arrest he was under the notice of Algerian security personnel and was detained again on occasions, sometimes being arrested at his place of work in the market place and at other times at the mosque. He claimed he was suspected of anti-government activities and, therefore, may be imprisoned or killed if returned to Algeria. The appellant lodged an application for a protection visa with the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs on 29 July 1999. On 20 September 1999 a delegate of the Minister refused to grant a protection visa, and on 24 September 1999 the appellant sought review of the delegate’s decision by the Tribunal. The Tribunal conducted a review hearing on 10 November 1999 and received further written submissions from the appellant’s legal representative, Legal Aid Western Australia, on 24 November 1999. The appellant sought review of the Tribunal’s decision on the ground that the Tribunal had erred in law either by failing to interpret the applicable law correctly or by applying that law incorrectly to the facts found by the Tribunal (s 476(1)(e)). It was also contended that the Tribunal had failed to make material findings of fact and that, therefore, as the reasons provided by the Tribunal did not comply with the requirements of s 430 of the Act, the Tribunal had not observed procedures the Act required the Tribunal to follow (s 476(1)(a)).The Tribunal’s Findings

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

SPENDER, CARR, TAMBERLIN JJ
The primary judge summarised the findings of the Tribunal as follows: “The Tribunal did not consider the applicant’s evidence to be credible and enumerated a number of instances where it considered the evidence to be ‘far-fetched’.In the Tribunal’s view it was implausible that the authorities would be interested in the applicant simply because he sold musk perfume to a fundamentalist. Furthermore, the Tribunal found that the applicant had ‘adjusted’ his story over time in relation to the number of times he had been detained and arrested and as to the manner in which he had been identified following his first arrest in January 1996.The Tribunal considered that the delay of between two and four months between the applicant obtaining a passport and leaving Algeria was an indication that he was not in fear of persecution and led to the inference that the applicant had not been detained and tortured as claimed. The applicant had attributed the delay to the need to sell his car and gather together money.The Tribunal considered that the claimed ‘horrific torture and ongoing harassment’ should have impelled the applicant to enquire as to Egypt’s status as a signatory to the Convention after he entered that country, and, thereafter, to seek asylum.The Tribunal also stated that the applicant’s credibility had been undermined by his departure from South Africa, which, it said, showed a willingness to leave a situation of safety and to use false documents.With regard to the applicant’s present position as a person who has left Algeria to make an application for asylum, the Tribunal gave weight to a report on the treatment of failed asylum seekers prepared by the Federal Office of Refugees, Switzerland, dated 14 May 1998. The report stated in part:‘The majority of the others, [that is, those not considered ‘dangerous’ opponents of the regime] whose demands for asylum have been rejected are not exposed to (legitimate) police investigations on their return, except if their stay abroad was not regularised, or if they had committed notorious offences abroad or soiled publicly the image/honour of Algeria abroad’.The Tribunal did not accept that the applicant had ‘soiled the image or honour of Algeria’, or committed notorious offences, or that he was considered ‘dangerous’ by the Algerian authorities.”The Conclusions of the Primary Judge The primary judge said: “Another mind making findings of fact in place of the Tribunal may have regarded it as unreasonable to reach a number of the conclusions made by the Tribunal.”His Honour gave examples:“…it may have been thought that there was no implausibility in the applicant’s account that authorities took an interest in him as a vendor of Islamic goods, in particular musk perfume to which it was known that terrorists pursuing the cause of Islamic fundamentalism attributed life-saving properties. It was well-documented in the ‘country information’ that Algerian authorities could be brutal and irrational in repression of the threat of insurrection by Islamic fundamentalists. It would not be difficult to conclude that the relevant authorities perceived the applicant as a possible sympathiser with the terrorist cause and as a possible source of information in that regard. It would not be necessary that such a suspicion be based on reason before it would be acted upon.”Secondly:“…the applicant’s statement that he required funds to leave Algeria and spent several months organising his affairs after he obtained a passport, and before he left, may have been seen by another rational mind as raising no issue as to the credibility of the applicant.”Thirdly:“The view formed by the Tribunal that it was not credible that the applicant was a refugee if he failed to seek asylum in Egypt when he left Algeria, may have been treated by another mind as tenuous reasoning given that Egypt has had significant problems with terrorists seeking to promote the fundamentalist cause.”Fourthly:“The statement by the Tribunal that the credibility of the applicant was undermined by his willingness to leave a ‘situation of safety’ and travel on false documents may not have been regarded as a reasonable conclusion by another mind given that there was no material before the Tribunal that the applicant would not be returned to Algeria from South Africa and that it was well-known that only by false papers could many genuine refugees reach the places where applications for asylum may be made.”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: SPENDER, CARR, TAMBERLIN JJ

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